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Summary 
Re-Conceptualising Strategic Environmental Assessment: 
theoretical overview and case study from Chile 
Olivia Claudia Bina 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has a prominent position in the ongoing search for instruments that can 
help governments and other organisations to pursue the complex goal of sustainable development. Academic 
literature and practitioners have devoted increasing attention to this instrument since the late 1980s, and the mid-
1990s have witnessed a surge in legislation and methodological guidance throughout both developed and developing 
countries. However, the theoretical basis of this instrument remains weak and this thesis contends that the actual 
reason for its existence (raison d'etre) of SEA is inadequately conceptualised. 
The first stage of the research critically reviews the theory and practice of SEA, identifying tensions, weaknesses and 
promising trends in the concepts underlying its three dimensions: strategic, environmental and assessment. These 
show that the idea that there is something 'strategic', whose environmental effects should be assessed - is 
misleading, as well as Simplistic, thus supporting the call for a re-conceptualisation of SEA. The meaning of two 
common claims (that SEA is to contribute to sustainable development and to the improvement of policy-making 
processes) in academic and policy literatures is explored in detail. Combining environmental assessment literature 
with work related to the knowledge perspective of policy-making, policy learning and policy analysis, the thesis then 
develops a series of propositions for a new interpretation of SEA's raison d'etre. These relate to four themes: context, 
object, purpose and assessment. 
The second stage seeks to deepen the understanding of the trends and propositions identified, and to verify their 
relevance in a developing context. Using a range of methods, from interviews to seminars, a case study of Chile - a 
middle-income country - investigates the interpretation · of the purpose and role of SEA according to a range of 
stakeholders, and in more detail within the Ministry of Public Works. This leads to the proposition, and testing, of a 
framework that emphasises the need to interpret and operationalise SEA at the level of organisations (such as 
ministries or multi-lateral development agencies), not of economic sectors alone. It centres on the interactions of the 
context, the nature of strategic objects, the framing of 'environmental', the purpose of SEA, and the assessmenfs 
approach and tools. 
The most important conclusion is that SEA can only facilitate more environmentally sustainable forms of 
development, if conventional wisdom about its raison d'etre is questioned. This thesis rejects the rhetorical claims in 
normative interpretations of SEA which identify strategic initiatives, and particularly policies, plans or programmes, as 
the defining feature of SEA, and the main meaning of its 'strategic' dimension. It proposes that the context, and in 
particular organisations, should be the focus of a new conception of SEA which seeks to institutionalise rational and 
argumentative learning as a means to promote environmentally sustainable policy-making. These findings therefore 
contribute to both the theory and practice of SEA. 
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Chapter 1 
An Inquiry into Assessment 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a relatively new assessment instrument 
for policies and plans, which is being successfully developed and promoted throughout 
the world as yet another technique that will help governments in their pursuit of 
sustainability (Therivel and Partidario 1996; Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 1998b). Through 
this thesis I examine the question: what concepts underlie SEA and why should 
governments and organisations around the world adopt it?1 
1. 1 SEA as a Research Topic 
The origins of SEA can be found in the literature on impact assessment, and in 
normative calls for integrating environmental factors in decision-making. The approval, 
in 1969, of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United States, 
signalled the beginning of a long - and in many ways successful - career for 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), a technique that enables developers to assess 
the environmental consequences of their proposed actions (Vanclay and Bronstein 1995; 
Wathern 1988). By the end of the 1980s, a new instrument called SEA gained 
prominence. Over the last 15 years many views have been expressed on its essence and 
I Chapters 1 and 4 are written in the first person, a style considered more appropriate to explain 
how my 'social and cultural background' (Flick 2002:4) inevitably influenced the research 
questions and findings. 
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nature (EIling 1997) and new definitions are constantly being proposed (Oiiate et al. 
2002; Sheate et al. 2001; Noble 2000; Partidario and Clark 2000a). However, two 
descriptions have been commonly used since 1992: those of Therivel et al. (1992) and 
Sadler and Verheem (1996:26). For the latter, SEA is: 
Ha systematic process for evaluating the environmental consequences of 
proposed policy, plan or programme initiatives in order to ensure they are 
fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest... stage of decision-
making on a par with economic and social considerations". 
While SEA's precursor, EIA, is used to evaluate likely significant impacts of 
development projects, SEA is being applied to more strategic initiatives, such as 
proposed legislation, international treaties, policies, plans and programmes - in other 
words, to most initiatives above the individual project level, likely to have an impact on 
the environment. The 1990s witnessed an increasing interest in SEA (Clark 2000) 
reaching beyond environmental practitioners, environment ministries and other 
governmental agencies, and involving organisations responsible for a range of economic 
development sectors, such as transport and energy. The appeal of SEA draws mainly on 
its promise to ensure early consideration of environmental impacts in the definition of 
strategic initiatives (Therivel et al. 1992). Linked to this is the assumption that SEA will 
also help to a\;hieve the (often elusive) goal of sustainable development (IAIA 2002a; 
Sadler 1996b; CIark 2000; Partidario 2000). 
Increasing support, and pressure, for its widespread adoption lead to the introduction of 
requirements for SEA in regional, national and international legislation and guidance, in 
both the developed and developing world. In the international arena, the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), whose mission is to advance the innovation, 
development and dissemination of best practice in EIA throughout the world (Annex B), 
has devoted increasing attention to the development of SEA at its annual conferences, 
attracting leading scholars and experts in the field. The United Nations' Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) proposed a draft Protocol on SEA (UNECE 2003), 
and in the spring of 2001, the European Union adopted a new Directive on the 
environmental assessment of plans and programmes (EC 2001). In the developing world 
context, several multilateral development banks and donor agencies are expressing an 
interest in using this new instrument (for example, Kjorven and Lindhjem 2001; 
Annandale et al. 2001; Sadler and Dalal-Clayton 2003). 
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The new requirements and the growing interest, both in academia and amongst policy-
makers, are reflected in a burgeoning literature on SEA. As the 1990s came to an end, 
attention sh~fted from the methodological exploration of SEA and its ad hoc 
applications, to the urgent need to institutionalise, and systematically adopt, this new 
instrument, and to the resource implications. However, it is surprising, and a matter of 
concern, that despite this growing body of work, the raison d'etre2 of SEA remains a 
question with no clear answer. 3 
To date, a significant part of the literature on SEA concentrates on methods, tools and 
practice, in a - largely successful - attempt to encourage its adoption. However, many 
of the benefits typically attributed to SEA have yet to be proven. At the same time, the 
longer-term and more substantive contributions that SEA could bring to strategic 
decision-making are just beginning to receive attention. My research aims to contribute 
to this shift in focus, and to propose a new conceptualisation of the purpose and role of 
SEA. I explore the idea that the reasons for carrying out SEA have changed since the 
late 1980s and that these changes, and their implications, are not being fully recognised 
in the literature. Indeed, I share the view of Dalal-Clayton and Sadler (1998), Flynn et 
al. (1999) and Gonzalez (2001) that SEA literature has devoted insufficient attention to 
, 
the development of the instrument's theoretical foundations, and I focus particularly on 
its failure to propose a clear conceptualisation of SEA's role in policy-making and in 
promoting sustainable development. 
Throughout this thesis I turn to developments in the literatures on sustainability and 
ecological modernisation, and draw on policy analysis and particularly on those 
perspectives concerned with cognitive factors in decision-making, including policy-
oriented learning theories, to enrich the theoretical perspectives on the purpose, role -
and limitations - of SEA. 
2 I use the term raison d' etre to refer to the theoretical reasons underlying the development of 
SEA. The thesis also uses the term 'purpose' to refer to the broad, long-term reasons of an actor 
or institution for wanting to apply SEA (not necessarily publicly stated), or reasons which are 
proposed normatively in the literature. The distinction is noted here since the definition of 
purpose in The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) combines both interpretations: the 
reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists. 
3 A question that was raised repeatedly at the various conferences and seminars which I attended 
throughout this research period, and most recently (as if to confirm the validity of the central 
question in my thesis), at the last of a series of seminars organised by the Department for 
International Development and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[Annex Al. 
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1.2 The Research Agenda 
1.2.1 Finding the questions 
During seven years of professional experience as lobbyist, researcher and practitioner, I 
was consistently exposed to the application of SEA in many European countries, and 
this involvement in the field kept raising questions and exposing vague assumptions, all 
of which demanded more attention than I could afford during brief moments of 
reflection between projects. One of the many events which eventually led to the PhD 
took place in June 1999 at the Annual Conference of the International Association for 
Impact Assessment (IAIA) in Glasgow. Towards the end of what can only be described 
as a tour de force of workshops on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) I 
remember sitting, quite by chance, next to BalTY Sadler, internationally acknowledged 
expert in the field, and whispering to him the following question: 'do we know why we 
are doing SEA? '. My question encapsulated (perhaps too obscurely) a mixture of 
growing confusion and frustration, at the endless listing of benefits, tasks, objectives and 
promises attached to SEA. The panacea, it seemed. Sadler replied with a definite 'yes' 
that allowed for no further doubts, or questions. Yet, my doubts remained, and 
interestingly, four years later, in the same context (the IAIA 2003 Conference), the chair 
of the SEA sessions concluded 'we have lost our understanding of what our purpose is' 
(Fischer 2003b:n.a.), implying that recent developments may be confusing, rather than 
clarifying the issue. 
Throughout this research I will therefore address the following questions: 
1) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the evolving conceptions of SEA's 
purpose(s)? 
2) What are the a) theoretical and b) practical implications of the changing 
conceptions of SEA's purpose(s)? 
The origin of these questions respects the principle of 'openness' and suspension of 'a 
priori theoretical knowledge' (Flick 2002:41). In line with grounded theory (Chapter 4), 
I argue that theoretical assumptions were not applied to a subject, but were' 
"discovered" and formulated in dealing with the field and the empirical data found in it' 
(Flick 2002:41). 
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1.2.2 Process and structure of the thesis 
The PhD process is summarised in Figure I-a, showing that the two main research 
questions are investigated iteratively through a combination of methods (described in 
Chapter 4). . 
Figure I-a Theresearch process 
Fieldwork 
Data collection and 
interpretation 
PhD 
........ Nested samples 
Open data collection Multiple methods: 
and interpretation Relate initial thoughts 
to: Interviews 
existing SEA theory observations Theory 
Professional ex~rience wider theories seminars 
1993·2000 documentary evidence 
Critique of existing Revision of Iterative comparison theoretical coding 
Empirical data theory between samples: 
Initial insights, 
Initial propositions Re-conceptualising research questions, General SEA 
and assumptions 
Theoretical sampling SEA discourses 
and SEA examples 
choice of case study 
./ 
Organisational 
perspectives 
Initial coding 
The thesis is structured around two phases of inquiry. In the first part I critically evaluate 
the academic and policy literature in order to map the different understandings and 
conceptualisations of SEA, how they evolved and what tensions they reveal, thus 
clarifying the area of research (Chapter 2). Then, drawing on these findings and partly 
guided by empirically-based intuitions, I interrogate further the theory and sometimes 
rhetoric ' in the SEA discipline to identify both conceptual and methodological 
implications, and produce a set of propositions (Chapter 3). 
In the second part of the research (introduced in Chapter 4) I use an in-depth case study 
and a number of supporting primary sources to gain further in sights into, and provide an 
illustration of, such conceptual and methodological implications and to test the 
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propositions. In a broadly realist spirit, the detailed investigation of evolving SEA 
conceptions in Chile (Chapter 5), and in particular within the Ministry of Public Works 
(Chapters 6 and 7), allows me to embed the concept's strengths and weaknesses within a 
particular context, but also 'to illuminate processes which may be more widely 
applicable' (Bulkeley 1999:3) as discussed in the concluding Chapter. Although most 
primary data is discussed in the second part, some interviews are used to support 
arguments developed in Chapters 2 and 3.4 I now turn to Chapter 2, to explore the 
origins and evolving conceptions of SEA. 
4 These are identified through the coding system described in Annex A. 
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Chapter 2 
Evolution, Tensions and Trends 
{SEA has evolved during the last ten years) 
taking impact assessment "up-stream" in the decision-making process, to address the impacts of 
policies, plans and programmes preventively and to identify sustainable development 
opportunities' 
Eggenberger and Partidario (2000:202) 
,[aly failing to be sufficiently cognizant of the political imperatives that 
marginalize the environment and seeking to impose an external and spurious 
technical rationality on the policy process, 
SEA may itself become discredited' 
(Flynn et al. 1999:2) . 
Drawing upon the tradition of etymological analyses (Hart 1998), this Chapter addresses 
the first research question, investigating the concept of SEA, its evolution and the way it 
has been operationalised to date. It reveals numerous tensions in the body of literature 
on this instrument, showing that insufficient attention has been devoted to the 
development of the theoretical foundations of SEA, and thus providing the basis for its 
re-conceptualisation. 
The Chapter provides a summary of the history and origins of SEA (Section 2.1), and 
traces the evolution of the concept and raison d 'etre, considering how the stated purpose 
of carrying out SEA has changed since the late 1980s and identifying the main themes 
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and tensions that characterised the last decade of theory and practice (Section 2.2) . I 
Following this detailed analysis of the literature and of policy developments, it identifies 
trends and assumptions underlying current conceptions of what SEA can and should 
achieve, and' how (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). Chapter 3 goes on to explore the wider 
implications of some of these trends. 
2. 1 A short history of EIA and SEA 
The origins of SEA, as a concept and an instrument, are to be found primarily in the 
literature on project-EIA and Impact Assessment (lA)2 (Caldwell 1982; Munn 1979; 
O'Riordan and Hey 1976; Wathern 1988; Vanc1ay and Bronstein 1995). In order to 
understand the nature of SEA this Section identifies the salient characteristics of its 
predecessor, and critically analyses the reasons used to justify the pursuit of a new 
instrument. 
2.1.1 The EIA promise 
SEA, as a concept and instrument, originates from EIA, itself the outcome of debates in 
the planning arena of the 1960s when the failure of major development projects 
highlighted the need to consider potential environmental impacts in advance (Gonzalez 
2001; Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). EIA was also a response to growing environmental 
awareness and to an 'ecocentric concern which began to challenge the technocentric 
view of... development... and the ability of science and managerial ingenuity to 
intervene to create economic growth and overcome environmental problems' (PeUs 
1999b:3). Wathern (1988:6), drawing from Munn (1979), describes EIA as: 
'a process for identifying the likely consequences for the biogeophysical 
environment and for man's health and welfare of implementing particular 
. activities and for conveying this information, at a stage when it can 
materially affect their decision, to those responsible for sanctioning the 
proposals ... 
1 In Chapter 3 the concept of purpose is itself under scrutiny, and a distinction is suggested 
between the stated purpose and more tactical goals that may not be explicit. 
2 Impact assessment is the generic expression used to refer to the whole family of assessment 
processes and methods (cf. Annex B, Box B-a). 
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... having the ultimate objective of providing decision makers with an 
indication of the likely consequences of their actions '. 
EIA is frequently associated with the legal text of the US National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (NEPA). However, according to several scholars, the concept behind the 
instrument was initially developed in a planning context during the 1960s. Gonzalez 
(2001) argues that EIA was first articulated through technical and academic debates on 
such topics and in particular in the land-use planning context, where for example, an 
innovative Land Inventory was being developed in Canada, and physical planning issues 
were being debated in Australia. Indeed, Wathern (1988:3) argues that EIA required 
under NEPA has given 'a federal dimension to land-use planning which existed in only 
rudimentary form prior to 1970', while Hey (1996:9) claims that what is now called 
SEA derived from 'participatory planning concepts from the early 1970s'. 
However, as the first legislation to include a request for an assessment prior to the 
authorisation of certain human activities that could have significant impacts on the 
environment (US Congress 1969), NEPA is acknowledged as the creator of the EIA 
instrument (Wathern 1988) and as entrusting it with far-reaching responsibilities. Lynton 
Caldwell (1998; 2000!n.a.), one of the architects of NEPA, recalls that when he urged 
the US Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to include 'an action-forcing 
operational aspect' (now commonly known as the EIA requirement under Section 
102(2.c)), the intention was 'to require an assessment of the environmental effects of 
proposed government action for the purpose of implementation of the principles 
enumerated in the congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy Section 
101(b)' ofNEPA (emphasis added). This section states that: 
'(b) ... In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to 
Jhe end that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended 
consequences; 
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(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports 
diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit 
high standards of living and a wide shating of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum 
attainable recycling of depletable resources' (US Congress 1969).3 
Such purpose represents a tall order, entailing political as well as technocratic 
dimensions that were to challenge the generations of policy-makers and practitioners to 
come (Taylor 1984). As Bartlett and Kurian (1999:425) and Bartlett (1997) note, the 
effectiveness of EIA (and thus subsequently of SEA), can be measured in terms of its 
contribution to changing political institutions (interpreted as formal organisations and 
rules),4 and the worldviews5 and behaviour associated with them: '[t]he logic of NEPA 
is clearly aimed at restructuring rules and values... through the forced 
institutionalisation of ecological rationality' (Bartlett 1997:57).6 Thus, the Act links the 
purpose of EIA to the implementation of a national environmental policy; a link which is 
- more often than not - problematic, since many developed and developing countries 
do not have such policy, or have very weak - and vague - statements of intent (see for 
example, Ruthenberg 2001a; RCEP 2002).7 For all the above reasons, it is not 
surprising that EIA has not yet been institutionalised and applied in a way that allows it 
fully to meet the purpose suggested above: despite having been adopted in over 100 
countries (IAIA 2002a), its interpretation and operationalisation remain limited.8 
3 Given the wide scope of NEP A, the Act is also considered the first law that formalised Social 
lA, as '[i]t became evident that altering the environment of the natural ecosystem also altered the 
culture and social organisation of human populations' (Burdge and VancJay 1995:34). 
4 Bartlett and Kurian (1999:425) define rules after March and Olsen (1989:16): 'the routines, 
procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organisational forms, and technologies around which 
political activity is constructed. [Also] the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge 
that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those rules and routines'. 
5 Worldview is used here according to the interpretation of Harvey (1996:188) who considers it 
the fusion of one's understanding of the world and the prevailing ideology. 
6 Ecological rationality is defined by Dryzek (1987:58-9) as a fundamental type of reason 
whereby 'the preservation and promotion of the integrity of the ecological and material 
underpinning of society ... should take priority over competing forms of reason in collective 
choices with an impact upon that integrity' (see also Roling 2000). 
7 These obstacles are discussed in Chapters 5-7. 
8 For an overview see Sadler (1996 1). For more detailed regional overviews see for example, the 
following authors work on EIA's peiformance in Latin America and the Caribbean (Espinoza 
and Alzina 2001; Espinoza and Pisani 2001; Gonzalez 2001). 
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2.1.2 Making the case for SEA 
Although there is no unanimity as to when the term 'strategic environmental assessment' 
or SEA, was first used to refer to a particular instrument, scholars generally agree it was 
sometime in the 1980s.9 According to the assessment literature, SEA owes its existence 
to the increasingly evident shortcomings of ErA experience since the 1970s. This 
Section reviews some of the common explanations given to justify the need for SEA, 
based primarily on such difficulties. 
Scholars and practitioners have tended to focus on the following constraints on the 
effectiveness of EIA: the limited types of projects that are subject to ErA, the narrow 
scope of information requested for the assessment, the objectivity and thoroughness of 
EIAs, the level of public participation, the influence of the assessment results over the 
final decision, and the limited techniques and procedures for monitoring impacts (Sadler 
and Verheem 1996; Lee and Walsh 1992; Petts 1999a; Therivel et al. 1992). According 
to Th6rivel et al. (1992:20) SEA is meant as an improvement of ErA in terms of: the 
latter's tendency to react rather than anticipate development proposals, its failure to 
consider cumulative impacts, the limited scope of the alternatives and mitigation 
measures given consideration, its typically compressed timescale, which also affects the 
quality of public participation. They conclude that there were two broad reasons why 
SEA should be promoted: 
'EIA of projects is effective only in a minimal and remedial way if the 
strategic decisions that ultimately generate the projects are intrinsically 
environmentally harmfuL .. SEA would not only overcome the worst 
limitations of the existing system of project EIA, but would also be a 
proactive step towards attaining sustainability ' (Therivel et al. 1992:22-23). 
Hence, throughout the 1990s, two areas receive particular attention: firstly the so-called 
problem with 'the timing of decisions ': whereby important decisions are taken before 
the project formulation stage, through policies, plans and programmes (PPPs) that are 
not themselves subject to an environmental assessment (EA) (Partidario 2000:649) .10 
This, it is claimed, undermines attempts to consider more strategic alternatives. 
9 Fischer (2002a) claims that the term dates back to 1989, while Gonzalez (2001) suggests 1984 
or 1985. 
IQ EA is used in this thesis to refer to the wide 'family' of instruments and techniques which 
assess the environmental effects of development activities and strategies, including ErA and 
SEA. 
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Secondly, there is growing awareness of the need to address cumulative and indirect 
impacts from a combination of projects within a geographical unit, which are not being 
considered in standard EIAs (Canter 1999; Hyder Consulting 1999; TheriveI1993).11 
However, since - at least in theory - both areas are within the remit of the original 
EIA concept (Wathern 1988; Wood 1988; Wallington 2002), at first glance these 
reasons do not seem sufficient to justify a new instrument (let alone a new concept). As 
Sheate (2001:iv) points out, 'SEA has existed in principle (in NEPA) for more than 30 
years'. NEPA's reference to 'Major Federal Actions' does not distinguish between 
projects and more strategic initiatives, and Federal Regulations interpret the term to 
mean policies, plans and programmes (Gonzalez 2001), including proposals for 
legislation and other major federal actions (Therivel 1993).12 Hence, the concept of EIA 
is intended to be applicable indistinctly from projects to policies, from the least to the 
most strategic type of development initiative. Accordingly, a decade after NEPA, Lee 
and Wood (1978) suggest a tiered system of EIA applied to a chronological sequence of 
category of activities, from policies to projects. This wide scope of EIA is reconfirmed 
by Wathern (1988:3) arguing that EIA is a 'procedure for assessing the environmental 
implications of a decision to enact legislation, to implement policies and plans, or to 
initiate development projects', hence, '[t]he EIA process ... is equally applicable at other 
levels of planning' (1988:19). Finally, the debate on the introduction of an EA 
instrument in Europe, includes reference to plans and programmes (Hey 1996; Wood 
1988), as well as projects, (though not to policies (Gonzalez 2001)). 
11 Cumulative impacts are defined as: 'the impact on the environment which results from the 
incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions regardless of what agency... or person undertakes such other action' (CEQ 
1997).This definition was produced by the US Council on Environmental Quality's regulations 
(40 CFR §§ 1500-1508) implementing the procedural provisions of the NEPA of 1969, as 
amended (42 USC §§ 4321 et seq.). 
12 This thesis uses the expression 'strategic initiative' to refer to the combination of policies, 
plans and programmes subject to SEA, and uses the term 'policy-process' to refer to all activities 
that lead to the formulation of such initiative, including: planning, decision-making and 
assessment. It therefore rejects the tight separation between assessment and planning/decision-
making often implicitly supported in impact assessment literature, and contradicted in that on 
planning. For example, The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 2002:75) 
defines the planning process 'and in particular its environmental component' as 'a repeated 
sequence of steps: setting a long-term vision, describing the present state of the environment, 
estimating the impacts of scenarios for action, deciding on courses of action, and monitoring the 
impacts of the decisions'. 
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Nonetheless, there is a substantial gap between theory and practice. In Europe, despite 
starting off according to the approach pioneered by NEPA, the EIA Directive 
(85/337IEC) is eventually approved in 1985 with a scope confined to two lists of project 
types (Annex I a'nd II). The inadequacy of this narrow remit becomes evident soon after 
the Directive's approval, and is one of the principal reasons for seeking new legislation 
that would assess PPPs for their effects on the environment (EC 1999). After many 
iterations and modifications, and having lost a 'P' (for policies) on the way, a new 
Directive is approved by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in 2001 
(Directive 2001l42/EC). As with the earlier EIA Directive, it has taken over ten years to 
reach a consensus on the final text (EC 2001). The outcome is a Directive that retains a 
strong similarity with the 1985 Directive on EIA (see for example Sadler 2001a). 
Similar problems are being faced in other parts of the world. Having legislated for EIA 
in the 1980s and 1990s, many countries have applied EIA in a narrow, often 
bureaucratic, sense, falling short of the more radical purpose underlying the original 
concept of NEP A. 13 
Similar arguments apply to the second major theme used to justify the need for SEA: the 
assessment of cumulative impacts. PeUs (1999c:53) explains that EIA (as well as most 
other tools for environmental management) has 'the potential, albeit in practice poorly 
exercised, to address cumulative impacts'. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that 
to improve the consideration of these impacts there is a need to develop a new 
instrument. The reasons why this is a 'poorly exercised' task, have less to do with 
techniques (if anything) and more to do with the way EIA has been interpreted. 
Crucially, the causes underlying the inadequate interpretation and application of EIA 
have received less attention in the literature. One contribution comes from Caldwell 
(2000:n.a.) who argues that environmental assessment was, and still is, 'an innovative 
aspect of public policy formation', and as such, is confronted with inevitable 
'bureaucratic and political incomprehension and resentment'. He stresses that: 
'NEPA's purpose was never the writing of impact statements, but to provide 
an analysis and an inducement to ecological rationality. To use EIA as it was 
intended requires leadership committed to the objectives and subjecting 
budgets, strategies, programs and plans to that end... [I]t requires a 
13 The example of Chile is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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broadened perspective, including additional scientific, technical and quality 
of life considerations ' (emphasis added). 
In practice however, the challenge is avoided by regarding 'impact assessment as an 
informational technique, the findings of which need no more than [a] review by the 
relevant agency' (Caldwell 2000:n.a); or, in the words of Wolf (2003: 1), by considering 
it a 'purely regulatory approach'. Both 'solutions' are contrary to the intentions of the 
architects of NEPA who intend the assessment (not necessarily a statement) to force the 
implementation of the principles in the NEPA Declaration (above). Impact assessment 
had become itself the purpose of EIA. The view is supported by Bartlett and Kurian 
(1999:417) who note that the most common model of EIA remains the 'information 
processing model' according to which the instrument is essentially regarded as 
addressing information problems, and its political nature, 'when recognised, is decried' 
(see also: McDonald and Brown 1995). This is partly explained by the fact that EIA, and 
early SEA practice, drew heavily from ecological and resource management disciplines 
(Sheate 2001), and less - if at all - from political science and decision-making theory 
(Chapter 3). 
2.1.3 Returning to greater expectations 
Apart from wanting to address perceived EIA shortcomings, many agree that another 
reason for promoting SEA was that it would ' "trickl[e] down" the objective of 
sustainability' (Therivel et at. 1992:20). Indeed, a renewed emphasis on the need to take 
environmental factors into account in decision-making in the 1980s (see, for example, 
IUCN - International Union for Conservation of Nature 1980; WCED 1987; UNCED 
1992a), contributes to giving SEA unprecedented prominence. The pursuit of 
integration, sustainable development, and biodiversity conservation leads many scholars, 
policy-makers and practitioners to turn to SEA for help. The link to each concept (in 
turn) is discussed in order to understand its implications for the purpose and nature of 
SEA. 
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Integration 
The 1980s witness a new wave of enthusiasm for the integration of environmental 
concerns in development and planning, which strengthens the pressure to introduce 
SEA. Noble and Storey (2001) mention mCN's World Conservation Strategy (mCN 
1980) as the earliest influential document promoting such integration. This is followed 
by calls for the early consideration of environmental issues in public sector policy 
making in a range of institutions: in 1987 the Bruntland Report (WCED 1987), calls for 
a clear move away from the idea of the environment as a separate sphere of policy; in 
the same year, the World Bank's Development Committee states that 'environmental 
issues must be addressed as part of the overall economic policy rather than project-by-
project' (World Bank in Noble 2002 4); the early 1990s witness agreement on the 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (UNECE 
1991) calling explicitly for an extension of the principles of EIA to PPPs, and the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. Chapters 8 and 10 (amongst others) of Agenda 21 advocate a number of 
improvements in decision-making, information for decision-makers, and assessment and 
planning tools (Box 2-a), and place the integration theme at the centre of the SEA debate 
in 1990s. 
Box 2-a The integration theme in Agenda 21 
Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. 
Chapter 8 (Integrating environment and development in decision-making) argues that 1t]he primary need is to 
integrate environmental and developmental decision-making processes'and 1ensure] the integration of economic, 
social and environmental considerations in decision-making at all levels and in all ministries' and 'support a more 
integrated approach to decision-making, the data systems and analytical methods used to support such decision-
making processes may need to be improved' (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Chapter 10 (Integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources) urges that: 
Governments ... should promote the improvement, further development and widespread application of planning and 
management tools that facilitate an integrated and sustainable approach to land and resources. To do this, they 
should: 
Adopt improved systems for the interpretation and integrated analysis of data on land use and land resources; 
Systematically apply techniques and procedures for assessing the environmental, social and economic impacts, risks, 
costs and benefits of specific actions' (emphasis added). 
(Details of the text can be found on the web: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21chapter8.htm) 
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Sustainable development and the nature of environmental problems 
In the European context, 1992 is a crucial year for SEA. The United Nations' Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE 1992) calls for environmental assessment of PPPs as a 
means of anticipating and highlighting potential environmental problems, preventing 
delays and assisting in long-term planning, as well as preventing or reducing litigation 
cases . It recommends that the results of such EA be considered on a par with social and 
economic factors in the development of PPPs. This final condition resonates with the 
earlier plea in Our Common Future (WCED 1987:313), whereby the ability to choose 
policy paths that are sustainable 'requires that the ecological dimensions of policy be 
considered at the same time as the economic, trade, energy, agricultural, industrial and 
other dimensions on the same agendas and in the same national and international 
institutions ' . 
As Petts (1999b:7) notes, SEA emerges 'in response to the challenges of sustainable 
development'. In 1992, the EC publishes its Fifth Action Programme on the 
Environment, making a strong claim for the pursuit of sustainable development and a 
first clear reference to the need for assessment of the environmental implications of 
Community policies and legislation. It calls upon Member States to 'undertake similar 
integration by applying environmental impact assessments on their own plans and 
programmes' (EC 1992:76). This is in line with the broad directives of Agenda 21. 
A further set of factors that intensifies demands for SEA around the world, are 
highlighted by Sadler (1999: 13): '[t]he environmental risks and impacts that command 
our attention today are far more complex, and large-scale and have extended spatial 
linkages compared with the concerns of 30 years ago when the EIA process was first 
established'. They include, for example, global trends such as climate change and 
biodiversity loss, and urban intensification and related environmental capacity issues 
which challenge our basic concepts of environmental management (see, for example: 
Weale 1992; Litfin 1994; Lipschutz 1996; Bulkeley 1997; Harremoes et al. 2001; 
Cannibal and Winnard 2001). In fact, the perceived shortcomings of EIA, and the 
interest in cumulative impact assessment are directly linked to the increasing scale of 
environmental risks and impacts that accentuate the interconnectedness and complexity 
of the relationship between nature and society (Beck 1992; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; 
Fischer and Hajer 1999). 
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Biodiversity and cumulative impacts 
The growing importance of the biodiversity theme is a particular case in point. Article 
14 ('Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts ') of the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (UNCED 1992b) calls for each party to introduce EIA procedures 
and 'appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its 
programmes andpolicies that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological 
diversity are duly taken into account'. In Europe, this is paralleled by the approval of the 
so-called 'Habitats' Directive (92143IEEC, Article 6) requesting that 'appropriate steps' 
be taken to protect all nature conservation sites, including an assessment of 'any plans or 
projects' which, individually or in combination with others, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the conservation value of the site (EC 1992). Since it refers 
explicitly to 'plans', this article is interpreted as an effective call for SEA (Hey 1996), 
especially by government agencies such as the Countryside Commission in the UK, and 
by non-governmental organisations (NOOs) keen to develop mechanisms that would 
strengthen site protection (for example: Wilkinson et al. 1994; Bina et al. 1996). 
Concepts of carrying capacity, the precautionary principle and strategic planning are 
related to nature conservation, and SEA is seen as a means to promote them: 
'[a] more strategic system of planning, including the use of SEA, could assist 
in identifying suitable locations for development, or areas where there should 
be a presumption against further development. .. An SEA framework would 
allow the principle of sustainability to be carried down from policies to 
individual projects' (Therivel and Thompson 1995: 13). 
EIA has largely failed to assess cumulative impacts and SEA is seen as the mechanism 
that would solve this problem. Attention to such impacts is accompanied, possibly even 
influenced, by the increasing interest in biodiversity issues reflected in the UN 
Convention on Biodiversity and in the European 'Habitats' Directive. In fact, Treweek 
(1999:23) argues that: 
'[m]uch of the pressure to legislate for SEA has come from ecologists and 
conservationists concerned about progressive and chronic damage to the 
"natural heritage" due to cumulative effects. Cumulative impacts expressed 
at a regional, national or international scale can only be controlled by 
planning or managing development at that scale '. 
Cumulative impacts/effects assessment (CEA) is also linked to the sustainable 
development theme. Piper (2002:20) argues that 'the management of cumulative effects 
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is the way (or one way) in which [sustainable development] may be achieved', although 
he recognises that this will only result if the 'management of cumulative effects [is] 
framed and designed in such a way as to achieve sustainable development' (emphasis 
added). 
2.1.4 Initial conClusions 
On the basis of existing literature, the conceptual differentiation between EIA and SEA 
is actually less than would be suggested by the enthusiasm with which the latter has 
been embraced. 14 Originally, ErA (which was aimed at all levels of activities, not just 
projects) had the far-reaching purpose of changing political institutions so as to take full 
account of the environmental dimension of development: an objective that is essentially 
the same as the one subsequently atttibuted to SEA. Even the idea that SEA would 
conttibute to sustainable development can be seen as a return, rather than a departure, 
from the basic tenets underlying EIA. Indeed, according to Partidario (1996:32), despite 
'considerable work' in this area it has not been possible to reach consensus on 'an 
accepted concept of SEA '. 
The theoretical weakness and the minimalist interpretation of the purpose of EIA in 
most applications have, however, undermined the instrument's capacity to demonstrate 
the full extent of its potential. In this Chapter it is argued that most scholars and 
practitioners wanting to promote SEA invoke shortcomings in the way EIA has been 
interpreted and operationalised, rather than flaws in the EIA concept itself, and conceive 
of SEA as a way to redress them. Hence, it can be claimed that the first attempts to 
promote SEA represent ptimatily a technical rather than a conceptual contribution, and 
one that addresses the symptoms - rather than the causes - of a deeper malaise. These 
causes are essentially political and policy-related: a lack of political commitment to, and 
CfJ."""'~ 
capacity for, environmental integration and sustainable development, anCJ(for strategic 
planning (Caldwell 2000; Bartlett and Kurian 1999; discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
The distinction between technical and conceptual dimensions of SEA is the focus of the 
next Section. 
14 For an overview of common distinguishing factors see: Audoin and Lochner 2000; ERM 1998; 
Therivel et al. 1992. 
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2.2 Evolution and Tensions 
Although SEA has been explored in the literature and practice for more than a decade, 
both scholars and practitioners are split: some argue that too little has been done to 
develop SEA theory and concepts, others see the major gap in terms of methodological 
clarity and consistency. These are a few examples: 
'SEA has been considered much more from a theoretical than a practical 
perspective, SEA methodologies are neither well-developed nor commonly 
agreed upon' (fh6tivelI993: 164; see also Noble 2002 and Fischer 2002a). 
'SEA is a... theme in need of reflection, since there has been much 
development of procedures and methodologies, but significantly less 
conceptual development' (GonzaIez 2001:5). 
'[F]Q!" more than most subjects, SEA theory could do with a prolonged spell 
of general re-thinking' (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 1998b). 
This division between authors represents one of the most significant tensions in the 
discipline. The main arguments are explored in the following sections, starting with a 
review of SEA definitions and stated purposes aimed at identifying changes or additions 
to the earlier EIA concept (Section 2.2.1), and concluding with an exploration of the 
practice of SEA with particular emphasis on the contested issue of methodological 
diversity (Section 2.2.2). 
2.2.1 Evolving conceptions of SEA 
The following analysis focuses on literature published from 1992 onwards, since that 
year witnessed growing attention to SEA in Europe and elsewhere, leading to more 
formalised conceptions of the purpose of SEA, while the rest of the decade witnessed 
the compilation of the first overviews of past experience, providing insight into the 
practice of SEA. 15 
15 An important early contribution can be found in Sadler 1996, followed by Sadler and Verheem 
1996; Therivel and Partidario 1996. The debate initiated at various IAIA conferences (in 
particular those of 1997, 1998 and 1999) has led to a series of papers on the theory and practice 
of SEA published in a special issue of Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, September 
2000. Drawing on the results of the 1997 Conference, Partidario and Clark (2000a) produced an 
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SEA definitions by some leading scholars and practitioners 
Four definitions; where leading authors have offered their views of the purpose and/or 
role of SEA, will serve to illustrate significant stages in the evolution of SEA, beginning 
with that of Th6rivel et al. (1992: 19-20), which is among the most widely cited: 
'SEA can be defined as the formalized, systematic and comprehensive 
process of evaluating the environmental impacts of a policy, plan or 
programme and its alternatives, including the preparation of a written report 
of the findings of that evaluation, and using the findings in publicly 
accountable decision-making' (emphasis added). 
This definition bears a striking resemblance to that of EIA, supporting the argument 
made in Section 2.1. The purpose of the new instrument is essentially the same: to assess 
'environmental impacts '. The only notable difference lies in the explicit reference to 
PPPs and to the need to consider alternatives: two aspects that have been mostly 
neglected since NEPA came into being. Th6rivel et al. (1992:35) argue that SEA can 
improve 'on the existing case-by-case reactive system of project EIA, helping to put 
principles of sustainability into operation, giving an opportunity for public involvement 
in policy formulation, and ensuring systematic appraisal of choices '. They view the 
nature of SEA ~ like that of EIA - as predictive, representing a step forward from the 
reactive response to environmental problems, which has penalised EIA's effectiveness. 
Another frequently cited definition of SEA comes from Sadler and Verheem (1996:26, 
also in Chapter 1): 
'a systematic process for evaluating the environmental consequences of 
proposed policy, plan or programme initiatives in order to ensure they are 
fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest... stage of decision-
making on a par with economic and social considerations ' (emphasis 
added). 
Although related to that of Th6rivel et al., this definition stresses the importance of an 
early consideration of environmental consequences in decision-making, and relates these 
to the other dimensions of sustainable development: 'social and economic 
considerations' . Sadler (Sadler 2001) argues that the 1996 definition seals the link 
analysis of international experience. Most recently, research funded by the European 
Commission, Environment Directorate, reviewed SEA practices and their contribution to 
environmental integration in Europe and beyond (Sheate et al. 2001). 
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between this new mechanism and the 'chief institutional challenge of the 1990s' 
presented in Our Common Future, discussed above. 
Two more definitions are important to understand the evolution of SEA. That of 
Partidario and Clark (2000b:4) : 
'a systematic, on-going process for evaluating, at the earliest appropliate 
stage of publicly accountable decision-making, the environmental quality, 
and consequences, of altemative visions and development intentions 
incorporated in policy, planning, or program initiatives, ensuring full 
integration of relevant biophysical, economic, social and political 
considerations' (emphasis added); 
and that of Brown and Therivel (2000:184), who stress the importance of agreement 
over the 'concept' and 'utility' of SEA: 
'SEA aims to provide a process by which the policy is developed based on a 
much broader set of perspectives, objectives and constraints than just those 
initially identified by the proponent [ . .. ] Our conceptual definition of SEA is 
thus a process directed at providing the proponent (during policy 
formulation) and the decision-maker (at the point of policy approval) with a 
holistic understanding of the environmental and social implications of the 
policy proposal, expanding the focus well beyond the issues that were the 
original driving force for the new policy [ ... ] The intention of SEA is 
moving policy (and PPP generally) towards sustainable outcomes'(emphasis 
added). 16 
Partidario and Clark (2000a) stress the need for a wide interpretation of 'alternatives ': 
visions, development intentions, perspectives. While supporting the traditional role of 
SEA as an evaluator of environmental consequences, they also advocate broad 
integration of biophysical, economic, social and political considerations. The reference 
to 'political considerations' recognises, for the first time explicitly, the political 
dimension that SEA (and ultimately all instruments) is confronted with, and which has 
been visibly absent in most EIA practice (see above, also: Elling 1997; Caldwell 1998; 
Bartlett and Kurian 1999; Owens and Cowell 2002). Brown and Therivel, on the other 
hand, include as the main role of SEA the holistic understanding of environmental and 
social implications, and refer explicitly to the goal of sustainable outcomes. Together, 
these definitions indicate a broadening and deepening of SEA 's scope, envisioning a 
more proactive role. Both distance themselves from the traditional view of assessing 
16 PPP stands for policies, plans and programmes. 
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draft proposals, and highlight numerous stages in planning and decision-making as the 
focus of the assessment effort. 
An overview of SEA conceptualisations (1992-2003) 
The main developments exemplified in the four definitions of SEA (above) are 
confirmed in an overview of conceptions of SEA, drawn from leading scholars in the 
field, and listed in chronological order in Table 2-a. 
Table 2-a The aim and role of SEA over the period 1992-2003 
How some of the leading scholars in SEA have defined its aim and role over the past 
10 years. SEA is about: 
Evaluating environmental impacts of PPPs and their alternatives; 
Applying the principles of EA to the various scenarios to assess the relative environmental 
impacts of each scenario. Eventually, the mix of options which can meet objectives in an 
'environmentally-sustainable way' is selected. 
Carrying out an 'environmental impact assessment of certain types of plans and 
programmes'. Often, environmental effects will be described in qualitative terms only. 
Subjecting policies, programs and similar actions by federal agencies I ... ] to environmental 
impact assessment' 
Enabling the true environmental costs'to be quantified and taken into account as PPPs are 
drawn up. Identifying policies that might have considerable adverse environmental impacts' 
An instrument with considerable potential I .. . ] for the integration of socio-economic 
development and the bio-physical environment at the regional scale'. In addition, 'SEA can 
be seen as providing a potentially effective vehicle for promoting sustainable development' 
Enhancing the integration of environmental concerns in policy and planning processes, 
thereby helping to implement sustainable development; 
Evaluating the environmental impacts of policies, plans and programmes. Consideration is 
being given to the potential of SEA 'as a tool for urban sustainability'. 
Integrating environmental and sustainability factors into the mainstream of development 
policy making as called for by the Brundtland Commission and Agenda 21; 
Evaluating the environmental consequences of proposed policy, plan or programme 
initiatives; 
Assessing the environmental impacts of strategic action; 
Providing explicit recognition of the environment in decision-making; 
Assessing cumulative impacts (amongst other); 
Addressing,lhe 1mpacts of PPPs preventively'; 
Identifying sustainable development opportunities; 
Environmental quality and environmental consequences; SEA is to be conceptualised as a 
framework ... incrementally integrated into policy and planning procedures and practices; 
Early consideration of the environment; 
Enhancing the attention and weight being given to environmental concerns in decision-
making; 
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Source 
Therivel et al. 1992 
Sheate 1992:172 
Verheem 1992:150 and 
153 
Webb and Sigal 
1992:137 
Pinfield 1992:157 and 
163 
Glasson, J. 1995:715-6 
Therivel and Partidario 
1996:4 
Shepherd and Ortolano 
1996:321-2 
Sadler 1996:sect.6.2 
Sadler and Verheem 
1996 
SDG 1996 
Van der Vorst 1999:6 
Treweek 1999:23 
Eggenberger and 
Partidario 2000:202 
Eggenberger and 
Partidario 2000 
Partidario 2000:647 
Clark 2000 
Thissen 2000a: 114 
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How some of the leading scholars in SEA have defined its aim and role over the past 
10 years. SEA is about: 
Holistic understanding of environmental and social implications of the policy proposal; holistic 
sustainability analysis; 
'fhe intention of SEA is moving policy (and PPP generally) towards sustainable outcomes '; 
Decision-making tool for supporting sustainable development; 
[flhe underlying objective of SEA is to determine the option(s) that provide the most 
benefit/least damage 10 the environment (biophysical, social, economic) for a given PPP '; 
Identify strategic alternatives, evaluate them against assessment criteria, and determine the 
preferred strategic action; 
'at the more fluid policy level ... more emphasis is placed on processes rather than 
methodologies, and changing attitudes rather than focusing on the quantification of impact 
significance' 
The main aims of SEA are: 'fo include the aim of sustainable development in the processes 
of strategic decision (this implies integrating the environmental aims with those if an 
economic and social nature). To improve the assessment of the indirect, cumulative, 
synergic environmental impacts of plans and programmes'; 
'fhe purpose of SEA ... is to inform strategic decision-making in support of environmentally 
sound and sustainable development'; 
SEA has become recognised as a supporting tool for decision making towards achieving 
sustainable development'; 
1mpact assessment [family of tools which includes SEA) is a process and assessment tool, 
which promotes sustainable development', and SEA is a pro-active instrument for 
integrating environmental considerations into spatial and sectoral policy, plan and 
programme formulation for sustainable development'; 
lA) tool for forward planning '; 
The aim is to improve the quality of decisions. 
Source 
Brown and Th9rivel 
2000:184 
Brown and Therivel 
2000:184 
Fischer et al. 2001 
Noble and Storey 
2001 :490 
Noble and Storey 
2001:490 
Sheate et al. 2001 :79 
Queralt et al. 2001 :11 
Sadler 2001a:13 
Noble 2002:4 
IAIA 2002a:2 and 4 
OEeD and UNDP 
2002:150 
Blanco forthcoming. 
The overview shows that the term 'impact' is increasingly out of favour among SEA 
scholars, giving way to words such as 'effects " 'consequences " and also 
'considerations', 'concerns' and 'recognition'. This can be interpreted as an attempt to 
distance SEA from narrow EIA practice. Similarly, the majority of definitions do not use 
the terms 'assessment ' or 'evaluation'. Instead, their authors advocate a different and 
wider concept, with a more proactive remit for SEA: the 'integration of environmental 
concerns' or 'factors '; the 'consideration " 'enhanced attention to' or 'recognition of' the 
environment in decision-making; and the identification of 'opportunities'. SEA is 
referred tb as a 'decision-making tool', a mechanism to 'improve the quality' of 
decisions, and as a process to 'define PPPs'. Although some of these expressions may 
imply the same traditional concept of assessment (for example, predicting and 
evaluating impacts) amounting to a somewhat superficial attempt to distance SEA from 
EIA, it is argued that in many cases the literature shows a tendency to expand the area of 
influence of SEA over decision-making, and in some cases (such as: 'identifying 
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opportunities', 'identify strategic alternatives' and SEA as 'a decision-making tool' or 'a 
tool for forward planning'), the boundaries between assessment and planning become 
blurred. Here assessment is envisaged as a process fully integrated with planning and 
decision-making (this is discussed further in Chapter 6). 
Table 2-a also confirms that the linkage between SEA and sustainable development is 
being progressively strengthened. Partidario (2000:651) highlights the importance of this 
trend: 'the practitioners of SEA have recognised that environmental assessment must 
understand and integrate sustainable development principles and not focus entirely on 
physical and ecological issues'. In her earlier review of practice (1996:35) she found that 
most countries related 'the role of SEA to sustainability goals, such that SEA may assist 
the decision-making process in improving the design of more sustainable policy 
strategies '. Brown and Therivel (2000: 184) argue that '[t]he intention of SEA is moving 
policy (and PPP generally) towards sustainable outcomes'. 
However, support for this connection is also a source of concerns. In the previous 
Section (2.1.3) it was argued that the SEA-sustainability link represents a reinforcement 
of the original purpose of environmental assessment. The failure of most EIA practice to 
live up to such a purpose symbolizes a warning for SEA. Appeals to sustainable 
development have major implications for the understanding of SEA's role, and how it 
should relate to decision-making processes (see, for example, the discussion about 
sustainability and integration in Eggenberger and Partidario 2000): far from being a 
simple matter of extending the list of indicators to include a few 'sustainability' ones, it 
is likely to involve a wider and more complex interaction with the policy-process. I? 
The emphasis on an assessment's purpose has other important implications. It clarifies 
the sometimes vague distinction between tool and process. Petts (1999c:53) raises the 
issue of the difference between EIA and SEA on the one hand, and Technology 
Assessment, Life-Cycle Analysis, Risk Assessment, Environmental Auditing and Cost-
Benefit Analysis on the other, arguing that only the first two 'meet the definition of a 
process', while the others are simply 'tools' (cf. Clark 2000). The difference is 
expressed thus in the Oxford Dictionary of English (1998): 'tooL.. a device or 
implement. .. used to carry out a particular function' and 'process ... a series of actions 
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or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end'. 18 Indeed, the various definitions 
analysed above all refer to SEA as a process, indicating sustainable development as the 
'end ' . 19 The implication is that SEA is unlikely to be a neutral tool since, as Wallington 
(2002:3) stresses: 'SEA is by nature a form of purposive inquiry' (emphasis in original), 
(see also:K\!lrn\!lV and Thissen 2000; In 't Veld 2000). The following admonishment by 
Owens and Cowell (2002: 166), although related to planning, could equally apply to 
SEA: 
'planning never has been and never could be neutral ... if [it] is to concern 
itself with the normative claims of sustainable development, it cannot avoid 
adopting positions in relation to different moral claims'. 
This issue will be explored further in the coming chapters (in particular Chapter 5) . 
Having investigated SEA conceptualisations, the next Section reflects on how these 
were made operational through processes and methods. 
2.2.2 Interpreting diversity in SEA practice 
There is no single universally applicable EIA methodology' 
(Ortolano and Shepherd 1995:6-7) 
There is no standard or universal methodology for SEA. 
Processes vary considerably, but some basic principles 
for the steps in SEA can be identified' 
(OEeD and UNDP 2002:150) 
The opening paragraph of Section 2.2 refers to the contention of some scholars that little 
has been done to develop SEA methodologies (Therivel 1993; Noble 2002; Fischer 
17 There is' also the risk that the sustainability imperative results in a dilution of environmental 
protection, this is discussed in Section 3.2. 
18 Process is defined by Petts as 'a way of using and integrating different tools with stakeholder 
expectations and concerns and other decision parameters to meet one or more of the requirements 
for a decision' (l999c:35). 
19 Although Sheate (2001 :ix) uses this terminology differently, he suggests a similar conclusions: 
'[i]ncreasingly, sustainable development provides not just a purpose, but the underlying 
philosophy to SEA .. . so that [this] tool and technique operates much more as approach '. In this 
thesis, the term instrument is used generically to indicate both process and technique elements of 
SEA. This is done to avoid confusion with reference to policy processes. 
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2002a). However, a review of academic and policy literature throws this claim into 
question. A significant effort has been devoted to the practical side of SEA. Apart from 
a growing number of reviews and analyses of examples of SEA throughout the world 
(Sheate et al. 2001; Bina 2001a; Bina and Vingoe 2000a; ECMT 2000; Partidario and 
Clark 2000a; Bina et al. 1999; EC 1997b; EC 1997c; Th6rivel and Partidario 1996; Lee 
and Hughes 1995a; Wood 1995; Th6rivel et al. 1992; Bina and Vingoe 2000), there has 
been increasing effort in the field of research. The European Commission's Research 
Framework Programmes are just one such example. 20 In terms of international and 
governmental guidance and proposed methods, there is also a large range of sources. 
The Dutch Government and AIDEnvironment designed and applied Strategic 
Environmental Analysis (SEAN), (Kessler 2003; Kessler and Van Dorp 1998), in 
several developing countries, including Benin, Honduras and Nicaragua. Brown (2000) 
shows how, for example, the Environmental Overviews tool developed by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 21 could be used to introduce SEA in 
developing countries. The European Commission has produced a number of manuals for 
the application of SEA to regional development plans and transport initiatives (DHV 
1999; Steenmans et al. 1999; ERM 1998). At national level, many public institutions 
have produced guidance for the application of SEA. This has been mainly in the 
developed world,22 though a widely praised contribution (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 
"-
1998b) comes from South Africa (Audouin and Lochner 2000) and a manual for SEAs 
of regional development plans is being prepared by the Czech Ministry of Environment 
(Duslk and Roseck 2002). 
20 See, for example, ECMT (2000) for an overview of research targeted and related to SEA 
methods and tools (including traffic modelling for example) over the period 1987-2004 
(planned), specifically for the transport sector. See also http://www.taugroup.comlanseaJ for an 
overview of the Analytical Strategic Environmental Assessment (AN SEA) project, financed 
under the 5th Framework Research Programme of the European Union. The project aims to 
provide an enhanced theoretical and methodological background for Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) and to provide a framework for assisting in the implementation of European 
and national dire'ctives and procedural requirements in this area. 
21 Brown (2000: 131) defines Environmental Overviews as 'a particular form of SEA that was 
developed to appraise the environmental consequences of programmes internally within the 
UNDP .... [it] utilises a small group approach where its participants examine the proposal and its 
context, scope the potential social and environmental consequences and opportunities associated 
with the proposal, and propose how it can be modified to reduce unwanted consequences and to 
enhance the opportunities'. 
22 It is impossible to provide an overview of this here, however, just considering the contribution 
of the British Government, see: DTI 2000; DETR 2000; DETR 1998; EFTEC 1998; DOE 1993; 
DOE 1991. 
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Why then is there a persistent demand for more methodological development and 
guidance? The following analysis explores the possibility that part of the reason is not 
the paucity of methods, but rather the confusion derived from diversity of tools and 
processes being adopted around the world. As mentioned above, interest in SEA has 
grown rapidly in the 1990s, and this has resulted in a new wave of legislation around the 
turn of the century. Thus, many countries and organisations are now faced with the need 
to operationalise this instrument and are searching for good practice examples, for a set 
of basic principles and a methodological framework, only to discover that there is no 
single answer. The apparent cohesiveness of the ErA discipline is not likely to be 
repeated in the case of SEA. Policy-makers, legislators and practitioners are confronted 
by bewildering diversity (see for example: Lee and Hughes 1995a; OECD and UNDP 
2002; Kjorven and Lindhjem 2001; CONAMA Undated-j).23 Moreover, most of the 
contributions mentioned above were aimed at promoting and testing SEA in particular 
development sectors or for specific types of initiatives (plans, policies, mUltiple projects 
etc.). The challenge is now to introduce SEA within governments and organisations, 
thus shifting the emphasis away from tools and methods, to processes and procedures,24 
which imply clarity of purpose as much as of techniques, and greater focus on context-
specificity (discussed further in Chapter 3). 
Previous sections have shown that SEA has been given a variety of purposes and roles. 
The next paragraphs explore how such diversity, and the relationship between 
methodologies and the varied nature of what they are meant to assess (PPPs), are 
reflected in SEA practice (as documented in the academic and policy literature). They 
seek to understand the causes of such disparate SEA approaches and questions the 
widely held view that diversity in practice is a problem or indeed a weakness.25 
23 This sense of confusion is supported by the author's own experience as a practitioner working 
with governments, and as a participant during the past three Annual Meetings of the International 
Association on 1mpact Assessment where SEA was extensively debated. 
24 The literature will often use these terms interchangeably. However, process refers to a generic 
series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end, while procedure implies a 
certain binding nature in the way of doing something, as it refers to 'an established or official 
way' (The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998). For simplicity, this thesis uses the term 
'process' to refer to both, and uses 'procedure' when raising a point about actions with binding 
nature. 
25 I h' n t IS thesis the term 'approach' is used interchangeably with that of 'process' to refer to 'a 
series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end' (Oxford Dictionary 1998), as 
explained in Section 2.2.2. 
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Is diversity a problem? 
In the 1980s and early 1990s the majority of SEA examples were coming from the USA, 
Canada and parts of Europe (Wood 1995; Wilkinson et al. 1994; Therivel1993; UNECE 
1992; Therivel et al. 1992) and, according to Fischer (2002a:87), in the late 1980s SEA 
'referred to the application of project-based environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
principles '. Indeed, Therivel's (1993 : 165) overview of SEA systems up to 1993 finds 
that, with the exception of the Dutch system for policy level assessments, 'all other 
systems are a straightforward expansion of project EIA' to higher levels. She then 
argues that none of the countries reviewed 'would claim that this incremental expansion 
of EIA would itself lead to sustainability'. A case in point is the relatively more 
advanced (in quantity, if not in substance) experience in the USA, during the early days 
of SEA-type initiatives. By 1989 the US federal system was already producing an 
average of 40 SEAs per year, known as Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements 
(PEISs), the contents of which were essentially the same as those for EIAs: an 
assessment of likely environmental impacts, an evaluation of siting criteria and options, 
and mitigation measures (TheriveI1993). 
Since then, the diversity of approaches to SEA has led some authors, users and 
practitioners to claim that it is increasingly difficult to establish whether something is, or 
is not, an SEA. Two broad approaches can be identified. The first is a technocratic, 
rationalist process (Blanco forthcoming; Therivel and Partidario 2000; Ortolano and 
Shepherd 1995), which partly draws on natural resources management disciplines 
(Sheate et al. 2001) and on a strong EIA inheritance that bind SEA to a procedural and 
methodological straight jacket bent on positivist precision and detail. Here SEA, like 
EIA, is interpreted as a science. The second approach is more openly political (Blanco 
forthcoming; Leonard Ortolano 26), collaborative, and aimed at consensus-building 
(Therivel and Partidario 2000), linked to a political science inheritance (Sheate et al. 
2001) which leads SEA to be interpreted more like an art and a 'social process' 
(expression ,used by Stirling viz EIA Stirling 1999:131), focused on discursive and 
SUbjective procedures, and more concerned with process than outcome (Voogd 1997). 
26 
Comment based on the intervention by Ortolano during the Plenary session of the IAIA '01 
Conference (on 29 May 2001). 
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The two positions are summarised by the following two authors: 
'[T]he effectiveness of SEA in achieving sustainability ... will only be 
realized [through] a structured and systematic methodological assessment 
framework' (Noble 2002:14). 
'[T]he revolutionary potential of SEA ... will only be realised if it reclaims 
attention to its original social and political purpose' (Wallington 2002: 1). 
Blanco's (forthcoming) review of trade agreements assessments (from an environmental 
and sustainability angle) provides an example of this distinction between 'technocratic' 
and 'more political' approaches. The first category concentrates on predicting, analysing 
and mitigating or enhancing a supposedly rational decision-making process. The 'more 
political ' approach takes into account the: 
'complexity of decision-making mechanisms and recognises that the ultimate 
objective of [sustainability assessment of trade agreements] ESAC is not to 
assess impacts, but to improve the quality of decisions' (Blanco 
forthcoming: 3 )?7 
Interestingly, this partly conflicts with Voodg's (1997) claim that process is more 
important than outcome. It is suggested that perhaps more attention is indeed being 
devoted to process and that the benefits deriving from this, such as learning (Section 3.4) 
are slowly being recognised, meanwhile, 'the quality of decisions' remains an important 
factor. 
The investigation by Therivel and Partidario (2000:275) of the links between SEA and 
planning, brings further evidence of change, showing that SEA practice is partly 
reflecting a move, at least in land-use planning in Britain, from the traditional 
'rationalist decision-making' and technocratic approach to a 'collaborative consensus-
making approach '. They note however, that best practice collaborative approaches to 
SEA 'conflict with an ovelTiding neoliberal technical regulation approach to planning'; a 
problem illustrated by the case study of Chile, in Chapters 5 and 7 (see also RCEP 
2002). FinallY"Sheate et al. (2001:76) argue that 'SEA can be seen to originate from two 
main disciplines: natural resource management, and political science', and that 'it is a 
hybrid of both these schools that forms the optimum SEA process'. 
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Blanco (forthcoming:3) argues that in Latin America it is necessary to adopt 'more political' 
approaches to assessment due to the complexity and - he implies -, the weaker level of rationality 
of their decision-making compared to that of developed countries. The assumption that decisions 
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However, the multiplicity of approaches and tools used to carry out so-called SEAs is 
also a reflection of the diverse contexts and policy processes being addressed, which 
force practice to deviate from the normative framework of the good practice SEA (see 
for example IAIA 2002). It is not uncommon to have to apply SEA to a draft PPP, rather 
than to the first stages of a policy-making process (Bina 2001a; Bina et al. 1999). 
Equally, it is rare for such processes to include full consideration of alternatives (Short 
et al. 2003). As a result, SEA processes often do not fit a standard framework, and do 
not meet basic performance criteria (lAIA 2002). 
Lack of consistency in SEA approaches, is viewed by some scholars as a threat to the 
wide acceptance of the instrument. For example, Noble and Storey (2001 :484) argue that 
there is 'still very little consensus on appropriate SEA methodologies' and appear to find 
this problematic (see also Noble 2002; Fischer 2001; Eggenberger and Partidario 2000; 
Brown and Therivel 2000; Buckley 2000; Therivel and Partidario 1996; Therivel 1993; 
Wood and Djeddour 1992). Verheem and Tonk (2000: 177) found that current SEA 
approaches differ in terms of: 'openness (for instance, with or without participation of 
the general public), their scope ( ... with or without the mandatory description of 
alternatives) or their intensity and duration ( ... from one day to several years)'. In their 
view, this should be a matter of concern, since 'the variety of approaches may also lead 
to some confusion with non-SEA experts [ ... which] may create an impediment to the 
acceptance and introduction of SEA' (2000: 177 -8). However, they accept that there is a 
tension here since '[s]pecific design for specific use increases the effectiveness of SEA 
processes' . 
Precisely for this last reason, the variety, and lack of consensus, do not appear to be a 
problem to others. Indeed, some academics and practitioners claim that the lack of 
homogeneity in SEA is both justified and necessary. Reasons relate to the context of 
application (legal, institutional, cultural), the purpose of the SEA, and the characteristics 
of the initiative under assessment. 
are taken more 'rationally' in developed countries has been challenged, even as a result of recent 
research, see for example Caratti et al. forthcoming; Bina 2002b. 
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Hilden (2000:68; also Nitz and Brown 2001) warns that 
'[d]espite directives, handbooks and guidelines differences between 
assessments, assessment objectives and the role of assessment will persist 
between and within countries. Instead of lamenting over these differences we 
should leam to appreciate them and learn from them. Environmental 
assessments can ... only be successful if they can be adapted to different 
situations and circumstance'. 
This seems to be the spirit of the Canadian Government's Cabinet Directive (1997) on 
SEA (providing guidance for conducting SEA), which holds that '[t]here is no single 
"best" methodology', and therefore calls upon Federal departments and agencies to 
'apply appropriate frameworks and techniques . .. approaches tailored to their particular 
needs and circumstances' (emphasis added, in Noble 2002:13). More recently, Lee and 
Kirkpatrick (2001 :396) applying Sustainability Impact Assessment to trade agreements, 
arguably a form of SEA,28 found that '[t]he type of assessment methods used in ... trade-
related appraisal studies are quite diverse '. They suggest three main reasons for this 
variety: 1) the purpose of assessment, by which they mean ex-ante or ex-post, integrated 
or specialised etc., 2) the nature of the object assessed, such as changes in tariff barriers 
or the geographic extent of a measure's application, and 3) the decision-making context, 
such as the range and type of stakeholders, the negotiation culture, and the early or late 
stage of negotiation. 
This said, neither group is impervious to the concerns of the other. The importance of 
consistency, on the one hand, and of context-specifici ty29 on the other is - to varying 
extents - universally recognised. However, the solutions proposed by the two groups -
based on procedures and methods, and on principles, respectively - do not always 
succeed in overcoming the tension between these concerns. Each solution is discussed in 
turn. 
~: In Section 3.2.1 the issue of sustainability assessment instruments is discussed in more detail. 
Here the term 'context' is used to encompass both the nature of the strategic initiatives to be 
assessed, the purpose attached to SEA, and the institutional, cultural, and political character of 
the context in which SEA applies. Section 3.4 develops a detailed discussion of the meaning of 
context. 
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FocuS on procedures and methods 
The work of Fischer (2002a; 2001), Noble (2002), and Noble and Storey (2001) 
proposes solutions to the 'consistency problem' mentioned above. Their propositions are 
based on the claim that procedural systematisation and clarification are important. 
Fischer (2002a; 2001) seeks to clarify procedures and methods by defining specific 
'assessment tasks' and methods for each SEA-type that had been identified and related 
to the normative three-level tiered framework of policies, plans and programmes by Lee 
and Wood (1978; cf. Section 2.1; see also Lee and Walsh 1992). The main driver behind 
this model is the achievement of consistency, which in turn would mean the promotion 
of all, or most, of the benefits commonly attached to SEA (Box 2-b). Fischer claims 
(2002a:96) that 'only a systematic and continuous application of SEA within a 
completely tiered planning system will enable assessments to result in all the potential 
benefits of SEA' . Tiering, both of the object of assessment and of the SEA process itself 
is thus recognised as critical (Partidario and Clark 2000a; Oiiate et al. 2002; Fischer 
2003a). 
Box 2-b The three-tier SEA system proposed by Thomas Fischer 
SEA type Benefits to which the combined SEA types would 
-=--::----=-:=-:-----=-----,-----,----:--:---:--_l contribute to: 
Policy·SEA To assess the impacts of unlimited • Consideration of a wide range of impacts and 
'Purpose' of SEA 
policy options, inter-sectoral and alternatives 
-::-:_:::-::c:--__ --.::c=.um:.:..:.=.:ul.::::at::..:.iv.::.e .::.:im::..r:1P=.,ac::..:ts::..: ..,...-----,---,-----,-_ _l. Pro-active assessment - SEA as a supporting 
Plan-SEA To compare potential spatial options instrument for sustainable development 
-=-_____ ...:a::.:n.::.d .::::al~te::..:.rn~a.::.:tiv:..:::e:::..:s' ______ _l. Strengthening project EIA 
Programme-SEA To identify project priorities, taking • Systematic and effective consideration of impacts 
socio-economic and environmental above the project level 
factors into account. • Consultation and participation of SEA related 
issues'. 
Source: Fischer 2002a:86-87 
However, the very basis of this vision is questioned by empirical observations of the 
nature and structure of 'tiered planning systems', which Fischer himself finds wanting 
(see also Bina 2001b). The three-level tiered framework is increasingly contested. If one 
were to take Fischer's argument to its logical conclusion, this would mean that SEA 
cannot deliver all its benefits unless countries adapt their planning systems to reflect the 
necessary three-tiers (PPPs). Indeed, with a decidedly normative outlook, Fischer 
(2002a:92) calls for an improvement of planning systems so that they reflect the tiering 
necessary to apply the three SEA-types model. At the very least, it is necessary to 
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conclude that this proposition is in conflict with the context-specific approach upheld by 
other authors. It also forces one to reflect on the limitations of often highly publicised 
'benefits' of SEA (Fischer 1999b; Sheate 1996; Lee and Walsh 1992; UNECE 1992; 
Therivel et al. 1992; Wood and Djeddour 1992) based on little or no empirical evidence 
(Tomlinson forthcoming). The tendency has been to present these as universal, and the 
expectation 'on the ground' has been to see them materialise at each application. It may 
be more appropriate to describe SEA benefits as indicative, and recognise that in many 
realities, their achievement will depend on the systematic use of this instrument over an 
extended period of time. 
The work of Noble and Storey (2001; and Noble 2002) is also aimed at addressing the 
vexed issue of consistency. They (2001 :489) claim that 'SEA is not constrained by a 
lack of methods', but by a lack of a 'structured framework'. In their view (2001:486-7), 
SEA methodologies should have two principal features: they should 'reflect the 
underlying characteristics of the notion of a "strategic" assessment', by which they 
mean: minimising negative impacts, being pro active, starting at the earliest possible 
stage of a decision-making process, and being 'flexible to the different. .. "tiers" of 
decision-making ... adaptable to different contexts of PPPs ,.30 They then argue (referring 
to Verheem and Tonk 2000, and Brown and Therivel 2000) that such flexibility should 
be accompanied by 'a structured methodology'. 
Noble (2002:14) explains that this methodology allows a variety of techniques to be 
applied, and concludes that 'the effectiveness of SEA in achieving sustainability 
objectives will only be realized' when such a framework is adopted (cf. with Fischer's 
views). This conclusion draws on the consistency argument, and on Noble's analysis of 
Canadian experience; it also implies that a structured framework and methodology will 
achieve sustainability objectives. Each point has some shortcomings. The centrality of 
consistency appears to be related to the objective of greater acceptability of SEA, 
suggesting that it would make the instrument more understandable to potential users. 
This is partly' supported by the confusion caused by diversity noted above. However, the 
need for structure to achieve such objective is less evident, and may be at odds with the 
equally evident need for flexibility and contextualisation. The basis for the framework is 
a detailed analysis of SEA practice in Canada since the early 1990s, but Noble's article 
30 
However, they do not explain what they mean by 'contexts of PPPs '. 
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provides little evidence of the link between the 'mixed success' (2002: 13) experienced 
by Canada in applying SEA, and the need for such structured and systematic framework. 
Finally, the proposed structured framework based on seven phases (see Table 3-b) and 
'specific sustaiilability criteria for generic EA application at both the project and 
strategic level' (emphasis in original, Noble 2002:9) risks sharing the limitations of 
similar normative and rationalistic models when faced with the challenge of contributing 
to sustainability (Owens and Cowell 2002). This argument is expanded in Section 3.2. 
Focus on generic principles 
Other authors, such as Sadler (1996b) and Hey (1996) have struggled with SEA's 
methodological inconsistency and have turned to the idea of principles for help. Recent 
contributions try to accommodate flexibility and acknowledge context as a determining 
factor. The work of Verheem and Tonk (2000), Sadler (2001a), Brown and Therivel 
(2000) and Thissen (2000b) leads to different, arguably more applicable solutions, 
helping to reconcile the tension between consistency and context-specificity. This 
echoes the experience of EIA, characterised by similar concerns about methodological 
coherence, which led to the recognition of the crucial influence of context: 
'The early 1970s witnessed much activity on the development of "EIA 
methodologies" as government agencies and consultants struggled to figure 
out what constituted an EIA and what methods could be used' (Ortolano and 
Shepherd 1995:6-7). 
The result is that still today: 
'[e]ach project requires a set of methods tailored to the local situation and the 
time and budget available. There is no single universally applicable EIA 
methodology' (1995 :6-7). 
Verheem and Tonk (2000: 181), like Fischer and others, focus on PPP tiers, arguing that 
different approaches to SEA can be envisaged according to which of the following 
questions is/are being addressed by the PPP: 
'why do anything, what to do, where to do it and how to do it? The why-
question deals with the need, objectives and principles of new actions. Once 
these have been established, the what-question deals with selecting the best 
methods and the capacities needed for each of these methods. The where-
question is about the location of facilities, installations, and so on. The how-
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question deals with topics such as the detailed design of projects ... 
mitigation ... and compensation'. 
They use this simple, normative framework to distinguish between EIA and SEA as well 
as between different types of strategic initiatives: 'EIA is traditionally applied for "how" 
questions and SEA for "why", "what" and "where" questions ,.31 However, they do not 
/V",&ie ew.o/ S~(;2Po/) 
come to the same conclusions aK Instead, Verheem and Tank (2000: 178) propose to 
adopt 'a clear set of principles that underlies all forms of best-practice SEA ,.32 To secure 
clarity as well as flexibility in the definition of what SEA is, they suggest focusing on 
goals to be achieved rather than on specific process requiremen~ 
I <The SEA process should then achieve these goals 
and its specific design will depend on 'its intended purpose, the level of decision making 
and the traditional/cultural decision making context' (2000: 178). 
Brown and Therivel (2000:183-4) believe there is general agreement on SEA being 'the 
application of environmental assessment to PPPs' but find little agreement in the 
literature and practice in terms of the broad nature of SEA.33 They nonetheless reach the 
opposite conclusion to that of Noble (2002) and Fischer (2002a), arguing that: 
'attempting to define SEA through prescriptive answers ... is not particularly useful' 
(2000:184). Like Verheem and Tank, they recommend the use of principles and the 
respect of context-specificity: 'a set of issues/principles that need to underpin the 
identification, development or selection of appropriate SEA methodologies', and stress 
that they should not be prescriptive 'with respect to how to conduct SEA: instead [they 
concentrate] on principles for effective and efficient implementation in any operational 
PPP context' (Brown and Therivel2000: 183). 
31 This simple framework turned out to be very useful during fieldwork in Chile, See Chapters 5 
and 7. . 
32 A detailed example of the type of principles being discussed in the international arena can be 
extrapolated through the set of performance criteria presented in Annex B, Table B-a. These 
criteria were developed by Rob Verheem of the Netherlands EIA Commission in consultation 
with members of the IAIA SEA Section and through discussion at special workshops held in 
1998, 1999, and 2000 during the IAIA annual conferences. The aim was to provide general 
guidance on how to build effective new SEA processes and evaluate the effectiveness of existing 
SEA processes (IAIA 2002b). 
33 
For example: '[d]oes it need legislation? Is it a repackaging of existing mechanisms? Is it a 
document or a process? ' (2000:184). 
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Further support for this approach comes from Thissen (2000b: 175): 
'a set of overarching principles and objectives . . . to guide the development of 
different implementation forms of SEA which are adapted to the specific 
context. Relevant contextual conditions include, but are not limited to, the 
nature of the decision issue at hand ... and the characteristics of the decision-
making context '. 
In general, the 'generic principles' approach is gaining increasing prominence in the 
impact assessment (lA) arena, as witnessed by activities in the International Association 
for Impact Assessment (IAIA). Just a year after the approval of SEA 'performance 
criteria' (IAIA 2002b), which also act as basic principles of good practice, a list of 
principles for Social lA (Vanclay 2002) was agreed on the grounds that 'it became 
apparent that principles had to be developed before guidelines' (lAIA 2003a:6). This 
suggests that practitioners (and scholars) interested in both environmental and social 
assessment are seeking to institutionalise their respective instruments.34 According to 
Perloff (1957:34 in Faludi 1987:27) 'progress of a profession usually depends upon ... 
the extent to which the profession comes to base its techniques of operation upon 
principles rather than rule-of-thumb procedures '. 
2.2.3 Initial conclusions 
Those who interpret diversity in SEA practice as a problem tend to view this debate in 
terms of technical and procedural dimensions, and those who see it as a necessary and 
beneficial condition are more concerned with the purpose that underlies the use of SEA, 
and the context in which it operates. Tensions arise when authors fail to recognise fully 
these two perspectives and how they interact. Instead, it is argued that the nature of SEA 
becomes clearer by focusing on such interaction and Chapter 3 explores this in more 
detail. 
34 
In a set of interviews at the World Bank in May 2003, interviewees active in environmental 
~nd social lA, as well as experts responsible for poverty reduction strategies, confirmed this 
Interest, and suggested that sometimes this results in clashes for predominance of one tool over 
another (see Chapter 4 and Annex A). 
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The tendency has been to ascribe different approaches to the hierarchy of strategic 
initiatives (PPPs) being assessed, failing to recognise the complexity and diversity of 
situations that characterise any policy process.35 Like EIA, SEA is also being 'guided by 
assumptions and models that have been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly and 
systematically explored, formulated or articulated' (Bartlett and Kurian 1999 416). 
Critical assumptions include the fact that projects derive from more strategic 
frameworks and that alternatives are necessarily there to be assessed more thoroughly. 
These normative and rationalist conceptions (and related SEA approaches) have 
coexisted with empirically-based and context-specific uses of SEA, which had to engage 
with less coherent policy process. However, it is argued that differences reflect, first and 
foremost, a variety of assumptions and worldviews that in turn influence the supposed 
raison d'etre of SEA itself. When the purpose of applying SEA goes beyond the strict 
'assessment of impacts', and moves closer to the original idea of the architects of NEPA, 
the nature and characteristics of the instrument are inevitably more varied. 
Thus, it can be concluded that diversity in SEA practice (approaches and tools) indicates 
a rebellion against the straight jacket of being conceptualised as a narrow impact 
assessment instrument. Far from being a sign of weakness, different approaches should 
be welcomed as a recognition of the complexity of the issues that need to be addressed 
(particularly in relation to the goal of sustainable development) and that the use of SEA 
- independently of its imperfections - is contributing to unveil. 
35 This thesis uses the expression 'strategic initiative' to refer to the combination of policies, 
plans and programmes subject to SEA, and uses the term 'policy-process 'to refer to all activities 
that lead to the formulation of such initiative, including: planning, decision-making and 
assessment. It therefore rejects the tight separation between assessment and planning/decision-
making often implicitly supported in impact assessment literature, and contradicted in that on 
planning. For example, The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 2002:75) 
defines the planning process 'and in particular its environmental component ' as 'a repeated 
sequence of steps: setting a long-term vision, describing the present state of the environment, 
~stimating the impacts of scenarios for action, deciding on courses of action, and monitoring the 
Impacts of the decisions'. 
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2.3 Trends from theory and practice 
Drawing on the analysis from the previous sections, it is argued that conceptualisations 
of SEA, and their interpretation in practice to date, reveal three underlying trends: 
• a shift away froin the traditional 'object' of assessment (draft PPPs) towards a more 
encompassing view of the policy process and its political dimension, with special 
attention to decision-making; 
• a growing focus on the promotion of sustainable development, with the implicit 
need to combine hard and soft sciences, and develop dialogical processes;36 
• a reduced emphasis on the positivist dimension of the assessment of impacts within 
the overall SEA process, accompanied by an increased attention to SEA's 
contribution to, and integration in, the 'formulation' process of strategic initiatives. 
Before exploring how these trends can help to clarify the concept of SEA, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that what appear to be recent trends, were in fact themes advocated as 
far back as 1992, in the work of Verheem (1992) and Therivel et at. (1992). Most of the 
characteristics currently being advocated as essential for the improvement and 
effectiveness of SEA had already been identified in 1992, but the literature was to 
'rediscover' them regularly in the following decade (Table 2-b). 
As a result, the three trends might be viewed as persistent topics. However, the fact that 
scholars and practitioners are placing growing emphasis on such topics suggests that 
they have not been addressed adequately (if at all) and are becoming more urgent. The 
relevance of these trends is confirmed in evaluations of more than a decade of SEA 
practice. In a special edition of the journal Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 
(September 2000) a number of experts in the field of EIA and SEA discuss visions and 
theoretical views of what SEA is, or should be. Their approaches, summarised in Table 
2-c, support the ideas summarised above. 
36 
See for example: Dourojeanni 2000 and Roling 2000. 
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Table 2-b New trends or persistent topics? 
-'Trend' or theme 
SEA using EIA 
methods 
SEA to develop 
alternatives and shape 
decision-making 
Environmental impacts 
nature of the object 
being assessed 
Scoping as a critical 
stage 
The over-simplification 
of the PPP rhetoric 
Centrality of 
sustainable 
development 
sustainability-Ied SEA 
Comparing SEA to 
policy analysis 
Discussed in: Verheem 1992 
noted that many early SEA examples were based rather heavily 
on experiences with assessment of projects ', p.150 
argued that the purpose of SEA 1s often to help in formulating 
the [developmentl proposal in some detail ', including its 
'alternatives or ideas', p.151. 
concluded that tilt is the development and discussion of these 
alternatives that makes environmental assessment so valuable ', 
p.156. 
argues that they are no less important but warns that 1n certain 
cases ' it is better to focus not so much on the actual 
environmental effects as on the factors that determine these '; 
thus allowing for a wider scope of assessment: from symptoms 
to sources, p.153 
clarifies that tiln strategic decisions there is no single decision-
making moment... Policy is continually added to, modified or 
even withdrawn', therefore SEA should be drafted quickly to 
provide the right information at the right time in this continuous 
process', p.156. 
concludes that scoping 1s extremely important at the strategic 
level: only the necessary information at the appropriate level of 
detail is needed, the rest is for later'. 
Discussed in: Therivel et al. 1992 
recognised the challenges to the hierarchical and chronological 
sequence implicit il'] PPPs. They discussed the complexity and 
open-endedness of policy definition and formulation', p.38. 
argue that sustainability could be the overriding objective for 
SEA' and that this would require a much more powerful and 
demanding system of SEA .. . which will ultimately improve 
existing environmental conditions and predict and mitigate 
against future ones ', p.123. 
acknowledge the many difficulties in trying to operationalise 
sustainable development through SEA, and conclude that 
perhaps the most significant obstacle to a 'sustainability-Ied 
SEA' is that it is not yet 'politically accepted '. Hence, in 'an ideal 
world SEA should be based on sustainability', but the authors 
suggest that an incremental approach might be best to start 
with, p.130. 
acknowledged the parallels between the two instruments and 
thought SEA would be subject to the same sort of difficulties as 
policy analysis, including: the nebulous and incremental nature 
of PPPs, the problems of system boundaries, lack of information 
(especially for predictions), variety of alternatives, uncertainty 
over public involvement, and the political nature of the decision-
making process, p.41 . 
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'Rediscovered' or 
persistent theme 
throughout the 1990s 
Partidario and Clark 
2000 
Noble 2002 
Partidario 2000 
Sadler 2001 a 
Caralli et al. 
forthcoming 
Bina 2001a 
Noble 2002 
Nilsson and Dalkmann 
2001 
Renton and Bailey 2000 
Partidario and Clark 
2000 
Sadler 1996 
Owens and Cowell 
2002 
K0rn0v and Thissen 
2000 
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The authors cited in Table 2-c advocate a change in, indeed an extension of, SEA's role 
in strategic decisions. Their analysis suggests that the world of SEA is opening up to 
other disciplines and perspectives, including that of spatial planning (Eggenberger and 
Partidario 2000), which is actually considered as one of the conceptual frameworks from 
which the discipline originated (Section 2.1), and knowledge and decision-making 
theory (K\?lrn\?lv and Thissen 2000). This is reversing a certain insularity that has 
penalised the development of El A and SEA (Nitz and Brown 2001). 
The boundaries of what is expected from this instrument are being pushed back to the 
extent that the actual name 'SEA' might have to be reviewed (Thissen 2000b). It is 
argued that the - sometimes subtle - change in the terminology used to describe SEA 
(see Table 2-a) is actually an important indicator of changes in expectations, and that 
recent approaches mark a growing, and more decisive, distance from the narrow 
interpretations of EIA. These have far-reaching impacts on SEA. In terms of process, the 
inheritance from EIA perpetuates the idea of a single moment of assessment as opposed 
to iterative analysis and feedback, a rigid step-by-step procedure - the often 'ineffective 
and certainly inefficient' reactive system which would criticise rather than be creative 
and proactive (McDonald and Brown 1995:486) - and a central role for the production of 
a stand alone report. In methodological terms, SEA practice adopts the use of methods 
and tools often ill-suited to the scope and scale of its evaluations (Clark 2000), 
including: a positivist model of analyses emphasising detail and quantification, together 
with a default aim to reduce, minimise, mitigate or compensate impacts, and justify 
alternative sitings. The EIA inheritance is therefore a mixed blessing for the 
development of SEA's potential. Perhaps it is time to revisit the links between EIA and 
SEA, particularly the emphasis on technocratic and rationalistic commitments (Burdge 
and Vanclay 1995; McDonald and Brown 1995; Partidario and Clark 2000a) and 
consider cutting the umbilical cord that is now constraining, rather than facilitating, the 
further development of SEA in this new phase.37 
37 A number of factors underpinned the influence of EIA over SEA throughout the 1990s, 
including: 1) experts, practitioners and scholars working on SEA often had a well established 
background in EIA, thus strengthening existing practices in the 'EA community' (see Hilden 
2000); 2) the SEA literature used terms, and concepts, common to EIA, such as 'screening', 
'Scoping', 'impact', 'assessment' (indeed the expression 'strategic environmental impact 
assessment' has sometimes been used) and 'mitigation '; 3) the authorities responsible for SEA 
often coincided with those responsible for EIA legislation (see for example the EIA and SEA 
network of EU Member State Representatives, see list of authorities at: 
http://europa.eu.intlcommJenvironmentleialcontacts.htm); and 4) SEA legislation, where it had 
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Table 2-c Outline of key issues and challenges affecting SEA 
Issues and challenges raised 
From theories of knowledge and policy processes to SEA 
The authors propose a distinction between: 
1) the original role of SEA: an 'advocative mission' which aims to strengthen the consideration of 
environment and/or sustainable development in strategic decision-making, and 
2) an 'evolved' or 'new mission' which would focus more on an integrated assessment and 
decision-process support with a more neutral remit, in some ways similar to the role of policy 
analysis. 
From spatial planning to integration and the role of SEA 
The authors identify new challenges for spatial planning, including the management of change 
and uncertainty which are becoming increasingly difficult as a result of development challenges 
and new development paradigms such as sustainable development. They stress the key role of 
integration (in five dimensions) as a guiding principle in devising new planning approaches, and 
argue that SEA can enhance integration of sustainability in PPP processes. 
From the process of policy development to SEA 
The authors look at the structured and unstructured (and mixed) processes of policy 
development in Australia. They stress the need to understand these processes as a necessary 
starting point in order to define SEA approaches which are relevant and context-specific. 
From SEA's variations to the importance of 'context' and flexibility 
The authors highlight the increasing variations in openness, scope, intensity and duration of 
SEAs, and relate this to the different contexts in which SEA is being applied (the term 'context' 
relates, in this case, to the nature of the PPP, whether there is legislation requiring SEA, whether 
it is being applied in a developed or developing country). They call for the need to distinguish 
between SEAs according to which of the following questions they are addressing: why do 
anything, what to do, where to do it. 
From 'methodologies' to non-prescriptive approaches which graft onto existing 
processes 
The authors argue that prescriptive definitions of SEA must be replaced by a broad overarching 
concept of SEA and a set of principles which focus on adapting methodologies to the strategic 
level being addressed (policy, plan or programme), and grafting SEA onto the specific decision-
making context and activities/process. 
(Based on five articles in Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal- September 2000) 
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2.4 SEA trends in related literature 
The evolution and cUlTent focus of SEA literature represent far more than an echo of 
previous concerns expressed in the environmental assessment literature. Many of the 
themes and trends discussed in Sections 2.1-2.3 can also be found in the literature on the 
interface between science and policy, on Technology Assessment, and on well-
established instruments such as Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Policy 
Analysis. What follows provides a brief review of: 1) the critiques of linear conceptions 
of the policy process, 2) technical rational models, and 3) the assumed objectivity of 
scientific knowledge. These themes summarise some of the main criticisms of technical 
instruments intended to support decision-makers, including spurious rationality, limited 
impact on final decisions, and inadequate mechanisms for consultation and public 
participation. This work helps to locate the critical analysis of SEA in a wider context, 
introducing and revealing important precedents for the trends described above (Section 
2.3), the implications of which will be explored in the next Chapter. 
The tension between normative and heuristic conceptions of how the policy-process 
operates, and how (and what) information can best be used to improve it, has influenced 
the development of many forms of IA since the 1970s, including Policy Evaluation38 
(Boothroyd 1995), CBA39 (Pearce 1998) and EIA (Vanclay and Bronstein 1995; Petts 
1999c). Section 2.3 outlined a shift towards a more all-encompassing view of the policy-
making process (first trend), allowing SEA to relate more dynamically to different 
stages (fact-finding, discussion, analysis and decision), and actively to shape a strategiC 
initiative, rather than simply to analyse its implications. This trend has also been 
identified in the evolution of Technology Assessment: 4o Baark (1991, in Porter 
1995:69), for example, distinguishes four schools of Technology Assessment: 1) 
regulatory, mainly reactive and aimed at controlling impacts, 2) promotional, where 
38 
Boothroyd (1995 :83) distinguishes Policy Evaluation (intrinsic to policy design: it analyses 
policies in terms of their potential to achieve stated objectives) from Policy Analysis which he 
sees as a combination of the former and Impact Assessment: 'i.e. as a process concerned with 
~ssessing all the intended and unintended outcomes of policies being planned, proposed, 
~~plemented or reviewed' . 
CBA is defined by the Treasury (United Kingdom) as an 'analysis which seeks to quantify in 
money terms as many of the costs and benefits of a proposal as possible, including items for 
which the market does not provide a satisfactory measure of economic value' it can sometimes 
~oe used to refer to the analysis of 'all the welfare costs and benefits ' (RCEP 1998:64). 
Technology Assessment is defined by Coates (1976, in Porter 1995 :67) as 'the systematic 
stUdy of the effects on society, that may occur when a technology is introduced, extended, or 
modified, with emphasis on the impacts that are unintended, indirect, or delayed'. 
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technological development is still a given, but assessment is intended to help formulate 
suitable policies to promote innovation, 3) constructive, seeking to tune proposals in 
response to social and political interests and priorities, 'constructively' redirecting the 
process of technical change, and 4) experimentaUparticipative, requiring the active 
intervention of a wide spectrum of interested parties in testing alternatives and 
improving the proposed innovation. Baark's categories 3 and 4 have clear parallels in 
debates about SEA discussed earlier in this Chapter, which stress a constructive role for 
assessment, and whose implications are examined in Chapter 3 (conceptually) and 
Chapters 5-7 (practically). 
Recent SEA literature has also focused on moments such as the definition of the 
problem, the choice of policy questions, and the bounding of institutional remits. Such 
moments are acknowledged in earlier forms of IA (O'Riordan and Hey 1976), such as 
Technology Assessment, where assessors are first required to define and bound the 
problem, before launching into the impact definition, analysis and evaluation stages 
(Porter 1995). They are also discussed in a wider literature dealing with environmental 
policy-making. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 1998: 119), 
for example, highlights problem 'recognition' and 'definition' as crucial steps in the 
policy-making process, explaining how 'the way the problem is formulated determines 
how the questions to be considered will be framed' . Conceptual progress in 
environmental policy and policy analysis (cf. Section 3.3.3) can contribute to the 
advancement of SEA theory and practice (Chapters 7 and 8), which has tended to focus 
more on setting objectives (Section 3.3.2),41 underestimating the earlier stage of 
problem-setting. 
The concept of tiered planning and decision-making, remains central to the raison d' etre 
for SEA despite growing evidence that it draws on simplistic, even unhelpful , 
assumptions: Petts describes it as a 'naIve concept' (2003:288) . Instruments such as 
CBA (Senn and Ravasio 2001) and Risk Assessment have been searching for more 
iterative and reflexive interpretations of planning. The latter being typically described as 
a 5-step sequenc,e: 1) hazard identification, 2) hazard accounting, 3) scenarios of 
exposure, 4) risk characterisation, and 5) risk management (Carpenter 1995:196); a 
sequence which has had to be reviewed as the instrument struggled to address complex 
and politically charged risks, such as global warming potential (Eduljee 1999). Others 
41 
A recent example of this is the guidance for the implementation of the European Directive on 
SEA, produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (United Kingdom) (ODPM 2003). 
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have found the linearity implicit in tiering to be 'at odds with reality' (Boothroyd 
1995:102): 
'[t]he problem is that policies (as opposed to programs) are for the most part 
not often officially created and when they are, say in the form of legislation, 
the most important steps in the policy-making process are taken behind 
closed doors. Often the nature of policy has to be induced from the programs 
and projects it supports' (Boothroyd 1995: 104). 
Bailey and Dixon (1999) discuss the nature of policies and explore the concept of 
'implicit' policies referring to the work of Bridgewater (1989, in Bailey and Dixon 
1999:254) arguing that '[s]ome policies may be implicit in that they were part of 
election campaigns or are "generally accepted" but are not committed to paper in any 
official form ... policies can be vague ... ambiguous statements which merely indicate a 
broad general direction'. The case study of Chile (Chapters 5 and 7) provides a vivid 
illustration of this less tangible, yet highly influential, type of policy-making. 
Further lessons can be drawn from these literatures, with regard the trend highlighting 
sustainable development as the framework within which strategic initiatives, and their 
assessments, are to be framed (second SEA trend, Section 2.3). Boothroyd (1995:84) 
noted a similar shift in relation to the well-established discipline of Policy Evaluation, 
which began as a process with 'particularistic goals' (evaluating goals 'established by 
the powerful according to their interests [and] values'), moved onto 'efficiency', 
'equity' and 'quality-of-life' goals, and culminated in the 1970s as a process with 
'sustainability goals', where 'policies and their consequences are seen holistically' and 
'heuristic tools are developed for coping with system complexity' . This expanded remit, 
which Boothroyd (1995:85) classifies in terms of: '1) substantive breadth, 2) systemic 
depth, and 3) hierarchical range', has affected most forms of IA since the 1970s.42 That 
decade witnessed the inclusion of ecological relationships and quality of life issues 
within IA, drawing on systems theory, which provided powerful conceptual tools for the 
analysis of complex and uncertain impact chains. 
However, change can take a long time before it is institutionalised, and despite such 
theoretical and rhetorical developments, '[d]ay-to-day inhouse [Policy Evaluation] is 
42 
For example, this is the case of Risk assessment practice, which has evolved since the 1980s, 
broadening its scope and remit, so that in 1995 the United Kingdom's Department of the 
EnVironment defined it as 'the structured gathering of information about adverse effects and the 
forming of a judgement about them' (Eduljee 1999:375). Australia and New Zealand have 
broadened the definition of risk even further: 'risk arises out of uncertainty. It is the exposure to 
the possibility of such things as economic or financial loss or gain, physical damage, injury or 
delay, as a consequence of pursuing a particular course of action' (Eduljee 1999:379). 
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still mostly particularistic, with the universals of welfare economists enjoying primary 
respect' (Boothroyd 1995:84). Positivism also still dominates EA, and Boothroyd 
(1995:90) finds that '[s]ystem-sensitive IA . .. is still the exception . . . IA is still mostly 
systematic (mechanical and reductionist) rather than systemic' (emphasis in original). 
Indeed, the resilience of disciplinary focuses (and biases) in assessment, and of the more 
general influence of positivism over social sciences, has meant that Boothroyd's 
observations are still relevant today. The conclusion of Shefer and Kaess (1990:84) on 
the progress in economic assessment is that 'innovation in evaluation approaches has 
tended to echo the prevailing social climate. In spite of the wide array of techniques now 
available ... the field is rather conservative in its trends'. The authors' appeal (1990:86) 
for 'a change in the perception of evaluation in planning and analysis, linking evaluation 
back with objective formulation and forward to implementation and monitoring' is fully 
pertinent to the debate on the future of SEA, and similar instruments (see Section 3.2). 
The positivist concept of technocratic decision-support tools has been the subject of a 
longstanding critique in policy sciences, planning theory and the sociology of 
knowledge (Wynne 1975; Togerson 1986; Fischer and Forester 1993; Innes 1998; 
Bartlett and Kurian 1999; K~rn~v and Thissen 2000; Saarikoski 2000; Owens and 
Cowe1l2002; Rayner 2003). Analytic approaches that draw on rational choice have been 
questioned both in methodological terms and for the weakness of their theoretical 
foundations, which are increasingly demonstrated to be limited and inconsistent (O'Neill 
1993; Owens et al. forthcoming; Stirling forthcoming). For example, Risk Assessment43 
was traditionally associated with notions of rationality and objectivity (Carpenter 1995), 
however, the interdependency of its objective and subjective dimensions (Eduljee 1999) 
has become increasingly apparent. Furthermore, the probability theory on which Risk 
Assessment often depends, has been criticised following the recognition of uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, and ignorance (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Wynne 1992; Stirling 
2003). Most significantly, accumulated experience with a range of technical instruments 
has shown that in many cases the information and knowledge produced continues to 
have 'little effect' (Weiss 1975; Pearce 1998; In 't Veld 2000; de Wit 2002). 
43 R k IS assessment is a technique that advises decision-makers about the frequency and severity 
?f adverse environmental consequences of activities involving uncertainties that 'are large and 
Important' (Carpenter 1995 : 196). The US National Research Council (NRC 1983 in 
Eduljee1999:375) provided one of the most widely cited definitions of Risk Assessment as 'the 
characterisation of the potential adverse health effects of human exposures to environmental 
hazards'. It can be seen as one of the techniques used within an EIA or as a stand-alone process. 
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It is in response to these developments that the RCEP (1998) highlights both strengths 
and weaknesses of scientific and technical inputs in the context of environmental policy-
making. In its contribution towards defining more effective ways of shaping 
environmental policies, the RCEP (1998: 113) states that: 
' [d]ecisions about environmental policies must be based on the scientific 
evidence and an analysis of technological options, but they must also take 
into account risks and costs, and be informed by values '. 
The RCEP (1998) stresses the need for combining scientific expeltise with the 
consideration of values . It acknowledges that environmental issues 'normally have a 
major technical component' and that therefore, 
'expelt assessments will continue to be essential but their certainty, precision 
and objectiveness should be neither over-estimated nor under-estimated. The 
way issues are formulated, and the choices available to deal with them, 
generally also raise questions of values, which should be specifically 
addressed from the outset' (RCEP 1998:113). 
The RCEP (1998: 114) also emphasises the importance of transparency and openness, 
which requires inter alia that 'the data, models and assumptions [used] should be readily 
available to the public' . This is closely linked to the critique of the objectivity assumed 
in relation to scientific knowledge, and to the problem of eroding public trust in expert 
advice and in those with official responsibilities for environmental protection (an 
example is the sharp variance between public opinion and some expert assessments of 
the risk of releasing genetically modified organisms). The conjunction of greater 
quantification and loss of confidence can partly be explained by the 'growing awareness 
of the complexity of environmental problems and the uncertainty which pervades them' 
(RCEP 1998: 116). If undue weight is placed on statistical and quantitative information, 
both scientists and politicians are eventually discredited . 
Thus, in considering the benefits and limitations of techniques such as Risk Assessment 
and CBA,44 the RCEP advocates the integration of complementary forms of assessment, 
and the combination of expert analysis with deliberative mechanisms for the inclusion 
of 'people's values' (Figure 2-a). Indeed, the dichotomy between analytic and 
participatory processes is being questioned (Stirling forthcoming) and the case for 
research into the synergies of different theories of assessment is being made both in 
theory (Owens et al. forthcoming) and in practice. As Boothroyd (1995:85) notes in 
44 S. 
tU'ling (forthcoming:3) defines CBA, Risk Assessment, Technology and Life-Cycle 
~ssessments , as 'narrow, rigid, quantitative, opaque, exclusive, expert-based, analytically 
ngorous procedures, tending to privilege economic considerations and incumbent political and 
commercial interests' . 
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relation to 'particularistic' policy evaluations, the narrow pursuit of scientific rigour and 
precision has meant that 'method determines question, tool becomes master', and the 
result is a sacrificing of 'holistic understanding', critical to the pursuit of sustainability. 
He acknowledges (1995:85) that evaluation practice aimed at reflecting 'sustainability 
goals' has made progress by combining 'deductive logic and empirical research' with 
the use of 'metaphor, reflection, and moral judgement'. Similarly, in the context of Risk 
Assessment, Starr (1985, in Eduljee 1999:399) has argued that the most important 
methodological advance has been the realisation by regulators and practitioners of the 
importance of the socio-political dimension, and that ensuring the confidence of the 
public in risk management is far more important than 'any quantitative estimate of risk 
consequence, probability or magnitude'. Thus, participatory processes, communication 
and transparency during the scoping phase become increasingly central to these 
disciplines. 
Figure 2-a Policy process for setting environmental standards 
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Such developments have increasingly been emphasised by scholars. Burgess et al. 
(Clark et al. 1998; Burgess fOlthcoming), for example, have sought to make a case for 
more deliberative democratic practices for science-technology governance, drawing on 
the growing critique of CBA (Adams 1995), and questioning the heroic assumptions of 
environmental economists (Harrison et al. 1998). Their research illustrates the rising 
profile of deliberative processes in the wide field of science-in-society, and stresses the 
importance of reflexive processes that, over the medium term, can promote social and 
policy learning, and changes in the political, cultural, economic and social contexts 
(Burgess forthcoming). The second and third trends identified in . Section 2.3 suggest 
that SEA scholars and practitioners are becoming aware, perhaps somewhat belatedly, 
of these problems and opportunities, and are seeking new concepts and procedures to 
respond to the challenge (Chapter 3). 
The idea of a 'cluster of analyses' (RCEP 1998: 120), represented in Figure 2-a by the 
five appraisals connected to each other, is increasingly discussed in EA literature, where 
the need to optimise efforts and resources, and the recognition of benefits from the 
integration of different assessments, have become more pressing (cf. Sections 3.2.1 and 
7.2). Figure 2-a also emphasises iteration and reflexivity during the policy process. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, greater insight into the functioning of such process and into 
the role - and limits - of science, has challenged the linear frameworks of most early 
assessments . 
This brief overview of the tensions and challenging developments in different 
assessment literatures and related disciplines, places the trends in SEA conceptions in a 
wider perspective. Chapter 3 explores these common themes, highlights the gap between 
theory and practice, and suggests a new purpose and function for assessment focusing 
on the promotion of comprehensive discussions on fundamental issues of policy, values, 
and worldviews. By relating these theoretical discussions to a set of primary data and an 
in-depth case study in Chile, the second stage of this research (Chapters 4-8) seeks to 
promote feedback and mutual criticism between scholars, policy-makers and 
practitioners 'in order to refine techniques and gain insight into the impact of their 
respective work' (Shefer and Kaess 1990:79). Chapters 5-7 draw lessons from the need 
to balance the '[a]bstract, methodologically focused works' with the difficulties 
encountered in 'case studies' and 'in the field, where the lack of recent data, time 
constraints, research problems and political or institutional biases interfere with the 
progress of a study' (Shefer and Kaess 1990:80). On the basis of theoretical and 
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empirical work, Chapter 7 proposes a framework for the introduction and shaping of 
SEA that seeks to balance technical and policy dimensions, and highlights the role of 
strategic-level assessment as a means of asking thought-provoking questions. 
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2.5 Summary 
The above investigation of the origins and evolution of SEA shows that its roots may not 
go very deep into the ground of theory, but they cel1ainly extend over a large surface of 
concepts and themes. However, the actual conceptual basis of SEA, when compared to 
that of its predecessor EIA? appears weak, and demand for a strategic successor seems 
poorly justified. The literature's focus on the symptoms, rather than the causes, of 
Sh0l1comings in EIA, explains why in the early efforts to develop SEA undue emphasis 
was placed on methodological issues (the assessment dimension), rather than on the 
complex strategic and environmental components. Furthermore, the narrow 
interpretation of EIA practice has constrained the development of SEA in its early days, 
as it tended to reproduce similar approaches and tools. Such problems are not unique to 
SEA; they are also discussed in earlier literature on instruments such as Policy Analysis, 
technology and Risk Assessment, and CBA. 
Nonetheless, demand for SEA has grown steadily, in connection with major themes such 
as biodiversity conservation and the pursuit of sustainability. This explains the 
systematic growth of expectations attached to it since the late 1980s, and the significant 
changes that can be witnessed in the normative and practical representation of SEA. The 
evolution and tensions in the academic and policy literatures do not point to a clear-cut, 
or dramatic, change of direction; instead, they reveal subtle shifts in emphasis, regular 
rediscovery of earlier concepts and progressive questioning of some of SEA's normative 
pillars: the PPPs framework and procedural rationality. These had already been criticised 
in the context of other instruments and it might be said that their critique in the case of 
SEA was quite late in comparison, not only with EIA and Social IA, but also with CBA, 
Risk Assessment, Technology Assessment and Policy Evaluation and Analysis. 
Nevertheless, a closer analysis of these 'subtle' movements may suggest quite a 
fundamental change in the conception of SEA's purpose and role, its raison d'etre . This 
can be summarised in terms of three broad trends, indicating a potential shift in the 
discipline's orientation, and a return to the original scope of EIA at the end of the 1960s. 
Thus, SEA itself is now ready for an in-depth assessment. 
Bartlett and Kurian (1999:415) argue that EIA 'in spite of its manifest policy 
irnportance. . . has been the focus of very few attempts at theoretical understanding' . 
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Indeed, notwithstanding the suggestions that EIA derives from planning, Lawrence 
(2000:607) stresses that '[u]rban and regional planning theory and the theory ... of EIA 
have largely proceeded along parallel [hence] separate paths', thus failing to improve 
each other. Many of the problems in EIA practice echo those attributed to rationalism in 
planning: autocratic, technically biased, poorly matched to contextual characteristics, 
weak in facilitating dialogue and in appreciating the political nature of planning 
(Lawrence 2000:611). This research suggests that the development of SEA may be 
contributing to the strengthening of environmental assessment theory, especially as it 
draws together theoretical contributions from related literature. 
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Chapter 3 
Re-conceptualising SEA: 
an initial proposition 
There appears to be vel}' little attention .. . given to defining the basic meaning of the term 
"strategic" in the context of strategic environmental assessment 
Noble (2000:203) 
SEA should be premoted as a means of changing attitudes and culture within organisations and 
government departments 
(Sheate et al. 2001 :87-88) 
The exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of evolving SEA conceptions has 
uncovered themes and trends that need further analysis; this Chapter considers the 
theoretical implications of some of them, aiming to deepen the understanding of the 
SEA phenomenon (research question 2.a, Figure I-a) and strengthen its conceptual 
basis. It thus provides the basis for the second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-8), which 
investigates the practical implications of key trends in SEA and of the propositions that 
will be developed in this Chapter through the theoretical unravelling of such trends 
(research question 2.b) . 
In spite of the growing body of literature on SEA, little has been said about the 
expression 'Strategic Environmental Assessment ' per se, providing further indication of 
SEA's uncertain conceptual basis. The trends in thinking about - and practising - SEA, 
and the growing expectations discussed in the previous sections (summarised in Table 3-
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a) call for a problematisation of the three constituent dimensions of SEA: 'strategic', 
'environment', and 'assessment'. In this Chapter, the potentially significant implications 
of these trends are explored focusing on four critical areas. Section 3.1 explores the 
significance, and 'alternative interpretations of the adjective 'strategic'. Section 3.2 looks 
at the sometimes misleading reference to 'environmental' assessment, and drawing on 
recent developments in the literature on sustainability and ecological modernisation, 
examines whether SEA serves a new ideology which goes beyond the narrow confines 
of rational and efficient management of resources that has characterised EIA practice. 
Section 3.3 considers the complexity behind the concept of 'assessment', drawing on 
policy analysis and particularly on those perspectives concerned with cognitive factors 
in decision-making, in order to bring new insights to the discipline. Finally, Section 3.4 
highlights the centrality of 'context', throwing some light as to whether SEA represents 
a new concept, as well as a new tool. 
Table 3-a The three trends in the evolution of SEA conceptions 
First trend A shift away from the traditional 'object' of assessment (draft PPPs) towards a more 
encompassing view of the policy process and its political dimension, with special attention to 
decision-making; 
Second trend A growing focus on the promotion of sustainable development, with the implicit need to combine 
hard and soft sciences, and develop dialogical assessment processes; 
Third trend A reduced emphasis on the positivist dimension of the assessment of impacts within the overall 
SEA process, accompanied by an increased attention to SEA's contribution to, and integration in, 
the formulation' process of strategic initiatives. 
Source: from Section 2.3 
Before turning to the analysis, it is useful to address a certain inconsistency in the use of 
common terms, including 'purpose', 'aim' and 'role', which has characterised SEA 
literature. This research will use the three terms according to the definition given in The 
New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998): 1) purpose: the reason for which something 
is done or created or for which something exists; hence, emphasising the issue of 
'existence', the purpose of SEA is intended here as the broad, long-term reasons of an 
actor or institution for wanting to apply SEA (not necessarily publicly stated), or which 
are proposed normatively in the literature; 2) aim: a purpose or intention, a desired 
outcome; emphasising the idea of 'outcome', the aim of SEA relates to the more 
immediate results expected from its application to a particular initiative, and 3) role 
refers to the function assumed or part played by something in a particular situation, 
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therefore, the role of SEA refers here to the instrument's function and activities within a 
particular policy process and its related context. 
3.1 The meaning of 'strategic' 
Despite its significance, the strategic dimension of SEA is poorly explored and 
conceptualised. Partidario's (1996) analysis of the 'word strategic in SEA' and Noble's 
article on 'What makes SEA strategic?' (2000) are rare exceptions. Partidario (1996:33) 
relates the word to the object being assessed and argues that its nature will vary 
depending on 'the socio-political context of decision-making '. She also refers to the 
'strategic component' in any decision-making process (for example, the vision 
statement, development intentions) as the main object of SEA's attention. Noble defines 
(2000:206) 'strategic' as: 'the set of principles and objectives that shape the visions and 
development intentions incorporated in a set of alternatives'. He (2000:217) argues that 
'[ w ]hile PPPs are often claimed to be at the centre of attention for SEA, the actual 
focus ... is on strategic alternatives '. 
In an interview, Marcos Orellana [academic] I illustrates how this aspect is perceived 
from outside the 'inner circle' of lA experts, arguing that the strategic nature of the 
object of assessment is not in itself sufficient to justify the replacement of EIA with a 
new instrument. Nonetheless, one of the key drivers behind the early demands for SEA 
is precisely the fact that EIA has not - by and large - been applied to policies, plans and 
programmes (PPPs). Such limited scope of application, primarily the result of 'bad' EIA 
practice, became the defining element of the new instrument: SEA is the environmental 
assessment of strategic initiatives (cf. Brown and Therivel 2000). For more than a 
decade, this has been the starting point from which most scholars and practitioners have 
explained both what SEA is, and why it is needed (cf. Chapter 2). The intuitive appeal of 
this explanation has made it into a powerful story line whose success may have delayed 
the theoretical development of SEA: directing - and confining - attention to the issue 
of how to assess these strategic initiatives, rather than considering why it has become 
I This interview took place in Cambridge prior to the first field trip in October 2001. 
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necessary to accompany EIA with a new instrument whose scope remains broadly the 
same (at least in theory). 
This Section begins by showing that the emphasis on PPPs delivers an inaccurate picture 
of policy-making processes (Section 3.1.1). It then explores three normative aspects of 
the relationship between assessment and PPPs, to help clarify what is expected of SEA 
(Section 3.1.2), thus moving closer to the nature of the problems that require an answer, 
and a new instrument to address them. 
3.1.1 Strategic 'objects' 
The three policy-making tiers summarised in the acronym 'PPP' are first introduced in 
environmental assessment (EA) literature by Lee and Wood (1978) and, since the mid-
1980s, have been a constant presence in SEA literature through the term 'tiering', which 
Noble and Storey (2001 :486), relate to: 
'a sequential process of development, which commences with the 
development and adoption of broad policies, proceeds to ... more concrete 
plans and programmes, and finally reaches the stage of... project 
implementation ... Ideally, actions at one stage are conditioned by actions or 
inactions at previous stages '. 
Therivel et al. (1992:37) define each tier: policies are governments' objectives and their 
preferred means of achieving them, plans and programmes are sets of related activities 
and expenditure that implement policy, programmes may in turn be composed of 
projects, which are seen as discrete activities, usLially at specific locations. The centrality 
of this view of planning and decision-making in the discipline of SEA is revealed in the 
expression: '[a] tiered approach to SEA', an approach whose: 
'importance and advisability... imply that the different stages in the 
formulation and implementation of a policy nest within one another, and that 
policies, plans and programmes are each a distinct stage of the 
process '(Therivel et al. 1992:37). 
Thus, a number of critical assumptions for SEA can be related to tiering: PPPs exist and 
are there to be assessed, projects derive from such PPPs according to a top-down 
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hierarchy,2 and the coherence between the top (policies) and the bottom (projects) layers 
is ensured through clear communication structures (hence transparency), and feed-back 
loops in the overall policy process. These assumptions have been taken for granted, and 
were rarely questioned or investigated until the mid-1990s, so that their hold on SEA 
literature remains strong: 
'[m]any decisions affecting environmental quality, and ... sustainability, are 
made at the policy, plan and programme level rather than at the project level' 
(Thissen 2000b:174). 
However, it is increasingly clear that they offer an inaccurate picture of reality, and the 
conventional wisdom on PPPs and tiering is now being questioned in developed and 
developing countries (OECD and UNDP 2002).3 The hierarchical policy and planning 
system evoked by the simple use of the acronym 'PPPs' is often a chimera, or little more 
than a fa~ade behind which lies a less coherent reality (Figure 3-a). This presents 
policies that are not reflected at lower planning levels, for various reasons to do with 
institutional structures, capacities and political will; or due to the absence of 
intermediate links between national policies and individual projects, such as planning at 
regional levels (Furman and Hilden 2001; Bina 2001 b; Hilden et al. 2002; Sheate et al. 
2001; Therivel1993; Noble and Storey 2001). The British planning sector (RCEP 2002), 
and the transport sector in some European countries (Bina 2001a) provide recent 
illustrations of such 'gaps'. 
Scholars are recognising that this 'tiered-forward planning process' (Noble 2002: 10), 
may be attractive as a 'normative perspective', but that 'PPP development rarely works 
like this' and that 'the need for policy can develop "bottom up" as the cumulative result 
of decisions at the project, programme or plan level' (Noble and Storey 2001 :486). 
Reflecting on assessments in the transport sector, Hilden (forthcoming:191) also warns 
that 'the top down direction may be reverted and programmes, or even certain large-
scale projects ... may begin to drive the plans and policies'. Noble (2002) provides a 
series of examples from Canada, where project developments have highlighted the need 
2 Therivel et al. (1992:28): ,[w]hatever the precise definition [of PPPs] given, the implication is 
that projects are undertaken within a programme, which in turn is the specific expression of a 
folicy ' . 
. Chapter 6 examines the example of a 'programme' which includes policy elements, as well as 
hsts of projects. 
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for more policies or more generally, strategic approaches at the planning level (see also 
Andre and Gagne 2000). 
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Furthermore, the influence of the neo-liberal economic agenda over the viability and 
effectiveness of planning systems has been underestimated in the normative accounts of 
tiering. In the United Kingdom, for example, Owens and Cowell (2002:9) note how the 
goal of market liberalisation led to planning systems being 'a direct target for 
deregulatory zeal in the 1980s' while there was a ,[r]enewed emphasis on the 
presumption in favour of development', and a concern about 'the adverse impacts of 
planning regimes on competitiveness' that persisted into the 1990s and beyond. The 
absence - or w;akness - of many 'strategic' levels (PPPs) such as sectoral policies, is 
revealed when assessments of major individual projects (often involving infrastructure) 
are confronted with implicit policy-level decisions. This phenomenon has been noted 
already during the 1970s in ElA (O'Riordan and Hey 1976) and Social lA practice. 
According to Wolf (1980:28), the latter was leading to growing demand for policy level 
assessment, partly because 'issues of a policy nature are often encountered on the project 
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level, yet they cannot be appropriately or effectively addressed or expressed on that 
level'. Today, this problem is common in Chile and more generally in Latin America 
(Espinoza and Alzina 2001), and will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Finally, many so-called policies, plans or programmes will actually be a hybrid of two or 
more 'Ps', for example: it is quite common for a plan or programme to include both a 
strategic vision for the future (policy level) and a number of proposed projects. Italy's 
2001 national transport policy was initially conceived as a set of strategic directives, but 
by the time it went to press it also included a large list of projects (Bina forthcoming). 
The Chilean 'Programme' for water resources management represented a strategic 
vision for river basin management in Chile, but also included a list of potential 
infrastructure projects (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
This analysis has questioned critical assumptions behind the key concept of 
tiering and the related PPP framework, which have in many cases justified the 
promotion of SEA. Policy-making is more complex and dynamic than is reflected in the 
literature, and the shortcomings attributed to EIA, and its application to projects, are 
likely to be symptomatic of something more than a need to 'scale up' impact assessment 
to the higher levels of planning. 
3.1.2 The relationship between SEA and its 'object' 
The paucity of literature on the relationship between SEA and what it assesses is 
particularly striking. 4 Brown and Th6rivel (2000: 188) warn that very little has been 
written on 'the relationship of the SEA to the PPP formulation and decision-making 
process' and that this would 'have to change if SEA is to realise its potential' . This gap 
is serious, and surprising, for at least three reasons: 1) the centrality of this relationship 
in most SEA definitions and the tendency to define SEA effectiveness in terms of how it 
influences decisions, 2) the virtually unanimous call for integration of assessment and 
policy processes (usually referred to as process integration), and 3) the equally 
undivided request for SEAs to start as early as possible, in line with the initial stages of 
the policy process. These reasons are conceptually linked to the first trend identified in 
4 
Contributions can be found in (Caratti et al. forthcoming; Therivel and Partidario 1996; 
Audouin and Lochner 2000; ERM 1998). 
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Section 2.3: 'the shift away from the traditional 'object' of assessment (draft PPPs) 
towards a more encompassing view of the policy process and its political dimension, 
with special attention to decision-making '. Each reason is discussed below, thus 
building a new understanding of what 'strategic' might actually imply. 
Defining SEA and its effectiveness 
If one considers the widely used definition of SEA by Sadler and Verheem (1996) the 
links with decision-making and the policy process in general seem evident. According to 
this definition, the aim behind the application of SEA is: 
• to ensure the full inclusion and consideration of environmental consequences in 
decision-making; 
• thus it should take place at the earliest possible stage in decision-making; and 
• should ensure that the environment is considered on a par with economic and social 
considerations. 
It therefore seems essential to understand how an assessment process can influence 
decision-making, what stages it can relate to, and how it can identify and influence the 
'considerations' made during decision-making. The need for such investigation is 
echoed in the following statement: 'SEA has always raised the intriguing prospect of 
integrating the environment into higher levels of decision-making than currently occurs', 
however, 'by failing to be sufficiently cognizant of the political imperatives that 
marginalize the environment and seeking to impose an external and spurious technical 
rationality on the policy process, SEA may itself become discredited' (Flynn et al. 1999 
1). 
In terms of effectiveness, SEA's greatest potential lies in its ability to influence 
decision-making. Recently, this aspect was investigated through seventeen European 
case studies and a workshop organised by the Finnish Environment Institute (Furman 
and Hilden 2001). The results of the project led to the following definition of 
effectiveness: 'an observable effect on goals, the views of decision-makers or 
involvement of decision-makers ' (Hilden et al. 2002: 1). More recently still, the 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) has commissioned studies in 
five countries to investigate the effectiveness of assessment techniques (including SEA) 
on transport decision-making (Bina 2002b; Poutchy-Tixier forthcoming; Tomlinson 
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forthcoming), showing that this is an important topic from the users' perspective. Hilden 
et al. (2002: 1 et seq.) identify 'necessary conditions' that contribute to the effectiveness 
of environmental assessments, and distinguish these from 'facilitating factors'. The 
conditions are arranged around three main themes: integration, aspects of timing and 
political will to initiate and use assessments. Facilitating factors include: legal 
provisions, practical organisation aspects, type and level of detail of the information 
used, and formal and informal networks between actors. All these themes relate to the 
policy process and its context. SEA's effectiveness is closely linked to both. 
Calling for integration 
The second reason for considering the relationship between SEA and decision-making is 
the persistent call for 'integration' (for example: Lee 2002; ECMT forthcoming), a 
feature of SEA literature that raises both aspirations and concerns. The term itself 
requires elaboration. It is commonly used to refer to the integration of environmental 
concerns into sectoral (or economic) policies (WCED 1987), and seen as a pre-requisite 
to the achievement of sustainable development (Sheate et al. 2001). In the European 
Union context, article 130r of the Single European Act (Wilkinson et al. 1994) and the 
commitment of the Council of Ministers at the Cardiff Summit in June 1998, have 
, 
provided strong support for such a concept. However, since the late 1980s, integration 
has embraced an increasing number of objectives (Bina forthcoming), including the 
specific integration of environment with land-use planning (Eggenberger and Partidario 
2000), 'process integration' (referring to policy/planning and assessment processes), 
integration of assessment instruments (for example, economic, social and environmental 
assessments),5 and integration of activities by different actors and their full iterative 
involvement in the policy process (administrative, political and technical experts). 
Hilden et al. (2002:6) also highlight the importance of broader actor networks and of 
consultation and participation. They emphasise integration into the preparation of a PPP, 
whereby actors should actively take part in each other's processes, or use other means of 
frequently exchanging information, to avoid 'mismatches and time and energy wasted 
on unimportant studies . .. [and] lack of sensitivity to the changes taking place in the 
planning process', and increase their willingness to use SEA results. 
5 
Note however, the paradoxical situation that is resulting from the advocacy of integration being 
combined with the promotion of specialised assessments, as witnessed at the lAlA Annual 
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prior to becoming a normative pillar of SEA, integratioff~recognised as critical in EIA 
literature and practice. The reasons are clearly expressed by Burdge and Vanclay 
(1995:54): 
'EIA will be most successful when fully integrated with planning at the 
appropriate level of jUl1sdiction .. . When this integration is accomplished, 
both social and environmental factors become central to planning decisions, 
rather than being treated as external or peripheral to the planning process. 
Achieving such integration requires a sound understanding of the nature of 
planning ... and how advances in knowledge about impact assessment . .. can 
fit into modem planning models. Additionally, functional integration of the 
key components of planning processes, from project inception to 
postdevelopment monitoring . .. is essential because, as a dynamic process, 
planning requires data collection across time and ongoing revision of plans to 
ensure that planning goals are being met'. 
It is therefore less surprising that in their international overview of SEAs, Sheate et al. 
(2001 : 81) find that 
'one of the major success factors of SEA is its ability to force decision 
makers to consider the environment at key stages in the policy making cycle. 
SEA acts as a series of hooks from the integration strategy linking to the 
policy making strategy ensuring that the two processes inform each other'. 
Several authors p ropose the idea of a chain reaction, which would see SEA using and 
promoting integration, and eventually leading to more sustainable PPPs. For example, 
Glasson (1995:715-6) found that at the regional scale, 'SEA may have considerable 
potential as an instrument for the integration of socio-economic development and the 
bio-physical environment [ ... and] can be seen as providing a potentially effective 
vehicle for promoting sustainable development'. A similar proposition is made by Lee 
and Kirkpatrick (1999, in Noble 2002: 11), though at the much wider scale of 
international agreements: 'integration has become a favoured means of increasing the 
effectiveness of [environmental assessment] . .. in decision making in order to promote 
sustainable development ' (see also George et at. 2001). The reverse logic is suggested 
by Sheate ef al. (2001 :52), who find that the 'sustainability approach to SEA' is 
beComing more widespread, and that this 'ties in well with the wider integration agenda 
of sustainable development'. 
Conferences (see also Lee 2002: 17), and the rare efforts to understand their synergies (but see 
Petts 1999a). 
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However, this enthusiasm is weakened by concerns. Process integration, if taken too far, 
can undermine SEA's impact on the policy process. Brown and Therivel (2000: 187) 
discuss the 'tendency of convergence of SEA and other planning methodologies', 
arguing that some existing PPP development activities may already 'constitute effective 
SEA or, more likely, represent elements of SEA', in which case SEA should aim to 
'supplement them where they are deficient'. This is seen by the authors as a benefit, but 
also as a problem, as it could lead to the underestimation of what SEA should achieve, 
and could provide an easy way out for those who wish to contain SEA 's role and impact, 
enabling them to argue that 'we do it already though we don't call it SEA' (Brown and 
Therivel 2000: 187). Eggenberger and Partidario (2000:202) are even more cautious, 
arguing that although it is increasingly suggested that SEA is an intermediate stage in 
the path towards full integration, it should be noted that integration itself 'is currently 
considered too complex and hard to materialise, given the lack of methodologies and 
adequate procedures, and especially, the difficulties in communication and in resolving 
policy options and conflicts among stakeholders'. Thus, the authors do not question the 
overall goal of integration, but they identify obstacles and propose a research project 
focused on integration and based on the assumption that 'both SEA and spatial planning 
have to opt for integration in order to unfold their full potentials with regard to 
contributing to a,more sustainable development of our living space' (2000:205). 
Brown, Therivel, Eggenberger and Partidario are all reflecting not only on the 
complexity and dynamism of strategic initiatives, but also on their purpose and role, thus 
lending support to the argument being developed in this section. These issues are partly 
a matter of context, and again, clarifying them is indispensable in order to define 
effective assessment. 
Focusing on an 'early' start 
The third reason for exploring the relationship between SEA and decision-making is the 
common request for SEAs to start as early as possible, which implies - as a minimum 
- knowledge of the timing of the policy process. Like the issue of integration, this can 
be considered a normative pillar of SEA's literature. 
The renewed attention to the concept of decision-making as the focal point for SEA 
(first trend in Table 3-a), and the increasingly prevalent view that SEA can help to 
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improve decision-making processes (Partidario 2000; Brown and Therivel 2000; Caratti 
et al. forthcoming), provide a new context in which to review the much acclaimed - but 
often elusive - rule where by SEA should be applied 'as early as possible' (for 
example: TheriveI et al. 1992; Sadler 1996; Partidario and Clark 2000a; EC 2001). The 
rule is a clear reaction to the well documented failure of EIAs to begin early enough to 
have a substantive influence on decisions, going beyond mitigation and its many 
interpretations (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). Similarly, the literature (both academic 
and practice-oriented, as well as EA regulations) is replete with calls for 'ex-ante', rather 
than 'ex-post' assessments,6 where ex-ante is taken to mean that the assessment should 
precede the moment when a key decision(s) is taken and is irreversible. Above all, SEA 
should not apply to a draft document, as this is associated, usually correctly, with many 
decisions having already been taken.? 
Thus, the timing of an SEA is crucial, and relates to different roles and purposes. Early 
SEAs can attempt to influence, indeed 'improve' the policy process as it develops; ex-
post assessments have an essential auditing role, which can lead to learning and 
improvement of future policy processes. Yet, despite its desirability, practice shows that 
it is extremely difficult to implement the ex-ante rule (for example: Redo and Bina 
1999; Noble 2000; Lee and Kirkpatrick 2001; CIPMA 2001).8 One of the main reasons 
was identified in 1993, by Therivel (1993:164) who saw the 'frequent lack of a specific 
point in time when a decision regarding the PPP is made' as a major difficulty in 
carrying out SEA. This is still part of the problem, and explains why attention is now 
being diverted from methodological issues, to finding and understanding that 'point', 
alternatively called a 'moment' (Partidario 1996), 'stage' (Therivel et al. 1992) or 
'decision window' (Bina et al. forthcoming). 
6 See, for example, the European Handbook on how to apply SEA to Structural Funds (ERM 
1998). 
7 This is especially true given the inheritance of less than perfect EIA practice, which is still 
operating as a single-moment activity on a draft document, both in the developed and developing 
world (for example: Ortolano and Shepherd 1995; Espinoza and Alzina 2001; Bina forthcoming, 
a). Indeed, while some cases meet most of the good practice principles proposed by IAIA 
(2002), many others are simply an application of EIA methods to draft PPPs, or draft groups of 
projects (for example, the Programmatic EAs in the USA - Partidario and Cl ark 2000a). 
Recent examples of assessments that have faced the challenge of 'early input ' can be found in 
~elation to trade evaluations, where the decision-making process can be particularly complex and 
Inconsistent (CIPMA 2001). Lee and Kirkpatrick (2001) distinguish between appraisal, an ex-
ante assessment, and evaluation, an ex-post assessment. Within appraisal they make the further 
distinction between prelimil1aty assessment, to be applied at the early stages of a negotiating 
process, and fuller assessment, relating to the more detailed requirements of the later stages in the 
process. 
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The pillars (or rules) set out above, imply a certain knowledge of how the policy process 
functions and develops over the period of PPP formulation. If the SEA literature has 
treated this somewhat superficially, assuming that PPPs have a beginning and an end 
(like most projects), SEA practice has constantly been confronted with the complexity 
of these processes. The steps-approach to SEA, discussed below (Section 3.3.2), is 
partly an attempt to highlight key moments when there would be an opportunity to 
integrate environmental concerns in the policy process. However, it is based on a 
combination of rationalistic interpretations of these processes, and the technocratic 
approach of most EIA inheritance.9 The key lies in the parallel rule, or hope, of full 
process integration (discussed above). 
In 1998 the EC commissioned a manual for SEA of the highly regulated and structured 
policy process for Regional Development plans and programmes (ERM 1998), an 
example of the attempt to design an SEA approach that would be ex-ante and integrated. 
The legal requirements of the EC facilitated this task by providing a framework of 
planning and decision-making 'points', on which to 'graft' SEA activities (borrowing 
the expression from Brown and Therivel 2000). Great emphasis was placed on the early 
stage of gathering, environmental and sustainability 'baseline data', which was 
considered the best way of influencing the rest of the process. However, the essence of 
the 'moments' in the policy process and the parallel SEA 'steps' remained tied to the 
early normative and technocratic propositions. Practice showed that steps like the 
production of baseline data (an essential starting point for SEA that usually draws on 
state of the environment reports or sustainability strategies), turned out to be 
substantially more complex (for example, Bina et al. 1997). Hilden et al. (2002:8) focus 
on similar themes, conceptualising the policy process as an ongoing and iterative one 
which requires the data from the assessment to be 'available during the preparation' of a 
PPP, and stressing that this 'is a prerequisite' if SEA is to have any influence, since: 
'[t]he crucial point is how, when and in which form the information is exchanged' 
(2002:9; cf Rada~lli 1995). Thus, the moments leading to the production, analysis and 
dissemination of information and knowledge appear to be at the heart of the ex-ante rule. 
The same could be said of the negotiation and debate that accompanies such moments. 
9 
The ErA framework may have led to a certain underestimation of this task, since projects 
~~I~ 's 'objects ') have tended to present a more clear-cut starting point compared to strategic 
lOIttatives. 
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The Analytical SEA (ANSEA) research project funded by the European Commission 
contributes further to this debate, by spelling out developments in half a century of 
decision-making theory that have relevance for the further development of SEA methods 
(Caratti et al. forthcoming) . 10 It then proposes a methodology centred round the 
description and analysis of decision-making, with the aim of identifying 'decision 
windows' through which SEA can best act to integrate environmental and sustainability 
concerns. It suggests a simple framework for identifying decision windows, based on 
three dimensions - information/input, analysis, output/decision - and stresses the 
importance of timing and actors in relation to each dimension. However, the overall 
approach was criticised during the 22nd IAIA Conference for being excessively complex 
and spuriously rationalist. Lee and Kirkpatrick (2001 :397) join the growing number of 
authors who support the basic principle whereby SEA should 'run in parallel with the 
planning and negotiation process' and 'inform critical decisions at the different points in 
that process '. The authors argue that this calls for a focus on the sequence and timing of 
decisions, the need to address the difficulties of simultaneous decisions being taken, and 
the inevitable uncertainty in all these matters, which requires flexibility and adaptation. 
In conclusion, the adjective 'strategic' is indeed significant, but for different 
reasons to those commonly referred to in the literature. It is claimed that the 'strategic' 
nature of SEA's 'object' is less central to the instrument 's raison d ' etre: it is not 
sufficient to justify its existence as a new process and tool (cf. Chapter 2). Instead, this 
crucial adjective is more related to the purpose and process of environmental 
assessment. SEA is to contribute to improve policy-making so that it delivers 
environmentally sustainable outcomes. The narrow interpretation of impact assessment, 
which has somehow undermined EIA's full potential and purpose, is the main target of 
this adjective, which emphasises the function of assessment in relation to the whole 
policy-making process. As Carlo Benedetto [academia] stressed in an interview on SEA 
in Italy: 'if we ~ant to do a strategic assessment, this will be [strategic] only insofar as it 
COnsiders the strategy of the entire process [of planning and decision]'. 11 
-----------------------
10 in~he author .was involved in this project until 2001 (see Chapter 4) and some of its results 
11 T rrned the field work discussed in Chapter 7. 
ranscript, p.5 
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This shift, from the 'object' to the purpose and process of EA, is implied in the three 
trends identified in Chapter 2 (Table 3-a): SEA is to become more cognisant of policy-
making processes, their rules and characteristics (first trend), in order to be more 
effective in contributing to the formulation of initiatives (second trend) that are 
environmentally sustainable (third trend). The understanding and ability to map, early 
on, the functions and timing of key activities and decision moments throughout the 
policy process, is essential to both the applicability of the ex-ante rule and process 
integration. This, in turn, is crucial if SEA is to play a role that goes beyond auditing and 
mitigation, and even more so, if it is to turn its 'revolutionary purpose' (Wallington 
2002: 1) into something less than elusive. 
Throughout the 1990s EA literature focused increasingly on the need to concentrate on 
processes (Therivel et at. 1992; PeUs 1999a) and to contribute to the improvement of 
decision-making (Verheem 1992),12 however, conceptually and methodologically, this 
'contribution' still needs to be unpacked (Thissen 2000b; ECMT 2000; Brown and 
Therivel 2000; Renton and Bailey, 2000; Furman and Hilden 2001; Nilsson and 
Dalkmann 2001). This Chapter therefore turns to investigate the conceptual (Section 
3.2) and methodological (Section 3.3) dimensions, seeking to support the case for SEA 
as a new concept an\! instrument. 
12 Th, IS not only in the developed world, but also in the context of development planning: in 1991 
~he World Bank (Operational Directive 4.01, 1991) was arguing that: '[t]he purpose of EA is to 
Improve decision-making and to ensure that the project options under consideration are 
environmentally sound and sustainable '. 
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3.2 The concept of environment in SEA 
In an analysis of the ideology of planning, Harvey (1996: 176-177) stresses that wanting 
to achieve 
'a better result. .. assumes some purpose, which is easy enough to specify in 
general but more difficult to particularize about. .. this immediately poses the 
question, useful or better for what and to whom?'. 
The same question ought to be asked of SEA literature. In what sense is SEA supposed 
to 'improve' policy-making processes? What is wrong with the way policy processes 
currently work? This was a question tabled by Tuija Hilding-Rydevik in February 2002, 
at a conference presenting the results of the European research project on SEA and 
decision-making (ANSEA, referred to in Chapter 4).13 The key lies in the desire to 
'improve': as Harvey points out this implies a purpose, and judging from the evolving 
conceptions of SEA, such purpose is linked to the idea that SEA is to contribute to 
sustainable development (second trend, Table 3-a) . Hence, the need to improve policy 
processes derives from the belief that such processes are inadequate in the light of an 
overall objective to achieve sustainable development. 
In this Section and the next, the two chief contributions that SEA is expected to make 
(towards improved policy-making, and towards sustainability) will be explored, 
particularly in the light of their mutual dependence, since it is claimed here that 
improving policy-making is none other than the expression of how SEA can - in 
practice - contribute to sustainable development. To begin with, it is essential to 
explore in some depth the meaning of 'environmental' as one of the three constituent 
dimensions of 'SEA'. Such meaning is far from clear, especially in relation to 
sustainability. 
13 T .. UiJa Hilding-Rydevik is based at Nordregio (Nordic Centre for Spatial Development), and 
was a member of the Advisory Board to the European-funded project. 
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3.2.1 Balancing environment and sustainability 
In the context of impact assessment (to which SEA belongs), reference to the 
'environment' define's the purpose, aim and role of the instrument. However, SEA does 
not appear to draw from a particular political theory, in the way that for example cost-
benefit analysis draws on liberal utilitarianism sired by welfare economics (Weale 
2001a, Owens and Cowell 2002). Hence, it is harder to establish the broader 
assumptions which underlie SEA's raison d'etre and the purpose of its use. The most 
common treatment of 'environment' is in terms of how it determines the scope (and 
boundaries) of the instrument's action. An analysis of the literature and practice reveals 
two main themes: tensions and divisions over the desirability of focussing exclusively 
on environmental protection, and an almost unanimous claim that SEA can, or should, 
contribute to sustainable development. 
Taylor (1984:3) illustrates the interpretation of EIA 's environmental dimension from the 
perspective of governments: '[g]overnment is responsible for protecting the 
environment, but government agencies all too often cause environmental damage as a 
"side effect" of their enthusiastic pursuit of programmatic goals', EIA, since its 
introduction in NEPA, is placed at the centre of the uneasy balancing act between 
environmental and other values (or environmental protection and other goals); it is 
called to help with this balancing effort but, as Taylor notes (1984:5) 'with apparent 
naiVete, the drafters of the statute [NEPA] set no clear standards of what is a COlTect 
"balance" 'between such values, and the law: 
'grandly but vaguely commands the agencies, 'Think more carefully about 
the environment before acting!" '. 
'Clear standards ' and 'correct balance' depend on the sorts of political theory which 
underpin the concept of EIA, and their weakness explains many of the difficulties that 
still confront EIA and SEA (for a recent analysis see Owens and Cowell 2002). 
Despite the substantial body of literature on SEA, there has been little analysis of the 
implications of choosing to focus its scope and role on environment or sustainability. 
NEPA is concerned with the social, cultural and economic dimensions of environment 
and development, as well as with environmental problems as problems in nature (Grove-
White and Szerzynski 1992; Wynne 1996). De facto EIA and SEA have developed very 
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mixed approaches. Ortolano and Shepherd (1995:4) find that the 1970s literature on EIA 
is sometimes 'equivocal' on what 'environment' means; however, by the 1990s 'the 
normative literature on EIA generally uses the term "environment" in a broad sense', 
including social, fisk, visual, cumulative and other dimensions. 14 They (1995: 16) go on 
to argue that '[m]any analysts and some organisations (for example, the World Bank) 
have embraced EIA as a principal tool for ensuring the sustainability of development'. 
Similarly, Piper (2002:18) suggests that '[a]lthough the term sustainable development 
was not common cUlTency when EIA and [cumulative environmental assessment] were 
first conceived, a close association between them has been identified'. 
Indeed, already in the late 1980s Jacobs and Sadler (1989) advocate environmental 
assessment as a key to sustainable development. 15 This function becomes increasingly 
central in the 1990s, promoting a broadening of SEA's scope (like in the case of EIA) 
beyond a strict environmental focus . Increasingly, it includes either social issues, some 
consideration of the economic implications of the proposal and its alternatives, or 
attempts to conduct a sustainability assessment of the proposal. Partidario (2000:651; 
see also 2003) highlights that SEA practitioners: 
'have recognized that environmental assessment must understand and 
integrate~ sustainable development principles and not focus entirely on 
physical and ecological issues. Hence the increased use of the concept of 
impact assessment, as widely promoted by the International Association for 
Impact Assessment'. 
14 As noted in <;:hapter 2, EIA and Social lA (SIA) are both formalised - albeit in different 
degrees - through NEPA in 1969 and since then, Burdge and Vanclay (1995:36) argue that 'SIA 
has become a part of project planning and policy evaluation and part of ... ETA as a result of the 
recognition that social considerations must be included alongside and even in lieu of solely 
~conomic criteria in the evaluation and decision process. The definition of the environment in 
Impact assessment has been expanded to include a "social component" '. Although much has been 
achieved (Wolf 1980; Vanclay 1999; 2002), EIA practice is still far from meeting this ideal, and 
~fcial impacts (at project and policy levels) are often being assessed through a separate SIA. 
At the 22nd Annual Meeting of the IAIA many keynote speakers from private, public and 
research/academic sectors, spoke in favour of a closer link between impact assessment and 
Sustainable development (Langeweg 2002; Weaver 2002; Klimpt 2002; Kjorven 2002; Au 2002). 
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It is increasingly common to find SEAs that address social and economic aspects of 
development to varying degrees. A recent SEA of tourism development in Fiji (Levett 
and McNally 2003:xiv) concludes: '[t]he assessment shows the importance of looking at 
social and econoinic issues together with environmental issues. This proved vital for 
gaining a good understanding of the situation and formulating practicable and 
achievable recommendations' (see also: ERM 1998; Hedo and Bina 1999; Bina 2001a; 
IAIA 2002a; Tomlinson forthcoming; Baldizzone et at. 2002; Short et at. 2003).16 The 
combination of the three so-called pillars of sustainability is common in the wide use of 
matrices which combine proposed initiatives or strategies with objectives and, or, 
indicators, as recommended in several SEA guidance documents (Audouin and Lochner 
2000; Majocchi et al. 1999; DHV 1999; ERM 1998).17 Recent World Bank efforts to 
consider adopting SEA show that it supports a wide remit: '[i]nternational experience 
and a number of Bank SEAs seem to confirm that SEA is indeed better placed than 
project-specific EA to assess environmental, social, and economic aspects in an 
integrated fashion ' (Kjorven and Lindhjem 2001 :40).18 
However, although this offers some evidence of what is happening in practice, more 
research is needed to understand the extent and effectiveness of such ad hoc cases. SEA 
praxis is extremel y diverse (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 2003), including many examples 
where the interpretation of 'environment' is strictly linked to ecological and spatial 
elements (Sheate et al. 2001). This diversity epitomises the tension between wanting an 
instrument capable of a strong environmental statement in the policy arena, and wanting 
to address a wider range of issues. 
16 An early example of attempting to translate this objective into practice was the 1992 Dutch 
version of SEA for policies called the E-test. This was happening at a time when, following the 
recommendations of the Brundtland report (WeED 1987), the Government was carrying out 
assessments of the extent to which instruments of various existing policies were contributing to 
sustainable development (Verheem 1992). Hence, the ex-post approach of the government's 
assessment (policy evaluation) was being transformed into an ex-ante one by the emerging E-test 
methodology 17 • 
For example, the guidelines for Strategic Environmental Assessment in South Africa are 
exemplary (Audouin and Lochner 2000: 10), stating that '[t]he fundamental benefit of SEA is that 
it aims to integrate the concept of sustainability into the formulation of plans and programmes' 
?snd ~efining sustain ability as a combination of environmental, social and economic components. 
This was confirmed by a series of interviews carried out by the author (Annex A). 
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Even allowing for the established wisdom whereby SEA should ultimately contribute to 
sustainable development, it is possible to envisage such contribution indirectly (through 
the pursuit of the protection of the natural environment), or directly (by shaping the 
quality of development), with the attempt to integrate environmental concerns in 
development sectors as the middle ground between these two poles. Article 1 of the 
recent European Directive (4212001IEC, EC 2001) is a perfect illustration of this 
potentially multi-layered approach: 
'The objective of this Directive is to provide for a high level of protection of 
the environment and to conuibute to the integration of environmental 
considerations into the preparation and adoption of plans and programmes 
with a view to promoting sustainable development'. 
This Article does not reduce ambiguity: its terms could simply aim to put the result of 
the environmental impact assessment in the wider sustainability context, or have 
substantive implications in terms of the overall nature of the development proposal. 
However, many seem to interpret the letter of this Directive to reflect the priorities of the 
earlier EIA Directive (337/85IEEC), prioritising environmental protection. 19 Indeed, 
quite apart from the experience with the new Directive, the presence of the word 
'environment' in the expression 'SEA' is often viewed as an indication of the 
instrument's focu~ on the natural and physical environment.2o 
Several scholars and practitioners oppose this narrow remit. How can SEA can live up to 
expectations of a contribution to sustainability by interpreting the 'E ' exclusively in 
terms of environment? Hajer (1995:2), for example, maintains that 
'[t]he environmental conflict simply has too many component pruts to be 
understandable if one delimits oneself to one of the many established 
academic domains'. 
Practitioners find that the strategic scope of the initiatives makes it more difficult to 
discuss environmental integration in isolation from social and economic factors. 21 In 
19 This is refle'cted in the many discussions over the last three Annual Meetings of the 
~~ternational Association for Impact Assessment, to which the author participated. 
The author 's own experience as an SEA trainer since 1997, confirms that this issue is raised 
~~nsistently throughout the years. 
Trade is perhaps the most strategic sector assessed to date. The fact that most trade- related 
assessments have tended to be sustainability assessments or appraisals (a term commonly used in 
British literature) may suggest that indeed, the more complex the issue, the more it is deemed 
necessary or useful to look at the interaction of potential effect categories. However, some of 
thes.e assessments focus on mitigating environmental externalities, more than on ensuring that the 
environmental dimension influences the substance of the trade agreements (see for example: Lee 
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discussing transport, Tomlinson (2000: 13, see also Baldizzone et at. 2002; MV A et at. 
1999) suggests that: 
'at strategic level, environmental goals cannot be considered in isolation and 
thus SEA tends to develop towards a general strategic assessment, balancing 
the goals and objectives of mobility, safety, environmental protection and 
economic development'. 
However, there are also those who argue that widening the scope of environmental 
assessment instruments may not necessarily always be the right solution. It might dilute 
the impact of the instrument in promoting environmental objectives, since there is a risk, 
which is directly linked to the context of application, whereby 'the dominant force may 
"capture" the appraisal process' taking matters back to the time when there was no EA 
(Lee and Kirkpatrick 2000; Owens and Cowell 2002; Smith and Sheate 2002:268; Wood 
2003). The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 2002:38) warns that 
'in many interpretations of sustainable development, environmental considerations have 
been far too readily subordinated to economic and social interests'. Here again, SEA has 
something to learn from Social Impact Assessment and EIA: 
'Social vatiables were often considered suspect. To ensure the presence of a 
social , component in an EIA, SIA was changed to socio-economic 
indicators ... In practice, the "social" part of the word was not done and 
socio-economic became an economic impact assessment.. . The linkage 
persists today and a goal for SIA must be to separate further the "social" ... 
and enhance the legitimacy of purely social concerns' (Burdge and Vanclay 
1995:55). 
As for ErA, Hilden (2000:64) notes that: 
'[0 ]ver the years there has been some tension on what the "environment" 
means in EIA. One school of thought has argued that the focus on the 
environment is the value added by EIA' (emphasis added), and he suggests 
that EIA should be kept 'as pure as possible'. 
and Kirkpatrick 2001; George et al. 2001; Gibson and Walker 2001; CIPMA 2001; Schramm 
2000; Schuttleworth and Howell 2000). 
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In practical terms, the many interpretations of environment, and of the scope of EA 
instruments, have led to problems. Hilden (2000:64) himself recognises that the 
argument above 'leads to a proliferation of all kinds of assessments', with severe 
implications in' terms of the management and effective use of the results of such 
disparate methods and procedures (Box 3-a). He concludes: 
'Presumably the overall result arises through some act of divine wisdom - a 
Deus ex Machina to SOlt out the mess that all the different specialised 
assessments have brought about,?2 
But while there are few signs of a Deus ex Machina that could organise the various 
results, there are clear signs of multiplying tools and growing confusion. Scholars and 
users are faced with the increasing difficulty of making sense of their individual 
meaning, and finding ways of managing them. Some are extending SEA's remit to 
include socio-economic issues (as discussed above), without changing the name 'SEA '. 
For example, Noble and Storey (2001) proposed an SEA framework that recommends 
the definition of environmental, social and economic criteria, even though they never 
refer to it as a sustainability assessment (but see: Lee and Kirkpatrick 2001). The same 
can be said of Hedo and Bina (1999) or ERM (1998)?3 Others are developing separate 
instruments, in terms of name if not substance, and are doing this more often than not 
without an explicit reflection on their positioning viz the alternatives. The European 
Commission adopted a Communication on Impact Assessment (EC 2002a) to assess all 
major policy proposals. Its relationship with the equally recent Directive on 
environmental assessment of plans and programmes remains unclear (EC 2001). 
22 A person capable to bring solutions to extremely complex situations (it was a divinity who 
appeared on the scene of Greek tragedies leading to unthinkable results in relation to such 
complex situations). 
23 Another useful example is provided by Hedo and Bina (1999) who carried out an SEA on two 
(advanced) dri;lft plans emphasising environmental and socio-economic issues at two critical 
(albeit ex-post in that case) stages of the process: the definition of a reference framework (or 
baseline) and the selection of indicators. In defining the reference framework, the authors aimed 
to 'provide a general overview of the state of the region ... including the most important socio-
economic .. . issues', deemed essential since the plans were 'intended to [solve] the region 's main 
structural problems though .. . irrigation .. . Consequently, the reference framework pays particular 
attention to agriculture and social factors, as well as to the environment' (1999:262). This was 
reflected in the indicators: 'a direct reflection of the economic objectives formulated in the plans, 
the ecological characteristics of the region, and other issues of legal and institutional nature 
regarding the regional environmental policy' (1999:263). Out of eight indicators, four were 
socio-economic. 
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Box 3-a Direct experience of the confusion 'on the ground' 
The author was alerted to the extent of the confusion in a number of occasions throughout the PhD, in both 
professional and academic contexts, In particular, at the 22nd annual conference of the International Association 
for Impact Assessment (IAIA 2002), which included seven workshops directly or indirectly related to strategic 
level impact assessment (lA): 
• strategic EA, 
• social lA, 
• health lA, 
• ecological and biodiversity lA, 
• Integrated lA, 
• sustain ability lA, and 
• cumulative lA, 
Not surprisingly towards the end of the six day event, an officer of the Inter-American Development Bank 
expressed the following concern: 1 am less and less clear about how I would be supposed to introduce the 
discussion on strategic EA back at the Bank given all these different versions' (Alzina, pers, comment), 
Interestingly, the training courses for the conference included one by Prof. Richard Morgan on 'fhe nature and 
practice of Impact Assessment ', aimed at clarifying the concepts and principles underlying all forms of lA, and 
emphasizing that they all share similar aims and conceptual bases', though differing In specific 
methodological and technical requirements' (IAIA Conference Programme), More recently, during a lecture to 
MSc students of the London School of Economics, the author was asked several questions regarding: the 
scope of SEA, what the practice showed, how a decision should be taken on whether or not to include social 
and economic dimensions in SEAs, and what was the difference between SEA and sustainability appraisals (a 
British form of sustainability lA), 
In Britain, the rise of 'sustainability appraisals' (a primarily British phenomenon) has 
increasingly divided the discipline, and is having repercussions in the international arena 
where Anglo-Saxon literature has a strong influence, Sheate et al. propose the following 
definitions (2001, glossary) : 
SEA: 'A strategic fmm of EIA, that may be derived from EIA or from policy 
appraisal, but essentially intended to identify and assess the likely significant 
effects of a policy, plan or programme on the environment, the results of 
which are then taken into account in the decision-making process ', 
Sustain ability appraisal: 'a form of strategic assessment that integrates 
environment, social and economic parameters, compared with SEA which 
deals primarily with environment', 
From these definitions it can be infened that the raison d' etre of one instrument is 
simply a factor of the way the scope of the other is defined (but see Short et ai, 2003), If, 
as proposed by Sheate et al., SEA is to be seen as essentially an instrument that 
interprets the 'E' for environment in strict physical and ecological terms, then there may 
be a need for an alternative instrument that will deal with the other dimensions of 
Sustainability, Smith and Sheate (2002:264) propose a further element of distinction by 
streSSing that sustainability appraisals attach 'equal weight to the consideration of 
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economic, social and environmental issues ' (emphasis in the original). But it remains 
unclear how different this concept actually is when compared to Sadler and Verheem 's 
(1996) requirement to consider SEA results 'on a par' with socio-economic ones, a 
clause which has been used by many to expand the scope of SEAs, as shown above. 
On the ground, sustainability appraisals have triggered a mixed response. They have 
been welcomed by many local authorities (Short et al. 2003) but also criticised: 
'for [their] lack of quantification and for the "poor science" involved in its 
environmental analyses' and for potentially 'marginalis[ing] the very 
environmental and social appraisals that it is supposed to bolster as a 
counterpoint to dominant fmancial and economic assessments ' (RCEP 
2002:98; also O'Riordan 2002). 
This criticism is based on the following idea of purpose: 
'[t]he purpose of environmental appraisal must be to integrate environmental 
concerns into primarily non-environmental areas of decision-making ... the 
environmental component of sustainability appraisal must be strengthened, 
as a condition for its retention' (RCEP 2002:98). 
It reflects the ideology underlying the Twenty-third Report of RCEP, which appears 
closer to NEPA's spirit of ecological rationality, and critical of enthusiastic support of 
vague interpretations of sustainability. Owens and Cowell (2002:2) reflect on the fact 
that 'sustainable development seemed to move the debate beyond "limits to growth" and 
therefore to mark a departure from the old forms of conflict between development and 
conservation'. However, EIA and SEA experience shows that simply referring to, or 
even aiming for, sustainable development, does not solve per se the fundamental 
questions expressed by Taylor (1984) at the beginning of this Section, on how to balance 
values and goals . 
A different angle is proposed by K0rn0v and Thissen (2000) who suggest that the main 
issue is whether SEA is an advocative or neutral instrument, not whether it should 
promote environmental protection or sustainability. In either case this would make SEA 
'a stakeholder itself' so that '[a]s a consequence, SEA plays an advocative role' 
(2000:197-198). If, however, this mission is substituted, by 'the ambition to provide 
integrated assessments and decision process support', then a different role is required: 
'[that of] a neutral position with respect to the issues at hand and the stakeholders 
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involved, and an equal ability on the part of the analyst to understand the different stakes 
and points of view'. Thus, 
'SEA's dilemma is whether to stick to the original objectives, provide partial 
analyses and play an advocative role, or to aim at "good" decision-making 
by providing balanced overall assessments and "outside" support to the 
learning and negotiation process of stakeholders and policy-makers' (K0m0v 
and Thissen 2000:198). 
Although this may explain some of the recent proliferation of instruments, it draws on 
the contested assumption that instruments can be neutral, and fails to recognise that an 
abandonment of the central focus on environment would lead to the elimination of SEA, 
or any EA, and not simply to a change in their role. 
This Section has shown that literature and practice tend to include social and 
sometimes economic factors within the 'environmental' dimension of SEA. This may 
indicate user preference for fewer instruments - or indeed, a preference for 
sustainability-type assessments, independently of what the actual instrument is called, 
reflecting perhaps a greater 'legitimacy' (to borrow the term from Burdge and Vanclay 
1995, above) in dealing with sustainable development as opposed to the environment 
only; 24 or the perception that thinking in strategic terms implies the coordinated 
treatment of all three pillars. However, reservations about replacing environmental 
protection with wider sustainability objectives remain. These different attitudes towards 
EA echo the changes in the wider debate on the radical environmental critique of the 
1970s, sustainability and ecological modernisation (Hajer 1995),25 therefore, if the 
purpose of SEA is unequivocally identified with the pursuit of sustainability, it is 
essential to understand how it relates to such debate and to the expectation that the 
instrument will contribute to an improved policy-making process. The next Section 
explores some of the challenges. 
24 Note the parallel with 'green' plans evolving into sustainable development strategies (OECD 
~nd UNDP 2002:37). 
5 The 1980s saw the emergence of a new policy-oriented discourse in environmental politics 
that could be labelled "ecological modernization" ... the discourse that recognises the structural 
character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, 
economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment... [E]cological 
~odernization basically follows a utilitarian logic: at the core of ecological modernization is the 
Idea that pollution prevention pays' (Hajer 1995 :25-6), (see also: Mol 1996; Christoff 1996; 
Blowers 2000; Huber 2000; Langhelle 2000). 
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3.2.2 Acknowledging and understanding the challenge 
Substantive change 
Independently of how far different authors take the link between SEA and the pursuit of 
sustainable development, there can be little doubt that, in practice, the challenges posed 
by the mere suggestion of such a link are considerable. Owens and Cowell (2002: 168) 
show that sustainable development is not a concept ready for use: 'a splendid item of 
furniture for self-assembly, the component parts simply waiting to be connected through 
use of the appropriate tools', and conclude that it has instead focused attention on 
'claims of environmental integrity, social justice and a dignified quality of life, and on 
the substantial moral and political task of adjudicating between claims that cannot 
always be happily reconciled' . Indeed, with reference to project EIA, Ortolano and 
Shepherd (1995: 16) warn that 
'there are many instances in which EIA has proven seriously deficient as a 
mechanism for attaining environmental policy goals .... Those who see EIA 
as a linchpin in the quest for sustainable development may be disappointed '. 
Of course, many argue that SEA has the advantage of starting at a more strategic level, 
which it is claimed, gives it the possibility to address development and sustainability 
issues more effectively (but cf. Sections 3.1). However this does not eliminate some 
fundamental problems. In 1992, Verheem found that, despite the visionary approach of 
the Dutch Government, which aimed for a close link between SEA and sustainability, 
the effectiveness of SEA in integrating 'sustainability principles' would depend on the 
possibility of making 'the term "sustainable development"" .operable' (1992). A similar 
condition is identified by Ortolano and Shepherd (1995: 16-17) who call for 'an 
unambiguous conceptual definition of sustainable development and a translation of that 
definition into operationally meaningful criteria for decision making ', adding that 'this is 
no simple task' . In addition, they point to a second condition, related to political will: 
'the existence of a governmental body (or process) that ensures that criteria for defining 
[what is] sus~ainable are used as a basis for decision-making'.(Jtherwise, they argue 'EIA 
alone may not prevent unsustainable development' . It is therefore not surprising that in 
1999 Sadler warned that (1999:12) '[d]espite recent advances, EIA and SEA fall short of 
realizing their full potential as a means of providing environmental sustainability 
assurance for development decision-making ' . 
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Thus, the apparent (or implied) linearity of the SEA-sustainability link is misleading. 
The implicit question that underlies it: 'what does it mean for SEA to contribute to 
sustainable development?' has, in fact, no obvious or unique answer, unveiling a 
mismatch between generic support for such link, at least in the most vague term of 
'contributing' to it, and the acknowledgement of the formidable difficulties that it 
implies. Even more specific statements, suggesting that it is the integration of 
assessment and planning processes - rather than SEA per se - which can lead 'towards 
sustainability at the strategic level' (Audouin and Lochner 20bO: 13), leave open 
questions about what exactly this entails. In most SEA literature the analysis of such a 
link does not go far beyond the rhetoric: it is almost as if it is too obvious to warrant 
explanation. This is far from the case. What exactly is meant by such connection: is SEA 
to facilitate the internalisation of the ecological dimension in mainstream PPPs, or is it 
supposed to address the more fundamental question of our consumption patterns and our 
commitment to growth? Interpretations of sustainable development span these two 
extremes, and will have different implications for the instrument's role in policy 
processes. 
Sustainability can be a very weak point of reference for SEA, as political systems tend to 
pay little more than.Jip service to this concept. Fischer and Hajer (1999) argue that the 
global 'discourse coalition' behind sustainable development has advanced institutional 
efforts and arrangements with typical modernist features, including policy planning and 
risk assessment. They discuss the weakness of the conceptual basis for sustainable 
development: ,[e]ssentially, the concept suggests that we "can have it all", both further 
growth and a cleaner environment' (1999:2),26 and argue that interpretations of 
sustainable development at best facilitate the internalisation of the ecological dimension 
in institutional thinking, failing to question the viability of endless material growth and 
consumption. While 'in the 1970s the new social movements dare to bring moral 
considerations and hold these against any economic calculation' (Hajer 1995 :94), 
ecological modernization and sustainable development as defined in the Brundtland 
26 Bill Clinton's pleas to India to save the environment while continuing to grow, provides a 
concrete example of this : '''Pollution has managed to do what 350 years of wars, invasions and 
natural disasters have failed to do," he said. "It has begun to mar the magnificent walls of the Taj 
Mahal." Mr Clinton asked India not to let growth get in the way of preserving the environment. 
"Give us a chance to work with your scientists to prove you can achieve even greater economic 
growth and make the environment cleaner." '(The Guardian 2000). 
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Report 'can also be seen as a strategy of political accommodation of the radical 
environmentalist critique of the 1970s ' (1995:32-33). 
Some of the SEA theory and praxis discussed earlier can be seen as a representation of 
these limits. However, there are exceptions. The early experience of The Netherlands, in 
linking sustainable development to SEA seemed promising. The Dutch interpreted the 
European EIA Directive (337/85IEEC) to include some PPPs and, by 1989, the link 
between assessing strategic initiatives and the pursuit of sustainable development had 
become established (Therivel 1993). The Netherlands' National Environmental Policy 
Plan of 1989 and 1990, which define the country's environmental strategy for the next 
decade, called for assessment of 'the extent to which ... various policy areas contribute 
to effecting sustainable development' (Action A141 in Therivel 1993:154). The driving 
force behind this requirement, and the explicit link to sustainable development, came 
from a 1988 report by the State Institute for Health and Environment: Concern for 
Tomorrow, calling for significant reductions in certain emissions aimed at achieving 
more sustainable levels, and recognising that such reductions: 
'would require changes of consumption and production patterns as well as 
end-of-pipe techniques' (de Jongh 1991 in TheriveI1993:154). 
A reminder of the complexities that would have to be addressed when employing SEA 
to promote sustainability. 
The capacity to promote substantive change will depend on how environment, 
sustainable development and SEA will be understood and used. SEA could be 
interpreted as yet another 'modernist feature' deflecting from 'the structural character of 
the environmental problematique' (Hajer 1995:25). Indeed, Therivel and Partidario 
(2000:277) conclude that to date most SEA's have been 'tools for "ecological 
modernization" , and that this allows 'decision-makers to enter the heaven of 
environmental righteousness after having survived the purgatory of writing an SEA 
report', but. having made limited substantive progress towards sustainable 
development. 27 
27 
The tension between different ways of addressing emissions reductions, highlighted by de 
Jongh (1991 , see above), is a case in point. 
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The range of understanding testifies to the struggle of SEA literature and practice with 
the process of conceptualising sustainability; a process captured thus by Owens and 
Cowell (2002:4): 
'we might expect interpretations of sustainability - the emergence of 
particular conceptions - to be constrained by existing institutions, so that the 
new idea could be absorbed seamlessly with little threat to the status quo; 
alternatively, we might postulate that the very process of interpretation could 
stimulate institutional learning, leading ultimately to meaningful and lasting 
policy change '. 
Yet, despite the differences, Hajer himself (1995:33) acknowledges that ecological 
modernisation could be seen as 'the first step on a bridge that leads towards a new sort 
of sustainable modern society'. Indeed, the analysis of trends in conceptions of SEA 
(Section 2.3) reveals a desire to use SEA to help achieve a stronger version of 
sustainability that goes beyond the 'simple' internalisation of physical dimensions, or 
the seamless absorption of environmental or sustainability issues without questioning 
substantive choices. Therivel and Partidario (2000:277) claim that 'SEA has the 
potential to ... incorporat[e] "true sustainability" targets or carrying capacities into 
strategic actions'. However, this would require 'a substantial rethinking of the approach 
toward SEA', partly represented by Wiseman's dictum that 'SEA should focus on the 
effect of the environment on development, not development on environment' (Therivel 
and Partidario 2000:278). 
The weakness in capacities to plan 
It is from this perspective of delivering sustainability that policy-making looks 
inadequate, as was suggested in the opening paragraph to this Section. Planning, in 
particular, has been recognised as the chief delivery mechanism of sustainable 
development. Owens and Cowell (2002: 13) state that the 'rapidly diffusing attention to 
sustainable development coincided with, and promoted, a resurgence of interest in 
national and land-use planning' and that this can be traced to the international sphere 
(WCED 1987; UNCED 1992a; EC 1992b)?8 In the United Kingdom, the first national 
28 
One of the most recent examples is that of The Millennium Development Goals, an agenda for 
reducing poverty and improving lives that world leaders agreed in the Millennium Declaration 
for attaining peace and security, human rights and sustainable development, in September 2000 
(UNDP 2000). The wording of The Millennium Development Goals illustrates the relationship 
between all the parts of what seems a 'sustainability puzzle' : Goal 7 'Ensure environmental 
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strategy for sustainable development sees planning 'as "a key instrument" for delivering 
tP~ Q4d tpcv~// 
sustainable land-use change' %2002: 14). However, a decade later, evidence suggests that 
the idea of planning as a delivery mechanisms is still largely a promise (OECD and 
UNDP 2002; RCEP 2002; Owens and Cowell 2002) and the OECD and UNDP 
(2002:27 and 76) find that - in both developed and developing world - '[a]chieving 
sustainable development will require deep structural changes and new ways of working 
in all areas of economic, social and political life' and that it needs a 'strategic approach' 
and the strengthening of 'capacities to plan ' . They therefore focus on institutional 
capacity for the effective development of national strategies.29 This capacity gap is 
confirmed in discussions at a recent seminar on SEA organised by the Department for 
International Development (UK) and the OECD, in which the author participated.3D 
It is the problems with planning that Tuija Hilding-Rydevik (introduction to Section 
3.2), amongst others, considers as the starting point when establishing a role for SEA. 
The changing relationship between SEA and its 'object' (Section 3.l.2) and the evident 
trend towards greater attention to decision-making and the overall policy process, all 
point in the direction of a re-conceptualisation of what SEA is about, and what it is 
expected to do. Early signs of these changes are visible in the mid-1990s through the 
experience with EIA: 
'EIA has really only been necessary because planning has largely failed the 
community in terms of the latter's environmental concerns. It is time for 
planning to demonstrate that it can take the initiative again' (McDonald and 
Brown 1995:494). 
sustainability' includes as the first target 'Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environment resources' (UNDP 2000). 
This implies that environmental sustainability is the goal, strategic initiatives (PPPs) are the chief 
delivery mechanism, and since these need greater integration (both thematic and organisational), 
and SEA is considered one of the mechanisms that can make such integration happen, it becomes 
a crucial player itself. Indeed, integration (Section 3.1.2) is central to the SEA debate and is 
considered the essence of environmental sustainability (OECD and UNDP 2002). 
29 This seems to confirm that ecological modernization may provide an inadequate conceptual 
basis for SEA, since it tends to suggest 'that environmental problems can be solved in accordance 
~ith the workings of the main institutional arrangements of society '(Hajer 1995 :3). 
The meeting discussed the usefulness of SEA in relation to Poverty Reduction Strategies. A 
number of interventions by government officials and consultants confirmed that the greatest 
challenge they are facing is the poor ability to plan and think strategically, which leads amongst 
other things, to the failure of considering the environmental dimension of poverty [d6-
SeminarIDFID-OECD-DAC]. 
Chapter 3 Re-conceptualising SEA - an initial proposition 72 
With this statement, McDonald and Brown clearly link the existence, and raison d'etre, 
of project-level EA to the failure of planning from the perspective of environmental 
protection. Planning and the plans themselves need to improve, and McDonald and 
Brown (1995:493) want to move 'beyond EIA " absorbing it 'into project planning and 
design'. They recommend incorporating environmental goals into plans, referring to 
concepts of resources and sink capacity, developing 'comprehensive plans' which could 
map characteristics . and constraints, thus providing 'a necessary basis for rational 
decision-making', and promoting coordinated planning systems at national, regional and 
local levels (1995:490). This list of recommendations strongly echoes some of the key 
messages in RCEP's recent Report on Environmental Planning (2002: 1-8, see also 
Jongman 2002), suggesting a certain overlap between what is expected from assessment 
and planning instruments. 
Reflecting on the future of impact assessment, Caldwell (2000:n.a.) argues that 
'[s]trategic planning and implementation are needed to enable the impact assessment 
process to realize its purpose' (emphasis added). In other words, the existence of an 
'object' for SEA is not to be taken for granted. A similar conclusion is reached at the 
SEA workshops of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in 2002: 
'currently, the fact that decision-making is not linear is a major reason for practitioners' 
frustration with SEA' (Fischer 2002b:n.a.). 
The similarity between what is expected of both instruments (assessment and planning) 
is therefore striking. This is explained by the weakness of the strategic level of planning 
and decision-making, which implies that to promote environmentally sustainable 
development, SEA must be more directly involved in various critical stages of such 
processes, operating upon its 'object': the planning instrument, in order for it to 
contribute to sustainability. This explains the normative calls for SEA to have a role in 
thejormulation of strategic initiatives, made in recent years by a number of scholars. At 
the 23
rd 
Annual Meeting of the IAIA, Wolf (2003) argued that: 
'the field of impact assessment may be characterized in two phrases, 
"comprehensive and integrated" and "proactive and creative" -
comprehensive in its coverage of assessment levels, scales, schedules, and 
sectors and integrated across disciplines, methods, and perspectives; 
proactive in its anticipation of trends and events, and creative in conceiving, 
devising, and implementing prefelTed alternative futures '. 
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decision-making', and promoting coordinated planning systems at national, regional and 
local levels (1995:490). This list of recommendations strongly echoes some of the key 
messages in RCEP's recent Report on Environmental Planning (2002:1-8, see also 
Jongman 2002), suggesting a certain overlap between what is expected from assessment 
and planning instruments. 
Reflecting on the future of impact assessment, Caldwell (2000:n.a.) argues that 
'[s]trategic planning and implementation are needed to enable the impact assessment 
process to realize its purpose' (emphasis added). In other words, the existence of an 
'object' for SEA is not to be taken for granted. A similar conclusion is reached at the 
SEA workshops of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in 2002: 
'currently, the fact that decision-making is not linear is a major reason for practitioners' 
frustration with SEA' (Fischer 2002b:n.a.). 
The similarity between what is expected of both instruments (assessment and planning) 
is therefore striking. This is explained by the weakness of the strategic level of planning 
and decision-making, which implies that to promote environmentally sustainable 
development, SEA must be more directly involved in various critical stages of such 
processes, operating upon its 'object': the planning instrument, in order for it to 
contribute to sustainability. This explains the normative calls for SEA to have a role in 
the formulation of strategic initiatives, made in recent years by a number of scholars. At 
the 23rd Annual Meeting of the IAIA, Wolf (2003) argued that: 
'the field of impact assessment may be characterized in two phrases, 
"comprehensive and integrated" and "proactive and creative" -
comprehensive in its coverage of assessment levels, scales, schedules, and 
sectors and integrated across disciplines, methods, and perspectives; 
proactive in its anticipation of trends and events, and creative in conceiving, 
devising, and implementing preferred alternative futures'. 
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However, he recognised that 'there has been an evident lack' of provision for foresight 
and the early entry in policy processes. He appealed to the rATA community to shift its 
attention from the 'back end' of the assessment cycle (such as monitoring) to the 'front 
end', and in partitular to: 'needs assessment, problem identification (or creation), 
normative planning, and environmental and community design '. Wolf calls for rATA to 
become an environment and development association. He argues (2003:2) that 
assessment experts should become cognizant of planning and go beyond the original 
(and still poorly met) aim of 'getting in earlier' in the planning -process; instead they 
should 'actually mak[e] up the game [the plan] itself'. The conclusions of the Annual 
Meeting (Fischer 2003b:n.a.) reveal that SEA is not 'just used to support decision 
making, but also to manage decision processes' (emphasis added), thus moving closer to 
the role of planning itself. Similar propositions are made by Brown and Therivel 
(2000:187): 'SEA methodology should emphasise the role of SEA as a PPP [policy, plan 
or programme] formulation tool [ ... ] SEA should start early in PPP formulation and be 
integrated, preferably as an active intervention in the PPP design process', concluding 
that '[t]he real value in SEA is as a creative tool in the cycle of PPP formulation and 
reformulation'. While Partidario (2000:661) argues that the aims and benefits of SEA 
are 'to help achieve sustainable development by changing the way decisions are made' 
(emphasis added)., 
Two important works have tried to interpret what the future of SEA (and EA) is likely to 
be in the longer term, and in doing so, have indirectly addressed the issue of overlapping 
functions between assessment and planning. Sadler (1999:31) focuses on the idea of a 
'transition' from ElA, to SEA to Environmental Sustainability Assessment (ESA) that 
essentially requires 'a paradigm shift in ElA thinking and practice ': 
'ETA is a "first-generation" process typically concerned with mitigating the 
impacts of major developments rather than maintaining the capacity and 
integrity of natural systems. 
SEA has emerged as a second-generation process that addresses both the 
sources and symptoms (or effects) of environmental damage. 
ESA is a next-generation process that requires methodological and 
institutional advances and the use of a suite of policy and management tools 
for full cost analysis of development proposals. A parallel integration of ETA 
and socio-economic appraisal methods will be necessary to promote an all-
encompassing form - sustainability analysis (SA)' (1999:29). 
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However, while Sadler envisions a paradigm shift, he remains nonetheless attached to a 
strong role for EA as a process in itself. A step further is proposed by Partidario (1996) 
and Eggenberger and Partidario (2000) who see SEA as an intermediate stage in the path 
towards full process integration, which - once attained - may not necessarily involve a 
separate assessment instrument: 
'full environmental integration is the ultimate means by which sustainable 
development can be achieved... SEA has a significant and distinctive, 
though temporalY, role... SEA can help in increasing integration of 
environmental issues in the development of policies... It forces the 
introduction of systematic practices ... Once sound environmental integrated 
approaches have been achieved, then SEA has played its role and may no 
longer be necessalY' (Partidruio 1996:34, emphasis added). 
This interpretation suggests a greater overlap between assessment and planning 
functions. However, as the authors recognise themselves, it may be a long time before 
such 'full environmental integration' is attained. Meanwhile Hilden (2000:68) warns 
that 
'[a]ssessments that are fully integrated into the planning process may appear 
as an ideal in the rational planning view of assessments, but in a world of 
conflict and diverse interests such assessments may be counter productive. In 
controversial issues a partly independent assessment may be a precondition 
for a meaningful public debate '. 
This is an important plea not to forget the role of EA as a control mechanism, as an 
independent evaluation and auditing instrument (Caratti et al. forthcoming). The way 
forward may be to combine the approach of Sadler and Eggenberger and Partidario. 
3.2.3 Summary 
This analysis suggests that the environmental dimension of SEA is crucial to its raison 
d'hre and role. This focus explains the divisions in the literature and practice, which are 
leading to the proliferation of alternative mechanisms such as sustainability appraisals or 
strategic as~essments . However, it is also clear that a narrow focus on the natural 
environment is increasingly questioned, and the scope of SEA is being extended to 
include social and economic issues. This seems inevitable when considering that the 
ultimate purpose of SEA is to contribute to sustainable development. However, the 
pursuit of environmental sustainability may reduce the risk of diluting the weight of 
environmental concerns in the framework of vague concepts of sustainability and 
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ecological modernisation. This 'contribution' is linked to the growing expectation that 
SEA is to improve policy-making. It is argued that this refers, first and foremost, to the 
instrument's potential to improve policy processes so that they can establish 'what it 
means for development to be sustainable' (Owens and Cowell2002:25). 
In conclusion, the implications of trends in SEA conceptions (Table 3-a) are indeed far-
reaching since the instrument is being asked to address both the weakness of 
sustainability conceptions, and of the policy-processes intended to deliver them. These 
expectations translate into major challenges (Degeling 1995; Owens and Cowell 2002; 
Jongman 2002) and profound changes in the nature and role of SEA which is still 
perceived as closely linked to EIA-type practices. It is argued that SEA's purpose entails 
a deeper involvement in policy-making with the aim of promoting 'better' development 
in terms of environmental sustainability. Its role is likely to include the provision of an 
arena in which the moral and political dilemmas over the meaning of sustainable 
development and environmental sustainability will have to be addressed. Dialogical as 
well as technical assessment processes may become essential, together with the use of a 
combination of hard and soft sciences (cf. the second and third trend summarised in 
Table 3-a). This is discussed in the next Section. 
3.3 Assessment as a strategic process 
Initially, SEA was a response to the difficulties that have characterised the application of 
EIA, and the frustrations often resulting from the way it was used rather than conceived 
(Chapter 2). The previous sections have shown that these problems represent something 
more complex than technical failures and that it is possible that disciplinary bias has led 
to premature conclusions as to what was needed next: primarily technical fixes. Early 
SEA forms have tended to respond to problems representing the tip of the iceberg, often 
ignoring substantial difficulties hiding beneath the surface, such as the significant 
shortcomings in policy-making itself. 
By relating the adjective 'strategic' to the assessment process, significant progress is 
achieved, both conceptually and in terms of practice. The evolution, and refinement of 
SEA methodologies and tools, can be discussed in terms of three areas of emphasis: the 
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first is the attempt to relate the instrument to the specific nature of the various strategic 
initiatives (for example, the PPPs), the second witnesses a new interest in decision-
making theory, and the third turns to policy analysis and cognitive factors in decision-
making to explore riew approaches to assessment. Each is discussed in turn. 
3.3.1 Relating SEA methods and tools to the nature of the 'object' 
Despite being a narrow interpretation of the meaning of 'strategic' in relation to SEA 
(cf. Section 3.1), focusing on the diverse characteristics of the 'object' of assessment has 
important effects on the methodological evolution of this instrument (cf. the second and 
third trends in Table 3-a). 
Since the late 1980s, SEA practice has developed along increasingly diverse paths 
(Section 2.2.2). Although a number of authors find that it has continued to reflect ErA 
methods and procedures (Caratti et al. forthcoming; Sheate et al. 2001; Noble and 
Storey 2001; Therivel and Partidario 1996 and 2000; Verheem 1992), there is also 
growing evidence of significant changes. Bailey and Renton for example, point to the 
'distinct rejection by government agencies of [project-based type] EIA of policies " and 
stress that these a!tencies 'are willing to integrate environmental concerns into their 
policy formulation procedures, but not by means of a simple extension of EIA to the 
level of policy' (in: Brown and Therivel 2000: 186). 
There is a fast growing literature critical of the use of EIA methods and tools in SEA 
practice, arguing that these reduce the potential of SEA (Sadler 1999; Baldizzone et al. 
2002; Ofiate et al. 2002; Partidario and Clark 2000a). Although some authors consider 
the issue as a matter of 'scope and scale' (Treweek 1999:22), Sheate et al. (2001:78) 
argue that '[t]he inheritance of EIA has, in the past, perhaps acted as a constraint on 
developing more appropriate SEA methodologies because of the focus on technical 
detail' (see also: Therivel et al. 1992; Clark 2000; Brown and Therivel2000; Noble and 
Storey 2001; Car~ttti et al. forthcoming). By the mid-1990s the link between the level (or 
tier) of a particular initiative and the type of assessment approach and tools becomes 
central to the debate on SEA. Examples of SEA of 'policies' are being added to the 
more copious body of work at programme and plan levels, largely - though not 
exclusively - due to the burgeoning field of trade agreement assessments (Blanco 
forthcoming; CIPMA 2001; Lee and Kirkpatrick 2001; George et al. 2001; Partidario 
Chapter 3 Re-conceptualising SEA - an initial proposition 77 
and Clark 2000a; Elling 1997). This brings to the forefront the different nature of a 
policy process compared to that for land-use plans (explored in the next paragraphs), and 
requires a fresh look at the relationship between assessment and 'PPPs'. 
While EIAs mainly deal with development projects with clear technical and spatial 
dimensions, conducive to being assessed in terms of likely environmental impacts, the 
initiatives subject to SEA can be far less 'concrete' (Sheate et al. 2001). This is 
illustrated in Figure 3-b, based on the findings of a study carried out on behalf of the 
European Commission, comparing SEA methodologies for transport corridors 31 from 
five countries (Bina 2001a). Moving from right to left, along the horizontal axis, the 
emphasis switches from spatial and technical aspects to policy-type issues (for example, 
fiscal measures to promote public transport). This change reflects the different nature of 
the 'object of assessment' of EIA and SEA. The order, as discussed in Section 3.1.2, is 
only illustrative, since most initiatives combine characteristics from different PPPs and 
even from projects. Here the issue is about the relationship between different types of 
impacts linked to different strategic initiatives, and the implications of this when 
choosing approaches and tools for SEA. Chapter 6 explores this problem in more depth 
with reference to an SEA of a multi-layered initiative including policy and project 
elements. 
31 
Large areas uniting two or more strategic centres, where transport problems could be solved 
through a range of modes. 
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Figure 3-b EIA and SEA -emphasising different issues and types of 'impacts' 
Major aspect. 
--------
Minor aspect 
POLICIES PLANS PROGRAMMES PROJECTS 
Source: adapted from Bina 2001b 
Responding to the growing attention for the 'object' of SEA, Noble and Storey (2001) 
propose three types of assessment, depending on whether it applies: 1) to a proposed 
PPP; 2) to alternative means to address a need (which does not have to involve a 
proposed PPP); or 3) to an existing ppp.32 Thus, the authors acknowledge some of the 
depth and complexity of strategic initiatives, and question the general assumption that an 
SEA must be applied to 'a PPP', and that such PPP must be at the proposal stage. 
Instead, they allow for the on-going nature of such initiatives, without expecting them to 
start and finish at given times (see also Bartlett 2001). No individual initiative (or 'P') 
actually terminates with its 'final decision' and approval. On the contrary, approval 
signals the beginning of implementation and further policy-making. It is an aspect often 
underestimated in the literature, which is also not clear as to whether the next stages 
should still fall within the remit of an SEA (i.e. be part of its 'object'). 
32 Fischer (2002a) also focuses on the 'object' of SEA, and acknowledges that reality often 
Contradicts the normative description of Lee and Wood (1978). However, his response is itself 
normative, as he calls for planning systems to adapt to the ideal hierarchic framework (see 
Section 2.3), while the three SEA types of Noble and Storey (2001) place greater emphasis on the 
Context in which they apply, or could apply, and less on the nature of the initiative itself. 
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Some authors have begun to highlight the essential role of SEA after the decision. 
George et al. (2001:318) turn to EIA experience and argue that '[m]any of the lessons 
that have been learned from capacity building for EIA in developing countries are 
relevant to trade impact assessment', including the importance of mechanisms for 
monitoring impacts 'in view of the greater uncertainty in impact prediction [at strategic 
levels] '. Building up the links between initiatives and ensuring that broad strategic 
directions are canied all the way to project level is also considered a priority. 
Walling ton (2002:3) stresses that 'although "the decision" does influence environmental 
outcomes, policy is more often made in the processes of negotiation and compromise 
that characterise the incremental process of implementation' (emphasis in original). For 
example, the SEA canied out by the Provincia di Milano (Baldizzone et at. 2002) on the 
land-use plan for the entire Milanese Province, was designed to make a crucial 
contribution to the Plan's implementation, and subsequent stages of negotiation between 
the Province and its municipalities. It achieved this by including the objectives, 
indicators and project selection criteria into the law which approves the Plan itself 
(Provincia di Milano 2002). A similar approach had been promoted in a study 
commissioned by the European Commission and the Italian Ministry of Finance 
(Majocchi et at. 1999), drawing from the EC Handbook for SEA of Structural Funds 
programmes (ERM~ 1998). Moving to developing country contexts, the World Bank 
experience of SEA-type initiatives has also tended to focus on using indicators for 
project screening (rather than selection), (Bina et at. 1999; Kjorven and Lindhjem 2001). 
These efforts will not 'straighten' the twists and turns of imperfect planning systems 
(Figure 3-a), which may be a desirable outcome amongst supporters of a more tiered and 
rational policy-making arena, but they can at least contribute to strengthen the linkages 
between strategic levels, and between these and projects (discussed and illustrated in 
Chapters 5-7). However, new approaches and tools are necessary but not sufficient to 
address the challenges discussed in Section 3.2. More substantive changes to the 
conceptual basis of SEA are discussed below. 
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3.3.2 Decision-making theory: lessons for EIA and SEA processes 
The third trend identified in Section 2.3 (see Table 3-a) suggests that focus on the 
original concepts of prediction, evaluation and mitigation of impacts can be insufficient 
to contribute to the formulation of PPPs, as is now expected of SEA. This pushes the 
boundaries of 'assessment', requiring different processes and tools, capable of 
addressing the more political, dialogical and subjective dimension of policy-making. 
The emphasis on rationalist concepts is therefore questioned and the range of activities 
that fall within the remit of 'assessment' per se may need to be widened. 
The origins of SEA are deeply rooted in rationalism and positivism. Most SEA 
processes have followed step-by-step frameworks (Table 3-b), which are usually elegant 
and easy to present and explain, but are not without shortcomings. They reflect 
technocratic and 'rational comprehensive' interpretations of the strategic initiatives 
being assessed, and often fail to account for their political dimension (Section 3.1). This 
can lead to the imposition of an order to decision-making processes that results in 
clashes and inefficiencies (Hilden 2000; Flynn et al. 1999). The inherent rigidity is 
compounded by several important assumptions, including that it will be possible, indeed 
straightforward, to id~ntify or formulate objectives and targets, or select and assess 
alternatives and scenarios, ignoring the complexity and obstacles in different contexts of 
application (Chapter 7). 
One of the main triggers for SEA was the need for assessment to consider a wider range 
of alternatives to a proposed initiative (Section 2.1); yet SEA literature and practice are 
unclear about the role of assessment in this respect. Although most authors refer to the 
early assessment of such alternatives as one of the main advantages of SEA, and 
certainly as the key means of contributing to sustainability, many also suggest that SEA 
should formulate such alternatives, thus treading common ground with key planning 
activities. For example, Queralt et al. (2001: 12) relate SEA's potential to integrate the 
'criteria of sustaimlbility in planning proposals' to its 'ability to put forward other 
strategic alternatives and to [start early in] the decision-making process'. 
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Table 3-b Example of SEA steps from a range of sources (1992-2001) 
SEA of transport SEA generic methodology SEA and structural fund SEA in decision-making Steps in SEA and Phases in general 
fora" PPPs plans and programmes climate change structured framework for 
SEA 
• Aim • Decide whether the • Assessment of the • Reason for carrying out • Screening • Phase I - Scoping the 
• Objectives PPP needs SEA environmental situation SEA • Scoping assessment issues 
• Options • Describe PPP's • Objectives, targets and • Who to involve • Analysis of effects • Phase 11 - Describing 
• Mix of options objectives ... identify priorities • Description of PPP* • Mitigation the alternatives 
(production of a alternatives for the PPP; • Draft development • Objectives, topics, • Determination of • Phase /11- Scoping the 
range of scenarios) describe the PPP proposal targets and indicators significance assessment 
• Assessment • Identify key impacts and • Identification of • Description of baseline • Public involvement components (for (identification and their boundaries; alternatives environment • Follow-up example, criteria used 
assessment of establish • Environmental • Description of programme. to evaluate) 
relative indicators/targets; assessment alternative PPPs • Phase IV - Evaluating 
environmental describe current and • Environmental • Test alternatives the potential impacts 
impacts of different likely future indicators • Explain which • Phase V - Determining 
scenarios environmental baseline; • Integration of the results alternative was selected impact significance 
• Option selection. identify problem areas of the assessment into and why • Phase VI- Comparing 
• Predict impacts; cope the final decision. • Describe how PPP has the alternatives 
with uncertainty; been changed as a • Phase VII- Identify the 
evaluate impacts; result of the above best practicable 
compare alternatives; 
• Monitoring. environmental option. 
• Propose mitigation 
measures; propose 
monitoring programme 
• Review SEA report; 
make formal PPP 
decision 
• Monitor and evaluate 
PPPs impacts ... 
Source: Sheate Source: Therivel and Source: ERM 1998:19 Source: Brown and Therivel Source: DETR 2000:30 Source: Noble and Storey 
1992:171 Partidario 1996:6 2000:446 2001 :486 
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These are normative interpretations of what SEA should do. Practice shows that 
identifying and assessing alternatives remain the Achilles' heel of EA at all levels. 
Hilden (forthcoming: 192) notes that, despite the emphasis placed on this issue 'it has 
proven difficult to formulate [alternatives] as part of assessments and policy related 
alternatives have not necessarily been broader than the programme alternatives'. Short et 
al. (2003), having reviewed twenty-five strategic assessments (both environmental and 
sustainability-Ied) in Britain, found that only three of these had formally assessed 
alternatives and when the author asked why (during the 23'd IAIA Conference) Short 
replied that these three had been managed by Riki Therivel (suggesting that her input 
had made the difference), while in the other cases the tendency was to consider this a 
stage in the process which was 'too political' for such 'formal' treatment. 33 
The step-approach is a visible sign of the influence of EIA practice, which continues to 
the present day. However, the use of steps pre-dates EIA, and ties with planning 
(Lawrence 1997; Lawrence 1997a; Lawrence 2000) and decision-making theories 
(Faludi 1987; Nilsson and Dalkmann 2001; Caratti et at. forthcoming). The lists in Table 
3-b are strongly reminiscent of the 'classic model of rational decision' (Lindblom 
1971:28) and problem-solving of the 1940s and 1950s: 
'Faced with-a given problem, 
a rational man [sic] fIrst clmifIes his goals, values, or objectives, and then 
ranks or otherwise organises them in his mind; 
he then lists all impOltant possible ways of - policies for - achieving his 
goals 
and investigates all the important consequences that would follow from each 
of the alternative policies, 
at which point he is in a position to compare consequences of each policy 
with goals 
and so choose the policy with consequences most closely matching his goals' 
(1971:28). 
33 
In an overview of SEA for the transport sector, Bina and Vingoe (2000) have found that of the 
five European countries that had SEA legislation, only the Dutch law included a specific 
requirement for considering alternatives during the assessment. Instead, the interviews with 
Finnish authorities revealed that: 'In Finland, the requirement for consideration of alternatives is 
not included [in the law] on the basis that it may be difficult to find alternatives for certain PPPs 
[ ... ] and therefore a legal requirement would not be helpful' (Bina and Vingoe 2000:16). 
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Social scientists from a range of disciplines (including political science, economics, 
sociology and psychology) have engaged in proposing and analysing rational decision-
making models since the late 1940s (Weber 1947; Simon 1976). The description of what 
would be perfectly rational behaviour was soon criticised. Castles et al. (1971: 16) 
highlighted how social scientists had started to look at the 'assumptions built into 
different branches of the social sciences about how decisions were made by individuals, 
groups, organisations and societies'. Scholars like Simon found that much of the 
theoretical writing conflicted with findings in psychology and sociology on the 
behaviour of decision-makers. Decisions linked to the policy process in the real world 
tend to be far less linear and rational than those described in the 'classical model of 
rational decision' criticised, for example, by Lindblom. Often these processes are also 
less transparent both externally and to the decision-makers themselves, which means 
that it can be difficult to list clearly each decision-making stage,34 making integration of 
planning and assessment all the more complex. 
In a close parallel with developments in decision-making theory in the 1970s, theorists 
and practitioners of EIA and SEA are discovering the limitations of these normative 
models: 
'the moSt common conception of EIA is as a "planning tool"... This 
perspective ... has been referred to as the "technocratic paradigm", since it is 
a view held by engineers and scientists .. . According to this ... paradigm, EIA 
is an element of the "rational model" of planning and decision-making . . . 
This . .. [view] has been criticised because it ignores politics and models 
decision making in an unrealistic way' (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995:3). 
However, despite fundamental criticism, rational models persist. In relation to project 
assessment there remain 'attempts to push EIA towards more rational means of 
screening, scoping and assessment' (Weston 2000). This is vividly demonstrated by a 
recent plea on the SEA discussion server for IAIA members (posted 22 August 2002): 
We are trying to develop a better methodology to evaluate our 
environmental impact[s] ... without using subjective reasoning. It almost 
seems impossible. I discussed the best techniques with many expelts and 
researched extensively. The UNEP, World Bank, individual countries like 
India are all trying to solve this same basic problem ... How do we measure 
the impacts .. . How do we compare unquantifiable effects, to those that are 
quantifiable? How do we determine if a project should go or not? My 
34 
A problem considered common both by interviewees in Italy (Annex A) and in Chile (Chapters 
5-7). 
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question is this: Does anyone know of an accepted methodology or system 
for determining impacts of a project that minimizes subjectivity? It could be 
overall, aspect based, risk based, importance driven ... anything'. 
EA literature continues to emphasise rationalism, using a language dominated by 
rationalist concepts such as 'objective ', 'systematic', and 'comprehensive' (Petts 1999a; 
Stirling 1999; Nilsson and Dalkmann 2001; Ofiate et al. 2002). 
In reaction to the limits of such views, EIA experts have called for a more realistic 
conception of decision-making that embraces political realities and recognises that 'the 
ultimate purpose of EIA is not just to assess impacts; it is to improve the quality of 
decisions ' (Formby 1990:193 in Ortolano and Shepherd 1995:4).35 This shift was partly 
discussed in Section 3.2 in relation to the rising prominence of sustainability, which has 
come to rival the concept of risk (Stirling 1999) in assessment. It represents a major 
departure from the positivist characteristics of most EIA practice and is reminiscent of 
the original purpose defined in NEP A. 
Section 2.1 identifies planning and EIA as the two instruments which inform SEA to this 
day. The problem is that both have been used to reduce political struggles and arguments 
to 'technical arguments for which a "rational" solution can easily be found' (Harvey 
1996: 188). For in conceptualising environmental problems as problems in nature 
(Grove-White 1993; Grove-White and Szerzynski 1992) EIA emphasises the need for 
more, and better, scientific knowledge, and most EIA practice is heavily based on 
impact prediction and control. The social critique of scientific knowledge (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986; Beck 1992; Beck 1996; Lash et al. 1996; Wynne 1996) should therefore 
be central to assessment and indeed EIA and SEA have not been immune to the debate?6 
As Stirling emphasises (1999: 113): 
'the asseltive self-confidence and heroic precision with which the results of 
so much environmental and economic appraisal are typically expressed do 
not seem to be borne out in their practical accuracy' (emphasis in original). 
35 Similar concerns are raised by Burdge and Vanclay (1995) in relation to Social Impact 
~ssessment practice. 
Camilleri (2001) identifies four strands is the social critique which explain the progressive loss 
of trust in the institution of science: the problematising of scientific methods, the lack of 
~onsensus amongst scientists, the increasing concern that science is co-opted to serve particular 
Interests, and poor results. 
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The assumptions that underlie the overwhelmingly important definition of boundaries 
(physical, thematic, organisational, etc., see Chapter 7) are 'a matter of essentially 
subjective judgement' (Stirling 1999: 118). 
The 21 st Annual Conference of the IAIA (IAIA '01 Cartagena) confirmed a general trend 
amongst impact assessment academics and practitioners (see Box 3-b) for the 
abandonment of the 'notion of technical fixes for political questions' and the need for 
environmental assessment to be part of policy processes as 'a coordination and dialogue 
tool, more than a controlling tool' (Elisabeth Monosowski [World Bank])37. A related 
argument was presented by Leonard Ortolano [academia]38 where he stressed the need to 
reduce emphasis on 'techniques' and focus our attention on the 'political reality' in 
which EIA and SEA are applied. He then invited IAIA to support the idea that a 'design 
[of EIA and SEA systems] needs to reflect the fact that the information we are 
generating may not be welcome by those we are planning it for'. 
Box 3-b The IAIA '01 Conference in Cartagena 
The proceedings of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) Conference (26 May-2 June 
2001) have not yet been.published. The information used here is based on the author's notes and interviews 
carried out during three main events: 
• A one-day training course on SEA and sustainable river basin management, by Linda Oxendine of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) where the author was present as an observer; 
• A one-day Multilateral Workshop on Environmental and Social Policies of major international development 
banks; 
• The three and a half-day Conference of IAIA '01, Cartagena. 
Brief individual interviews were carried out with key representatives of the EIA and SEA network of experts, 
including: Barry Sadler (independent international expert), Paulo Pinho (Universidade do Porto, Portugal), 
Elisabeth Monosowski (World Bank), Maria Partidario (New University of Lisboa, Portugal), Markus 
Eggenberger (Swiss Development Corporation), Ursula Platzer (Ministry of Environment, Austria), Jules 
Scholten (EIA Commission, The Netherlands), Thomas Fischer (Institute for Regional Development and 
Structural Planning, Berlin), Adam Barker (University of Aberdeen, UK), William Kennedy (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development); Leonardo Ortolano (University of Stanford, USA), Jiri Dusik (Regional 
Environmental Centre, Hungary), Marcela BoccheUo (Yale University, ex- Comision Nacional del Medio 
Ambiente, Chile), Kirstin Olesen (World Bank). 
37 
Comment made during the final Panel session of the One Day Multilateral Workshop at the 
~~IA '01 Conference, Cartagena. 
Comment made during the Plenary session of the IAIA '01 Conference (on 29 May 2001). 
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The inadequacy of a model that focuses on impact assessment is being discussed also in 
the arena of development assistance. Here, initial attempts to apply SEA-type 
mechanisms consider the actual impact assessment phase as essential, but nonetheless 
secondary to the need to promote debate, coordination and collaboration, and address 
weak planning contexts. 39 This impression is not unique to the developing world, as 
discussed above. Hence, despite the undisputable clout of rational models, there is 
evidence of increased awareness of, and demand for, more dialogical and subjective 
processes capable of dealing with complex and political dimensions of development 
(Fischer and Forester 1993), which are more central to EA as a result of its link to the 
pursuit of sustainability. In this regard, policy analysis debates can be illuminating. 
3.3.3 Policy analysis and SEA 
The similarities between policy analysis and SEA, both in terms of role and evolution 
can be striking (Thissen 2000a). Policy analysis is broadly conceived as a discipline 
concerned with the evaluation of public policies and an instrument intended to 'improve' 
the quality of public policies (Van der Knaap 1995). As discussed above (Section 3.2), 
the same, though with a focus on environmental sustainability, can be said of SEA. 
Partly in response to questions about the purpose of policy analysis and whether, or how, 
its results are being utilised (Weiss 1988), Thissen (2000a) and Van der Knaap (1995) 
argue that policy analysis has undergone a paradigm shift from a traditional rational-
objectivist approach to a more argumentative-subjectivist one. Just like EA, policy 
analysis has been characterised by the fascination for 'hard' sciences and the tendency to 
consider modelling outcomes as facts, rather than just one of several sources of evidence 
(Majone 1989:11). An argumentative-subjectivist approach is meant to strengthen the 
influence of policy analysis on the policy process through informed and relevant 
arguments (Van der Knaap 1995). Fischer and Forester (1993:8), also find that there is 
growing emphasis on a shift from a technocratic conception of policy analysis as 
science, to an interpretative and dialogical conception. SEA (cf. Table 3-a) is moving in 
a similar direction, and the following call for integration, expressed in terms of 
transforming policy analysis into an 'active participant' of argumentation, highlights 
such comparability: 
39 [d6-SeminarfDFID-OECD-DAC] 
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'It is acknowledged that the actual policy-making takes place in numerous 
contacts, discussions and negotiations between various actors. To the policy-
making agency, evaluations constitute 'Just anothd' source of information. 
If the evaluating body wants to influence the outcomes, it has to become an 
active pm1icipant in and influence the social "arena" or argumentative 
domain for policy discourse' (Van der Knaap 1995 :205, emphasis added, see 
also Majone 1989). 
Given this similarity, SEA could learn from the substantial process and methodological 
implications deriving from the experience of policy analysis in dealing with policy-
making. Referring to Weiss, Van der Knaap (1995:202) admits that 'neither good 
analysis nor good argumentation alone will automatically lead to better policies '. The 
information from an assessment is only one 'ingredient' in the process. Weiss argues 
that the mix of interests, ideologies, institutional procedures, and the political will to 
make things happen, are all important factors. This is crucial for SEA's further 
development. The second trend essentially signals a reduced emphasis on those activities 
(and consequently tools) providing information on, and analysis of, potential effects. 
Relating this to experience with policy analysis, it becomes evident that the goals of 
integrating environmental concerns and contributing to sustainability cannot be achieved 
through assessment alone. There is a need for persuasion, and for a rise in awareness and 
understanding of these goals within the policy process. In this sense, the renewed 
interest in decision moments may prove crucial (Section 3.1.2). SEA process and 
methods need to adopt dialogical traits to strengthen the often weak, yet critical, effort of 
problem definition: what is the problem being addressed by the proposed strategic 
initiative? What, therefore, can SEA's contribution be? Hence, what process and 
methods will be most appropriate? 
Majone (1989:7) finds the notion of government by discussion increasingly relevant to 
policy analysis and its techniques (see also: van Eeten 2001b; Weale 2001a; Weale 
2001b). He (1989:5) refers to the benefits of dialogue in addressing trans-scientific 
issues: '[d]ialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in 
bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks 
posed by new projects'. Similarly, Fischer and Forester (1993 :6) suggest that policy 
analysis involves organisational networking, 'boundary spanning', relationship building, 
ritualised bargaining. They emphasise rhetoric and interpretation in problem definition: 
'problem solution depends on the prior work of problem construction and 
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reconstruction, and this work is deeply rhetorical and interpretative' (1993:6, emphasis 
added). This, for example, is particularly relevant to the highly contested and poorly 
implemented stage of defining and assessing alternatives (Section 3.3.2). Most literature, 
and practice, is focusing on SEA's contribution to the proposition of 'better' 
alternatives, from the environmental or sustainable point of view. 
However, greater attention to the earlier phase of problem definition could provide a 
more effective starting point (Chapter 7). As Wolf (1980:35) also stresses: '[t]he first 
approximation to an answer ... is to get the question right'. A strong case in this respect 
is made by In 't Veld (In 't Veld 2000) and de Wit (de Wit 2002) in their analyses of 
knowledge use in complex national policy issues (for example involving major 
infrastructure projects like Amsterdam airport extension) . In't Veld (2000:3-4) finds that 
'problem perceptions of the policy makers concerned are often fixed ... Dominant policy 
concepts and selective perception of the problem are at the base of an imbalance in 
knowledge input in the policy process', so that 'radical alternatives for the propagated 
solution' (2000:5) are often seen as a taboo. Shifting the focus to problem definition can 
therefore serve the purpose of improving policy-making and strengthening the 'capacity 
for strategic planning' (RCEP 2002:56), by turning SEA into an instrument for strategic 
thinking and strategkapproaches to policy processes (cf. Saarikoski 2000). 
Hence, the approach and tools of SEA need to be tailored to the assessment 
purpose and to the nature of the initiative under scrutiny: the more strategic - and 
political - the issues, the more SEA's efforts should focus on the promotion of 
dialogue, confrontation and negotiation; especially during the early stages in the 
formulation of proposals, when the problem is constructed and re-constructed. Some of 
the latest SEA practice strongly supports this move.40 This will ensure that SEA is better 
equipped to achieve the far-reaching objectives of improving policy processes and 
40 A clear sign is the rising attention for the 'scoping' phase of SEA which is becoming a critical 
moment of confrontation, debate, and stakeholder involvement in order to 'lay all the issues on 
the table' (Bina 2001a). A confirmation of these trends came in several presentations during the 
21
st 
Annual Meeting of the International Association for Impact Assessment in Cartagena (May-
June 2001): Ursula Platzer (Austria): 'SEA and integrating environment into decision-making'; 
Samuel Bartlett (Australia): 'Systems approaches for strategic environmental assessment in New 
~Outh Wales local government, Australia'; and Michelle Audouin et al. (South Africa): The 
Integration of sustainabillity objectives into policy processes in South Africa ' . See also Sheate et 
al. 200l. 
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eventually contributing to environmental integration and environmental sustainability. 
However, enthusiasm for more subjective and argumentative approaches must not 
ignore the power and resilience of 'the myth of knowing - more knowledge results in 
better decision making' (In't Veld 2000:5). As Van der Knaap (1995:209) highlights, 
even the use and impact of the more established policy analysis depends on contextual 
variables such as the institutional setting, organisational culture and political willingness 
of those active in the development and implementation of policies. These issues are 
explored in the next Section. 
3.4 A matter of context and learning 
The context in which an instrument is applied matters, and SEA is no exception. The 
aim in this Section is to contribute to a definition of the context for SEA, and to 
understand better how instrument and context relate to each other. 41 Once again, the 
literature is ambivalent on this matter: should SEA be shaped independently of its 
context, or should it be context-specific? The 'structured approach' proposed by Noble 
and Storey (2001) "exemplifies this tension (Section 2.2.2). The authors claim that 
'effective SEA methodologies' can be designed and then fitted to political and 
administrative realities, but also recognise that this may not be successful: '[w]ithout the 
appropriate political and legal triggers for SEA, and without the necessary institutional 
capacity for its implementation, even the most effective SEA methodologies will have 
little significance for PPP processes' (Noble and Storey 2001 :27). For this reason, Nitz 
and Brown (2001) argue that the policy-making context must drive the process, method 
and tools of an SEA, and the South African SEA guidance explicitly highlights context 
as central to design: 
'The process for a SEA should be informed by the context (e.g. political, 
institutional, social and biophysical environment) in which the plan or 
programme is being developed. The focus is on the identification of key 
elements for SEA, to be integrated into context-specific processes for plan 
and programme formulation . . . SEA is therefore adapted to local 
41 
The recent acknowledgement of the importance of context in SEA is not surprising when one 
considers that after three decades of EIA practice Lawrence writes that '[t]he matching of 
alternative EIA approaches to context characteristics is far from "well-trodden ground" although 
some consideration has been given ... especially to Third World contexts' (2000:621). 
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requirements for decision-making. The aim is not to develop a new and 
separate process for SEA' (Audouin and Lochner 2000: 13). 
The importance 'of this factor is best summarised by Clark, who argues (in Partidario 
2000:657) that many decision-makers prefer to ignore the existence of SEA rather than 
to risk sacrificing the incremental nature of their decision-making processes to the 
technocratic and rationalistic commitments imposed by cunent assessment procedures. 
This is partly the result of the somewhat spurious rationality of early SEA approaches, 
and a clear admonishment for the future design of effective SEA. The theme also relates 
to the distinction between tool and process discussed earlier (Section 2.2.1), since 
process implies a stronger interaction between the tool and its context. 
3.4.1 The context of application: a critical factor 
It is essential to clarify what is meant by context. The idea can be traced back to the 
classic dualistic formulations of politics and policy arguments on the one hand, and 
administrative practices on the other (Lindblom 1968); a dualism that still very pertinent 
today [Pancheri-governmentl Planning theory, to which assessment is related (Chapter 
2), discovers context as one of the responses to the limitations and negative tendencies 
, 
of rationalism, and develops pragmatism: 'a normative planning theory [that] starts from 
the premise that knowledge-based experience should guide planning action' (Lawrence 
2000:611). Like recent changes in SEA thinking, which are placing the nature of the 
context at the forefront of discussions, pragmatism stressed the uniqueness of each 
planning situation. Faludi (1987:53) also argues that '[w]hether planning was restricted 
to considering means to given ends on the level of "functional rationality", or whether it 
included the evaluation of alternati ve ends ... might depend on the context of planning'. 
Context also relates to concepts of the 'technologizing of policy making' (Shaffer 
1999:621) premised on the use of non-political and technical models (Section 3.3.2). An 
early, albeit indirect, reference to such political and technical divide can be found in 
Therivel 's (1993:165) conclusions to her overview of SEA systems: 
'[W]ithout a fundamental shift in the weight given to environmental 
considerations, decision makers will continue to opt for the least contentious, 
most politically desirable options, and SEA itself will have precious little 
positive impact on the environment'. 
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This is a precursor to the more recent references to the influence of political will, 
evaluation and planning cultures, and institutional and policy context, on the 
effectiveness of SEA (Sadler 1996. See also: Partidario and Clark 2000a; Lee and 
Kirkpatrick 2001; Bina 2001a). Like other aspects of SEA, the concept of context is 
initially interpreted in different ways, with little cross-referencing: from being another 
word for PPPs, to referring to specific policy-making procedures. Some relate it to the 
problems of SEA acceptance by decision-makers, while most interpret context as the 
specific conditions tied to the policy process of particular initiatives that affect SEA's 
ability to influence decision-making. The increasing emphasis on the importance of 
'integrating' SEA in 'real' decision-making processes attests to this (see, for example, 
Sadler 1996b; ERM 1998; Van der Vorst et al. 1999; Clark 2000; Partidario 2000; 
Brown and Therivel 2000) . Linking or 'grafting' (Brown and Therivel 2000) SEA onto 
the PPP-process is expected to increase SEA's acceptability and enhance its 
effectiveness. 
However, it is argued that scholars and practitioners alike are interpreting the idea of 
context too narrowly. Drawing on the analysis of literature and practice, and on 
observation at various conferences and workshops on SEA (Annex A) it is suggested 
that context in relation to SEA can be articulated thus: a) the policy process, intended as 
" 
the combination of decision-making processes, planning and assessment activities, 
refened to here as the 'immediate context'; and b) the combination of political, cultural, 
institutional and administrative dimensions, refened to as the 'wider context' (see Figure 
3-c). Thus, the context of SEA is effectively like a matrioshka doll that reveals hidden 
layers as one proceeds to explore it. 
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Figure 3-c The immediate and wider contexts of SEA 
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2) Cultural dimension 
Previous sections have commented on various aspects of the immediate context (the type 
most commonly discussed in the literature), and the way they can affect the purpose, 
shape and effectiveness of SEA; however, the wider context requires further 
explanation. The political and cultural dimensions are effectively the backdrop to all 
other contextual elements, influencing everything else in the wider and immediate 
contexts. For example, the political dimension of policy-making processes is recognised 
as an often-definitive influence over SEA's effectiveness. The tendency to try to isolate 
(even ignore) this dimension and favour a more technocratic interpretation and analysis 
of the process, has shown its limitations (Section 3.3), not least in the policy analysis 
tradition. Politics plays a key role in defining the purpose, and hence the shape, of SEA. 
As one practitioner observed [Pancheri-government], politicians, administrators and 
experts all contribute providing a context-specific interpretation of each constituent 
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dimension of SEA.42 Their combined views of what is 'strategic', 'environmental' and 
'assessment' define the purpose of carrying out SEA on a particular initiative. Another 
interviewee [Baccelli-academia] stressed that although the relative weight of each actor 
will vary, political will is often decisive.43 
There is also a cultural dimension to the policy process, as shown in relation to the well-
documented transport sector. Hilden et al. (2002) identify three different 'views' of 
transport planning: 'synoptic optimising planning, communicative planning, or planning 
as an interpretative struggle over the future '. They argue (2002:3) that '[a]ll these views 
have bearings on the role of environmental assessments of transport policies, plans and 
programmes ... lead[ing] to very different interpretations of what the assessments can 
and should be about and what they should deliver'. Hence, the type of planning culture, 
or 'view', defines the purpose and shape (i.e. the combination of approach and tools) of 
SEA: an opinion confirmed in other studies (Blanco forthcoming; Bina 2001a; Fischer 
2000) and discussed in Chapters 5_7.44 An interview with academics and practitioners 
confirmed that most aspects, even if legislated for, will still be open to context-specific 
interpretation [Benedetto, C., and DeBlasiis, interview-academia]. Assessment itself, for 
example, can be viewed as a bureaucratic phase of an administrative procedure or as a 
dynamic process. Other aspects include: participation, consultation, co-operation, co-
ordination and knowledge management (see Section 3.4.2). Culture is also crucial in 
terms of different constructions of reality, social relations and rationalities, leading to 
different 'myths of nature' (Thompson 1991 :252) which affect directly the purpose and 
shape of SEA. 
The administrative dimension refers to the way all elements of the policy process are 
managed on a daily basis, including politicians' interaction with civil servants, and all 
procedures for data gathering, assessment, planning and decision-making. The 
institutional dimension is interpreted to refer to legal and policy systems in place in a 
42 See also Self (1972) and the theories of politics and public administration, discussing the 
relationship between politicians and civil servants, and how to structure public institutions to 
make them responsive to politicians' objectives yet efficient, fair and free from partisan bias. 
43 Both interviews focused on the strategic socio-economic and environmental assessment of 
transport in Italy. See Section 4.2 for more details. 
44 The analysis of five SEAs of transport initiatives supports further the significance of the 
cultural dimension of context: '[d]espite the common starting point, each study has developed in 
significantly different ways, reflecting the variety of planning systems and appraisal cultures in 
the [countries] involved .. . SEA applied to theoretically similar issues .. . can actually result in 
radically different approaches and methods' (Bina 2001a:12). 
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particular context, which are of direct or indirect relevance to the policy process being 
assessed, and to the SEA process in particular. 
However, although Figure 3-c identifies each of the four dimensions separately, in 
practice there is a strong dynamic interaction between them, and the definitions given 
here are only one way of conceptualising the wider context. It is worth noting, for 
example, that according .to Cannibal and Winnard (2001), the institutional dimension 
can include the concept of ideology, as a set of beliefs that 'reflect and explain "reality'" 
(Jordan and Greenaway 1998:671 after Kuhn), of culture, as the 'pattern of basic 
assumptions which a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to 
cope with its problems of external. .. and internal adaptation' (Bate 1994 in: Cannibal 
and Winnard 2001: 152), and of strategy; since as Cannibal and Winnard claim, 'cultural 
change implies strategic change, and vice versa [therefore] ... culture and strategy are ... 
tautological'. This last point supports the claim that the strategic dimension of SEA is 
more far-reaching than generally acknowledged (Section 3.1). 
The identification and unpacking of the two context-types described here, provides a 
conceptual framework that explains the phenomenon of context, thus allowing an 
analysis of its relationship to SEA. Drawing from the literature and from discussions 
with practitioners and scholars, it is suggested that the administrative and institutional 
dimensions, which in turn reflect political and cultural characteristics, combine to 
influence the character of planning and decision-making (parts of the immediate 
context). Each of these dimensions can influence the shape of SEA and its effectiveness 
(Table 3-c). 
Work by Bailey and Renton (2000) offers a rare example of a concrete attempt at 
understanding policy processes and their interaction with the context before designing 
SEA procedures (for policies in Australia). The authors (2000:248) distinguished 
between 'structured' and 'mixed' or 'unstructured' policy development processes. 45 
They found that the agencies which appeared to follow a mixed or unstructured process, 
tended to develop their policies as a 'function of time, resources, and in particular the 
nature of the problem being solved or the objective of the policy itself'. Interviews also 
revealed that the notion of 'context-specific policy-making' was much more pronounced 
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for unstructured or mixed processes, compared with the structured ones: '[t]he context, 
formality, timing and duration, as well as other external factors of the unstructured 
approach differ markedly from the more structured '. This suggests that the context is all 
the more influential in circumstances where policy-making is weak and underdeveloped. 
3.4.2 Is SEA a victim of its context? 
Having examined the nature of context, it is important to recognise that its many 
dimensions can enable or constrain the normative view of SEA as a 'radical' assessment 
process: placing environmental protection on the political agenda, ensuring that 
environmentally sound alternatives are at least given full consideration, that sustainable 
development is the goal of the strategic initiative, and that it can raise the overall level of 
transparency and accountability .46 In certain contexts the environment is 'marginalised'-
to use the expression of Flynn et at. (1999:2) - in relation to other sectors and priorities 
such as economic growth (see, for example, Owens and Cowell 2002; Noble 2002; 
OECD and UNDP 2002). Authorities operating in such conditions are unlikely to apply 
SEA with the aim of maximising the consideration of the environment, seeking the most 
sustainable alternatives, or involving the widest range of stakeholders as well as making 
use of expert advic~ throughout the decision-making process. They would not attempt to 
undermine the characteristics of their system through the application of a 'radical' 
assessment method that pursued environmental sustainability.47 The 'weak' capacity of 
the wider and immediate contexts to promote environmental integration and 
sustainability would ensure that the purpose, shape and effectiveness of SEA are 
contained. This is partly reflected in the claim by Sheate et at. (2001: 87-88) that the 
political and administrative culture can be an obstacle to SEA's ability to promote 
change: 
45 Their analysis of how policies are actually formulated also supports some of the arguments laid 
out in Section 3.1.2 regarding the rhetoric underlying the strategic dimension of SEA. 
46 See: Principles' of Environmental Impact Assessment by the International Association for 
Impact Assessment (lA lA 2000, at http://www.iaia.org). (see also \IAIA, 2002b #588) . 
47 This has important implications for the future of SEA and to some extent practical experience 
is beginning to confirm such a view. The comparison of SEA methods developed in five 
countries to address the same type of plan (a transport corridor), reveals significant variations: 
from quite exhaustive attempts to assess a broad range of alternatives against sustainability 
objectives, to rather conservative methods looking at very limited alternative options (Bina 
2001a). Conclusions from the comparison suggest that policy-making, decision-making, planning 
and evaluation cultures can all represent opportunities and constraints for SEA. The empirical 
research, in Chapters 5-7, provides further insight on these issues. 
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'in some countries ... a change in [policy making] culture may be needed 
before SEA can have a fulther catalytic role'. 
The question becomes whether SEA itself can trigger the 'change' referred to by Sheate 
et al., or whether it is to be seen as a victim of a weak or under-developed capacity. Can 
SEA be interpreted and used to address contextual weaknesses? The emphasis on 
integrating the assessment and policy processes is unlikely to deliver the desired result 
of sustainable development since the problem often relates to the contextual dimensions, 
including the issue of poor planning capacity, illustrated in Section 3.2.2, and weak 
environmental objectives or strategies for sustainable development. In these cases, 
'grafting' SEA onto PPPs may amount to very little. If SEA is given the normative 
purpose of pursuing sustainable development in a weak context where 'the role of 
planning is subordinated to the precepts of growth' (Owens and Cowell 2002:8), the risk 
is that it will not be able to deliver. It would be the equivalent of having to swim 
upstream, without being a salmon! 
Therefore, it is argued that the environmental character of the dimensions of both 
contexts is what makes them central to a new conception of SEA. Such character can be 
explained through the work of Janicke (1996:8) highlighting the importance of a 
country's 'environmental capacity ,:48 the capacity to protect the environment and to 
identify and solve environmental problems. This concept can further refine the definition 
of contextual framework for SEAs. Janicke's 'capacities' are constituted by: 
'[t]he strength, competence and configuration of organised governmental and 
non-governmental proponents of environmental protection [and t]he (a) 
cognitive-informational, (b) political-institutional, (c) economic-
technological framework conditions' (1996:8). 
The quality of these capacities determines a country's ability to identify more 
substantial, complex and long-term environmental problems, which are difficult to solve 
and may require structural change in key sectors. Janicke's concern that weak 
environmental capacity can restrict a country's ability to identify problems to those that 
48 The expression as used here should not be confused with the more common use of the term 
'environmental capacity' which refers to a concept and assessment tool aimed, similarly to SEA, 
at the operationalisation of sustainability in planning (Owens 1994; Jacobs 1997; Camilleri 
2001). In this literature, environmental capacity is defined as the limits to the extent the 
environment can provide for society and the economy 'without causing intolerable strains, both 
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can be handled is critical to SEA. For example, his concern regarding the failure to 
tackle major environmental problems can be compared to the failure to consider 
substantive, and sustainable, alternatives in SEA. 
Previous sections have clarified that the normative purpose of SEA is to 
promote environmental integration, and ultimately sustainability, and that the main route 
to achieve this is to improve policy-making, that is to say: the immediate context. 
Having established that this is only part of a broader context, it becomes necessary to 
explore how its many dimensions affect SEA and the challenge implicit in its purpose. It 
is argued here that the essential contribution of SEA can be reframed in terms of how it 
can help to bridge the gap between the current environmental capacity of the context 
(the combination of political will and availability of means to promote environmental 
protection and sustainability), and what would be required to ensure that policy-making 
serves environmental integration and sustainability. It follows that, if it is to achieve its 
goals, SEA needs to operate beyond the boundaries of the policy process under scrutiny. 
Table 3-c provides a few examples of how Hnicke's concept can be used to investigate 
the gap in the capacity of immediate and wider contexts. 
This proposition rrovides a conceptual framework for suggestions like that of Bartlett 
and Oldgard (2003:2 and 6), according to whom 'the SEA process could have a central 
role in generating and framing public participation and deliberation' in those public 
policy making contexts which provide limited opportunities, and ask whether SEA 
should 'seek to operate within the existing political settings, or ... be a force for political 
change' (cf. Chapter 5). 
to natural ecosystems and to the quality of life. In this sense we can talk of environmental 
capacities' (CPRE 1993: 12 in Camilleri 2001 :37 emphasis in original). 
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Table 3-c Relating the environmental capacity of the context to SEA 
Example of contextual 
aspects relevant to SEA: 
Strategic capacity 
Different assessment 
procedures 
Public participation 
Consultation, co-operation, 
co-ordination 
Knowledge management 
Note: 
The environmental capacity of such aspects, which affects both the 
purpose of SEA and its approach and tools: 
The capacity for strategic thinking and planning (for example, are there 
policies, plans or programmes or mainly projects; is there an institutional/legal 
framework that requires the development of environmental and sustainability 
strategies, state of the environment reports etc.); 
The capacity to co-ordinate and/or integrate different assessment processes 
(for example, social, economic, technical, environmental); the capacity and 
cultural disposition to work with multi-disciplinary teams; 
The capacity for public participation and wide stakeholder involvement; and 
related to this: the level of environmental knowledge and public awareness, the 
level of decentralisation and strength of local communities and environmental 
movements, and the support for participation by the legal system; 
The capacity for consultation within and outside the institution which is 
proposing the PPP; and related to this: the capacity for volunteer intrapolicy 
co-operation, for interpolicy co-ordination, and for network management';' 
The capacity in terms of generation, distribution, interpretation and application 
of environmental knowledge; the potential for knowledge brokers, policy 
entrepreneurs, mediators, facilitators, advocates". 
The following proposal draws partly on the concept of environmental capacity proposed by Janicke (1996), and 
on the various forms of integration proposed by Eggenberger and Partidario (2000), relating them to the key 
elements of SEA processes. 
, = See, for example, Carley and Christie 1994; Glasbergen 1995. 
** = See, for example, Owens and Rayner 1999; KI'Hmw and Thissen 2000. 
The key lies in linking the normative purpose of SEA, as explained in Section 3.2, to the 
context in order to unravel meaning of such purpose in operational terms. The 
instrument's approach and tools can be shaped and used tactically, thereby 'aiming at an 
end beyond the immediate action' of assessing a strategic initiative (Oxford Dictionary 
1998). Hence, SEA can be intended: 1) as an instrument to influence the policy process, 
but potentially falling victim of weaknesses in the environmental capacity of contextual 
dimensions, or 2) as an instrument that transforms the policy process and the capacity of 
the wider context, essentially acting to compensate for some of the contextual 
weaknesses. At the Johannesburg Summit (1992), the IAIA (2002a: 10) stated that 
'impact assessment should also be regarded as a vehicle for strengthening institutions'. 
Indeed, it is argued that some of the expectations attached to SEA in recent works are 
implicitly calling for a transformative role without, however, acknowledging the full 
implications of this. 
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In essence, the two broad purposes for SEA represent two opposite ways of 
understanding the strategic dimension of this instrument. The first, aimed at influencing 
the policy process, is clearly centred on the idea of the strategic 'object' (the initiative 
and its process of planning and decision-making). This purpose would involve ensuring 
process integration with SEA, and assuming that key contextual factors will 
progressively pursue sustainability according to the evolution of environmental capacity 
(Janicke 1996). In this case SEA will not result in 'a threat to established interests' and 
thus is unlikely 'to be marginalised or overridden' (Owens and Cowe1l2001). However, 
it risks being interpreted as a feature of modernity, limiting itself to the internalisation of 
the ecological dimension in institutional thinking, deflecting attention from substantive 
problems and real institutional challenges (Fischer and Hajer 1999), (Section 3.2). The 
second proposition expresses the more far-reaching purpose of transforming the policy 
process and part of the context. It therefore relies on a wider understanding of 
'strategic', which includes the complex wider context sUlTounding the specific process 
that may need 'improvement' (Section 3.2). This may involve seeking outcomes (and 
processes) that are not always 'consonant with prevailing norms' (Owens and Cowell 
2001). SEA would be implemented with the explicit aim of compensating for a weak 
policy process and context, requiring greater focus on new approaches and instruments 
capable of triggering, such transformations (cf. Saarikoski 2000). This thesis argues that 
to meet its more radical purpose, SEA promoters should frame this in terms of bridging 
the gap in environmental capacity that characterises the area in which SEA is to operate, 
and they would need to refer explicitly to this transformative role, leaving behind the 
nanow 'impact mindset', in the words of John Horberry [practitioner].49 In this sense, it 
is claimed that SEA represents a new concept, as well as a new instrument, compared to 
CUlTent EIA practice (cf. Chapter 2). 
The two purpose-types differ in terms of: 1) how they relate to the context: wanting to 
influence the policy process and fitting within its strengths and weaknesses or 
attempting to change some of the dimensions of the wider context to eventually 
transform it, and 2) how they try meeting the ultimate goal of sustainability: through 
modernist or more dissonant and argumentative features. It follows that the inextricable 
link between purpose and context is crucial in the delicate process of interpreting the 
three dimensions of SEA itself: strategic, environmental and assessment. The instrument 
49 [d2-SeminarIDFIDJ 
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can be a technocratic and modernist expression of the integration and sustainability 
storylines, emphasising the centrality of the 'assessment' dimension; or it can be a 
process aimed at strengthening the environmental capacity of the wider context, through 
an extended conception of assessment, focused on the exchange and development of 
knowledge and policy learning, discussed in the next Section. The literature's demands 
for greater attention to the context are re-interpreted by distinguishing between the 
immediate and wider contexts of SEA, and their environmental capacity. SEA can be 
conceived either as a 'victim' of its context, or as a transformative process, which in 
time leads to changes in the environmental capacity and context of operation. The latter 
implies that SEA must adopt a wider range of approaches, rather than persist in trying to 
achieve complex results through the back door of technical rationality. The next Section 
considers the importance of policy learning in this respect. 
3.4.3 Knowledge perspectives and learning 
The importance of a knowledge-perspective of policy-making and the significance 
attached to learning by many authors (Owens and Rayner 1999), are explored as 
frameworks that can facilitate the conceptualisation of SEA's transformative purpose 
and can contribute to shape the instrument to achieve such goal. This different 
theoretical focus can help unveil the potential of SEA processes, including their ability 
to trigger, or strengthen, institutional and policy learning, which in time could lead to 
institutional change and to the structural changes needed for sustainable development 
(see In 't Veld 2000; 2002). 
To varying degrees, both purpose-types proposed above require SEA to be more 
cognisant of the policy-making process, its rules and characteristics, in order to be more 
effective. The 'knowledge perspective' sees policy-making as 'a process of collective 
learning through argument and persuasion' (Owens and Rayner 1999:7), emphasising a 
SUbjective and dialogical angle in clear contrast with the more traditional technocratic 
views of the policy-making process (Section 3.3). The need to shift attention to this 
alternative perspective has appeared repeatedly throughout this analysis. It was stressed 
as an essential development of the assessment dimension of SEA, following the 
footsteps of policy analysis, and partly also those of EIA. The acknowledgement of the 
role of context and the proposition of two broad types of purposes, helps explain why a 
more subjective and . dialogical approach to SEA might be not simply useful, but 
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essential to its effectiveness. In particular, it provides an arena for the discussion of the 
moral and political dilemmas over the meaning of sustainable development, increasingly 
central to SEA's remit (Section 3.2.2). 
By understanding when and how (Radaelli 1995) environmental knowledge matters in 
the policy process, and the implications of this for the purpose and shape of SEA, the 
latter may become more effective. K0rn0v and Thissen (2000) have begun exploring 
some interesting similarities between the developments in the literature on knowledge-
based support of decision processes and SEA's move beyond impact assessment. 
Referring to such literature, they argue that (2000:195): '[iJnitially focus was on 
assessing the impacts of alternatives with known outcomes: later significantly more 
attention was paid to formulating the problem, identifying the values of interest and 
identifying a wide enough range of alternatives' (see also Langeweg 2002). These 
moments during the policy process, which were discussed in Section 3.1 above, can be 
seen as instances when environmental knowledge may have a significant impact. 
The knowledge perspective draws attention to another theoretical contribution that can 
further enlighten the discipline of SEA: the field of 'policy learning ' (Sabatier 1987; 
Bennett and Howlett 1992), which seeks to strengthen the role and influence of 
" 
knowledge. It emphasises the 'knowledge-based power of persuasion' (Owens and 
Rayner 1999:9) that can be based on 'hard science' or on 'evidence [ ... J re-framed by a 
credible, trusted broker, often in response to societal demands' (Owens and Rayner 
1999: 10). In this respect, argumentation is a critical factor. Following the example of 
policy analysis (Van der Knaap 1995; and also Weiss 1988), SEA could be a way of 
'institutionalising' policy learning: 
'When argumentation is based upon mutual attempts of informed persuasion, 
evaluation as an argumentative process offers a method for reciprocal 
learning through the exchange of arguments. Argumentation functions as a 
catalyst for policy-oriented learning' (Van der Knaap 1995:205). 
Sabatier (1987:683) describes a more instrumental (or rationalist, cf. Owens and Rayner 
1999) form, which he calls 'policy-oriented learning ': 
'an effort to show how - despite the partisan nature of most analytical 
debates and the cognitive limits on rationality - actors' desires to realize 
core values in a world of limited resources provide strong incentives to learn 
more about the magnitude of salient problems, the factors affecting them, 
and the consequences of policy alternatives. If the different coalitions have 
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access to a minimum of technical resources and if relatively 'depoliticized ' 
communication fora exist which force competing professionals to address 
each other's findings , the framework suggests that more adequate causal 
models and a better understanding of policy impacts will gradually emerge 
over time!. 
There are also parallels between the policy learning concept and that of environmental 
capacity explored above. The principles underlying Jiinicke's (1996) emphasis on 
identification of salient problems and the cognitive-informational and political-
institutional conditions for environmental protection, are echoed here by Sabatier and 
Van der Knaap. It is suggested that the process of negotiating and implementing SEA 
can, itself, lead to changes to the constraining reality of a weak context. It could trigger a 
'virtuous circle' leading to the improvement of the context in which it operates (Figure 
3-d). The means that the acclaimed 'contribution' of SEA to sustainable development 
could be interpreted to refer to individuals and institutions learning about 'what is' 
sustainable development, and how such development should be achieved (Section 3.2). 
Applying SEA would lead to better understanding of the necessary conditions for 
sustainable development, rather than simply operationalising such understanding, on the 
assumption that the context will provide a ready-made sustainability recipe for SEA to 
use. Eventually this could also lead to change in the wider context and could improve 
policy-making to such an extent that SEA itself becomes redundant (at least in its more 
proactive terms), thus confirming some of the views in Partidario (1996) and 
Eggenberger and Partidario (2000, see Section 3.2.2). 
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Figure 3·d Looking for a virtuous circle 
The context defines the 
purpose and shape of SEA 
SEA is applied within this 
context (thus in line with its 
opportunities and constraints) 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
The process of negotiating and implementing 
SEA influences the context (e.g. especially if 
argumentation, interpretation and learning are 
promoted) 
Through the critical analysis of academic and policy literature, as well as some primary 
data, Chapters 2 and 3 have provided an initial answer to the two main research 
questions: 1) what are the strengths and weaknesses of the evolving conceptions of the 
purpose of SEA? 2) what are the a) theoretical and b) practical implications of the 
changing conceptions of SEA's purpose? 
Fifteen years of academic and policy literatures on SEA reveal both tensions and 
significant divisions amongst the scholars and professionals in the field . The broad 
conceptual origins and the methodological inheritance from EIA have resulted in a 
diScipline of SEA that is at once complex and diverse. Such difficult traits are 
compounded by the equally complex nature of the many strategic initiatives and policy 
processes to which SEA can apply, and to the even greater range of contexts. 
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Focusing on the three main trends in Table 3-a, this analysis leads to a deeper 
understanding of the SEA phenomenon. It identifies deficiencies in the way assessment 
and its 'object' are conceptualised, both in EIA and SEA, which at once helps to explain 
why NEPA's original far-reaching purpose has rarely been operationalised, and why 
demand and expectations related to SEA have grown steadily in the 1990s. The Chapter 
uncovers the weaknesses of some of the normative, and at times rhetorical, claims that 
constitute the conceptual . and methodological basis of SEA. Themes, such as the need 
for more integration and the general expectation (or hope) that SEA will contribute to 
sustainable development, remain under-theorised, despite appearing persistently in all 
literatures for over a decade. As a result, the divisions and tensions have increased. 
Meanwhile, SEA praxis appears to pursue all possible methodologies and procedures, 
ranging from technocratic and rationalistic approaches to the policy-inspired and more 
subjective ones. While some see this as a cause for concern, others see it as inevitable, 
and even desirable, as flexibility allows for the essential adaptability to the context of 
operation. This difference is leading to more tensions in the literature, and to a confusing 
proliferation of instruments. 
To date, one of the most striking aspects of SEA literature is the superficial treatment of 
the nature of PPPs, and their relationship with SEA. Significant elements of SEA 
rhetoric, including the nature of its object of assessment (the PPPs), and one of its most 
distinctive and valued characteristics (the early start and ex-ante nature), have 
progressed virtually unchallenged until very recently, despite practical and conceptual 
weaknesses. Equally, the very tangible obstacles to golden rules, such as the 'early start' 
and the acclaimed contribution to sustainable development, remain favourite concluding 
warnings, but are rarely at the heart of investigations. The same is true for the all-
important factor of SEA's context of operation. 
This shows that SEA literature has indeed suffered from a combination of theoretical 
and methodological weakness (despite divided opinions even on this issue). Chapters 2 
and 3 provide an explanation of the need for SEA (its raison d'etre) that goes beyond 
the superficial realisation that strategic initiatives also had to be assessed, and is centred 
round the desire to improve policy processes and to promote sustainable development. 
Together, these two needs have become the main purpose of normative conceptions of 
SEA, and the investigation provides an explanation of their conceptual and 
methodological implications. 
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This research stresses the importance of relating SEA's strategic dimension to the 
assessment process itself, as well as to the 'object' under scrutiny, thus questioning the 
focus on technical fixes. An analysis of the relevance of a knowledge perspective of the 
policy process and the concept of policy learning offers intriguing possibilities as to how 
SEA might actually contribute to sustainable development. It brings new insights to the 
discipline, drawing on policy analysis and particularly on those perspectives concerned 
with cognitive factors in decision-making and policy development, that indicate ways in 
which the narrow remit of providing information and assessing impacts may be extended 
to serve the far-reaching purpose and growing expectations attached to SEA. This helps 
to redefine the many themes and concepts related to SEA, and places a different 
emphasis on concepts relating to context, purpose and shape of SEA. 
Thus context, which has also been under-theorised in SEA literature, becomes central to 
this investigation. It can be decisive in the design of SEA approaches and tools; 
however, the analysis concludes that it is the environmental capacity of contexts that is 
critical, as it can be conceived as part of the 'object' of the assessment. It proposes that 
the purpose of SEA depends on the context of application, and that two broad types can 
be identified, one r~flecting the features of modernity, the other more far-reaching, 
perhaps to the point of being utopian. The relevance of one or the other depends on how 
the context is conceptualised (whether as immediate or wider context). Therefore, 
although it can be argued that in normative terms the added value of SEA lies in its 
ability to contribute to the pursuit of environmental sustainability, this Chapter has 
stressed that the context of SEA influences the exact nature of such purpose. This 
contextualisation also applies to each constituent component of SEA (,strategic', 
'environmental', 'assessment'), accounting for the wide diversity in SEA praxis. 
The Chapter concludes with a new interpretation of the rhetorical statement whereby the 
instrument will contribute to sustainable development, placing the environmental 
capacity of context at the centre of SEA purpose and methods. A number of propositions 
are embedded in this analysis (Table 3-d), providing the foundations for a re-
conceptualisation of SEA. The second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-8) takes these 
propositions as its starting point, and explores them with reference to the experience of 
the Chilean Government's recent and on-going efforts towards the development of a 
concept and approach to SEA. 
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Table 3-d Propositions based on the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 
The context 
The purpose of 
SEA 
The strategic 
'object' 
The assessment 
• SEA is context-specific, both in terms of purpose and shape (approach and tools), and will 
be contained by the poor environmental capacity of a given context; 
• The context of SEA can be described as 1mmediate' and wider', where the latter influences 
the environmental capacity of the former; 
• Although attention has centered on the immediate context, it is claimed that the wider 
context and its environmental capacity are crucial to the raison d'etre of SEA. 
• The choice of purpose is context-specific and is the most critical aspect of SEA as it will be 
the key to interpret the three constituent dimensions of SEA: 'strategic' 'environmental', 
'assessment '; 
• The actual purpose (and therefore shape) of SEA can lie anywhere between two extreme 
cases: to influence a particular policy process, or to contribute to a transformation of the 
environmental capacity of the wider context; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
SEA distinguishes itself for its advocacy role in favour of environmental integration and 
environmental sustainability. It is this normative character that makes it different from other 
instruments such as strategic assessment, policy analysis or sustain ability appraisals. 
Understanding the nature of the object and the problem is crucial, and should precede the 
definition of assessment approaches and tools; 
SEA's 'object' is not always as strategic as expected in the literature, and it may have to 
contribute to build a strategic dimension in the initiative under scrutiny; 
The 'object' is not limited to the policy-process (PPPs), but could be expanded to address 
the wider contextual dimensions and their poor environmental capacity. 
The strategic dimension of SEA is as important to the shape of the assessment, as it is in 
terms of the nature of the 'object' being assessed; 
The centrality of impact assessment is becoming secondary to the need to integrate 
environmental concerns in development sectors. This involves a shift from a rational-
objectivist to an argumentative-subjectivist approach, which has implications for the 
activities and tools related to SEA. It also implies a less rigid separation between 
assessment and planning processes/activities; 
• The application of SEA can lead to a better understanding of the necessary conditions for 
sustainability, rather than simply operationalising a prior understanding; 
• SEA can trigger, or strengthen, a process of individual and institutional learning that 
strengthens the environmental capacity of the immediate and wider contexts. 
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Chapter 4 
Method, Structure and Serendipity 
As Camilleri (2001:85) points out in her work on environmental capacity for Malta, '[i]t is 
in a sense strange to write this methodology, since on one level my research is all about 
methodology'. Indeed, many of the considerations on qualitative methods that I develop 
here are also relevant to the research topic itself. This Chapter explains the scope of the 
empirical investigati~n in the context of the PhD (Section 4.1), describes and evaluates 
reflexively the data gathering process (Section 4.2) and outlines the analytical approach that 
has shaped subsequent chapters (Section 4.3). 
4. 1 Gathering evidence - on method and chance 
4.1.1 Qualitative research and grounded theory 
Flick (2002:40) argues that '[q]ualitative research comprises a specific understanding of the 
relation between issue and method', which highlights the mutual interdependence of 
conceptual, metho9010gical and empirical steps in the research process. The importance of 
this relationship is best developed through grounded theory (GIaser and Strauss 1967; 
Strauss 1987). In this research I combine the linear logic of traditional experimental or 
quantitative investigations, with the more iterative one of qualitative approaches such as 
grounded theory. In the latter case, the 'question of which method to use for collecting data 
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becomes minor', while the focus is on the interpretation of data, and '[d]ecisions on data to 
be integrated and methods to be used for this are based on the state of the developing theory 
after analysing the data already at hand at that moment ' (Flick 2002:42). Following 
Goodman's (1978) concept that theories are versions of the world based on different 
perspectives, the normative literature analysed in the first chapters, and the propositions, are 
to be seen as 'preliminary and relative' (Flick 2002:43). The next step is to choose what data 
should be integrated and which methods would provide a different perspective and best 
serve my research objectives. Figure 4-a illustrates how the grounded research approach 
relates to the research questions (orange boxes) outlined in Chapter 1. 
Figure 4-a From theory to practice, and back - the PhD structure 
ing constituent dimensions: 
S·E·A 
Context 
Purpose 
Problem definition 
Knowledge & learning 
Identification and analysis of 
themes, trends and tensions: 
In the 
literature 
In published 
practice 
Legend: 
the strengths and 
of evolving SEA 
Start here 
Or~nge boxes - PhD questions 
Question 2: 
What are the Implications of the changing conceptions of SEA's purpose: 
2.a) Implications In theory 
Analysis of themes, trends and 
tensions, drawing on insights 
from: 
Policy analysis and perspectives 
concerned with cognitive factors in 
decision· making 
2.b) Implications In practice 
Recommendations on how to 
facilitate SEA contribution to 
sustainable development 
Development of a conceptual 
approach to SEA ope rationalisation 
Contribution to theoretical strengthening of SEA phenomenon 
Development of a conceptual and analytical framework: re-conceptualising SEA 
~ ~ 
Empirical investigation: 
Are the themes, trends and 
tensions also identifiable in: 
Chile 
(LOC context) 
Other contexts and 
intemationat 
discourse on SEA 
Chile case study: 
Is the framework proposed in 
Chapters 1·3 useful: 
To understand As a conceptuat 
SEA framework to 
conceptualisations ope rationalise SEA 
Berge boxes - Main research activities ~r~en boxes - Initial results from literature review and theory 
~boxes - Focus of the empirical investigation 
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The idea is to contribute to strengthening SEA theory by analysing new empirical material 
that allows me to explore the relevance of the trends and propositions already identified, 
increasing their empirical grounding and their theoretical relevance. Essentially, the PhD is 
stlUctured around two phases of inquiry. The findings of the first phase (Chapters 2-3) have 
both theoretical and practical (methodological) implications. My aim for the second part 
(Chapters 4-7) is to gain further insight into, and provide an illustration of, such 
implications; to do this I have chosen to use an in-depth case study and a number of 
supporting primary sources. 
At this point, it could be argued that the research is distancing itself from grounded theory 
precepts, as I propose to use a case to test propositions based on the theoretical knowledge 
and earlier empirical findings analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. However, the work in part one 
of the thesis is itself informed by earlier empirical work (albeit prior to the PhD). 
Furthermore, theory and methods are constantly being reviewed as empirical findings shed 
light on the broader concepts underpinning the propositions. 
Bearing in mind the nature of the propositions, which require the exploration of the 
intricacies of policy-making processes and of contextual dimensions such as politics, culture 
and institutions, and taking into account the resource and time constraints of a PhD, I 
decided to concentrate most effort on a single case study (albeit stlUctured in several units -
Section 4.2.3). Thus, the case is not designed to be representative of other realities, but 
rather to provide the necessary level of detail to explore processes, which - as 
demonstrated in previous Chapters - do not develop with the abstract simplicity of 
categories proposed in the literature, and have an inherently contextual character. The focus 
on one main case is balanced by a number of additional sources of primary data which I 
have used throughout the three-year research period to gain a wider perspective on the 
evolving SEA scene, and provide some scope for triangulation (Section 4.2.4). 
The empirical findings presented and analysed in this and following Chapters, contribute to 
the understanding of the strengths and limitations of SEA in conceptual and technical terms, 
and point towards a practicable approach to the operationalisation of SEA that resolves 
some of the tensions discussed earlier. In this sense, my investigation will entail a 
combination of theoretical and policy-type research (Hakim 1987:3). 
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4.1.2 Choosing the case 
Most of my professional experience with SEA over a period of seven years has been within 
the European context. 1 Having worked in several European countries, I am aware of the 
limited cross-fertilization of the literature across linguistic borders and - more in general -
of the overwhelming contribution of the industrialised (particularly Anglo-Saxon) world to 
the development of SEA thinking and practice to date. This conflicts with the context-
specific nature of SEA, discussed in Chapter 3. Given the growing interest and expectations 
being placed on this instrument in developing countries and by international organisations 
(Chapter 1 and 2), I therefore sought to identify a case that could help bridge the literature 
gap, and contribute to a discipline that is evolving in both developing and developed worlds. 
A number of factors led me to focus the empirical work in Chile. In recent years Chile, and 
other Latin American countries (including Costa Rica, Republica Dominicana, Venezuela), 
have been considering the systematic use of SEA as a response to the need for 
environmental integration (and sustainability) and the growing realisation of the limits of 
existing institutional arrangements, including planning and assessment practices, to deliver 
sustainable development (see also Kessler 2003) . Chile provides a context similar to that of 
the late 1970s-early 1980s in developed countries, when complex needs (large projects with 
strategic effects, cumulative impacts, etc.) led to calls for a more strategic form of EA, 
which eventually translcrted into the demand for a new instrument: SEA (Chapter 2). It is a 
developing country that falls into the diverse category of 'middle-income countries', sharing 
a number of development challenges: 
'persistent povelty; the need to improve the investment climate; social, structural, 
and sectoral constraints; and varying access to international markets and private 
capital flows ... many of these countries now find that the principal constraints to 
poverty reduction and faster growth lie in their social, structural and sectoral 
policies and institutions' (World Bank 200la:3)? 
Middle-income and SEA literatures therefore share a common focus on policies and 
institutional change and strengthening, and not surprisingly, the - mainly ad hoc - cases 
of SEA applications have started appearing in middle-income countries like Brasil, South 
I Something which had important implications for my identity and positionality in the field, discussed 
below. 
2 Middle-income countries encompass realities with annual per capita incomes between US$ 755 and 
US$ 2995 in 1999 (World Bank 2001). 
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Africa and several transition countries. The fact that I had a relative advantage in learning 
Spanish, being Italian, made me focus on Latin America, and eventually on Chile.3 
During the first year of. the PhD, Maria Partidario and Rodrigo Jiliberto (both ex-colleagues 
of the ANSEA project, see Section 4.2.4), had signalled recent developments and growing 
interest in SEA in the country. Soon after, at the IAIA Annual Meeting of 2001, I was able 
to make three important contacts for Chile: one of the workshop presentations was precisely 
about an example of SEA canied out by the Chilean Government with assistance by the 
World Bank, and I met the speakers Juan David Quintero and Kirsten Oleson. It transpired 
that the Bank was negotiating with the Ministry of Public Works for a $400 million loan for 
institutional and infrastructure development in eight watersheds. One of the conditions for 
the loan was that a Regional Environmental Assessment (REA - a version of SEA 
promoted by the Bank (World Bank 1999» had to be canied out for each watershed plan. It 
was the pilot REA that Quintero and Oleson had presented, highlighting the potentials of, as 
well as the numerous obstacles to, the effective implementation of SEA in Chile. 
Secondly, I met Marcela Bocchetto, ex-officer of the Chilean National Commission for the 
Environment (CONAMA)4, and gained further insight into the developments and challenges 
that confronted impact assessment in Chile, as well as additional contacts. According to her, 
and to some of the documentary evidence from CONAMA's web site, the Chilean 
Government was showing increasing interest in SEA and in 2000 it promoted a programme 
which should lead to the introduction of SEA in the country. A Task Force for SEA was set 
up. Amongst its objectives was a review of existing international experience, followed by 
the test application of SEA to a number of plans. The Chilean Environmental Act, Law no. 
19.300 (March 1994) includes requirements for an environmental assessment of certain 
plans, and CONAMA was interpreting this to mean SEA. Depending on the interpretation of 
SEA, SEA-type studies had in fact been canied out on urban land-use plans. 
Finally, I met Hernan Blanco, a representative of one of the most prominent NGOs 
(CIPMA), who highlighted advances in the assessment of trade agreements and mining 
developments. A special one-day workshop organised by multilateral funding agencies 
3 I considered the ability to speak the local language as a key condition since the research methods I 
intended to use entailed intensive qualitative investigations. 
4 Comisi6n Nacional del Medio Ambiente 
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before the Conference itself, provided further evidence of the interest and pressure behind 
the adoption of strategic assessment instruments (both social and environmental). 
Hence, more and more evidence was pointing towards Chile as an ideal case study for an in-
depth analysis of on-going discourses on the need (or otherwise) for an instrument like SEA, 
the role and shape it should have, and the expectations it raises amongst different players. In 
short, Chile provided the necessary case study for an analysis of SEA concepts in the 
making, and in context. 
In-depth primary research into SEA concepts and practice makes an important contribution 
to the literature for three more reasons. SEA literature (academic and other) tends to 
describe SEA examples using secondary sources (Therivel and Partidario 1996; Noble 
2000), or makes only limited use of primary sources, offering little in the way of substantive 
analysis of their merits and limitations. Secondly, with the notable exception of South 
Africa, there is a bias for focusing on well-known SEA examples from developed countries. 
Instead, this research will explore the establishment of SEA in Chile. The case study 
provides a lens through which to observe and understand the relevance and accuracy, or 
otherwise, of the conceptual framework outlined above. The decision to opt for in-depth 
analysis instead of several, more supetficial, case studies was based on the need to document 
the content, dynamics, and underlying discourses of the processes defining the aim and role 
of SEA in a particular institutional, organisational and social context, thus comparing the 
theoretical propositions with the complexity of a particular case. Finally, the focus on the 
process of defining a new SEA regime, as opposed to discussing an existing one, should 
make a third and significant contribution to existing SEA literature. 
The insight into how Chile is handling and framing SEA is to inform the re-
conceptualisation of SEA and the recommendations for future research priorities laid out in 
the final chapter of this thesis. 
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4.2 Identity, positionality and involvement 
4.2.1 Exploring SEA in Chile 
Finding my way 
The second year of the PhD was essentially devoted to the Chilean case study. Field work 
took place in three phases. The first trip (October 2001 to January 2002) provided an overall 
understanding of the main issues related to SEA in Chile in order to define 'the case' on 
which to focus the investigation. It entailed the identification of key informants, the carrying 
out of a first round of open-ended interviews, and thoroughly improving my language skills. 
On my return I spent six weeks in Cambridge, analysing the data and writing up a Case 
Study Report, and focusing the research for the second trip. This took place from March till 
the end of May 2002, and was centred around the emerging conceptions of SEA within 
MOP, in particular the SEMA T, as well as methodological approaches which were then 
tested during the period June-September 2002. My final trip to Santiago (October 2002) was 
sponsored by MOP, and was specifically focused around the discussion of initial SEA 
results presented at a two-day internal seminar. 
During the entire period in Santiago I was based at the Instituto de Investigaci6n y 
Postgrado, of the Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile. This opportunity was the result 
of the kind efforts of Prof. Fernando Perez Orzun and Prof. Cristina Felsenhardt. (Director 
of the Institute), who allowed me to use the resources of the department, introducing me to 
those lecturers who could be interested in my research (see Acknowledgements). Being 
based at the Instituto helped me through the steep learning curve, which I had to embark on 
in my first weeks. 
According to my First Year Report (2001 :47), once in Chile, the plan was relatively clear: 
The proposal adopts a simple nested approach, staIting from the national scale, 
then focusing on watershed management plans. It aims to explore the CUlTent 
general concept of SEA as it is developing in Chile, and its relation to watershed 
planning in particular. This will involve literature reviews, a detailed analysis of 
selected texts, and interviews. The on-going nature of this debate should allow 
the researcher to identify the different stakeholders and carry out both one-to-one 
interviews, and focus group interviews within, and between stakeholder groups 
(for example, 'environment' Government bodies, 'development' Government 
bodies, international institutions active in Chile, ptivate sector, NGOs)'. 
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Many of these ideas were indeed followed up, but, thanks to the laws of chance as well as 
those of method and planning, the emphasis has partly shifted. This is in line with 
theoretical sampling (Flick 2002:42) which depends on the iterative process of sampling, 
collecting and immediately interpreting the data, and calls for openness in the decision about 
what data to integrate next, and possibly what method may need changing. Refening to 
'field procedures ' , Yin (1984:67) argues that 'the investigator must learn to integrate real 
world events with the needs of the data collection plan '. Together, these approaches became 
the golden rules of fieldwork in Chile, but before I tell this story, I need to reflect on some 
of the links between chance, identity and positionality. 
Reflexivity has become a common aspect of social science research. It can be seen as the 
taking account of the effect of the personality or presence of the researcher on what is being 
investigated (Oxford Dictionary 1998). Woolgar (1999:725) sees this as: 
'benign introspection. Social scientists are encouraged to reflect upon the social 
circumstances of production of their knowledge, either as a methodological 
conective ... or as part of a general injunction toward healthy awareness of the 
social and political context within which they operate'. 
I was soon to recognise that detached and passive observation - let alone conversation -
are virtually impossible. 
As I set off for Chile I was fully engrossed in my identity as PhD student, and was prepared 
to face the inevitable difficulties of getting access to people and their time, given that - as I 
saw it - they would essentially be doing me a favour. I was therefore not prepared for the 
amount of interest in my research topic, and the willingness to discuss it that ensued. With 
hindsight, this was perhaps na'ive in two respects: my identity and positionality were far 
more complex, and the double nature of my research - theoretical and practical - meant 
that interviews could be of interest to both the interviewer and interviewee. Investigating an 
assessment tool that was becoming increasingly relevant in Chile meant that many 
interviewees had an active interest in reflecting on my topic and, as it sometimes turned out, 
expected to learn something more about it in the process. 
My identity and the way I presented myself in the field was particularly important in these 
respects. The whole purpose of doing this PhD was tightly linked with my professional 
background (Chapter 1), and the research themes and questions were developed on the basis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of SEA that I came to experience as a practitioner who 
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designed and applied this instrument, and trained people to use it. I felt it was essential, as I 
presented myself to interviewees, to explain this background to my investigation. This 
combined with what Espinoza [academia] and Gonzalez [academia]5 consider as a tendency 
to see 'everything from Europe' as good, and often to be preferred to indigenous sources of 
knowledge. A tendency exacerbated by being a student of a highly regarded academic 
institution. Together, these factors meant that I was sometimes viewed as an 'SEA expert 
from Europe', as well as a PhD student - especially by those who were interested in the 
applied nature of the research topic. 
Five methods of data gathering 
Inevitably, my identity influenced the research process, leading to obstacles and 
opportunities.6 This resulted in the use of five different methods of data gathering (Table 4-
a), in addition to documentation and personal comments through email correspondence. 
Such variety of methods and sources of evidence has allowed the development of 
converging lines of inquiry, helping to construct validity (Yin 1984). Each additional 
method strengthened the inductive approach of my investigation, providing greater insight 
in the understandings and conceptions of strategic, environmental and assessment issues in 
the Chilean context, which are then related back to the conceptual framework outlined in the 
first part of the thesis. ' 
~ [TA-al-Espinoza-(21l1l01)][AI-bl-Gonzalez-(241l0/01)] 
It also had implications in terms of ethical and reciprocity issues which I discuss in Section 4.2.2. 
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Table 4-a Methods of data gathering and frequency of use 
Method Method description Times used 
category from Oct. 2001 
- Oct. 2002 * 
A Interviews - formal open-ended 19 interviews 
B Interviews - informal 16 discussions 
C Group interviews (2-4 people) C - number of times individuals (includes repeat 15 interviews) were interviewed in a group situation 
(formal open-ended interviews) 
CB - informal group discussions 
D Observations - conferences or • Centro Estudios y Desarrollo (CED) 5 
seminars on or around the Presentation of the Alumysa Project EIA by 
research subject the Consultants 
(see Annexes A and C for the full • Seminar organised by the Government 
list, including events unrelated to Transport Secretariat 
Chile) 
• MOP conference on Infrastructure and 
Environment 
• MOP Conference III Encuentro de las Aguas 
'Agua, Vida y Desarrollo' 
• Planes Reguladores Sustentables -
Presentation at the Seminar Series at the 
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile 
E Seminars, meetings and E - observations with some direct involvement: 5 interviews partly shaped by the • 3 - 2 hour seminars at the CED, 
author to address research topics • 1 - 4 hour seminar with the SEMAT staff 
• 1 - 4 hour seminar at the Catholic University 
F Seminars, meetings and F - two day seminar 
interviewsJelated to the SEMAT 
Initiative 
FA - open-ended interviews related to the SEMAT 5 
Initiative 
FG - meetings (between 2-10 people) related to the 12 
SEMAT Initiative 
* = these only refer to the Chilean case study. Methods A-D were also used in other contexts (Section 4.2.4 and Annex 
A). 
Categories A-C focused on traditional interview methods . When I first arrived in Santiago 
(9110101) I had already a few interviews (Table 4-b) set up thanks to early email and 
telephone contact with informants suggested to me at the IAIA Conference (above). From 
these initial me~tings, I was able to map out a set of potential issues and, thanks to Burgess' 
snowballing technique of using personal contacts and contacts of contacts (1996), my list of 
interviewees started lengthening and, most significantly, the methodological relevance of 
the country's geography became clearer. Chile has a population of just over 15 million, and 
although it is 4000 km long and approximately 200 km wide throughout, over a third of its 
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people lives in Santiago, highlighting the centralised political, administrative and economic 
nature of the country [Romero-academia; Escudero-government; Santibafiez-government; 
Parra-academia, personal comment].7 It therefore became less of a surprise to see how the 
names that were being recommended to me soon began to repeat themselves. 
Table 4-b The first contacts in Chile 
Interviewee Affiliation Date Type of interview 
Raczynski, M. (suggested by Oleson, Ministry-MOP 22110/01 open ended interview 
World Bank) 
Rivera, C. (suggested by Bocchetto, Yale Government agency- 23/10/01 open ended interview 
University) CONAMA 
Gonzalez, Santiago (contact from the FAO/ Universidad 24/10/01 open ended interview 
ANSEA project) Politecnica de Madrid 
(Spain) 
MOP Conference: 11/ Encuentro de las Santiago, Chile 24-26 conference tangentially relevant 
Aguas 'Agua, Vida y Desarrollo' Oct.101 to the research 
Astorga, Eduardo (suggested by Blanco, Ministry-MOP/SEMAT 29/10/01 open ended interview 
CIPMA- Centro de Investigaci6n y 
Planificaci6n del Medio Ambiente) 
Blanco, Hernan (met at the IAIA in June NGO-CIPMA 29/10/01 open ended interview 
2001) 
Espinoza, Guillermo (suggested by Think tank-CED 2/11/01 open ended interview 
Gonzalez and Astorga) 
As soon as I started interviewing people in Santiago, I realised how deeply apart I felt from 
the context in which I was operating. I shared none of the essential elements that would have 
made the process easy(ier): language, narratives, history, culture. This had several effects on 
the interview process. At first it was difficult to interrupt and re-direct discussions. This 
gradually eased off, thanks to my growing confidence with Spanish. However, as a rule, I 
tried to create an inter-subjective space which would not be threatening, and allow 
interviewees to follow their train of thought as much as possible, feeling that too many 
specific questions would influence the range of topics that the informant would otherwise 
choose to raise. 
The distinction betwee~ formal open-ended interviews (method A) and informal discussions 
(method B) is more linked to the situation, timing and length of discussions, than to their in-
depth character. For example, several informal discussions took place over a lunch break or 
after a formal meeting or seminar - to clarify specific points. This is also reflected in the 
7 [A -a-Romero-(20/ 12/01)] [0-fa 1-Escudero-(23/4/02)] [ 0-b-Santibafiez-(26/3/02)] 
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technique used to record interviews: 24 were taped (including group interviews) and the rest 
involved hand notes taken (almost always) during conversations and subsequently typed out 
(usually within 24 hours). Initially, both were used to ask respondents about facts and 
opinions in relation to the growing interest in SEA in Chile, where possible seeking their 
insight both as 'public role-holders' and as private individuals (Hakim 1987:73). Gradually, 
the interviews took a more focused form (Yin 1984), aiming to corroborate facts , which 
have already been established, and to explore in-depth specific issues identified as critical to 
the research theme. Back in Cambridge, I had planned to run a number of focus groups. 
These are usually seen as group interviews on a predetermined subject, involving up to a 
dozen participants and a moderator (Kreuger 1998; Morgan 1988), who introduces questions 
and ensures the discussion remains focused . Their appeal is tied to the fact that, according to 
Goss (1996:115, in Camilleri 2001:97), they 'better reflect the social nature of knowledge'. 
However, this idea was replaced by alternative opportunities to shape a number of seminars 
(method E) and participate in a government project (method F). I also found it useful to 
interview a number of people in groups of two to four (method C). This is a less formal set-
up compared with that of focus groups, nonetheless it provided the opportunity for reasoned 
argument, reflection, and learning. 
Four Government informants were interviewed three times individually and seven other 
informants, including NGO activists, researchers and consultants were interviewed twice. A 
group of Ministerial officers from the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and 
Telecommunications (MOP) was also interviewed thrice. Reflecting on all the interviews, I 
can distinguish broad types of reactions: most interviewees seemed interested in the 
opportunity to discuss the topic, leading to engaging conversations; a small number took this 
as a knowledge display opportunity. On a number of occasions when I had group interviews, 
the respondents mentioned that they had found the process interesting and useful. 
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4.2.2 Serendipity, positionality and ethics 
Data collection methods D, E and F follow an increasingly serendipitous path, and reveal an 
important shift towards an active, as well as overt, position in the field (Figure 4-c), which 
had ethical implications. I discuss each as it transformed from opportunity to method. 
Figure 4-b Positionality and ethics in the field 
Active 
Covert 
Passive 
Source: (Hobbs and May 1993) 
Member 
Actor/agent 
Overt 
Method D included two conferences and three seminars that provided additional material 
enabling me to understand the overall context in which SEA was being discussed. The 
conferences took place within the first two months and were a useful arena for the 
observation of key stakeholders involved in and around my topic. The Infrastructure and 
Environment Conference in particular, revealed some of the underlying struggles for power 
and knowledge between government institutions. The three seminars allowed for both 
formal observation and active participation, since I was twice asked to make a presentation 
on key SEA themes from the international literature. Each seminar was arranged by a 
different organisation, providing useful comparisons: a think tank (Centre for Studies and 
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Development - CED)8, a Government department (Executive Secretariat for Transport -
SECTRA)9, and a university (Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile - PUC). 
Method E refers to. five seminars, which were partly shaped by me to address the research 
topic. These opportunities, the first and most important of which presented itself less than 
four weeks after my anival in Santiago, raised issues of positionality and ethics, as I saw 
myself becoming more of an actor within the world I was investigating. The first open-
ended interview with Espinoza [think-tank], IQ of the Centro de Estudios y Desanollo (CED), 
revealed CED 's interest in running a series of seminars to discuss the role of SEA in Chile 
with a wide variety of stakeholders. Espinoza asked me if I were interested in joining such 
an effort, particularly contributing to the definition of an agenda. Both the topic and the 
range of stakeholders to be involved were strongly relevant to my research. However, a 
number of factors had to be weighed up. Firstly, the CED is a think tank linked to the 
socialist party and has the clear intention of positioning itself as a leading institution in this 
new discipline, hence, the seminars would not be perceived as sponsored by an independent 
body." Secondly, the seminar format would allow the involvement of a large number of 
stakeholders (20-25) but would not allow the same level of debate as in a focus group 
interview (which I had planned as part of the second field trip), and finally, according to 
CED's proposal the seminars would take place between November and December, leaving 
insufficient time to-obtain a first impression of the overall issues for the research. 
However, the benefits seemed to outweigh these concerns. The CED would take care of all 
the administration and logistics for the seminars, leaving me free to concentrate on drawing 
up the agenda for what turned out to be three seminars. The reputation of the CED was to 
ensure a high turnout, including senior representatives of Ministries and the private sector, 
and I was able to recommend a number of participants from NGOs and academia. The 
timing proposed by CED also provided an unexpected opportunity to gain an early insight in 
the views of a wide range of actors, crucial to my area of research. 
8 e . enfro de EstudlOS y Desarrollo. 
9 
Secreterfa Ejecutiva de Transporte. 
10 [AT-al-Espinoza-(2/11/01)] 
11 
Although, as my research proceeded I came to realise that the reputation of CED was indeed of a 
prestigious and balanced organisation, which played a crucial part in providing a forum for the debate 
of economic growth, justice, social and environmental issues. 
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A similar opportunity was to arise from the first interview with Astorga, Director of the 
Executive Secretariat for Environment and Land Use of MOP (SEMAT).12 Astorga 
considered SEA to be a potential instrument for the Ministry. He therefore asked whether, 
given my past experience as a consultant in this field, I could give a presentation on SEA 
methods to his team (the SEMAT group). This meant effectively assuming an advocacy 
role. However, the opportunity of discussing SEA with the whole team of SEMA T, 
including its director and some regional staff, was not to be discarded lightly, also because it 
allowed me to do something useful in return for the time they had given to my interviews. 
Finally, a solution was found by setting an agenda, which meant I would deliver a general 
introduction to SEA based on academic literature and policy documents, followed by staff's 
discussion around set questions, which I was to facilitate. Hence, rather than being primarily 
a presentation of methodologies, the meeting would aim to facilitate a discussion amongst 
SEMA T 's staff, in terms of the reasons for their interest in SEA, their expectations from 
SEA and the types of problems which they needed to address daily and which could be 
addressed through such an instrument. 
The last case under method E is a seminar organised by the Institute (of the Catholic 
University) where I was based. Experts in urban planning, including Sergio Leon and the 
Director Cristina Felsenhardt, asked me to help in the organisation of a seminar focused on 
the on-going housing development reform and SEA, and to contribute with a presentation of 
my preliminary results. The issue of housing is tightly linked to that of planning in Chile, 
where the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU)13 has to approve all land-
use plans in the country. This in turn is closely linked to SEA since Chile's main 
environmental law (Law 13.900) already calls for an EIA of land-use plans, making this one 
of the most likely areas for the application of the new instrument. The seminar took place on 
15 May 2002 and was a further occasion of confrontation and debate on the desirability and 
possible function of SEA in the Chilean context. 
12 
13 Se~r~terfa Ejecutiva de Medio Ambiellte y Territorio del MOP [G-a-Astorga-(29110101)] 
Mlll/sterio de Viviellda y Urbanislllo. 
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The fifth data collection method arose during the first half of my second field trip to 
Santiago, and entailed a definitive move into the 'active/overt ' role of a 'member' and 
'actor' (Figure 4-b). On 28 March 2002 I was asked to attend a meeting with Juan Escudero 
and Ingrid Castro of SEMAT.14 They explained that SEMAT wanted to explore further the 
potential of SEA, and understand how it worked in practice, by launching an exercise within 
MOP that would 'simulate an SEA '. I asked Juan to explain further their objectives for the 
exercise. His answer can be summarised thus: 15 
JE: we want to develop a full case study: 
• to learn how to do SEA 
• to understand what it is that we [SEMA T] are missing 
• to understand for whom this instrument actually works, 'who wins' using it 
• to learn how to define a methodology for SEA. 
We want a one week concentrated seminar to 'simulate a final decision'. You 
[OIivia] would have to play a passive role but we want you to be present to help 
us develop a methodology. 
The proposal presented an even greater dilemma than that of previous occasions. By this 
time I had included the SEMA T as one of the institutional focuses of my investigation, 
particularly since it represented the only environment division within a leading ministry in 
Chile (this is discussed in Chapter 7). Thus, Escudero and Castro's idea was as tempting as 
it was worrying. Afte~ additional clarifications it became clear that the initiative would take 
place during a much longer period (April-September 2002) and would entail my 
participation in the following activities: 
1) the discussion of SEA (what it can be used for, and how it can be applied) amongst 
a selected number of Directorate Generals MOP; 
2) the selection of a MOP initiative which can be used to design an SEA methodology 
and simulate its application (to promote learning by doing among a selected number 
of MOP officials) 
3) a two-day seminar to discuss the experience of the simulation and draw conclusions 
with an aim,to promote the use of SEA more widely within the Ministry. 
14 
15 [G-fgl-Escudero-(28/3/02)] [G-fg-Castro-(28/3/02)] 
I only took written notes during the meeting, highlighting any direct quote with inverted commas. 
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On the positive side, such involvement and access to the participants would provide a level 
of understanding of the issues at stake, which would be difficult to obtain through standard 
interviewing, particularly because of the restraints on time and availability that such 
interviews would have to confront. For example, in order to help them discuss what SEA 
can be used for (point 1 above), I could envisage a series of group discussions with the 
officials involved in the initiative. The material thus collected could serve two purposes: 
provide invaluable information for my PhD, and guidance to SEMA T. Finally, the Ministry 
would offer to pay for my travel expenses and accommodation in the light of my 
participation in the two-day seminar, provisionally planned for September 2002, giving me 
an important opportunity to witness the reflections and argumentations in favour or against 
• 16 the expenence. 
However, the requirement to act as a facilitator was clearly based on SEMAT's expectations 
that my past experience as a professional in this field would make a useful contribution. 
Could the ethical implications of such direct involvement be reasonably addressed? The 
complexity of the situation is best explained with reference to the term 'methodology' 
referred to repeatedly during those early discussions with SEMAT staff. Although the exact 
remit of the project became clear only as it progressed, SEMAT wanted it to result in the 
definition of an SEA methodology, and hoped that I could play a role in shaping this. This 
was exactly the kind of thing I had resisted getting involved in throughout my stay in Chile, 
to avoid directly influencing the opinions and discourses I was examining. Also, by that 
time this idea was raised, the picture I had built of the Ministry's organisational and 
institutional context led me to believe that the focus on methods (how), as opposed to 
purpose (why), risked raising many of the tensions and difficulties identified in my 
conceptual framework (Chapters 2-3). Yet, on reflection, these difficulties could also be 
seen as a tremendous opportunity, albeit a challenging one. If I could concentrate my 
involvement in terms of stirring the debate, raising questions, provoking discussions and 
highlighting difficulties in relation to the issues that would arise throughout the process, 
then perhaps the benefits would outweigh the complications and effort involved. In turn, this 
way of drawing out, rather than proposing, issues, themes and solutions would allow me to 
define methodol~gical components that responded to SEMA T 's concerns and understanding 
of the context of operation, rather than depend on my understanding of it. Finally, it became 
16 
See Saarikoski 2000 for a similar example where the researcher was officially involved in an EIA 
process. 
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clear that SEMAT would work throughout the 'summer' (I was to leave Chile by early May) 
testing the SEA approach on a selected case, and I would then have the unique possibility of 
participating in the closing seminar where the experience was to be discussed over two days. 
It is impossible to re-create in this short space the many moments of discussion, doubts and 
re-thinking that took place in week following my meeting with Escudero and Castro. 
However, I should stress that none of this was very linear, and that the - quite 
extraordinary - Chilean ability to take decisions and move things along almost without you 
noticing, accounted for how things developed. I could now fully understand Santiago 
Gonz:Hez's warning [academia]17 that Chileans like to act quickly and postpone difficulties 
to a later (sometimes indefinite) date. 18 Hence, I found myself involved in a number of 
meetings even before I had had the time to articulate to myself (let alone my interlocutors) 
all the issues raised above. With hindsight, this worked well as it allowed me to have a 
clearer picture of what was expected, and gave me time to think through the issues, without 
committing myself to the project. 
Having clarified the concerns I had and agreed to the role outlined above, I agreed to join 
the project. This led to nine meetings with a range of members of the SEMA T initiative 
(including people from different directorate generals within MOP), during the period 
between April and October 2002; a range of individual and small group discussions; 
documentary material from the SEA example developed by the team between May and 
September 2002; and my participation at the closing seminar (October 2002). 
Overall, during the three field work trips I was able to interview 38 individuals (using 
Methods A-C), and shape and participate in six seminars, involving four different 
organisations and themes (Methods E and F), to which I now turn. 
17 [AI-b-Gonzalez-(24/1O/O 1)] 
18 This is one example where I had to confront my pre-conceptions of Latin America, since I had 
tended to believe things would move slowly and people would need time to make decisions. 
However, the speed with which the three seminars on SEA had been decided upon and ananged by 
the CED should have provided enough warning. This aspect had wider cultural significance in that 
several interviewees criticised Chileans', and Latin America's, tendency to focus on (or run for) 
solutions and results, often sacrificing reflection and analysis. 
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4.2.3 Units of analysis in the Chilean case study 
In the previous chapters I proposed an analytical framework based on SEA's three 
constituent dimensions, and argued that their conceptualisation and operationalisation is 
context-specific. I identified the purpose of SEA as the critical factor in selecting the 
approach and tools needed, and suggested that the purpose can be defined tactically in order 
to transform SEA contexts, using dialogical and learning processes. Four sets of 
propositions (context, purpose of SEA, strategic 'object', and assessment) summarise the 
initial findings of Chapters 2 and 3. The empirical data gathered in Chile, and in the 
supporting cases mentioned below, explores these in detail and addresses the following 
additional questions: is the analytical framework based on SEA constituent dimensions 
helpful in understanding SEA conceptualisations and purpose? Can this framework help 
operationalise SEA? Can it facilitate the instrument 's promotion of sustainability? 
The priority during the months prior to field work and for the first weeks in Chile had been 
to identify adequate 'units of analysis' (Hakim 1987:128) that could illuminate the above 
themes. The plan, according to my First Year Report, was to gather data at two-levels: 1) at 
the macro level I would analyse the on-going debate on the future of SEA, considering a 
wide range of actors and stakeholders; 2) at a more detailed level I would look at an 
example of SEA. However, as many researchers have pointed out, the research process 
rarely follows a linear and tidy sequence. This approach was altered both as a result of the 
initial findings suggesting different emphasis on certain themes, as well as new lines of 
inquiry, but also to accommodate some of the opportunities that materialised on the way. 
The PhD First Year Report provided a list of objectives and propositions relating to the case 
study. This was, on the one hand, of great support in directing activities during the first 
weeks in the field, however, the objectives also felt somewhat artificial and detached from 
the complexity of the reality with which I was suddenly confronted. Faced with an 
unfamiliar country, continent, language and culture, I felt a clear need to 'allow the research 
subjects to speak for themselves ' (Corn well 1988:220). As a result, during this first phase of 
field work, great e~phasis was given to engaging with as many informants as possible to 
obtain a first overview of the actual issues in relation to the research topic. Although the 
themes and questions above still reflect the priorities of the First Year Report, they have 
changed in terms of emphasis and focus on aspects that appear particularly interesting and 
relevant in the Chilean context. 
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The units of analysis and related questions combine conceptual and more practical aspects 
of SEA. They are summarised below and in Table 4.c: 
• The research problem in context: SEA discourses in Chile (What conceptions 
already exist? What are the main issues being debated in relation to the future use of 
SEA? What purpose"":"" explicit, and non-explicit - is being proposed for SEA ?); 
• The existing examples of SEA (What issues arise from an analysis of the three 
constituent dimensions of SEA? How do they compare to the trends and tensions 
identified in the broad literature overview? What are the characteristics of the contexts 
of application? What obstacles do they raise?); 
• Organisational perspectives and expectations (How are conceptions forged and acted 
upon in particular organisations? What may need to change in order to ensure that SEA 
meets the expectations attached to it? Is the SEA debate in Chile leading to a greater 
understanding of sustainable development requirements?). 
• Methodological implications (What recommendations for the future definition and 
operationalisation of SEA ?) 
Table 4-c Units of analysis in the Chilean context 
Research themes Main unit of analysis Main data gathering 
method used 
SEA discourses in 0 Range of stakeholders (public and private sectors, academia, 0 All Methods (A-F) 
the Chilean context think tanks, consultants, NGOs and international agencies 0 Literature and 
[the United Nations and a multilateral bank]) policy documents 
The existing 0 Various initiatives 0 Methods A,B,C and 
examples of SEA 0 EIAs of land-use plans E 
0 SEA-type assessment of a national river-basin management 0 Literature and 
programme policy documents 
(listed in order of increasing detail) 
Organisational 0 MINVU (Ministry of housing and urban planning) 0 All Methods (A-F) 
perspectives and 0 CONAMA (Environment Commission) 
expectations 0 World Bank 
0 MOP (Ministry of public works) departments involved in the 
SEMAT Initiative (Hydraulic Directorate, Water Directorate, 
Planning Directorate, Environment Secretariat and others) 
(listed in order of increasing detail) 
Methodological 0 EIAs of land-use plans 0 Methods A,B,C, E 
implications 0 SEA-type assessment of a national river-basin management and F 
programme 0 Policy documents 
0 The SEMAT Initiative 
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Together, these four layers (or units of analysis), which are listed to reflect the chronology 
of the field work, led to the identification of existing conceptions of SEA, their evolution 
and the changing expectations implicit in the different understandings of the instrument, and 
allowed a comparison with the trends and propositions highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Moving from one unit to the other entailed a growing level of detail, and involvement, 
enabling an investigation of the way SEA relates (and could relate) to policy processes, and 
institutional frameworks, including environment and development policies, planning 
practices/cultures, and assessment practices/cultures. This led to a better understanding of 
the purpose of SEA in the Chilean context and, hence, of the type of SEA regime (processes 
and tools) that can ensure the instrument meets the expectations of those applying it. The 
different layers also helped to expose the implications of linking SEA's purpose to 
sustainable development in contexts (like the Chilean one) where this is neither sufficiently 
defined, nor operationalised. 
4.2.4 Additional sources of primary data 
The Chile case study is the central source of empirical material for the thesis. However, 
during the three years of the PhD, I sought additional sources of primary data at IAIA 
annual conferences, at a,number of seminars on SEA by different institutions (see Annex A), 
and by participating in two research initiatives. These sources served a number of purposes. 
They provided an idea of the wider debate sunounding the PhD investigation, reflecting the 
live nature of the topic, the rapid changes in both academic and policy-making circles (for 
example: the World Bank, the Department for International Development - DFID, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD, the Italian 
Government), serving as a further means of triangulation for the arguments and propositions 
developed throughout the thesis. Furthermore, while bearing in mind the different scope and 
scale of the investigations, the additional material - which relates to both developed and 
developing country contexts - allowed for reflection on similarities, as well as differences, 
between these realities and helped to embed the Chilean findings in wider trends. 
At the 2001 and 2002 Annual Conferences of IAIA I was able to cany out brief interviews 
and informal discussions with a number of experts from academic and professional 
backgrounds. In both cases, the feedback from the two presentations summarising some of 
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the early findings from the PhD was also extremely helpful. The contacts made during IAIA 
events, as well as previous contacts that I had developed as activist and consultant, were also 
followed up with informal discussions, to ensure I kept abreast of developments in the 
impact assessment world. Following the principles of openness central to grounded theory, 
an additional set of interviews was organised to examine issues raised during the analysis of 
an SEA example (Chapter 6) that involved both the Chilean Ministry of Public Works and 
the World Bank. The interviews were conducted in Washington D.e. in May 2003 (Annex 
A). I was also a participant observer at three seminars organised by DEID and the OECD on 
the relevance of SEA in development assistance work and particularly in relation to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, which shed further light on critical aspects of developing world 
contexts. 
Finally, I participated in to two research initiatives tightly linked to my PhD research. The 
first relates to the final stage of a research project (called ANSEA: Analytical SEA) aimed at 
the proposal for a new approach to SEA that focuses on decision-making, funded by the 
European Commission's Directorate General for Research. I had been involved in this 
project since 1999 and when I began my PhD in Cambridge the final report was being 
drafted (Caratti et al. forthcoming).19 In February 2002 I participated at a Conference in 
Milan [d3-Conference], presenting ANSEA 's results to a range of academics, users and 
practitioners from around Europe. I also gathered useful data through observation at the 
Conference on SEA in Italy [d4-Conference], which followed on from that of ANSEA. The 
presentations and discussion that followed make important additions to my findings in 
Chile, highlighting similarities with trends in developed countries. 
The second research initiative entailed the production of a paper for a project of the 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), coordinating a number of national 
overviews on assessment and decision-making in the transport sector (ECMT forthcoming). 
In a similar fashion to the SEMA T case, I was able to shape this request in order to meet 
both ECMT's and my research objectives. The paper with an overview for Italy was 
prepared on the basis of 26 interviews (Annex A) with government officials, academics and 
19 A h . t t e time I was senior consultant at Environmental Resources Management. 
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professionals.20 These provided valuable insight in the attitudes of decision-makers to the 
use, and usefulness, of technical evaluations such as EIA, CBA and SEA. 
4.3 On analYSis and iterations 
4.3.1 From field notes to research themes and codes 
The overall approach during fieldwork has been to record and analyse as much data as 
possible in situ, while facts and impressions were still fresh in my mind. Apart from editing 
hand written notes of interviews and transcribing taped ones, I found it useful to keep a 
record of any thought or detail that cropped up, using a word table that had an entry date, the 
note itself, a code for the broad topic being entered and a reference number. The 213 records 
(mainly a few lines each) turned out to be an excellent and versatile tool. 
The gathering and analysing of data was itself a learning process. Following an inductive 
and grounded theory approach, which centres on 'theoretical coding as a method of 
interpreting texts ' (Flick 2002:42), I allowed - as far as possible - themes and categories to 
emerge from the informants (Silverman 1993; Glaser and Strauss 1967), and also later, from 
my notes and transcripts. Despite this, I recognise that my pre-conceived notions would 
influence my reading of the results; I therefore make assumptions explicit where possible. 
Almost a third of the overall time spent in the field was dedicated to the constant revisiting 
of the increasingly available evidence from all sources, with a view to identifying gaps and 
new areas of inquiry to direct the ongoing process of interviews (Yin 1984). This exercise 
also provided a first tentative interpretation of the material in the light of the research 
questions and allowed for the circularity, which is the strength of case analyses (Flick 2002). 
As I embarked on data analysis (mid-October 2002), I reviewed the themes and coding used 
during my stay in Chile. The process was essentially iterative as I devoted the next four 
months to drafting Chapters 2 and 3, while also cataloguing and analysing primary data. The 
result is summarised in Table 4-d: 13 themes and 22 sub-themes. 
20 ECMT's original request for collaboration on this project was based on my knowledge of Italy, as 
well as transport and assessment themes. 
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Table 4-d Coding used for the analysis of empirical data 
A Assessment approach, shape, method, tools 
\M SEA methodological issues, various activities 
\N Nature: Rationality elements, steps, info influence over OMPs ... objective,positivism, technocratic 
\T Tools 
\TI Tiering issues 
\OAI Data and information myths 
C Context (wide.r) 
\IN Institutional 
\CU Cultural 
\PO Political 
\A~ Administrative 
D Dichotomy between pig and ass, overlaps, blurring boundaries, pig that can do SEA work 
DEF Definitions and principles, characteristics and benefits 
E Environment dimension 
\SO Interpreting 'f' as SO or vice e versa 
\T Tools more adapted to promote SO 
G Gap in the literature and practice; methods, undertheorisation .... 
Integration issue 
\PR Process integration + calls for: ex-ante, early start (and the contrary) 
\A Assessments integration (economic, social, technical etc) including whether they exist 
\AC Actors integration 
\SE Sectoral integration 
\OIS Interdisciplinary 
L Learning, virtuous circle 
\PLG Learning about planning 
\SO Learning about sustainability conditions 
0 Origins of SEA 
\OP Practical origins of SEA, the instrument - EIA and SEA relative to EIA inheritance 
\OT Theoretical origins of SEA, the concept 
P Purpose, Goals, aims, objectives, role, function of SEA, scope of SEA, strategy of insertion 
\W Who does SEA 
PR Practice of SEA, the variety etc. eg.s of ex-ante, ex~post etc. 
S Strategic dimension (policy process-immediate context) 
\SG Strategic: compensation function, aim of promoting institutional change, or any other meaning 
\SO Strategic: object, PPP, imperfect world, OMP, strategic consequences=object 
TE Theoretical elements 
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4.3.2 Analysing and learning 
Having started analysing my notes from the early stages of field work, I was able to revise 
my data gathering methods and the inquiry's focus as I went along. A first formal attempt at 
analysing the data resulted in a Case Study Report (February 2002) of the period 15110101 to 
24/01102, which helped focusing research for the second field trip. 
The method of analysis has been similar throughout the PhD process. Analysis was canied 
out essentially through the categorising and coding of material from transcripts and 
documents (Hajer 1993; Hajer 1993b; Fischer and Forester 1993; Hajer 1995). I made 
extensive use of conceptual maps and flow diagrams, endeavouring to an'ange concepts and 
themes onto one page, thus facilitating the organisation of the data in my mind. Analysing 
the data without the help of computer-based packages, such as ATLAS, for qualitative 
analysis was a choice; partly the result of starting the process while in Santiago, where I did 
not have such tools; but most importantly due to my belief in the learn-by-doing philosophy, 
based on the iterative process of reading the material and translating its messages into 
diagrams, tables, etc. This approach also allowed me to recollect some of the more 
ethnographic elements of my research, including memories or places, tensions, states of 
mind and interactions between informants, as well as with myself. In the analysis, the views 
that key informants held at the beginning of my research and towards the end of the process 
of investigation, were compared in order to determine whether there had been any shifts in 
positions, interests, or beliefs. Changes in relationships between SEMAT and other 
directorates were also assessed. 
The physical coding and tracking material amongst the piles of paper and documents, was 
done through a simple method based on positioning sticky (post-it) notes in thirteen unique 
positions along the right margin of the standard A4 sheet (format in which most of my 
material is printed), coinciding with the main themes identified above. 
Coding is also crucial for referring to empirical data in the following chapters. I use a 
number of procedui'es to facilitate understanding of the broader context of specific sources. 
Firstly, all primary data is referenced in the main text between square brackets, thus 
distinguishing it from documentary evidence and literature, while more detail is provided in 
footnotes (see Annex A for a full description of the method). Secondly, Annex A provides a 
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complete list of all sources and codes, except for those used to secure anonymity. 
Confidentiality, and the researcher's responsibility, becomes critical issues when there is the 
need to refer to events and actions which are not documented in official sources and publicly 
available documents. Only a few informants asked me to switch off the tape-recorder at 
specific moments; in general there were no requests for anonymity or other restrictions. 
Nonetheless, I have at times replaced an informant's name with a code, where I considered 
the comment could raise sensitivities. 
A greater problem was posed by the significant part of the data gathered in the shape of 
seminars and group meetings. This made it particularly difficult to ensure that people could 
opt out of being cited in my research. In each case, either someone introduced me, or I 
myself clarified my status, the nature of my research and the use I would make of the 
material gathered. However, it this was only partly satisfactory. Michael Bravo and Harriet 
Bulkeley (from my Department at Cambridge University) had provided valuable support 
and advice, but the idea - for example - of allowing people to sign a short declaration 
opting in or out W0-5 deemed inappropriate by the counterparts organising these events, 
mainly because it felt 'too formal',zl Quite apart form this specific problem, I also felt that 
no matter how clear you have been with an informant, when you read a transcript you realise 
that they themselves might have wanted to alter or eliminate some of the text because it is 
difficult to have absolute control during a long discussion. As a result, whenever I deemed 
the content of a quote potentially sensitive, I allocated the interviewee a second, anonymous 
code. Finally, I make extensive use of direct quotes in the next chapters. These had to be 
translated from Spanish into English with the inevitable loss that such process entails, 
however on a few occasions where I felt it was impossible to translate the charisma of the 
sentence, I have kept the original text. 
21 In Chapter 5 some interviewees stress the general tendency to avoid putting anything in writing if 
possible. 
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I now turn to the description and analysis of the primary data gathered throughout the 
research period. This is organised in three chapters (5, 6 and 7), following - broadly 
speaking - the order of the four units of analysis in Table 4-c. Each allows for a 
progressively more detailed exploration of the propositions outlined in Section 3.5. I 
investigate the emergence of particular conceptions of SEA's purpose in Chile, with 
reference to discourses from a range of actors (Chapter 5) and through the investigation of 
SEA-type initiatives based on the work of the Ministry of Public Works in relation to water 
resources (Chapters 6 and 7). I use the different units of analysis to examine the meaning 
and implications of context and purpose, and unveil the concepts underlying SEA's 
constituent dimensions ('strategic', 'environmental' and 'assessment'), and the interaction 
between them. 
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Chapter 5 
Conceptualising SEA in Context 
[I]nformation confuses me 
Professor Hugo Romero, recalling the reply of a mayor in Santiago 
the word environment complicates [things] a little 
Jaime Silva, of the Ministry for Housing and Town Planning (MINVU) 
if I had a planned territory, how easy everything would be! 
Gianni Lopez (CONAMA, Executive Director) 
Previous Chapters have portrayed a complex, changing and challenging reality for SEA. 
This Chapter emphasises the need to justify the adoption and use of SEA in different 
contexts. It investigates the conditions, existing problems and discourses that can make SEA 
useful and necessary in the context of a middle-income country at the turn of the century. 
Section 3.4 has shown how instruments such as SEA are connected to the 'environmental 
capacity ,I of unique political, cultural, institutional and administrative dimensions (the 
wider context). This Chapter explores how such dimensions can shape conceptions of SEA, 
its purpose and methods, and how these in turn can be expected to influence - if not shape 
- the policy proces~ and ultimately the wider context (cf. Figure 3-c). 
I The expression is used here according to Janicke 's idea of 'environmental capacity' as a political 
system's capacity for environmental policy (1996), not to be confused with the more common use of 
the expression (see Section 3.4.2). 
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The first Section (5.1) describes the case study context and the sources of primary data, 
leading to a detailed analysis of the nature of strategic initiatives in the Chilean context 
(Section 5.2). This is followed by an investigation of the role of politics, culture and 
institutions, in shaping the strategic and environmental dimensions of policy processes in 
Chile (Section 5.3). The final Section (5.4) relates some of these findings to normative SEA 
concepts and proposes an interpretation of the type of purpose that could be attached to SEA 
in Chile. 
5.1 SEA Discourses in Chile: Setting the Scene 
The Chileans like to joke that their country is the one always being represented in at least 
four separate maps, meaning they have to go abroad to get 'the overview ' on a single sheet. 
With its approximate 4700 km of length, and 200 km of width, Chile is undoubtedly a 
challenge for cartographers (Figure 5-a). Its climate, cultures and habitats range from those 
of the driest desert in the world (the Atacama), to the green valleys and vineyards of the 
central regions , followed by volcanoes and lakes, which lead to the icy mountains and 
glaciers of Patagonia, in the extreme south. The combination produces an awesome, 
beautifully diverse, scenery (Figure 5-b). This is certainly the image that educated, middle 
class Chileans have in ' mind when they interact with a foreigner: 'have you been to 
Patagonia? Did you like the Regi6n de los Lagos? Have you visited Atacama and Easter 
Island?', these are the typical questions one would be asked, both in the casual chats at bars 
and restaurants, and by interviewees. There is also another side to the story, which has more 
to do with Chile 's middle income status (World Bank, 200la), recent history and current 
political and economic context (UNDP, 2002).2 Section 5.1.1 provides an outline of Chile's 
political and institutional characteristics, as background and context for the interpretation of 
themes arising from the interviews, seminars and discussion groups presented and analysed 
throughout Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
2 
See also Annex C for an overview of the country's statistics on popUlation, natural and economic 
reSOurces. 
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Figure 5-a Map of Chile 
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Notes: The map shows 
the thirteen regions of 
Chile, some of the main 
urban areas (Santiago, 
capital city), and (in 
/e~~ 
gree~ some of the well 
known areas of natural 
beauty. The inset refers 
to the case study area 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Source: Phil Stickler. 
137 
Figure S-b Some of Chile's natural landscapes 
Description and Sources (clockwise from top left corner) : Golfo de Arauco (www.newtenberg.com); Salar de Huasco, 
Primera Region (www.conama.cl); Laguna San Rafael (www.newtenberg.com); Torres del Paine 
(www.newtenberg.com). Central picture: San Pedro de Atacama (www.newtenberg.com), cf. Figure 5-a for locations. 
Chile, most decisions are taken in Santiago: the centre in geographical, administrative 
and po 1 . al terms.3 In fact, the sometimes extreme centralisation of executive powers was 
discussions, as it inevitably affects the way development and 
an be framed and operationalised.4 The majority of data for this 
research was collected in SantI , fully recognising that this is only one perspective, albeit 
fundamental. 
3 Santiago is the capital city of Chile. All Ministries and ernment offices are based here, however 
it is significant to note that the Congress remains based in Valp ISO, more than 1l0km away, where 
it was relocated according to the plans of General Augusto Pinochet t before the end of his 16 year 
dictatorship. Congress began to operate again in 1990 when Patricio Ayl . became the first elected 
President since 1973. 
4 This problem is partly discussed in Chapter 6 with regards to the distribution of er over water 
resource management, and Chapter 7 which focuses on an initiative involving the Gover ent of the 
Primera Region (First Region). Under the regime of General Augusto Pinochet, all 12 region were 
renamed from North to South, stal1ing with the Prill1era Region in the extreme North of the country. 
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5.1.1 Introducing the wider context 
In Chile, and throughout South and Central America, the degree of democratisation, the 
development model and the economic growth process are critical factors influencing 
environmental management and the effectiveness of instruments such as Environmental 
Assessment. Brito and Verocai (1999:183) argue that such factors are more likely than the 
level of technical skills and administrative capacity to explain any difficulties with EIA in 
these countries: 'there is no doubt that the essential requirement for [EIA's] full adoption as 
a planning tool and an efficient aid to decision-making is political will and commitment'. 
Wider political, economic and institutional issues similarly contribute to an understanding of 
the raison d'etre for SEA in Chile. 
Democracy, development and environment 
The recent history of Chile, and in particular events since 1970, marked a watershed in the 
political, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions of people's lives. In November 1970 the 
first leftist Government in Chile (Popular Unity) was inaugurated with the victory of 
Salvador Allende. The incoming President promoted socialist and statist policies which soon 
led to unprecedented levels of social unrest (expropriation, land invasions and violent 
confrontations), and hyperinflation: problems that were used to justify the military 
, 
overthrow of his three-year-old Government on 11 September 1973 (Barros 2002; Az6car 
1999; Harris 1999; de la Parra 1998; Eastman 1997). The military coup led by General 
Augusto Pinochet, put an end to one of the most solid democratic traditions in South 
America, and began a 16-year dictatorship which left a controversial legacy, combining the 
highest sustained rate of growth in the history of Latin America (Hojman 1995; O'Brien and 
Roddick 1983), and the transformation and modernisation of Chilean society and 
institutions, with a politically and socially divided country where approximately one-third of 
the electorate in the 1990s still held a favourable view of Pinochet's dictatorship, despite its 
condemnation around the world for its crimes and human-rights abuses (Uribe and Navarro 
1999; Az6car 1999). Today, supporters of the Pinochet era coexist with the many victims of 
the regime, including those who were exiled after 1973 and returned to Chile only after 
1990. As noted in Section 5.3.4, this coexistence is partly based on a tacit agreement to 
avoid explicitly critical language in any sensitive domain; whenever possible, conflict is 
evaded. Even in relation to highly controversial projects, with major environmental and 
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social implications, think tanks and NGOs struggle to challenge the Government. The 
implications for public participation in assessment are explored below. 
Pinochet's military dictatorship ruled until a freely elected President, Patricio Aylwin (a 
Christian Democrat), was installed in 1990. The current President, Ricardo Lagos, was 
elected in 2000 (for a six-year term) and is heading a broadly socialist Government. 
Pinochet introduced a new Constitution in 1980, based on a bicameral National Congress 
(Congreso Nacional) . The Constitution was subsequently amended (in 1989, 1993 and 
1997), but still allows for non-elected members in the Senate (Senado: 49 seats, 38 elected 
by popular vote and serving eight-year terms, 9 designated members, and 2 former 
presidents who serve six-year terms and are senators for life); while all members of the 
Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados, 120 seats) are elected by popular vote to serve 
four-year terms. It is also significant that the Congress remains based in Valparaiso, more 
than 110km from Santiago, where it was relocated according to the plans of General 
Pinochet just before the end of his 16-year dictatorship. 
The seventies and eighties witnessed the influence of the conservative sections of society 
and of international capitalism on the political leaders and military forces leading different 
forms of totalitarian governments (Brito and Verocai 1999). Despite having had a broad 
centre-left Government since its return to democracy in 1990, the economic policy of Chile 
has continued to pursue neoliberal free market economic principles (Hojman 1995; Hojman 
1988; O'Brien and Roddick 1983). This development model has important implications for 
the role of the State and of planning, discussed below and in Sections 5.3.1, and for the 
interpretation of sustainability (Section 5.3.3). In contrast to other South and Central 
American countries, Chile's economy grew steadily in the 1980s, increasing productivity 
and per capita income. According to the World Bank country profile for Chile, the growth 
was at 6.8% per year throughout the 1990s, while the incidence of poverty dropped from 
40% in 1987 to 17% in 1998, and extreme poverty was reduced from 13% to 4% over the 
same period.' Chile's economic policy, and its growth, is based largely on the exploitation 
of natural resources . Trade liberalisation triggered significant export diversification into 
forestry, fishing, wines, fruits and other agro-based products . 
I 
For more detail : (Perry and Leipziger 1999; UNDP 2002). See also: www.worldbank.org/cl 
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The country was not spared the environmental degradation and social problems that have 
characterised rapid economic expansion (Cam us and Hajek 1998; Politzer 1989; de Riz 
1979). In South and Central America, 'the dominant culture of economic growth and 
employment [has been] enough to justify decisions on development projects, even when 
important environmental resources are at stake', and in Chile 'environmental concerns are 
perceived as restraining economic growth, the primary priority of both government and 
population ... all kinds of conflict are seen as potentially threatening' (Brito and Verocai 
1999:185 and 197). Inde~d, Camus and Hajek (1998:46) conclude their analysis of the 
environmental history of Chile stating that they 'perceive a low priority for the 
implementation of solutions to environmental problems in current State policies'. The 
analysis of primary data in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and Chapter 7, confirms that environmental 
concerns are still rarely seen as a priority by the public and private sectors . 
In Chile, prevention, management instruments and environmental protection policies were 
developed mainly in the mid-1990s, when the new environmental law (no. 19.300) was 
approved (Section 5.2.2), giving priority to EIA as the principal tool for environmental 
policy implementation. This was partly the result of external pressure from multilateral and 
bilateral funding agencies and international organisations such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and Development Programme (UNDP), which provided 
technical assistance for institutional development projects; again a characteristic throughout 
the continent. However;'Brito and Verocai (1999:200) conclude that: 
'The region [South and Central America] has not yet been wise enough to 
benefit from the potential of EIA as a process to achieve integration of policies 
and activities or to promote information sharing, transparency and coherence, in 
decision-making' . 
The cautious transition towards a democratic system and the continuity of the development 
model outlined above from the 1980s into the 1990s, have meant that there is still limited 
scope for consideration and discussion of environmental consequences of development 
initiatives, or broader sustainability implications. It is not uncommon for the decision to 
approve a project to ,be taken before the EIA results (Section 5.2.1 and Section 7.1.3). It is 
therefore not surprising that the concept of sustainable development is being framed by 
academics like Patricio Gross (2002:22) to include important political and institutional 
notions such as the need for 'a democratic political system that enables ... governance ... 
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decentralisation processes and local development, linked to the national and metropolitan 
levels [of government]', as well as 'integration' and 'interdisciplinarity'. 
Centralism, sectoralism and planning 
The history, politics and economic model of Chile's Government emphasise centralism, 
sectoralism and a limited role of the State: characteristics that influence significantly the 
daily operation of the public and private sectors. As in the Pinochet era, most decisions are 
still being taken in Santiago: the geographical, administrative and political centre where all 
Ministries and Government offices are based. This phenomenon inevitably affects the way 
development and sustainable development can be framed and operationalised, and was often 
considered problematic by interviewees and discussants. Centralism was clearly apparent in 
relation to the distribution of power over water resource management, for example (Chapter 
6), and in relation to another water resource initiative involving the Government of the 
Primera Region (First Region), discussed in Chapter 7? 
As with several other South and Central American countries, centralism is accompanied by 
'a long tradition of sectoralism [whereby] environmental matters have been dispersed 
among line agencies and ministries, without effective coordination to ensure compatibility 
of action and sound policy' (Brito and Verocai 1999: 188). Section 5.3.2 discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Chilean National Commission for the Environment 
(CONAMA), established in 1994 through the Environment Law (Ley de Bases del Media 
Ambiente, 19.300, March 1994, see Box 5-c). It exemplifies some of the problems deriving 
from sectoralism, as well as those of lack of independent powers that result from linking 
CONAMA's executive powers to representatives of the national Government. Indeed, Brito 
and Verocai (1999: 188) reflect on the fact that' [t]he creation of environmental commissions 
at the national level to integrate and coordinate activities .. . has not always solved [the] 
situation [of sectoralism], . Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the impacts of sectoralism referring to 
water resources and highlighting those contextual elements that inhibit the implementation 
of a multi -sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach to environmental management, and 
development. This, d,espite the fact that the 'spirit' of the Environment Law is essentially 
'integrative and holistic', promoting a 'systemic focus on the . . . relationships between the 
2 
Under the regime of General Augusto Pinochet, all 13 regions were renamed from North to South, 
starting with the Primera Region in the extreme North of the country. 
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different elements of the environment' (Alende 2002:23). The fragmentation of roles and 
expertise also contributes to entrenchment of a narrow perspective on problems and 
solutions, and provides support for a single-project focus at the expense of strategic planning 
(Chapter 7). 
The influence of dominant political ideologies over the relationship between environment 
and planning is another theme that was often reflected in the opinions expressed by 
informants (and related throughout Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Land-use, spatial planning 
(ordenamiento territorial)3 and the environment are subject to two legal frameworks in 
Chile: 1) the Urban and Construction Law (Ley General de Urbanismo y Construccion, no. 
458, 1976) and the Regional Government Law (Ley Organica Constitucional de Gobierno y 
Administracion Regional, 19.175, March 1993), and 2) the Environment Law. The rules and 
worldviews that regulate the interaction between these two dimensions help explain part of 
the wider context in which instruments like EIA and SEA have to operate. In Chile, spatial 
planning was legislated for in the late 1970s according to a narrow interpretation of the 
discipline, focusing on land-use and zoning, while 'leaving aside other important concepts 
included in the idea of "ordenamiento territorial'" such as those of regional development 
(Boisier 1997:3). Yet, even in terms of strict land-use management, Rossetti (1996) notes 
that the country lacks mechanisms for regulating the combined use of urban and rural areas, 
and that the Regional Government Law only defines urban planning and its planning 
instruments (Instrumentos de Planificacion Territorial) at national, regional, inter-
municipality and municipality level. This problem persists to the present day (Romero 2001; 
see also Section 5.3.1) and has major implications for the ability to manage the 
environmental implications of development (Section 5.2 and Chapter 7). 
Boisier (1997:4) distinguishes two broad approaches to spatial planning: the first sees it as a 
'spatial expression' of economic, social, cultural and ecological policies, and is based on a 
neoclassical notion of the territory as a 'mere passive object that can be manipulated from 
the outside and from above'; the second views spatial planning as the 'combination of 
actions' that can direct the transformation, occupation and use of geographical spaces. The 
difference, according to Boisier is between 'seeking' to plan space, or receiving and 
3 
The expression 'ordenamiento territorial ' is not readily translatable, as it combines the notion of 
spatial planning with that of administrative boundaries (such as regions or municipalities) and 
management functions . This thesis uses alternatively the terms spatial and territorial to refer to the 
Spanish expression. 
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accepting a certain spatial planning, and this will depend largely on the role of the State. 
According to Romero (200 I), Boisier (1997) and Geisse (1993), the nature and remit of 
spatial planning is also linked to discourses of decentralisation, as it depends on political and 
administrative boundaries, on the definition of specific roles and priorities for each territory, 
on the distribution of population and major infrastructure (for example ports, dams and 
motorways) across the country, and on policies for the use of resources and landscapes (for 
example, coastal, mountain and urban areas). 
However, in Chile the role of the State is often constrained by pursuit of free market 
economic policies, and decentralisation is inhibited by persistent centralising tendencies 
(Chapters 5-7). A common theme throughout the investigation has been the paucity and 
weakness of regional development plans, which, according to scholars (Boisier 1997; 
Romero 2001) and interviewees, is essential to the effectiveness and pro-active role of 
spatial planning: 
'a spatial planning policy linked to a regional policy would contribute to reducing 
environmental conflicts or, at least, to make the ''trade-off' between growth and 
environment explicit. 
In summary, Chile lacks a policy of ordenamiento territorial stmctured as a 
component of a wider regional policy' (Boisier 1997:7). 
This problem is apparent in relation to a number of developments discussed in Chapters 5 
and 7. The examples analysed in the context of the Ministry of Public Works also highlight 
the lack of long-term visions normally associated with planning for development, and 
particularly for sustainable development (OECD and UNDP 2002). 'Planning' within the 
Ministry appears to respond to external demands, as much as internal plans which - more 
often than not - tend to be lists of individual projects. Regions seeking central Government 
support will frame projects within similar shopping lists rather than regional development 
strategies, while the other trigger can be private investment seeking partnership for specific 
initiatives. 
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Participation and decision 
Finally, it is worth exploring how political and historical developments, even before the 
1970s, have had a significant impact on mechanisms for public involvement in decision-
making: a central feature of environmental assessment (EA). Sabatini et al. (2000:9) 
consider that such involvement is obstructed by 'centralism, paternalism and the vertical 
style [characterising Chile's] social and power relations', and find that EIA practice has 
failed to unleash the potential to democratise decision-making. Confrontation, rather than 
negotiation, has been the preferred route of high profile cases in the 1990s. In order to 
prevent environmental conflicts and promote negotiation, the authors require fundamental 
changes to the country's political culture and institutions. Cultural changes would include 
the ability to cohabit in a democratic context, the need for tolerance and dialogue, and the 
search for agreements. Sabatini et al. consider these ingredients essential to reach a 
'democratic maturity' conducive to finding solutions to environmental conflicts. 
The public participation requirements of Chile's EIA system have a double purpose 
(common to many EIA regimes): to improve the environmental dimension of projects and to 
improve the political quality of decisions by providing social legitimacy to complex choices 
(Sabatini et al. 2000). However, practice has fallen short of expectations and, despite 
improvements enabling public participation to start earlier in the process of decision-
making, the potential for contributing to the project design phase is still under-utilised, while 
the actual influence of public opinion on the authorities remains unsatisfactory (CED 
undated). These issues are raised in different contexts throughout Chapters 5-7. Sabatini et 
al. (2000: 16) also recommend a stronger link between EIA (and its public participation 
requirements) and the formulation of policies with environmental implications in order to 
respond to the 'citizens' expectations that they should influence decisions which transcend 
the single project and in relation to which there are no appropriate occasions for 
participation'. This is echoed throughout the Chilean case study, as the voices of informants 
from a range of social identities acknowledge the absence of such policies and call for SEA 
to help define them (Chapters 5-7). However, the role of the public was less central to such 
debates, perhaps r~flecting the broadly expert nature of interviewees and the vertical 
structure of social and power relations, referred to by Sabatini et al. (2000). Certainly, many 
discussions and comments echo the reflection by Brito and Verocai (1999) whereby many 
South and Central American countries have experienced political instability and centralized 
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autocratic governments. The ideologies that characterised these regimes (the Pinochet 
dictatorship, in the case of Chile) 
'still remain in a number of countries, where public participation in the EIA 
process is deliberately limited on account of the unwillingness to promote 
democratic discussion and decision-making. For the most part, society is still 
unaware ofEIA, its potential as .... the means and rights to participate. 
In ... Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, CUlTent political stability is seen as depending 
more upon economic growth than on social development and equity. Therefore 
any constraints to investments are considered as politically threatening. As 
environmental agencies are patt of government administrations, this perception 
also underlies most environmental decisions' (Brito and Verocai 1999:201). 
Having introduced some of the themes that characterise the political and institutional 
structure of Chile, the next Section presents the scope of the first stage of field-work and the 
methods used to gather data. 
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5.1.2 Scope and Sources 
The aim is to investigate the increasing interest in, and related demand for, SEA in Chile, 
and to establish whether there are parallels between: 1) the themes central to Chile's debate 
on SEA, 2) the trends identified in Chapter 2, and 3) the propositions made in Chapter 3 (to 
facilitate reference see Table 5-a). 
Table 5-a Trends and propositions (repetition from Sections 2.3 and 3.5) 
Trends 
First trend 
Second trend 
Third trend 
Propositions 
The context 
The purpose of 
SEA 
The strategic 
'object' 
A shift away from the traditional 'object' of assessment (draft PPPs) towards a more 
encompassing view of the policy process and its political dimension, with special attention to 
decision-making; 
A growing focus on the promotion of sustainable development, with the implicit need to combine 
hard and soft sciences, and develop dialogical assessment processes; 
A reduced emphasis on the positivist dimension of the assessment of impacts within the overall 
SEA process, accompanied by an increased attention to SEA's contribution to, and integration 
in, the 10rmulation' process of strategic initiatives. 
SEA is context-specific, both in terms of purpose and shape (approach and tools), and will be 
contained by the poor environmental capacity of a given context; 
The context of SEA can be described as 'Immediate' and 'wider', where the latter influences the 
environmental capacity of the former; 
Although attention has centered on the immediate context, it is claimed that the wider context 
and its environmental capacity are crucial to the raison d'etre of SEA. 
The choice of purpose is context-specific and is the most critical aspect of SEA as it will be the 
key to interpret the three constituent dimensions of SEA: 'strategic' 'environmental', 
'assessment'; 
The actual purpose (and therefore shape) of SEA can lie anywhere between two extreme cases: 
to influence a particular policy process, or to contribute to a transformation of the environmental 
capacity of the wider context; 
SEA distinguishes itself for its advocacy role in favour of environmental integration and 
environmental sustainability. It is this normative character that makes it different from other 
instruments such as strategic assessment, policy analysis or sustain ability appraisals. 
Understanding the nature of the object and the problem is crucial, and should precede the 
definition of assessment approaches and tools; 
SEA's 'object' is not always as strategic as expected in the literature, and it may have to 
contribute to build a strategic dimension in the initiative under scrutiny; 
The 'object' is not limited to the policy-process (PPPs), but could be expanded to address the 
wider contextual dimensions and their poor environmental capacity. 
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The assessment • The strategic dimension of SEA is as important to the shape of the assessment, as it is in terms 
of the nature of the 'object' being assessed; 
• The centrality of impact assessment is becoming secondary to the need to integrate 
environmental concerns in development sectors. This involves a shift from a rational-objectivist 
to an argumentative-subjectivist approach, which has implications for the activities and tools 
related to SEA. It also implies a less rigid separation between assessment and planning 
. processes/activities; 
• The application of SEA can lead to a better understanding of the necessary conditions for 
sustainability, rather than simply operationalising a prior understanding; 
• SEA can trigger, or strengthen, a process of individual and institutional learning that strengthens 
the environmental capacity of the immediate and wider contexts. 
The emergence of SEA discourses and concepts according to different organisations and 
actors is analysed using a variety of sources: 1) notes and transcripts of three seminars on 
the subject, 2) a wide range of interviews using methods A-C discussed in Chapter 4, 3) 
observation and data from two conferences and a seminar, and 4) academic and grey 
literature. 
The three seminars were organised by the Centro de Estudios para el Desanollo (CED), a 
think tank based in Santiago (Section 4.2.2).5 The CED regularly organises seminars and is 
considered a (rare) institutionalised space for debate on many subjects. Twenty-seven 
people were invited to each seminar (ranging from academia, government agencies, NGOs, 
private sector, international organisations and consultants - see Annex C), and between 18-
22 participated.6 The impact of the author's contribution in shaping the agenda of each 
meeting in line with her investigation (Box 5-a) was mitigated by the fact Espinosa and 
Asenjo (of the CED) chaired the sessions, and that all participants had been regular 
attendants of CED Seminars in the past.? The tapes and transcripts relay a combination of 
explicit themes and implied agendas and philosophies, which are subtle challenges in a 
5 Hereafter 'CED Seminars', [el-2-3-Seminars/CED]. 
6 The participants have now become part of a 'Reflection Group' which will continue to meet to 
promote SEA in Chile. This was one of the objectives of the CED, when it proposed to arrange the 
seminars. 
7 In practice, the Agenda was followed only in terms of the opening question for each Seminar. 
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context where open confrontation is usually avoided.s Where possible, each quote is 
referenced using the same procedure applied to interviewees.9 
Box 5-a Summary of the agenda for the three seminars on SEA in Chile 
First Seminar: (26 November 2001) What is SEA? 
State of the art in SEA 
Role of SEA with respect to different planning levels (PPPs) 
Different approaches to SEA 
The challenge of integrating SEA in decision-making processes and other evaluations 
SEA principles 
Benefits of SEA and the growing emphasis on institutional, cultural and long term changes. 
Introductory presentations by: 
Olivia Bina (U. de Cambridge) 
Santiago Gonzfllez (FAO/U. Politecnica de Madrid) 
Carlos L6pez Ocaiia/Virginia Alzina (IADB, Washington) 
Second Seminar: (11 December 2001) What can be the role of SEA in Chile? 
Examples of recent demand for SEA in Chile 
Role of SEA in Chile 
PPPs that could or should be subject to SEA 
Discussion on the implications of key aspects of the Chilean context (economic, political and institutional) 
Main obstacles to SEA 
Third Seminar: (18 December 2001) What can be the future of SEA in Chile? 
"-
Role of SEA in the country? 
Existing approaches to SEA 
SEA principles 
SEA tools 
Requirements for the insertion of SEA in the Chilean context (for e.g. in terms of legislation, voluntary use, pilot studies, etc.) 
Likely SEA characteristics in the light of Chile's context (actors, information flows, public participation, instruments to support 
decision-makers, other assessment procedures). 
8 The relevance of different identities and philosophies when interpreting and conceptualising the 
rurpose of SEA became evident as the three seminars progressed (cf. Saarikoski 2000). 
Citing system for interviewees: for example, the comment of a businessman is quoted as: 
[Contreras-business-e], where 'Contreras' is the surname of the participant, 'business' is one of the 7 
categories of actors, and 'e' refers to the data gathering methods coding (in this case: seminars partly 
arranged by the author). If the comment cannot be linked to an individual because the recording was 
unclear, then it is marked as [unknown-e]. Citing material from seminars without attributing to a 
particular individual: for example the third of the CED Seminars is quoted thus: [e3-Seminar/CED] . 
For transparency and traceability, wherever possible a page reference is also added in the footnotes, 
example: [e3-Seminar/CED]3 :8, i.e. page 8 of the transcript of the third seminar. See also Annex A. 
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5.2 'Strategic': Problematising an Adjective 
Having established that PPPs are central to SEA theory, representing its single most 
distinguishing feature compared with project EIAs, the first set of interviews endeavoured to 
establish what type Of strategic initiatives might be subject to SEA in Chile. The picture 
these interviews delivered was unexpected and, at least initially, somewhat disconcerting 
since PPPs were being dismissed as either non existent or not worthy of attention, while 
most interviewees converged around the theme of major projects. Later, participants in the 
CED Seminars contested the reference to a PPP (policies, plans and programme) framework 
which they found to be a normative, 'ideal model', implying a hierarchy in the decision-
making process, and assuming that 'planning exists and is done well '.IQ These conditions 
appeared to go way beyond the scope of the first trend - identified in Chapter 2 -, 
whereby the normative PPP framework was becoming less relevant. Indeed, from the 
perspective of normative interpretations of SEA, they almost begged the question of 
whether SEA had any role in such context. 
5.2.1 Mega-projects - the example of Alumysa 
The early findings mentioned above made it less surprising that throughout the CED 
Seminars, the common way of approaching the problematic question of the meaning of 
'strategic' in the Chilean context was by the seemingly contradictory route of talking about 
projects, and conflict, rather than PPPs. What will be called here the mega-project 
phenomenon (major investment initiatives) became central to the problematising of SEA's 
strategic dimension in the Chilean context. I I Notorious cases include the EIAs of the Ralco 
dam on the Bio Bio river (centre-south Chile) and the more recent assessment of the direct 
10 [Contreras-Business-e-Seminar/CED] An in-depth analysis of a Government's initiative that deals 
with this theme is presented in Chapter 7. 
II Seminars and interviews with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
suggest that the 'problem of large projects requiring different approaches to the standard EIA 
practices, and leading to ad hoc processes sometimes called SEA, is common to many developing 
countries [d4-SeminarlWorld Bank], In their presentation at the first CED Seminar, Lopez and 
Alzina, of IADB, explained how they were dealing increasingly with complex projects affecting very 
large areas and often more than one country; and that this required more sophisticated instruments 
than traditional EIA, Indeed, similar cases have been found in European countries, The extension of 
the Amsterdam airport (In 't Veld 2000) and a waste management project in Finland (Saarikosld 
2000) are just a few examples, 
Chapter 5 Conceptualisation in Context 142 
, 
foreign investment project to develop the world's largest aluminium plant in one of the 
Southern-most regions of Chile (the eleventh region, Figure 5-a) by the Canadian company 
Noranda. 12 This project is analysed below, to illustrate the nature of 'strategic ' development 
initiatives in Chile, which is more related to scale than to planning and strategic visions. 
The project, known as 'Alumysa' (Box 5-b), was constantly being discussed in the media 
and in all the events attended by the author for research purposes (seminars, conferences, 
lectures, interviews, informal chats). El Mercurio (main newspaper) reported Manuel 
Baquedano, director of the Institute of Political Ecology (IEP) as saying that '[t]his will be 
"the" emblematic project that Ricardo Lagos' Government will be faced with' (Garz6n Ortiz 
2001). 
Box S-b The Alumysa project presented by the EIA consultants (16/11/01) 
The project, which has been discussed for over a decade, would entail an investment of US$ 2750 million to develop 
the following components: 
• A new sea port 
• A new wharf 
• Three hydro-power stations and related dam 
• Road works: improvement of existing roads and construction of 90km of new roads 
• Power transmission lines 
• Aluminum plant (p&nta reduc/ora de a/umina) 
Some economic impacts: 
• Direct employment from the plant operation: 1100 jobs 
• Indirect employment from the plant operation: 3000 jobs 
• Indirect employment in the area estimated at 15000 jobs 
• Employment during construction: average 3100 (maximum 8100) 
The EIA for the project ' (more than 20 volumes) was presented at a Seminar at the CED [d1-Seminar/Alumysaj by two 
of the consultants who had coordinated its preparation. These are some of the questions they were asked by 
participants (representing a similar range of stakeholders to that of the CED Seminars): 
• how do you expect the local community to be able to tfigest' a similar proposal in 60 days; 
• how can a decision be taken given the significant unknown variables still to be resolved (for example, what will be 
the price of the energy produced, how will the conflict with the salmon industry be resolved); 
• is the project being assessed at the right level? What project are we assessing ... how can we be sure it will not 
lead to more interventions; 
• have you taken into account some of the conclusions of the report by the World Commission on Dams; 
• how does this project relate to the Government's spatial policies in such beautiful natural areas. 
Source: [d1-Seminar/Alumysaj and Garz6n Ortiz (2001), 
12 [Pardo-G-al-15111101]; [dl-Seminar/Alumysa] 
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Many commentators argued that by choosing to approve Alumysa, the Government would 
confirm foreign investment as the single most important criterion in development-related 
decisions, and implicitly, relegate to a secondary position (if not undermine) the nascent 
regional strategy, which aimed to promote the natural beauty and pristine character of the 
region through tourism and other industries. The Minister of Economy, lorge Rodrfguez 
Grossi, refused to see such implicit choice: 
The Minister. .. maintained that it is paramount that all possible projects in the 
country should reach [approval and completion], because this is the only way to 
grow and generate new employment. "For this reason I [lorge Rodrfguez Grossi] 
refuse to accept that there can be incompatible projects. We must ensure that all 
industries can co-exist in peace and mutual benefit''' (El Mercurio 28/11101). 
This approach gave clear encouragement to private sector companies such as Noranda; in 
fact the company's project manager in Chile, who was asked 'how does this project relate to 
the Government's spatial policies in such beautiful natural areas', during the seminar on the 
Alumysa EIA, gave the following reply: 
'this is a democracy ... and there is the right to do any project wherever, so long 
as it complies with the legislation ,.13 
Alumysa exemplifiea the kind of wide-ranging, indeed strategic, implications that are 
involved in the implicit and explicit choices being made when approving these projects. 
Seminar participants referred repeatedly to these implications when justifying their request 
for an SEA of mega-projects. In line with the literature on SEA (Chapters 2 and 3), the 
complexity and scale of impacts triggered a demand for the consideration of alternatives, 
which - it is argued here - depends on the wider context's capacity to identify and discuss 
them. Alumysa, for example, raised problems and strategic implications that potentially 
questioned the rationale for the project, however, according to Romero [academic] neither 
the Region, nor the salmon industryl4 have been capable of coordinating a coherent response 
or counter-proposal; the local community remains divided despite the high stakes: 
'between ' the rhetOlic of discourses and the project... [we are] missing the 
institutional framework, these alternatives... this is the great bottleneck ... 
because we will continue reacting to projects ... but this does not mean that we 
13 [d1-Seminar/Alumysa] 
14 Which in Chile is the second largest in the world (at the time of writing), after Norway, and risked 
being negatively affected. 
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do not need this intermediate [stage], and this has to do with one's life projects, 
with development projects, with what communities want themselves to be, with 
what the Government's public policy aspires to in this country. It has to do with 
values that" can be exchanged, ... with fundamental principles of development in 
which the environment is a critical theme '.15 
The lack of capacity is not only institutional, but also political and cultural, since it is clear 
that there is an inability, or unwillingness, to question the precept of growth through inward 
investment. Thus the raison d'e/re of the project was not challenged and the Government 
appears to have made only a half-hearted attempt at analysing location options, which could 
have led to significantly lower environmental impacts: for example, using natural gas 
available in the North of Chile via Bolivia. 16 The EIA consultant explained that for such 
energy-intensive plant, hydro-power 'is the only solution' and that the Canadian company 
had excluded natural gas (which would be a viable solution) on security grounds, because 
the source of gas was from a less stable country than Chile. 17 Indeed, several informants 
expressed disappointment with the EIA of Alumysa, judging that a more strategic 
assessment would have been appropriate. Pardo [government], for example, who had to 
comment on such EIA on behalf of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP), expressed her 
frustration at the 24 volumes-worth of study, which were not focused at the right level or on 
the fundamental issues. 18 She had asked, in vain, for an assessment 'at the regional level ' of 
the socio-economic'and environmental dimensions of the project. 19 
IS [Romero-A-a-20/I2/0 1 ]:36 
16 Note that the Jose Ram6n Gutierrez, President of SalmonChile was arguing precisely in terms of 
finding an alternative location for Alumysa, in July 2003 (El MerclIrio 14/7/03). 
17 [dI-Serninar/Alumysa]. This explains the importance of the reply given by Noranda's project 
manager (above) stressing Chile 's democratic credentials. 
18 [Pardo-G-aI-ISllllOl] 
19 Similar comments were expressed by [Saldias-G-a-2/4/02]; [Gonzalez-AI-b-241l010I]; [Espinoza-
TA-aI-2I1I/0 1]; [Astorga-G-a-291l010l]. 
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5.2.2 Strategic consequences and project limbo 
Many of the comments and propositions made during the CED Seminars were actually 
made with conflict-ridden projects in mind, and finding ways of solving the intractable 
problems that arise from such mega-projects seemed a definite priority. Asenjo [think-tank] 
argued that 
'a Strategic Environmental Assessment is perhaps the way that allows us to make 
a better connection or solution of the conflicts that inevitably occur between the 
three angles of the sustainability uiangle.. . where these three things do not 
always imply a positive-sum game . .. an SEA I think is like .. . solving these 
conflicts or [clarifying] what we are aiming for with an environmental policy . . . 
with the growth policy or a policy for social equity ... The only way fOlward .. . 
to eventually solve the type of conflict that today we are witnessing in [the 
Alumysa example] ... perhaps SEA with this strategic outlook could facilitate the 
solution of conflicts ,?O 
From these discussions, and from various interviews, it transpired that the fundamental 
problem with mega-projects such as Alumysa was essentially a lack of capacity to plan for 
development in strategic and environmentally sustainable terms, and - crucially - to 
identify alternatives. In other words, a failure to be pro-active, rather than reactive to 
proposals. In the pa'fallel world of assessment, this failure is traditionally seen as one of the 
main 'limitations of project EIA' which can be dealt with by - and indeed justifies the 
existence of - SEA (Therivel and Partidario 1996:8-9): 
'(SEA] can incorporate environmental issues. . . into project planning by 
influencing the context within which project decisions are made. It allows for the 
consideration of alternatives'. 
However, even if SEA can 'consider' alternatives, it will still need a context and process 
that has the capacity and willingness to identify them. If policy-making is the problem, can 
assessment be the solution? Confusing needs with solutions can have severe consequences. 
The Chilean debates suggested the possibility of such confusion: refelTing to the many 
criticisms of EIAs for projects like Ra1co (above), Leal [international-UN-CEPAL] - like 
many others - argued this would have required an 'environmental assessment which was 
much more strategic .. . including the issue of the development of the Bio Bio river-basin ... 
20 [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED]2:6 
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the theme of an energy policy ... all these big themes were not present [in the EIAl', 
concluding that it was essential to 'widen project ErAs '.21 
Seminar participants and interviewees tended to agree that mega-projects lead to 
intrinsically strategic consequences, and therefore required a more 'strategic approach' than 
ErA could provide.22 They stressed the urgent need to find ways of improving infrastructure 
mega-projects,23 addressing their severe, irreversible environmental and social impacts24 
(i.e. the direct impacts), and wider socio-economic and political implications?5 Participants 
also highlighted the need to resolve intractable controversies (Rein and Schon 1994; van 
Eeten 2001a) arising when projects become, in Lean's [academia] words: the 'expression of 
implicit policies' (i.e. the wider implications).26 In an interview, Astorga [government] 
argued that the regular over-stretching of EIAs when applied to major infrastructure projects 
was a clear symptom of the difficulties arising from mega-projects struggling to relate to a 
21 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]3:6, also [G-a-2/4/02] 
22 [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED]2:6 Not surprisingly, some raised the questions: 'are there 
experiences in project EA that deal with strategic consequences?' and 'can we do an SEA of the 
Chacao bridge project? ' Chacao was a major project, also attracting much attention and debate: it 
entails the building of a bridge to connect Chile's largest and most culturally diverse island (Chiloe, 
see Figure 5-a) to the lllainland. Astorga [government] referred to this example as just one of the 
many cases where EIA is simply inadequate to address the very strategic implications of a large 
single project. Early in 2001 SEMAT had proposed to apply SEA to the project but had not been 
successful. It is also worth comparing these developments with Saarikoski (2000) who provides an 
example in a Northern European context, of an EIA of a waste treatment project which was framed as 
an SEA to allow a broader treatment of alternative strategies. 
23 [d2-Conference/lnfrastructure; d I-Seminarl Alumysia] 
24 [Balaguer-G-c2-28/3/02]; [Raczynski-G-c2-28/3/02]; [Gomez-G-c 1-28/3/02]; [Gallardo-G-c 1-
28/3/02]; [Astorga-G-a-291l0101] 
25 The argument in favour of SEA of mega-projects was interestingly framed in terms of economic 
gains by Astorga [government]: 'if many of the [transport projects which the State executes]... had 
been subject to a strategic environmental assessment, they could have been given different standards, 
locations, and this would have - obviously - lowered the costs of these projects .. . [current speed] 
standards ... have no justification ... hence there is also an economic approach, economic advantages 
in terms of project cost savings' [Astorga-Government-e-Seminar/CED]2:3. His aim is to secure a 
more rational use of economic resources, and with the Minister of Public Works in mind as his main 
interlocutor, Astorga was keen to see the introduction of SEA as having advantages that can be 
readily understood - and seen as such - by those who take key decisions [Astorga-G-a-291l0101] ; 
[MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fgl-5/4/02]. 
26 [Leon A-b-301l1/01] Leon suggested, following a presentation by the author at the Seminar series 
Territorio al dfa' (30/11/01, Universidad Cat6Iica), that there was a possible 'epistemological trap' in 
the objective of analysing SEA of PPPs in Chile, since PPPs do not exist here in the way they are 
conceptualised in SEA literature. In his view, projects are the expression of policies which are not 
made explicit anywhere, thus suggesting that the strategic levels which SEA should be tackling are 
only revealed through the decisions about individual projects (especially highly contentious ones 
such as the Alumysa Project or the Puente de Cachao Project). 
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'context,.27 EIAs such as the one for the RaIco dam project end up raising fundamental 
questions about the national energy objectives and policy which, he contended, cannot be 
addressed through such an instrument. Ruthenberg et al. (2001:13) support this view 
arguing that: 
'the most fundamental problem with the EIA process ... [is] lack of national 
policies for resource use in areas such as water, land, forestIy, fisheIies, 
biodiversity, and rriining ... Having such policies would provide a clearer basis 
for reviewing and clealing new investment projects. Without clear national 
guidelines, CONAMA [Camisi6n Nacianal del Media Ambiente] must tIy to 
apply its best judgment on a project-by-project basis, and is open to public 
cIiticism '. 
By raising both questions of 'how' to design a project (to avoid direct impacts) and 'why' 
do such a project in the first place (wider implications), EIAs of mega-projects are 
effectively collapsing within a single level the normative hierarchy that allocates the 
questions (and tasks) of 'why', 'what', 'where' and 'how' to policies, plans, programmes 
and projects, respectively (Verheem and Tonk 2000). This phenomenon is by no means 
unique to Chile, nor is it new to environmental assessment practice. In the 1970s, 0 'Riordan 
was proposing 
'overlapping "tiers" of EIAs', starting at the policy level ... so that final project 
proposal need not contain (as they cun'ently tend to do) the laborious evaluations 
of philosophy and policy that are inappropIiate at the point of project 
development' (O'Riordan 1976b:209). 
Hence, complex controversies, arise as a result of the consideration of policy questions (of 
why a certain development is desirable), which are 'inappropriate' at such level of decision-
making, planning (mega-projects) and assessment (EIA)?8 This has triggered in Chile, and 
elsewhere (Chapter 2), a certain rush towards the introduction of SEA to compensate for 
EIA shortcornings.29 However, it becomes necessary to ask why strategic issues are raised at 
27 [Astorga-G-a-29/1 % 1] 
28 The phenomenon of collapsing substantially diverse questions within one project-EIA, and the 
serious problems, delays and conflicts that it involves, remains common in developed countries like 
Italy [Vittadini-academic-] . See also: Rayner 2003, for a perspective on England. 
29 Focusing on the shortcomings of instruments and seeking a purely technocratic response, for 
example through the new SEA approach may not be a solution. As Borregaard [research-a-21/3/02] 
pointed out, SEA was being discussed and tentatively applied in the area of energy, river-basin 
management and trade agreements, however, for problems such as that of the Chacao bridge project, 
perhaps what is needed there is a good EIA and a regional development plan, 'not so much an SEA '. 
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project level, and what can SEA do about this - if anything (Section 3.1). What is the nature 
of the problem: is it a matter of planning or one of assessment capacities and instruments?3o 
Only once this is clear can a solution be identified, and a purpose defined for SEA, in line 
with the concept of context-specific instruments (Section 3.4); a concept supported by 
Contreras [industry] .31 Discussions suggested that the problem was a combination of poor 
capacity, and willingness, to define policy directions for development and plan the use of 
resources. 
Several participants argued that there is an absence, or perceived absence,32 of policies, 
intended essentially as frameworks and overarching visions that can direct development 
towards a clear common goal. Talking mainly about spatial planning, Rovira [government-
CONAMA] stated that '[in Chile] we want to do an SEA in a reality where the object of the 
evaluation is poor, if non-existent [but that is not the case, the object] exists, but it is poor ,.33 
Accordingly, Borregaard [research] pointed out that even when the term 'policy' is used, 
this will mainly refer to 'programmes ... for example, the programme to foster agriculture in 
the South, and part of this [programme] involves subsidies ', but it rarely - if ever - asks: 
'where is the big agriculture policy and where do we go? ,.34 This situation is revealed 
through the EIA process:35 
'if one looks at the policies of the Ministry [omitted], for example, one realises 
that often th~e deviate fi'om a celtain logic rationality, and often nobody knows 
[what] the origin of projects [is] ,.36 
30 However, it should be acknowledged that the separation between assessment and planning is not 
always clear, or desirable . It is more a matter of clarifying respective roles . Dourojeanni 
[international-UN-CEPAL-a-14/4/02] :4, an expert in planning and assessment of water resources, 
sees both processes as part of a single system. He focuses on 'strategic ' interpreting it as 'strategy .. . 
working out how to get where I want to be' and on 'assessment ' as the process of comparing the 
current situation with that ideal model, informing decision-makers about how far they are from such 
ideal, what they need to do to get there, and the impact this would have on the environment. 
31 [Contreras-Business-e-Seminar/CED]3: 5 
32 On the question of the existence, or otherwise, of policies in Chile, Pardo [government], who was 
at the CED Seminars, reflected during a subsequent interview [Pardo-G-a2-6/12/0 I], that this 
constant debate is almost 'a slogan '. She distinguished between policies that exist but are not on 
paper, and those which are actually printed on paper, but would not agree with those who argue that 
Chile does not have policies. 
33 [R . oVlra-G-c-lS/4/02]: 5 
34 [Borregaard-T-a-2113/02] :3 
35 [Astorga-G-a-29/1 010 I] 
36 [500]2:7. Interestingly, as almost identical comment on the sometimes poor rationality of decision-
making was made by an interviewee from the Ministry of Transport in Italy [Croccolo-government] . 
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, 
Or, as Blanco explained, a close analysis of the tensions sUlTounding social, economic and 
environmental claims of mega-projects reveals that: 
'often the arguments of the conflict, in reality have to do with an implicit or 
absent policy, often an absent one . . . rather than with the . .. characteristics of the 
specific project,.3? 
Crucial to this research is the fact that, even if there had been the possibility to discuss broad 
alternatives to investments such as Ralco or Alumysa, there was little capacity to do that in 
practice. This suggests that the case for switching assessment instruments is weakened as it 
may not be addressing the core problem. Accordingly, BOlTegaard [research], an economist 
who served at CONAMA in the mid-1990s, felt that the interest in SEA over the last few 
years had coincided with the rejection of a number of projects between 1998-99, primarily 
because of 'a lack of. . . a [natural] resources policy .. . which is really a grave situation in a 
country that depends on the exploitation of basically natural resources', and for a lack of 
energy policy.38 In her view, SEA had become an interesting alternative to addressing the 
key problem (lack of a policy) by focusing attention on a tool instead: 'a natural resource 
policy is too big an issue [in Chile] '; even though the problem was clearly a lack of policy 
direction, people would increasingly ask whether SEA was 'a way out,.39 
This attachment to the concept of tools, and the inversely proportionate enthusiasm for 
policy-making, has an important historical precedent in the way the General Environment 
Framework Law (hereafter Ley 19.300) was designed, giving overwhelming predominance 
to EIA (Box 5-c). BOlTegaard explained that indeed, EIA was 'regarded as the exemplary 
tool for environmental management in the country', while obtaining political agreement by 
all Ministers on more policy-oriented issues (such as standards or policy frameworks) was 
much 'harder, more complex, more political' and thus received limited 'space '.40 This 
37 [Blanco-NGO-e-Seminar/CED]2:5 
38 [Borregaard-T-a-21/3/02]:1 A draft policy was prepared by CONAMA after it had produced the 
Environmental Policy in 1998. However, the draft never really took off; it was circulated for 
comments amongst some key non-governmental players, such as CIPMA, but was never followed up. 
According to Borreggaard, this can partly be explained in terms of lack of capacity within 
CON AM A 's institutional framework, which is clearly geared towards 'brown issues ' and has almost 
no capacity for natural resource ones. 
39 [Bonegaard-T-a-21/3/02]: 1-2 
40 [Borregaard-T -a-21/3/02] :4 
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pattern was common throughout Latin America; Borregaard quoted Mexico as another 
major example. 
Box 5-c EIA in Chile (Ley 19.300) and first attempts at SEA 
Environmental assessment in Chile is regulated by the General Environment Framework Law 19.300 of 1994 (Ley 
Bases Generales del Media Ambiente), and by the EIA System Regulation of 1997 (modified by Decreta Supremo N° 
95, 7 December 2002). The purpose of the Sistema de Evaluaci6n de Impacto AmbientaJll 'applied to projects and/or 
activities performed by the public and private sectors, is to assure the environmental sustainability of said 
undertakings ' (CONAMA Undated-a: 1). 
The law requires a choice between two versions of EIA: an Environmental Impact Declaration (a simplified procedure 
called VIA, whose purpose is narrowly defined to demonstrate that none of the conditions listed in Article 11 (letter c. 
impacts on the way of life; letter d. changes to the landscape and tourist value of a zone) of the law are likely to take 
place, or an Environmental Impact Study (full study), depending on the 'effects, characteristics or circumstances' of 
the project. However, individual projects are not the only category of initiatives subject to EIA. Section 3(h) of Ley 
19.300 requires its application to certain Instrumentos de Planificaci6n Territorial, in particular the Regional plans for 
urban development, the Inter-district plans, the District zoning plans and the Sectional plans (CONAMA Undated-a:3; 
Ducci 1998).42 
By 2001 approximately 100 EIAs of plans had already been produced. This, at least, was the impression gathered 
from the first round of fact-finding interviews. However, most of these have been Environmental Impact Declarations 
(Reyes and Rivas 2001). This is clearly a far cry from the approaches recommended in SEA principles of good 
practice, since it essentially stresses the bureaucratic and impact avoidance dimensions, with little regard for the more 
constructive side of SEA. 
Nonetheless, the broad scope and role of an SEA was not new to Chile. Romero [academia-a) claimed that SEA was 
already on the agenda during Frei's Presidency (1994-2000), albeit as a mere public relations exercise whereby 
people were allowed to exp@ss their expectations, although these would rarely - if ever - be followed up. With the 
Lagos Presidency, SEA has been given new impetus. There have been attempts to improve the integration of 
environmental concerns into planning instruments, such as coastal zone management plans, Instrumentos de 
Planificacion Territorial, river basin plans, sustainability planning, all of which can contribute to the foundations of SEA 
in Chile. In addition, toward the end of 2001, one of the most prominent NGOs, the Centro de Investigaci6n y 
Planificaci6n del Media Ambiente (CIPMA), embarked on a strategic assessment of the forthcoming free trade 
agreement of the Americas (FT AA). 
Focus on the particular instrument of EIA was also a response to pressure from the private 
sector (especially mining), which in turn was being pushed by credit institutes to conduct 
EIAs.43 Influence by international agencies was widely acknowledged by informants and is 
equally relevant in the case of SEA since it is organisations such as the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) that are pushing forward SEA in this world 
41 The EIA system is refened to as 'SEIA' in Chile, however, in this thesis the standard EIA acronym 
will be used, to avoid confusion with SEA. 
42 The law involved a similar debate to that which led to the Europ~an EIA Directive [e2-
Seminar/CED-unidentifiedJ, although the latter settled for the inclusion of projects only. 
43 [Bonegaard-T-a-21/3/02J :4. Indeed, it was the World Bank that funded the project for Law 19.300 
in Chile. 
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region (see Chapter 6).44 In this respect, and thinking about the importance of the context of 
application, Dourojeanni expressed scepticism: 'we take these concepts of SEA, EIA and all 
because, to a certain extent, the international banks, the agencies, sell you this idea, but it's 
like bringing an aeroplane where you haven 't got a landing strip ,.45 Similar views were 
articulated by BOlTegaard [research] who likened Chile's interest in SEA to 'the flavour of 
the month', and compared it to the country 's interest in transferable emission permits in the 
early 1990s: 'nobody knew how to use it and when .. . and if to use it and whether this was a 
really useful tool or not, because people started to understand what it was all about. .. after it 
was already in the law [19.300], .46 Romero [academia] also compared the enthusiasm for 
SEA to that for Geographical Information Systems: 
'all these innovations come from different philosophical, theoretical, political, 
and technological contexts ... they [OIS] arise as [innovations that] are .. . only 
pat1ially understood . .. thus you cannot expect them to be absorbed in terms of 
their substance ... They may be captured ... in terms of more peripheral. .. trivial 
aspects, but you will never get to the essence of the issue ... ; for this you would 
need a context. . . like that which justified the appearance of this methodology in 
England or other countries ... you [can] introduce the idea, the technique, but this 
"context" - you cannot introduce it! ,.47 
Following from these observations, the problems sUlTounding mega-projects and 
their assessment can be defined as the 'project limbo' phenomenon, whereby the absence or 
weakness of a strategic context leaves individual initiatives in a virtual vacuum that is then 
exposed (but not solved) through the EIA process.48 The latter has to struggle with the 
policy vacuum and is often inadequate to confront the strategic implications of such 
projects. Hence, the project limbo phenomenon challenges current conceptions of what is a 
'strategic object' in relation to SEA, and this analysis supports several propositions under 
the four themes in Table 5-a. 
44 Two IADB representatives participated to the first CED Seminar. 
45 [Dourojeanni-I-a-14/4/02]:7 46 [BoITegaard-T-a-21/3/02]: 1 
47 [BoITegaard-T-a-21/3/02]; [Romero-A-a-201l2/01] : 1-2 
48 However, as discussed in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.1, the weakness of the Chilean strategic context is 
multi-faceted, rather than limited to a concept of expertise or administrative capacity. It is also linked 
to the significant influence that foreign investment has in shaping development (for example, the 
Alumysa case) and to the political will to question whether such foreign proposals are 'in the interest' 
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Context-specificity became a dominant theme throughout the investigation, the problems 
and needs that were , identified in discussing 'why SEA?' were pointing to something 
broader than the narrow remit of assessing impacts or potential consequences of initiatives. 
Owens (2002a) relates the controversies surrounding mega-projects to what Hajer (1995: 13) 
calls 'a particular way cif talking and thinking' that Owens (2002a:950-951) finds to be 
'shared across many of the liberal democracies', and which frames the mega-project 
problem 'primarily in terms of a conflict between national need and local amenity', drawing 
on a worldview 'in which certain kinds of development are deemed "essential" '. She notes 
that these concepts and worldview are problematic, concluding that: 
'when such projects are contested, [it] is rarely a simple conflict between 
universal and PaI1icular (place-specific) conceptions of the good, but nearly 
always a more complex and dynamic process which, over time, can be a vital 
stimulus to policy learning and change' (Owens 2002a:95 1). 
Given that interviewees and seminar participants were essentially preoccupied with 
obtaining better (more sustainable) development decisions, SEA's contribution should be 
conceptualised more in terms of policy learning, acknowledging that preventing negative 
consequences plays a crucial, though limited, role. The following section looks at a third 
aspect of SEA's strategic dimension, which further influences the purpose and shape of 
assessment. 
of the country; questioning whose result would depend on the criteria and values used [based on 
comment-702]. 
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5.2.3 Decision-making 
Chapter 2 identified the increasing focus on decision-making, moving away from the EIA-
related idea of a draft PPP to be assessed, and stressing the importance of assessing the 
formulation process rather than a document, as a key trend (Table 5-a). Judging from the 
debates in the CED Seminars, this important shift may apply to the Chilean context, if the 
following additional distinction is made: processes for taking strategic decisions can be 
either structured and more or less formal, or diffuse and often unstructured (cf. Renton and 
Bailey 2000). The distinction applies to both projects and PPPs. For example, this is how a 
businessman viewed decision processes for mega-projects: 
'strategic questions are not necessarily limited to the level of policies, plans and 
programmes. We have strategic decisions being taken at all times, including in 
relation to projects ... a certain project is associated implicitly or explicitly with 
previous strategic decisions,49 
The project limbo phenomenon thus also relates to the idea of diffuse, and difficult to trace, 
'strategic decisions ': although they might not be aimed at specific initiatives, they 
nonetheless contribute to shaping the general direction of development, which itself may 
shape the initiative in question. 
Similarly, during the third Seminar, participants discussed the nature of decision-making 
and considered the fact that 'there is no systematic procedure for decision-making at 
[strategic] levels ... we never really know what the process is ... the decision-making process 
is not transparent, it is ill-defined', and that 'it would help immensely the use of [SEA] if 
such procedure existed ,.50 In a subsequent interview Romero [academic] related this 
problem to 'Latin America's oral culture ' based on not writing things down, to make it 
'difficult for others to contradict us ,.51 Commenting on the almost elusive PPPs in Chile, a 
consultant clarified: 
49 [Contreras-B usiness-e-Seminar/CED]2:2 
50 [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED]3:S. A tendency in Chile not to make Government decisions 
explicit was also noted by Carmen Schlotfeldt, who viewed this as 'an ethical problem ' [A-b-
30/1//01). 
51 [Romero-A -a -20112/01 ] 
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' ... so, this definition of policy, let us not think that it is a document. .. This 
definition [of] strategic, when it does not exist, it does not exist on paper, but it 
does exist in the facts, and one could [therefore] apply SEA anyway,.52 
For this type of policy-process and wider context, the first trend in Table 5-a may not go far 
enough: the idea of 'decision-making moments' still implies a tangible, and traceable, 
process leading to a PPP: The fundamental idea of a - more-or-Iess - structured policy-
making process remains. Instead, the Chilean case study calls for a subtle difference in 
focus, whereby strategic decisions are the essence, and possibly the only tangible element, 
of strategic initiatives, and therefore crucial to the definition of the 'object' of SEA in Chile. 
The first trend is also important for highlighting the assessment of key moments of the 
decision-making process (and the related rule of an 'early start' to the assessment). In this 
respect Chile should learn from the difficulties in its experience with EIA. According to Ley 
19.300 the Planning Ministry (Mideplan, see Figure 5.c) requests that all projects funded 
with public money should complete an EIA before the 'design stage', which is when the 
proponent (for example, MOP) will present a request for the full amount of money needed 
to the Treasury (Hacienda). Kornfeld [government], found the timing of the EIA 
problematic, since it takes place very late in the process,53 reflecting the failure of the 
legislators (see also Section 5.3) to consult with Mideplan before setting out the relevant 
articles in Ley 19.300, in order to establish the type of information it deemed necessary at 
each stage. As a result, the CUlTent EIA system 'asks for information and data that is only 
really available during the last phases [of project development]', and therefore at a stage 
when many decisions have been taken and a lot of money has been spent in preparation.54 
52 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED]2: 11. However, given the lack of a formal process of 
decision-making and approval ('un proceso formal de sail cion de las decisiolles' [comment-702]), 
such policy decisions will only be relevant for as long as the person who took them remains in 
charge. 
53 [Kornfeld-G-d-8/4/02]. This timing issue is discussed also in developed countries such as Italy, see 
Bina (forthcoming, a). 
54 [Kornfeld-G-d-8/4/02] 
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Figure 5-c Investment in public sector projects: approval, finance and EIAs 
Investment In public sector projects 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM· CHILE 
The SYSTEM is coordinated by Hacienda and Mideplan 
(includes input from the World Sank, the lADS etc.) 
Example: a project proposed by MOPIT: 
Each Ministry Is responsible for Initiating the process of funding application and EIA 
These are usually initiated In parallel 
Typical project life cycle: t, EIA expected by Mideplan Idea ';' :', before the 'Design' stage 
Project outline 
~ Technical Committee (Mideplan is a member) Pre-feasibllity 
Feasibility reviews EIAs , 
Full project design 
Approval and implementation I Conflict Resolution, mHigation, compensation 
Project REVIEW system - managed by Mideplan 
INVESTMENT decisions for each project - managed by Hacienda 
Public sector money is distribut~d: 
To Sectoral Ministries 1 To other recipients: 
National Fund for Regional Development 
Municipalities Fund 
Private Sector Fund 
Source: Kornfeld, M.(Mldeplan) [ G d(8/4/02)] - -
Rivera [government-CONAMA] condemned the implementation of EIA in Chile, which 
fails 'to exploit ' EIA 's preventive potential by taking place after most project decisions have 
been taken, and presents the new emphasis of CONAMA on an EIA process aimed at 
'continuous improvement' through the integration of the 'environmental dimension during 
the whole life cycle of the project. .. We want to emphasise the principle of integration 
versus the idea of obtaining the approval for development ,.55 Kornfeld argued that Mideplan 
would prefer to have a joint assessment of the economic, social and environmental 
, 
55 [Rivera-G-d-5112/0 1] One reviewer for this Chapter pointed out that one should be careful not to 
blame the EIA system for the poor practice of sectoral ministries, who often fail to prepare projects 
according to the rules of 'good project design' which require environmental information at each step 
of design [comment-702]. This comment echoes the opinion expressed by an ex-member of Italy 's 
EIA Commission during an interview suggesting that our focus on getting EIA right is misplaced 
When one considers the often grave failures of project deign [academic-304]. 
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inevitable trade-off process would weaken environmental protection.57 This experience with 
ElA, both in terms of how it was framed and operationalised, and then applied, provides 
important lessons for the introduction of SEA. 
In conclusion, on the basis of the above analysis of the meaning of 'strategic' in the 
Chilean context it is suggested that SEA could be applied to three different 'objects ' : mega-
projects, existing and future planning instruments, and diffuse decision-making at strategic 
level. CUlTently, only mega-projects are subject to legally-binding procedures and decisions. 
Since applying SEA to projects is contrary to the conventional wisdom of much of the 
literature (Chapter 2), the next sections explore reasons why this wisdom may need to be 
revisited. 
5.3 Key elements of the context 
The mega-project phenomenon (and project-limbo effect) led to discussions of the context 
in which SEA could, be applied, thus moving beyond the immediate context, to reflect on 
wider political, cultural, administrative and institutional dimensions. In line with the 
propositions on 'context' in Table 5-a, these discussions helped to frame more precisely the 
purpose of SEA in Chile. Sections 5.3.1-5.3.4 explore the following aspects of the context 
(respectively), drawing on the Seminars, but also on literature and targeted interviews: 
1) tensions between planning and the 'implicit' policy based on market economy 
values; 
2) the weak institutional and administrative framework for environmental integration 
into sectors; 
3) commitment to sustainability and its relevance to the future of SEA in Chile; and 
4) lack of public participation and weak social structures. 
Furthermore, until 2002 there was no ex-post evaluation of projects, although Mideplan was 
considering introducing a new system [Hamuy-G-a-5/12/01J. 
57 [comment-702J 
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5.3.1 World views: planning and the market economy 
This aspect of the Chilean context contributes to the understanding of the political and 
cultural dimensions that shape Chilean interpretations of what is considered 'strategic' and 
what is 'planning ' or policy-making, and explains why Chile has an 'allergy to policies, 
plans and programmes ' (Romero 2001 :95). A discussion of planning in Chile cannot avoid 
the wider issue of market economy values, which Chile has continued to embrace 
throughout the 1990s while having a broad socialist coalition in power.58 Several 
interviewees commented on the fact that Chile represented a somewhat extreme example of 
economic liberalisation and that in this context the conflict between environmental 
protection and development was 'very real'. 59 A World Bank report analysing results of an 
environmental institutions strengthening project (Section 5.3.2) stated 'although President 
Alwyn was committed to the project's objectives, other officials felt that addressing 
environmental concerns would compromise economic growth' (World Bank 2000a:2). 
Beliefs in the powers of the market60 coexist with more moderate worldviews (Santibafiez 
2003). Both were represented at the CED Seminars, providing a miniature example of the 
underlying dynamics in everyday Chilean politics and policy-making. 
An example frequently used by interviewees to explain this predicament was the evolution 
of lnstrumentos de P lanificacion Territorial (instruments for spatial planning - hereafter 
'IPTs '), and regional development plans; both have mixed reputations.61 IPTs were 
originally conceived as spatial plans for the management of the environment, but Sabatini 
[academia] and Espinosa [think-tank] found they had been increasingly re-framed as rigid 
zoning exercises that paid little attention to the environmental dimension. They have limited 
influence due to the lack of comparable development plans to guide them and turn them into 
more far-reaching development strategies for urban areas; they are weak in the face of 
pressure to change them to accommodate new projects and market forces. 62 
58 [Espinoza-TA-al-2/11/01] 
59 [Gonzalez-AI -b-241 10101] 
60 [Mege-B usiness-e-Serninar/CED] ; [Gal'cfa-Practitioner-e-Serninar/CED] 
61 [Romero-A-a-20/12/01] ; [e4-SeminarIlPTs] 
62 Espinosa [TA-b-10/5/02] explained that one underlying problem is that current IPTs al'e designed 
for a time frame of 25-20 years, while development plans, which should exist for all equivalent 
administrative levels, tend to be a four-year management instrument (rather than a plan) which 
coincides with the life-span of local governments. See also: (Reyes and Rivas 2001) . 
Chapter 5 Conceptualisalion in Context 158 
--------------------. ....--
They are also considered conceptually flawed since they do not apply to rural areas outside 
urban complexes, and the narrow scope makes it impossible to address very basic problems 
such as pollution ' caused by land-uses in neighbouring areas.63 According to Romero 
[academic], Regional Development Strategies have an even worse reputation: 
'[the] perfect reflection of what we mean by strategic planning here [in Chile] ... 
[They are a] championship of good intentions. .. nothing concrete is ever 
expressed in them .. . they end with a collection of projects ... already being 
planned or being built. .. So you have to understand that, for example motorway 
X ... is the manifestation of the strategy. But you do not know how the linkage 
took place , .64 
Hence, it is often difficult to see how projects relate to strategic frameworks, partly because 
strategies originate from the - usually sectoral - indications of central Government in 
Santiago. It is standard practice for the private sector not to participate in the definition of 
these plans since their tendency to focus on practical issues (such as whether the 
Government will provide financial incentives for specific development initiatives) clashes 
with the rhetorical tone of discussions.65 Borregaard [research] argued that many of the 
issues arising from mega-projects today are not supported by the few 'policies ' that exist 
(for example on forestry) because these are either out-of-date, or were never substantive 
enough, and because what is needed is clear regional development strategies and priorities 
--.. 
capable of 'orienting' projects.66 
IPTs were produced because they were legally required and were 'managed like an 
investment project,.67 The lack of flexibility led to conflicts with the prevailing principles of 
the market economy, resulting in the marginalisation - by the political establishment - of 
this otherwise potentially useful tool. According to Espinosa the concept of spatial planning 
63 [Romero-A-a-20112/0 1] 
64 [Romero-A-a-20112/01] This problem is very similar to that raised by various interviewees in Italy, 
while discussing the recent National Transport Plan, which includes a number of strategies and 
concludes with a long list of projects (see Bina forthcoming, a). A similar situation was found to be 
true in France in the late 1990s (see Bina 2001a). During a CED Seminar Romero added that failure 
to give a clear policy direction on issues like population distribution (in a country where 
approximately 50 percent of the people in the next few years will be living in one city: Santiago), the 
'situation of indigenous people ', and the sustainable use of natural resources, continues to undermine 
the effectiveness of such planning tools. [Romero-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2: 15 
65 [Romero-A-a-20112/01] Romero finds that the public administration is perhaps just as disillusioned 
with the process, but it has to go through the process because it is required to do so by the central 
administration (the Ministry of Planning, Mideplan). 
66 [Borregaard-T -a-21/3/02]3 
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has been essentially emptied of its meaning since the 1980s, and replaced by 'the market': 
'it is the market, the private sector. .. these are the forces that decide "what to develop 
where", not the Government,.68 The strong focus on the individual, typically associated with 
market economies, makes integrated planning more difficult. For example, Dourojeanni 
[international-UN-CEPAL] stressed the need for an approach 'which is more focused on the 
community ... and [on] how it can act together to solve and manage [situations]' in the 
context of integrated environmental management of river-basins, 'however', he warned: 
'the focus we have here [Chile] today on individuals ... is leading to increasing problems' 
and mis-management of water resources.69 
When people refer to planning, Espinosa and Schlotfeldt [academia] find that they are really 
thinking in terms of management systems focused on economic objectives.7o Or, in 
Sabatini's words, planning is associated with the concept of 'State', of anticipating the 
future and building a comprehensive vision, while management relates to 'the private 
sector', to today's markets and market opportunities.71 What confuses the issue is that often 
the latter (management) is referred to as 'strategic planning', and more specifically as 'urban 
strategic planning' when referring to IPTs, drawing from the theories of 10rdi BOlja on 
'planificaci6n urbana estrategica' (Borja 1997) which focuses on the need to attract 
investment and increasing competition between all government and administrative levels.72 
67 [A-b-7111/01] Quote: [Espinoza-TA-al-2/ll/01] 
68 [EspinozaTA-al-2/ll/01] 
69 [Dourojeanni-I-a-14/4/02] Another interviewee [government-524] made a related comment 
discussing IPTs (zoning plans) and more generally local and regional governance issues, complaining 
that there was no sense of partnership or spirit of collaboration that enabled to make sense of the 
territory as a whole (at the regional scale). This criticism was referred to public sector institutions, but 
also to the general societal structure, and the attitude of the private sector. The implications for 
strategic approaches has been very significant since the declining economic growth trends of the late 
1990s: 'any strategic attempt is frustrated by any project that comes in '. See also the broader trend 
criticising individualism as the dominating ideology in western culture since the late 1970s (see for 
example: Putnam 2000; Layard 2003). 
70 [Espinoza-TA-al-2/11/01]; [Schlotfeldt-A-b-5/11/01] 
71 [Sabatini-A-b-7/ll/01] 
72 [Sabatini-A-b-711l/01] 
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Perhaps the most significant argument in support of the inadequacy of existing frameworks 
from the environmental and sustainability perspectives, relates to the shared view that one 
policy guides all major decisions on investment and development in Chile: economic 
growth73 and related direct foreign investment:74 
'we are moving - with greater force in those countties which subsctibe to 
market economies.. . - towards having the smallest possible quantity of 
explicitly defined policies, and many more definitions of implicit policies, 
which .. . if someone wanted to write down .. would occupy two lines: freedom in 
setting ptices, freedom so that foreign investment can come to Chile ... ,?5 
\ 
Dourojeanni [international-UN-CEPAL] relates the paucity of PPPs to the 'much loved 
theme' of foreign investment: 
'in our Latin Ametican countties there is no such concatenation of macro 
policies which, step by step, leads to the project level. .. whereby projects are part 
of a wider component. .. instead ... interventions within territoties come from 
many [sources] which are external to the place itself ... the so-called extel71al 
govel71ments [quoting Peter Rogers] ... Decisions to develop a project do not 
normally otiginate from the tertitory itself... [many are conceived] externally ... 
not from local or regional authorities but, for example, from ptivate 
companies ... [and this is] promoted by the investment policies, and policies for 
the attraction offoreign investment, which is a much loved theme in [Chile). ,76 
The influence of this' powerful macroeconomic policy was stressed by many interviewees, 
and was vividly recognised by Carla Gonzalez, a senior member of the MINVU, the 
Housing Ministry with responsibility for IPTs.77 The value or clout of IPTs and regional 
strategies in the face of what is considered 'la gran polftica',78 defined by the Treasury 
(Hacienda) has been very limited to date. Some suggest that there are very few ideas about 
how to proceed towards a sustainable development of the country, apart from pursuing 
'growth' itself. Romero [academic] recalls visiting the Mideplan and Hacienda to ask: 'so, 
what do you want to do? And I did not get a reply ... they do not know where they are going 
and where they want to get to . Nor do they know where they are at today'; the policies that 
do exist in Chile are so 'abstract and theoretical. .. they imply no commitment [and] this is 
73 [Asenjo-Think Tarik-e-Seminar/CED]2:2 
74 [Dourojeanni-I-a-1414102] 
75 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED] 
76 [Dourojeanni-I-a-14/4/02] : 1 In Chile, the external government factor is compounded by the 
centralised system of government, which exacerbates the gap between 'the terri tory' and the 
development solutions being advanced for it. 
77 [e5-SerninarIPUC-MINVU] 
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what we have on the one side ... on the other we have projects, nothing else ,.79 The resulting 
project limbo phenomenon gives overwhelming influence to this 'implicit' policy, with 
potentially serious co'nsequences, given that it frequently conflicts with environmental 
protection and sustainability principles.8o 
Garcfa [consultant] delivered a clear verdict on many of these issues: in the Chilean market 
economy 'planning is discredited ... and is not used because it does not bring results', the 
'State is no businessman' and therefore is not confronted with 'the efficiency challenge' 
implicit in resource distribution that would ensure it knew the effect of its activities in the 
long term. 81 Instead, he continued, the State focuses on laying down the 'rules of the game' 
(regulations), reducing 'social injustice' and defining social policies, which do not include 
environment in any substantive way (but see Santibafiez 2003; Perry and Leipziger 1999), 
and tend to be 'very generic'. 82 This intervention led to the question of whether SEA would 
be more useful if applied by 'large or multinational companies' to their investment plans; 
implying that their concrete nature would lead to more effective assessments,83 while SEA 
of generic statements of intent (such as government PPPs) would be an inefficient use of 
resources.
84 In Chile's economy the relative importance of the public sector compared with 
the private one is fundamental: a participant made a rough comparison with average 
European Governments pending suggesting that Chile's public sector has a weight of 19-20 
78 Essentially: 'the' policy. 
79 [Romero-A-a-20112/01]:14 
80 The debate inside and outside the CED Seminars repeatedly raised the divide between those who 
think policies are there, and those who do not. This is partly fuelled by fundamentally different 
concepts of what policies should be, particularly in relation to development and sustainability. For 
example, while many refer to natural resource policies, others think in macro-economic terms: the 
Head of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (CEP AL), Jose Antonio Ocampo, sees 
Chile as the example of a country that has developed active public policies such as 'technology 
policies' and 'strategic visions' to ensure economic growth (compared to other Latin American 
countries that have embraced free-market policy reforms known as the 'Washington consensus '), 
(The Economist April 261h 2003). However, many informants in relation to Alumysa, Ralco and the 
Puente de Chacao disputed the existence of any 'strategic vision'. The clash is also significant in 
terms of the social dimension of sustainability: a World Bank study (Perry and Leipziger 1999) 
examined the 'Chilean model' of economic management, finding sound fiscal policies and 
institutions, however, it acknowledged that much still needed to be done in terms of equality of 
income (Moulin 1999), health and education. 
81 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED] 
82 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED] 
83 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED] 
84 At this point, someone sitting next to me at the Seminar scribbled on my notes: 'this is Latin 
America ' , 
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percent of the economy compared to 40-50 percent in Western Europe.85 Hence questions 
about the opportunity-cost of introducing new mechanisms to deal with a relatively small 
sector of the economy, suggesting that perhaps a better option would be to strengthen the 
existing EIA system. This last consideration was indirectly supported by Contreras 
[industry] who argued he could see no substantive difference between the functions of SEA 
and those of the existing EIA system.86 A sceptical view supported in this thesis (Chapter 2). 
Thus, it becomes essential to establish whether SEA can, or should, play a substantially 
different role from that of a strengthened EIA, and to explain what that could be. This is 
discussed in Section 5.4 and in the next Chapters. 
5.3.2 Environmental integration into sectors 
The second aspect of Chile 's context which is directly relevant to the definition of a pUlpose 
for SEA, is the 'environmental capacity' (as defined in Section 3.4.1) of the institutional and 
administrative framework for environmental integration into sectors. One of the 
propositions in Table 5-a is that the instrument can strengthen such capacity within the 
wider context. Chile's capacity for integration, and for environmental policy-making in 
general, was essentially shaped by a World Bank project specifically aimed at building its 
environmental institUtions, and in particular the Comision Nacional del Medio Ambiente 
(CONAMA):87 
'The project... was designed to help raise the priority of environmental 
protection and modernize environmental management in newly-democratic 
Chile .. . This required no less than a cultural shift within government' (World 
Bank 2000a:l) 
85 [e2-unidentified] 
86 [Contreras-Business-e-Seminar/CED]2: 18 He expressed this view on the basis of the literature in 
Chile that echoed the general idea that SEA is an extension of EIA to PPPs. A related comment was 
made to the author after her presentation at the lA lA Conference in Cartagena, where Raymond 
CoIley [practitioner]- asked why should developing countries with limited resources choose to invest 
in this 'new' tool? 
87 National Commission for Environment, hereafter 'CONAMA' or 'the Commission '. The World 
Bank project is known as the scheme for developing environmental institutions: Proyecto del Ballco 
MlIndial de Desarrollo de Illstitllciolles Ambientales: la Comision Nacional del Medio Ambiente. See 
Ruthenberg (ed.) 2001a. The specification 'current' environmental capacity is in recognition of the 
fact that the institutional and organisational set up changed significantly since the end of the Pinochet 
era, in 1989. 
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CONAMA is the principal authority for environmental protection in Chile, established 
through Ley 19.300, and based on the 'Coordination Model' proposed under the Bank's 
project. 88 It falls under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General of the Presidency, and its 
mandate emphasises the provision of guidance and coordination to the public sector 
administrations, on all aspects of environmental issues: 
'. .. responsibilities of environmental management remain with the sectoral 
agencies and decisions are taken by an Inter-Ministerial Council to which 
CONAMA is the Executive Secretariat. Environmental authority is therefore 
integrated into the sectors which have the responsibility of implementing the 
policies, regulations and enforcement.. .. Furthermore, CONAMA is also a 
highly decentralized institution with presence in each of the 13 Regions . . . the 
strategy was to develop a sense of ownership for environmental issues in the 
respective policies and activities of each agency' (Ruthenberg 200 1 b:4). 
Notably, CONAMA is responsible for EIA in Chile, including its application to the spatial 
planning instruments (lPTs) mentioned above. In the so called 'consolidation phase' of 
1998-1999, CONAMA focused on promoting the formal application of EIA, as well as of 
other legislation, the management and decontamination plans, and public participation 
(Espinoza and Pisani 2001:32). In 1998 the Consejo Directivo of CONAMA approved the 
environmental policy for sustainable development (CONAMA 1998), calling for the 
production of 'envh:.onmentally sustainable policies ', and the harmonization of 
environmental policies with economic and social ones. The document also calls for a 
strengthening of environmental institutions, including the responsibility of all public 
organisations for the integration of environmental sustainability principles in their respective 
sectors. Significantly, in a short document: SEA - An Instrument for Environmental 
Management to be Applied in the Country posted on the web, CONAMA (Undated-b) draws 
a link between the above requirements, its own coordination role and the purpose of SEA. 
Here SEA is described as an 'appropriate instrument' for the 'definition and implementation 
of procedures which can strengthen the establishment of environmentally sustainable 
sectoral policies ' (CONAMA Undated-b:2). The document concludes by stating that this is 
88 Two models for developing environmental institutions were being tested by the Bank in Latin 
America: the 'Coordination Model' was adopted in Chile and Brasil, and the 'Ministerial Model ' was 
adopted in Mexico. Ruthenberg (2001b:4) explains that 'An important factor that influenced the 
decision to opt for the "Coordination" instead of the "Ministry" model was the strong sentiment in 
Chilean society against creating large, new public sector agencies. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
economic, political and legal costs associated with establishing a vertical authority (ministry) were 
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the right moment for Chile to embark on a discussion about the objectives of SEA and to 
clarify 'what is expected of it'. Its closing remark suggests that this is also intended as a 
document that positions CONAMA in any future activity related to the development of SEA 
in Chile. Referring to its coordination role, it states that 'it is judged indispensable to 
advance on [the subject of SEA], an initiative for which CONAMA takes responsibility'. 
CONAMA (Undated-b:l) uses a definition of SEA close to that proposed by Sadler and 
Verheem (1996) and Therivel et at. (1992): 
'the formal and systematic process for the incorporation of environmental 
considerations in the pre-project level of decision-making ... to ensure that the 
environmental consequences of such instruments [policies, plans and 
programmes] are considered in the decision-taking process, together with 
considerations of an economic and social nature '. 
It recognises the 'preventive' nature of SEA, and considers this of growing importance in 
the light of the pursuit of sustainable development. CONAMA (Undated-b: 1) is also aware 
of the different versions of SEA around the world, and stresses that Chile 'must create its 
own instrument of SEA' and that, although attention should be given to international 
experience, 'there is the liberty to shape an instrument that is appropriate for our reality'. 
Hence, by the turn, of the centmy, the Chile Government's leading environmental 
organisation was developing an understanding of SEA closely related to other policy and 
institutional developments (and deficiencies). Its policy documents suggest a clear link 
between SEA and the urgent need for environmental integration in key development sectors 
(and Ministries), and the wider pursuit of sustainability. Given the poor progress in this 
direction during the 1990s (which a World Bank report stresses not to be the sole 
responsibility of CONAMA, (Ruthenberg 2001a», SEA may be faced with an 
insurmountable challenge, or a unique opportunity. 
CONAMA, was designed - according to the Coordination Model - to achieve the specific 
objective of strengthening environmental integration across all sectors (Figure 5-b). 
However, a recent assessment of the success of the World Bank project for institutional 
strengthening in Chile reveals that: 
too high given the multiplicity of already existing responsibilities in the different ministries and 
public services and considering that the environmental issues are inherently cross-sectoral'. 
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, 
'Success ... [in]strengthening and implementing sectoral policies . .. was mixed, 
in large prut because the environment agenda sometimes conflicted with other 
institutional incentives. When the environmental objectives were consistent with 
the general objective of the relevant ministry, there was considerable success .. . 
However, when environmental objectives were in conflict with the general 
mandate of the ministry there was considerably less success. Examples of this 
include development of regulatory frameworks by ministries in productive 
sectors such as Mining and Economy ' (Ruthenberg et at. 200l:ll). 
The 'mixed' results in integrating the environment into sectors may not be a surprise given 
the three conditions for the Model's success: 
'First, political commitment must be serious and translated into sectoral 
ministries ' ownership and commitment for environmental protection. These 
ministries also need to be strong institutions with good administrative and 
technical capacity. 
Second, a strong role for non-governmental participation (both private sector and 
civil society) that goes beyond mere information sharing and consultation. 
Third, certain central clearance and monitoring functions (e.g. Environmental 
Impact Assessments and formulation of emissions standards) remain under the 
control of the national environmental agency' (Ruthenberg 200lb:3). 
Although the third cQ.ndition has been met, especially with regard to EIAs (as discussed 
above), the first two are still a major challenge (Camus and Hajek 1998; Gligo 2001; Gross 
2002). During his presidency (1994-2000), Frei gave little support to CONAMA: he 'was 
not willing to sacrifice any perceived potential for short-term economic growth in favour of 
long-term sustainable development', and he inflicted a significant blow to CONAMA's 
credibility and to the then fledgling SEIA by publicly stating that 'no economic investment 
should be stopped due to environmental concerns' (Ruthenberg 2001 b:4-5). Given the 
Chilean model's dependency on the President's support (Espinoza and Pis ani 2001; Garcfa 
2001), the newly elected President Lagos (in 2001), brought with him the opportunity of a 
new start. There will be a renewed possibility of addressing outstanding issues, particulru'ly 
in terms of natural resources and the role of public participation (Ruthenberg 2001b). Table 
5-b illustrates the frequent change in the heads of key organisations with major influence 
over CONAMA, as well as of its Executive Director. 
public services and considering that the environmental issues are inherently cross-sectoral '. 
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Figure S-d CONAMA's Organisational Structure 
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Table S-b Turnover in the leadership of CONAMA and other key organisations 
Function 
President of the Republic 
Minister of Finance 
Period 
1990-94 
1994-2000 
2000-06 
1990-94 
1994-2000 
Officeholder 
Patricio Aylwin Azocar 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz·Tagle 
Ricardo Lagos Escobar 
Alejandro Foxley 
Eduardo Aninat 
............................................................................... ................. ~???::: ........................................ ........... ~i9.?I~~ .. ~~~.~.9..u..i.r.r~ ................................................................................. .. 
Executive Director of CONAMA 1990-94 
1994-95 
1995-97 
1997-2000 
2000-2001 
2002-
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Rafael Asenjo 
Jose Gofii 
Vivianne Blanlot 
Rodrigo Egafia 
Adriana Hoffmann 
Gianni Lopez 
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Function 
Secretary General of the 
Presidency (SEGPRES) 
Vice-Minister of the Secretary 
General of the Presidency 
(SEGPRES) 
Period 
1990-94 
1994-96 
1996-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-
1990-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-99 
1999-2000 
2000-
Source: (based on World Bank 2000a: 11) 
Office holder 
Edgardo Boenninger 
Genaro Arriagada 
Juan Villarzu 
John Biehl 
Jose Miguellnsulza 
Alvaro Garcfa 
Ricardo Solari 
Angel Flisfich 
Jorge Rosemblulh 
Sergio Galilea 
Carlos Carmona 
Eduardo Dockendorff 
However, to date, most problems persist. The constant reference to a lack of environmental 
and natural resources policies (Gross 2002; Sien'alta 2001; Garcfa 2001), the virtual neglect 
of such theme by the new Environment Agenda of CONAMA (Box 5-c), and the fact that 
only one Ministry (MOP) has recently established its own environmental division (the 
Secretarfa Ejecutiva de Medio Ambiente y Territorio del MOP, known as SEMAT), shows 
the extent to which the 'great potential advantage' (Ruthenberg 200Ib:5) of the Chilean 
Model is far from being exploited, BOITegaard [research] was critical of the lack of progress 
..... 
in building capacity within key Ministries to ensure they could deal strategically with the 
environmental dimension of their sectors,89 As an example, she mentioned that the Ministry 
for Mining had actually reduced its environment staff (a handful or less), normally busy 
analysing new environmental regulations and managing EIAs, and simply with 'no time to 
deal with strategic questions,., with long term issues, or with issues not on their agenda '; 
more significantly, BOITegaard added that these units tended to have no access to the 
Minister, having to depend on other Departments to gain influence.9o 
89 [BoITegaard-T -a-2113/02] 
90 [Bon'egaard-T -a-2113/02]:3 
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The brown agenda is still in the lead, compared with the urgently needed green one: 
throughout the nineties, 'Chile focused on urban pollution management and neglected the 
natural resources agenda, despite having an economy that is based on natural resource 
extraction' (Ruthenberg 2001b:5).91 Unfortunately, the new Environmental Agenda repeats 
the pattern, with the exception of one of the four Action Lines: 'Protection of biodiversity' 
which coincides with financial assistance being granted by the Global Environmental 
Facility. 
Box S-d The Country's Environmental Agenda 2002-2006 
Los Programas y Proyectos que CONAMA esta lIevando a cabo de acuerdo con 10 planteado por la Agenda Ambietal 
Pars, 2002-2006, estan agrupados segun 4 Uneas de Acci6n: 
Recuperacion ambiental de las grandes ciudades Proteccion de la biodiversidad 
• Programa Residuos • Programa Catastro de ecosistemas relevantes 
• Programa Agua • Programa Protecci6n de ecosistemas relevantes 
• Programa Aire 
• Programa Sitios Contaminados Transformacion cultural 
• Programa Atm6sfera Global • Programa Forjadores Ambientales 
• Programa Sendero de Chile 
Modernzacion y agilizacion de la gestion ambiental • Programa Fondo de Protecci6n Ambiental 
• Programa Gesti6n Ambiental • Programa Participaci6n ciudadana en SE lA 
• Programa Informaci6n e Indicadores Ambientales • Programa Cultura ambiental y media humane 
• Programa Control y Fiscalizaci6n • Programa Certilicaci6n Ambiental Educacional 
• Programa Descentralizaci6n 
Source: http://www.conama.cI/portaI!1255/propertyname-1654.html(20/5/03) 
Ruthenberg concludes her analysis by arguing that hope now lies in the institutionalisation 
of environmental concerns in sectoral policies, which should reduce political dependency, 
and - as discussed during the CED Seminars - improve the nature of development 
initiatives. In theory, SEA is precisely meant to institutionalise environmental concerns, at 
least according to the general understanding of SEA's role (Chapter 2) and to the recent 
interpretations proposed by CONAMA. However, expecting SEA to strengthen the culture 
and means of prevention, and help pursue integration and - ultimately - sustainable 
development, may be ambitious given the backdrop of longstanding (relative to other Latin 
91 A problem reiterated by many interviewees, including [BolTegaard-T-a-21/3/02] ; [Astorga-G-a-
29110/01]; [Romero-A-a-20112/01]; [L6pez-G-a-18/4/02]. Although, some progress has been 
achieved, for example: mining projects are now subject to EIAs with increasingly wider scope ( 'una 
conception cada vez mas amplia ' [comment-702]), and projects affecting native forest are now 
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American realities) EIA practice being repeatedly undermined politically, the lack of natural 
resources policies accompanied by a clear market-oriented economic policy not centred 
around sustainability principles, and weak consultation and public participation 
mechanisms. The influence of Chile's political and cultural dimensions adds complexity and 
obstacles to such objectives. Clearly, the question becomes one of whether SEA can operate 
effectively only in certain conditions (see Partidario 1996), which can amount to it being a 
victim of context (cf. Section 3.4.2), or whether its relationship with context is a two way 
system, whereby SEA is strengthened by conducive contexts, but can function in more 
hostile conditions, improving these as a result of its operation. Romero (2001:97) clearly 
states that SEA is 'one of the principal mechanisms for strengthening of environmental 
institutions', envisaging a certain compensatory role. This theme is explored further in the 
next Section. For this research, it is important to stress that an understanding of contextual 
challenges can help shape a more effective SEA. 
5.3.3 Commitment to sustainable development 
Commitment to sustainability is closely related to the institutional and administrative 
framework, and equally relevant to the future of SEA in Chile. This issue brought to the 
forefront the divide between those who see the market as capable of delivering, amongst 
others things, sustainability, and those who see significant 'inefficiencies' in the market 
economy (Gligo 2001). For example in the intractable case of the Chilean market for water 
resources, which is witnessing the Government's efforts - and limited success - to promote 
integrated river basin management (Chapter 6). 
Romero [academia] argues that progress towards sustainable development has been very 
disappointing compared with the: 
'great expectations generated with the conference of Rio de Janeiro [UNCED] . . . 
the fundamental themes have not been solved: the distribution of wealth in Chile 
continues being the same, the rate of devastation of natural resources continues 
being the same ... in other words, the concrete results hoped for, have not been 
achieved. What probably has been achieved is a rhetorical innovation ... nobody 
speaks against sustainable development.. . Even the most devastating of 
businesses will say that it is contributing to the environment, to sustainable 
subject to EIA. However, the State is still virtually powerless in relation to water resources 
[comment-702]. 
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American realities) EIA practice being repeatedly undermined politically, the lack of natural 
resources policies accompanied by a clear market-oriented economic policy not centred 
around sustainability · principles, and weak consultation and public participation 
mechanisms. The influence of Chile's political and cultural dimensions adds complexity and 
obstacles to such objectives. Clearly, the question becomes one of whether SEA can operate 
effectively only in certain conditions (see Partidario 1996), which can amount to it being a 
victim of context (cf. Section 3.4.2), or whether its relationship with context is a two way 
system, whereby SEA is strengthened by conducive contexts, but can function in more 
hostile conditions, improving these as a result of its operation. Romero (2001 :97) clearly 
states that SEA is 'one of the principal mechanisms for strengthening of environmental 
institutions', envisaging a certain compensatory role. This theme is explored further in the 
next Section. For this research, it is important to stress that an understanding of contextual 
challenges can help shape a more effective SEA. 
5.3.3 Commitment to sustainable development 
Commitment to sustainability is closely related to the institutional and administrative 
framework, and equally relevant to the future of SEA in Chile. This issue brought to the 
forefront the divide between those who see the market as capable of delivering, amongst 
others things, sustainability, and those who see significant 'inefficiencies' in the market 
economy (Gligo 2001). For example in the intractable case of the Chilean market for water 
resources, which is witnessing the Government's efforts - and limited success - to promote 
integrated river basin management (Chapter 6). 
Romero [academia] argues that progress towards sustainable development has been very 
disappointing compared with the: 
'great expectations generated with the conference of Rio de Janeiro [UNCED] ... 
the fundamental themes have not been solved: the distribution of wealth in Chile 
continues being the same, the rate of devastation of natural resources continues 
being the same ... in other words, the concrete results hoped for, have not been 
achieved. What probably has been achieved is a rhetorical innovation ... nobody 
speaks against sustainable development... Even the most devastating of 
businesses will say that it is contributing to the environment, to sustainable 
subject to EIA. However, the State is still virtually powerless in relation to water resources 
[comment-702] . 
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development, no-one is participating in under-development, this is very 
interesting. But, there is no... desire for this concept to be transformed in 
indicators you see? Because that would be a little more complicated . . . we might 
demonstrate 'that the process of urban development, for example, in this case is 
being disastrous ,.92 
Romero concludes that a lot of the official discourse that includes the environment is a 
question of 'image'. Indeed, several participants at the Seminars described the trends in the 
current period as 'unsustainable'. This in itself was seen by Leal [intemational-UN-CEPAL] 
as a reason for applying SEA, in order: 
'[to identify those] policies which lead to the .. . bad use of resources. .. Here 
there is a rather important role [for SEA] ... and there could be harsher times 
ahead in terms of unsustainable policies ... There are signals [of this:] cIean-
production agreements versus the environmental impact assessment system ... 
projects like the pet coke production, like Alumysa .. . These are major actions -
some sustainable, others not sustainable ,.93 
He saw great potential in the use of SEA as a tool that can reveal some of the glaring gaps 
between reality and rhetorical claims that Chile is 'doing sustainable development'. In fact, 
he concluded that SEA should be used by 'the enemy', those responsible for promoting and 
implementing development policies: 'that is where we should sell [SEA], because that is 
what matters: that the enemy knows .. . what happens with his policies, ... where they are 
-.... 
heading for,.94 The aim is to highlight the conflict between implicit environmental policies 
(Gligo 2001) contained in development and fiscal policies on the one hand, and the explicit 
policies of CONAMA and other environmental agencies [comment-207] . 
This, and many similar interventions are based on the assumption that information - and 
knowledge - are desirable to policy-makers, and that assessment instruments such as SEA 
are in a good position to provide such a service. However, as showl) in Chapter 3, the linear 
equation whereby assessment provides inputs for decision-making, thus influencing the 
outcome, has been repeatedly challenged, and indeed, the ideas of Leal and others were 
judged by several participants as an almost naIve aspiration given the character of key 
contextual dimensions in Chile. For example, Dourojeanni [intemational-UN-CEPAL] and 
92 [Romero-A-a-20112/01]:4 
93 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2:4, 8. During the 3rd Seminar Leal also called for SEA of 
r,rivatisation strategies. 
4 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]3:2 
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Romero [academia] stressed the lack of interest in using the results of assessments,95 
Referring to the results of state of the environment analyses, Dourojeanni concluded that 'in 
principle, I would say that they are absolutely ignored by the senior [directors] who take 
decisions' both in the public and private sectors, including foreign investors who are very 
active in Chile, More in general, on the issue of how decision-makers consider and use 
information, Romerorecalled interviewing one of Santiago's mayors about what 
information he used or needed to make decisions, to which the reply was 'information 
confuses me', To the ensuing question: 'so how do you take decisions?' the answer came 
unequivocally: 'political intuition', which Romero interpreted to mean 'seeking those 
solutions which will lead to greater votes at the next elections' , This was a rather 
representative answer in a country where 'strategic information is requested by no one ' and 
where 'we do not have a system of decision-making based on information ' ,96 
One government representative warned that the current 'institutional, legal and economic 
context' was not conducive to the effective functioning of SEA, except as a mere 
bureaucratic step,97 Along similar lines, Friedmann [consultant] and Astorga [government] 
identified the 'lack of political will ' and the weakness of public institutions as clear 
obstacles to the adoption of SEA,98 Chilean public institutions, they argued, were not set up 
to discuss coherently all aspects of development. MOP was perhaps the closest to this, but 
inadequate as it only had responsibility for infrastructure, and there was a lack of connection 
(let alone consistency) between policies, plans and programmes (see Chapters 6 and 7), This 
sectoral fragmentation is compounded by disciplinary divides, highlighted by several 
representatives of government and academia: 1) environmental research in Chile was 
deemed under-resourced, and suffered from a lack of incentives to pursue thematic, as 
opposed to self-contained disciplinary, enquiries; 2) a 'comprehensive and holistic approach 
to research ' was needed; 3) the sectoral focus of most administrative and institutional set-
ups had to be overcome; 4) environmental disciplines in courses aimed at the future 
professionals - especially those who will be taking up positions where major decisions are 
made - had to be strengthened,99 
95 [Dourojeanni-I-a-14/4/02]; [Romero-A-a-20112/01] 
96 [Romero-A -a-20/12/01] 
97 [523]2:22 
98 [Astorga-Government-e-Seminar/CED]3:6 
99 [Pardo-Government -e-Seminar/CED]3 :3, [Romero-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2: 10 
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Participants expressed doubts about the existence of the necessary institutional framework 
('institucionalidad') for a balanced assessment of social, environmental and economic 
aspects - considered essential in any discourse on sustainability, both by discussants and in 
the literature. In a plea that was reminiscent of Hilden 's search for a 'Deus ex Machina' 
(2000:64, in Section 3.2.1) discussants asked, 'where can these be pulled together?', 
considering that initiatives pass through many organisations before ending on the desk of 
the Treasury for the money. 100 Who could take the responsibility for this synthesis? Pardo 
[government] reminded participants that the SEA process should involve many different 
actors and decision-makers, especially compared to the current EIA system which is 
identified with CONAMA and with the concept of producing development 'permits', and 
concluded by stressing the need for flexibile answers to this issue. 101 Asenjo [think-tank] 
concluded that indeed the final responsibility for drawing together all the issues lay with the 
decision-maker. 102 Moving to the issue of cumulative impacts frequently associated with 
SEA, Romero [academia] referred to the lack of 'an interdisciplinary vision of reality ... our 
epistemological ignorance' as a fundamental obstacle to integrative and strategic vision, 
without which it becomes virtually impossible, in his view, to be able to predict, anticipate 
and comprehend cumulative implications. 103 
Discussions led to a questioning of whether or not there was sufficient determination to 
pursue the objective of sustainability in Chile (within both the public and private sectors). 
Striking a balance between the positions expressed above, Garces [industry] called for an 
explicit definition of the objective of using SEA (referred to as purpose throughout this 
thesis). He criticised the CED summary of the first Seminars for failing to reflect the 
division amongst participants on whether sustainable development should be an explicit 
objective, and argued that unless the user (Le. the 'developer') embraces a sustainability 
world-view, it is very unlikely that he will seek an instrument that demonstrates that its 
policies are unsustainable, or are moving away from such goal. 104 He claimed that SEA 
should not be neutr~l ('hay que quitarle neutralidad al instrumento') and that the objective 
100 [Friedmann-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED)3:6 
101 [Pardo-Government-e-Seminar/CED)3:6 
102 A view shared by several interviewees in Italy [Pancheri-academiclgovernment) ; [Croccolo-
government). 
103 [Romero-A-a-20112/01):20 
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of its use should be clear before choosing to introduce it in a particular context. 105 The 
underlying argument, shared by several commentators, was that if there is no determination 
in pursuing sustainability - and it appeared that there is not much beyond rhetoric -- and as 
long as there is no political will to 'discuss the sustainability of our [development, growth] 
model', then the 'instrument is of no consequence ,.106 
These views have a number of conceptual and practical implications. As discussed in 
Section 3.2.1, they bring to the forefront the implicit political theory (Weale 2001a) 
underlying individuals ' arguments and interpretations of the nature of assessment, of its 
neutrality or otherwise: issues that highlight the relationship between the instrument and its 
context. As the debate progressed from the first to the third Seminar, several values and 
political theories crept implicitly in the folds of the arguments and concepts being tabled. 
Some called for more reflection on these values, which are closely linked to the idea of SEA 
constituent dimensions explained in Chapter 3: 
'we should not lose sight of the values that are implicit in these steps because I 
think that Strategic Environmental Assessment... in each of these words one 
should be able to fix certain values ... the parameters that we are using in this 
discussion are necessarily crucial '.107 
Discussions revealed a clear divide. Gm'ces [industry] envisaged an advocacy role for SEA 
(leaving aside political constraints): 
'an instrument which allows us to get closer to criteria for a more sustainable 
development. .. to more just policies ... ; [all] this presupposes ... an instrument 
charged with ethics .. . [that] is not technical. .. not objective ... If it brings us 
closer to sustainability then it is not neutral. .. I would not [abandon] the ethical 
theme: just because [SEA] implies ethical issues it does not mean it will be more 
complicated, more difficult or less good. My view is that at this moment, what is 
charged ethically is better'. 108 
However, market economy enthusiasts argued that 'SEA has no ethical value' attached to it, 
and is there to demonstrate (qualitatively) the costs and benefits of a certain PPP in 
104 A similar criticism came from Gonzalez, during the third Seminar. 
105 [Garct~s-B usiness-e-Seminar/CED] 3:2 
106 [e3-unidentified]3:7 
107 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2:7 
108 [Garces-Business-e-Seminar/CED]2: 10 
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environmental terms. 109 More moderate opinions of the benefits and limitations of such 
political theory were in line with Garces and replied that it is not possible to have a neutral 
instrument, which has 'no ethical connotations because, as Leal [international-UN-CEPAL] 
contended: sustainable development itself is 'neither objective nor neutral', while Cadiz 
[government], in an interview, argued more broadly that 'we all have a history, a certain 
"common sense" .. . the human being is [by nature] ethical. .. not professional or 
economic '.110 Romero [academic] further criticised the neutralist interpretation, arguing that 
by referring to SEA (and GIS) as 'tools' we effectively neutralise them, whilst these 
instruments are inevitably linked to ethics. I 11 These views support the propositions relating 
to 'purpose' in Table 5-a. 
Nonetheless, some participants referred to SEA as an 'instrument', using this term to stress 
SEA's neutrality and technocracy in opposition to concepts of value and ethics. According 
to a consultant, the adoption of social impact assessment in the late 1970s made it possible 
to measure the social benefits and costs but: 
'with this tool, this instrument, we did not necessarily succeed in generating a 
market for wellbeing . .. we simply measured whether a certain line of action . .. 
produced or not, social costs and benefits .. , 
Strategic Environmental Assessment, from my point of view, is a neutral 
instmment, therefore from the perspective of defining sustainability, it takes the 
role of at least demonstrating qualitatively - because SEA is not quantitative -
the costs and benefits of a certain policy from the environmental point of view '" 
I would therefore ... give it only the connotation of instrument, so that it be a 
neutral instrument, and thus applicable by whomsoever, a company... the 
State . .. a consultant. .. without having to adhere ideologically '. 112 
Further support for an SEA that provides an 'objective view' and thus be of use to all, not 
only environmental specialists or advocates, came from Leal [international-UN-CEPAL]. 
This divide, which was reiterated in the last Seminar, highlights the difficulties of taking a 
clear stance in favour of the pursuit of sustainable development. 113 Those interested in a 
strictly neutral role for SEA also stressed the distinction between the provision of 
109 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Serninar/CED]; [Mege-B usiness-e-Seminar/CED] 
110 [Cadiz-Government-e-Seminar/CED]; [Gross-Academic-e-Serninar/CED]; [G-a-121l2/0 1] 
III [Romero-A -a-201 12/01] 
112 [Garcfa-Practitioner -e-Seminar/CED]2: 8 
113 [Garces-B usi ness-e-Semi nar/CED] 3 
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information, for example 'on the approach that is being taken towards natural resources 
involved in development, the level of depletion ... the damage', and the decision that is to be 
taken by the authorities. 114 This is in line with the emphasis recently placed on such 
separation by the ECMT (forthcoming), aimed to render decision-support instruments at 
once more desirable and effective. 
Participants agreed that it would be important to clarify the relationship between the 
instrument (SEA) and its context, and the impact this has on its purpose. The Seminars, and 
the divisions they uncovered, support the analysis in Chapter 3 and the two purpose-types 
proposed therein (Table 5-a). On the one hand, the arguments of Garces and others implied 
that, if the context does not support the basic - yet fundamental - principles underlying 
sustainability, then SEA as a mere instrument cannot be effective. This assumes that SEA 
can operate effectively only in certain conditions, limiting its conceptualisation in terms of 
strict assessment mechanism, rather than a wider process that can contribute to transform 
the context. On the other, it was felt that the purpose should be defined in line with one's 
own world view and belief system, suggesting a more independent and forceful role for 
SEA. 
Hence, political will, the Achilles ' heel of many contexts, and in Chile a constant refrain, 
need not determine the fate of SEA. liS Asenjo [think-tank] reminded participants that they 
should make recommendations without being too concerned about what the State mayor 
may not want to reveal (a reference to those who want to use SEA to demonstrate current 
unsustainable trends) as a result of a more systematic use of SEA. 116 In this case, the 
proposition whereby a context's environmental capacity becomes itself the 'object' of SEA, 
rather than an obstacle to its application, is upheld. 
114 [Garcfa-Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED]2: 11 
115 [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED] ; [Astorga-Government-e-Seminar/CED]; [Gonzalez-
International-e-Seminar/CED]3:7 
116 [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED]3:3 
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5.3.4 Participation and democracy 
The fourth relevant aspect of the Chilean context is the potential conflict between the three 
pillars of sustainability and the need to involve the publici I? and secure legitimacy of the 
decisions made in relation to development. As argued by Astorga [government]: 
'one of the mqjor contributions of SEA is to make the public administration's 
decisions legitimate [in the eyes of] different actors: public and pIivate ... to 
allow for consensus . .. The possibility of legitimising the authoIity's actions ... 
[and] public participation are extremely important ,118 
SEA is seen as a way of facilitating the engagement of stakeholders in dialogue. The 
importance and urgency of this objective is illustrated by Blanco [NGO-CIPMA] : 
'Chile has a big problem in telms of the scarce tradition of consultation ... of 
sitting - as we are doing here - to discuss vaIious subjects .. . instead, there is a 
very vertical tradition, a very authoIitarian tradition of taking decisions ... not 
only in the public sector, but also in business and its relationship with the 
community ... I think that one of SEA functions should be ... to allow evelyone 
to be involved in the decisions ,119 
Blanco goes on to stress that a similar function requires flexibility in the way SEA will be 
designed. In particular he distinguishes between instruments 'inside the office' and 'out of 
the office', suggesting that SEA should be a process that is carried out 'with the people'. 
"-
Pardo [government], responsible for environment and water issues, and involved in the 
promotion of river-basin management plans and related SEAs, places great emphasis on 
public participation and the concept of stakeholders, pointing out - in response to some of 
the interventions - that 'one does not have concrete projects to sell, rather one has many 
alternatives ... a plan is more flexible [than a project at the design phase] and can therefore 
include participation of citizens, or between actors' . 120 The implication here, is that 
participation should involve communities in discussing the 'many alternatives', and perhaps 
more importantly - following Owens (2000) - in defining and reframing the problems 
which are to be addressed. 
117 Here the term is used following Blake (1999:271, in Owens 2000:1141) who proposes that the 
public 'is best defined in terms of alienation from dominant political or knowledge regimes ill a 
particular context'. 
118 [Astorga-Government -e-Seminar/CED]2:7 
119 [B lanco-N GO-e-S emi nar/CED] 2: 12 
120 [Pardo-Government-e-Seminar/CED]3:2 
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This relates to the earlier discussion about conflicting worldviews, which involve different 
perceptions of the problem, and therefore of the solution(s). Alumysa is a case in point, 
where alternative views of regional development differed between the interested and 
affected publics. Pardo went on to stress the need to involve those people who are directly 
and indirectly linked to the potential benefits and impacts expected by the intervention, 
strengthening mutual trust in the process. She also argued that comprehensiveness, implicit 
in river basin management, required greater participation ('la integralidad te obliga a una 
major participaci6n ').121 SEA was seen as a process to ensure that these affected parties are 
identified early on. Gross added that SEA could contribute to the 'concertaci6n' process -
promoting cooperation between private and public sectors. 
However, participation, and the transparency it implies, face a number of obstacles in Chile. 
According to Dourojeanni [international-UN-CEPAL] in Chile, and more generally in Latin 
America, the lack of an organised society which can participate in governance issues, and 
that is capable of complaining when it has been wronged, was a major obstacle to more 
sustainable resource management. 122 
Many questioned whether SEA could create a forum that legitimised and institutionalised 
discussion and transparency in a society 'where things are always oblique and ambiguous' 
(Allende 2002: 15), where confrontation remains undesirable, and opinions are expressed 
with a certain 'shyness,.123 Furthermore, the current conception of participation, sanctioned 
in Ley 19.300 is strictly 'indirect', whereby 'the Government must listen to everyone, give 
answers to everyone, and then "ponder" over these opinions and take its own decision ' 
[comment-702]. 
121 [Pardo-Governmen t -e-Semi nar/CED] 3: 4 
122 [1-a-14/4/02]:8 
123 [G-a-121l2/01]; [AI-b-241l0101] This comment was made reflecting on the tone of the CED 
Seminar discussions on sustainability in Chile, which failed , even in the face of such unequivocal 
problems, to use explicitly critical language. Some interviewees also pointed out that even think tanks 
or NGOs struggle to challenge the underlying values of market economy, even in the case of highly 
controversial projects such as Alumysa or Trillium (Bocchetto 2001). Sabatini [academia-b-71ll/01] 
argued that 'Chilean society suffers from a lack of recognition of the existence of conflict ' and this 
has far-reaching implications, for example he finds that in the case of requests for compensation in 
ETAs, the private sector tends to react as if it was being 'blackmailed '. A reaction I was able to 
witness during a discussion on the EIA for the Alumysa project (see Box 5-b). In addition, Romero 
[A-a-201l2/0 1] has stressed the 'absolute dependency of public officials towards their bosses', which 
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Chile also suffers from a strong 'elitist' and 'expert' culture that influences the way issues 
are disclosed and debated: 'this is the country of technical commissions, or reflection 
groups' (said one Govemment official), the Ministers decide who should be on these 
committees (typically including academia, private sector and public officials, mainly from 
central govemment), and these formulate the policies. 124 According to Hamuy [govemment] 
'there is no institutionalised [evaluation] system' for such policies, not even in socio-
economic terms. 125 Any controversy arising from the work of experts is usually relayed to 
the committee of Ministers. Thus, an informant wondered 'how far does this State system 
allow for democratic decisions to be taken on the basis of information?' In line with the 
highly centralised Govemment structure, the policy-making process is primarily driven by 
the Presidency, which gives strategic indications and works through the inter-Ministerial 
committee to define 'priorities '; ultimately, the difference between 'what you would want to 
do' and 'what you can do' depends on Hacienda (Treasury).126 
Despite, or perhaps due to, these difficulties, discussions revealed a general agreement that 
'in the Chilean case' the 'promotion of public participation' should be identified as a 
specific function of SEA.127 The theme was explored further in terms of whether SEA 
should 'contribute' to, or 'facilitate' a democratic process, and Astorga advocated that 
'the event of citizens' participation and consensus constitute the essence of SEA, 
otherwise it makes no sense. SEA is not a purely technical instlUment, a 
laboratory instrument '. 128 
Escudero [govemment] added to this, stressing the need to amplify the concept of 
participation, linking it to decision-making and therefore reducing the problem of sectoral 
fragmentation by including a wide range of decision-makers in the process. 129 
he sees as one of the reasons why during the Frei Preidency, no one really raised the issue of 
environmental planning. 
124 [Hamuy-G-a-SI12/01] 
125 [523] 
126 [Schlotfeldt-A-b-5/11/0 1] 
127 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]; [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED]3:3 
128 [e3-Seminar/CED] [Asenjo-Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED] [Astorga-Government-e-
Seminar/CED]3:5 
129 [Escudero-Governmen t -e-Semi nar/CED] 3: 4 
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5.4 Chilean expectations and the purpose of SEA 
Can SEA operate in· a hostile climate? Can it influence positively the institutional and 
administrative dimensions of the context in which it applies? This Chapter has explored the 
nature of the problems that a range of stakeholders identified as critical when discussing the 
potential use of SEA. It also described their expectations and direct or implicit demands in 
relation to SEA, thus allowing this final Section to draw some conclusions in terms of the 
potential purpose of SEA in Chile, and some reflections on the implications of these 
findings for the theory of SEA. 
5.4.1 Decoupling 'strategic' from the 'object' of SEA 
The CED seminars demonstrated the complexity behind the presumption, implicit in all 
definitions of SEA, that there are policies, plans and programmes to be assessed. In fact, the 
Seminars resulted in a problematisation of the 'strategic' dimension - at the heart of SEA: 
both in terms of what is a strategic initiative, and - more fundamentally - in terms of what 
'strategic' relates to. These findings support the critical analysis in Chapter 3 and deepen 
the understanding of the nature and practical implications of propositions in Table 5-a. 
Most SEA literature draws a direct link between the raison d'etre of SEA and the 
limitations of the experience with EIA (Chapter 2). This has implied - almost without 
question - that 'strategic' refers to the nature of the initiative being assessed (the 'object' of 
assessment). Instead, the debate in the Seminars suggests that the raison d'etre of SEA 
could equally lie in the need to address the strategic environmental implications of any type 
of initiative, thus shifting the defining character of SEA away from the nature of the 
initiative and onto the nature of impacts, or potential implications (cf Section 3.3). Thus, in 
Chile 'strategic' is an adjective best related to the nature of the effects of certain 
development initiatives. A claim supported by Gonzalez's closing remark during the third 
Seminar [academi~-FAO], inviting participants to decide whether 'the instrument is for the 
assessment of strategies, or whether it represents a strategic approach to assessment' and 
suggesting that 'the adjective "strategic" comes from the type of approach that [SEA] 
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promotes ,.130 Furthermore, in many interventions and interviews on the reason for adopting 
SEA in Chile, 'strategic' was used in relation to the quest for a 'strategic dimension' of 
development; an interpretation which relates 'Closely to the scope of sustainable 
development strategies (OECD and UNDP 2002), and in turn to SEA's normative objective 
, 
of contributing to the promotion of environmental integration and sustainability. This 
supports the proposition · that SEA may have to contribute to build a strategic dimension 
(Table 5-a). 
Thus, it is argued that these new perspectives imply a decoupling of the strategic dimension 
from the character of the 'object' of assessment (and from the rigid PPP concept), in favour 
of a link to the nature of effects and of the wider contextual dimensions. This conflicts with 
the crucial idea in the literature that SEA differs from EIA because it applies to everything 
above, and excluding, the project level. However, normative conceptions of SEA are having 
to evolve as a result of SEA practice, making it harder to define such crude criteria. More 
substantially, drawing on the discussions in Chile and combining these with the literature 
analysis in Chapter 2, leads to the suggestion that SEA is increasingly conceived as 
something of a 'banner' rather than a tightly defined concept: used in reference to support 
for a series of principles and world views, and in reference to a complex set of needs whose 
nature is widening (some would say, beyond recognition). 
5.4.2 SEA as a 'banner' 
The broader interpretation of SEA, supported by Chilean discourses, links to the discussion 
about the meaning of diversity in SEA practice (Section 2.2.2), which requires further 
unpacking. While praxis has moved quite freely, unfettered by concerns of strict coherence 
with normative definitions, and has been able to interpret and respond to the real needs and 
concerns of organisations calling for the use of 'something like SEA', academic literature 
has been slower - more cautious but perhaps insufficiently self-reflective - as it adapted its 
understanding and framing of SEA. As Jon Hobbs, of the Department for International 
Development, said recently: 'SEA practice is ahead of theory ... though we are not sure 
whether this is a good or a bad thing'. 13l 
130 [Gonzalez-International-e-Seminar/CED]3:4 
131 [d6-Seminar/DFID-OECD-DAC] 
Chapter 5 Conceptuaiisation in Context 181 
This thesis argues that the different speeds are causing problems. They are exemplified by 
current divisions over the scope of SEA: in the world of applied assessments, the issue of 
whether to include social and economic issues in strategic assessments such as SEA 
presented itself very early on, and there are many examples where it was resolved by a 
combined consideration of the three dimensions. Research literature, in contrast, remains 
opaque on this issue (Sections 2.2 and 3.2). It failed to identify the problem arising in the 
praxis and advance its thinking on a clearly evolving topic. As argued in Chapter 2, the 
conceptual basis of SEA remains weak, and as a result, an increasingly confusing picture is 
being delivered by both academics and practitioners, exemplified by the proliferation of 
'strategic ' instruments and related acronyms. 
The Chileans, despite being relatively new to the topic, were not immune to the problem. 
People expressed concern about the 'E' in SEA, asking what is meant by this term 132 and 
why SEA included it if the point was to promote 'integrated development,.133 Gonzalez 
[academia-FAO] made a crucial link between this debate and that about alternatives, central 
to the whole justification for SEA: he suggested that SEA related to the provision of better 
knowledge of alternatives and to their analysis in a 'strategic context', and implied that 
'we are expanding the concept of environment: it is not sufficient to consider 
natural resources ... what we are referring to also includes the theme of quality of 
life ... I therefore think that SEAs . . . necessarily links us ... to the theme of 
policies,.134 
Hence, the scope of SEA, the focus on alternatives and the need for a more strategic 
dimension in development initiatives are closely interrelated. Several participants felt that 
'the' objective of using SEA was to promote sustainable development, and emphasised the 
social equity dimension. 135 
132 [Gross-Academi c-e-S emi nar/CED] 
133 [Contreras-Business-e-Seminar/CED] 
134 [Gonzalez-International-e-Seminar/CED]2:9 
135 [e2-unidentified]2:23 [del Canto-Business-e-Seminar/CED]; [Silva-Government-e-Seminar/CED] 
[Gonzalez-International-e-Seminar/CED]; 
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One argued that to date in Chile, of the three elements of sustainable development, social 
equity was the weakest: 
'despite the clear policy of seeking [social equity], it is being left behind ... this 
topic... and the theme of pruticipation:... if we ru'e going to do Strategic 
Environmental Assessments ... there is no doubt that the themes of equity, and 
therefore political and also ethical themes, will be present'. 136 
Silva, of the Ministry for Housing and Town Planning (MINVU) , advocated a wider 
interpretation of the environmental dimension of SEA, to include cultural aspects, which he 
admitted to be intrinsically linked to themes of ethics and values.137 For this reason, he 
argued - together with others - that SEA should not be so called: 
'[the application of SEA] should reflect wider aspirations, [it] should say look we 
are talking about the three pruts of sustainable development... I think this is 
extremely important because then one really can start thinking of an integral 
development and this, yes, seems fundamental. .. the word environment 
complicates [things] a little ,.138 
Several participants argued that the aim should not be to define a new environmental 
instrument for environmental experts: instead, SEA ownership should lie with those who 
take decisions on development, especially if those decisions tend to be unsustainable.139 
Gonzalez [academia-FAO] argued that the scope of SEA should include in the decision 'all 
" 
that which then falls ... onto society': all the negative social and economic externalities that 
tend to be excluded from social and cost-benefit analyses, without however 'pretending to 
justify a project from the economic point of view' . In accordance with recent practice (for 
example Baldizzone et al. 2002), he concluded that: 
'we should stop using the words Strategic Environmental Assessment, and 
substitute them with Strategic Assessment, that is more in line with the reality 
that we are discussing here '. 140 
136 [e2-unidentified]2: 14 
137 [Silva-Government-e-Seminar/CED]2: 14 
138 [S'l G . 1 va- overnment-e-Semmar/CED]2: 14 
139 [Gross-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2:4 
140 [Gonza!ez-International-e-Seminar/CED]2:9, 16 
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The methodological implications of such a different perspective will be explored in the 
following Chapters but it is worth stressing that this perspective seems coherent with the 
historical evolution of the discipline (Chapter 2): EIA's perceived limitations were the first 
reason for promoting SEA, and this partly explains the early methodological bias for 
technocratic approaches centred around environmental effects, while the subsequent focus 
on sustainability led · to diversity of SEA approaches and led to the quest for core 
characteristics (Section 2.2.2.). 
5.4.3 Learning and compensating for the wider context 
Another fundamental question arising from Chilean discourses on SEA is whether - as 
proposed in this thesis - SEA could be designed to address problems intrinsic to the 
context, as was indeed suggested by several interviewees. Felsenhardt [academia], for 
example, wondered whether, in a cultural context where planning and prediction are far 
from common, SEA could 'induce an improvement' . 141 Several comments throughout the 
debate on SEA suggested that existing EIA processes had already triggered forms of 
learning, and many participants and interviewees hoped that SEA could lead to 
improvements in the context. 142 
One of the benefits of EIA in Chile has been to improve the quality of projects being 
proposed. This has been a particularly significant result in those countries and contexts 
where projects were often of poor quality from a technical perspective, let alone in 
environmental or sustainability terms. 143 However, the emphasis has been placed on even 
wider effects of the EIA system: Rivera [government-CONAMA] argued that it has 'led to 
the generation and updating of environmental legislation and to the definition of policies 
and criteria for environmental themes which had not been legislated for'; a classic example 
being the issue of adequate levels in relation to water flows needed for environmental 
141 [Felsenhardt-A-b-13/2/02]; [Bonegaard-T-a-21/3/02]. Romero [A-a-20112/01] talks about Chile as 
having 'a culture of improvisation '. 
142 An explicit reference to such a role for SEA was made by the then Director of the ErA Directorate 
General of the Italian Ministry of Environment, Prof. Mariarosa Vittadini, who argued that the new 
European Directive (so called SEA Directive) would lead to changes in the way planning is done in 
Italy, so that it can be assessed [d-4-Conference/SEA Italy]. A comment supported by Prof. Eliot 
Laniado [academia] in the same Conference. 
143 Once again, the experience is comparable to that in Italy [Vittadini-academic]; [de Benedetto, c.-
academic] 
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purposes, which was often raised in relation to individual developments and their EIAs, but 
which has only been legislated for in 2002. 144 Rivera concluded that EIA had 'developed 
institutional capacities' in the public sector, amongst proponents and developers, consultants 
and citizens' organisations, as well as academic centres and universities. These arguments 
support the claims, made in previous Sections, of a certain policy vacuum and of EIAs 
having to force their way through a difficult context; a condition referred to as 'project 
limbo' above. 
Accordingly, having had first-hand experience of doing strategic assessments himself, 
Blanco stressed the potential of SEA-type instruments in terms of building strategies where 
they are absent: 
'we should envisage SEA as a step towards having policies. It's like starting from 
the bottom to move upwards, [by which] I mean that we do not have policies, 
[so] we need to make an effOlt , doing strategic environmental assessments 
which can allow us to clruify what we need, and for what we need it. I think the 
example of trade is exemplary. For example, the agreement Chile-EU one cannot 
say this is a policy, but it is part of an implicit policy of the Government to open 
up our markets, to favour exports .. . if we are capable of advancing towru'ds an 
SEA at this level, not of projects ... I think this could inform us in terms of what a 
policy should or should not be ... if we want a more strategic approach [SEA can] 
clarify som~of these absent policies and contribute to their development,.145 
This supports the proposition in Chapter 3, whereby a purpose for carrying out SEA could 
be to promote institutional learning, and eventually transformation, and that in a context 
characterised by a weak institutional basis (environmental and other), SEA could act as a 
temporary compensating mechanism. This interpretation is further supported by the 
intervention of Schlotfeldt [academia] who considered that given the current situation in 
Chile, especially in terms of the uncertain existence or strength of strategic frameworks, 
SEA should have a 'socio-cultural' role that helps 'us' to understand the wider context, 
including in environmental terms. 146 Espinosa [think-tank] saw SEA as a means to promote 
more strategic thinking and, eventually, the definition of policies. 147 
144 [Rivera-G-d-5/l2/01] 
145 [Blanco-NGO-e-Seminar/CED]2:5 
146 [Schlotfeldt-Academic-e-Seminar/CED]2: 13 
147 [Espinoza-TA-a1-2/ll/01] 
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Astorga [government] points out that SEA can help to 'answer the questions of why, and for 
what [of a certain initiative or project]. MOP has never concerned itself with the why and 
for what'. 148 With reference to the mega-project of the 'Ruta Costera', a motorway which 
connects the centre-north to the south of the country, he stresses that a closer look will 
reveal that the aim is to promote tourism along the coast. Yet, the technical standards, and 
routes, may well frustrate this objective by damaging the landscape. Astorga laments that an 
assessment of the project's raison d'etre and its implications for the whole country were not 
considered; furthermore, he thinks it is essential that 'from the Minister downwards, [we 
should] ask ourselves why we have a promise ... to deliver 14000 kilometres of tarmac', and 
concluded with a play on words which relates back to the discussion on the ethical or neutral 
contents of instruments such as SEA: 'yo no se si nUls etico 0 no, pero mas estetico', hence, 
the process mayor may not be more ethical but would (certainly) be more aesthetic. 149 
Finally, a further benefit - albeit unplanned - which may have even greater implications 
for SEA was highlighted by Romero [academic], who argued that EIA in Chile has provided 
the 'only alternative that people have had in their lives to express [their views on] what they 
want to be'. 150 Since there is no other legal instrument to allow such a debate, people end up 
discussing social and economic problems under the heading of 'environmental impacts '. 
Romero believes that this is partly why there is a debate in terms of Strategic Assessment 
versus SEA and argues that since in Chile what is needed is 'development strategies' it may 
be better to aim for an assessment framework that discusses social and economic factors as 
well as environmental ones. 
148 [Astorga-Government-e-Seminar/CED]2: 13 
149 [Astorga-Government-e-Seminar/CED]2: 13 
150 [Romero-A-a-201l2/01]:39. Once again, a parallel can be drawn with the findings in Italy, where 
interviewees pointed out that the reason why this instrument has become a burden in the eyes of 
developers, is because it provides the main opportunity to discuss, criticise and oppose proposals. It is 
only once the EIA is presented to the public for comments (in other words, very late in the planning 
cycle) that most of the problems arise [de Benedetto, C-acadernic]; [de Blasiis-academic] ; [Pompilio-
government]. 
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5.4.4 Initial conclusions: two 'objects', two purposes 
The analysis of the shaping of SEA conceptions in the Chilean context provides support for, 
but also adds complexity and depth to, the themes and propositions advanced in Chapters 2 
and 3. In terms of the strategic dimension of SEA, the discourses confirmed the relevance of 
trends and tensions in the theory, practice and rhetoric surrounding the instrument, and 
upheld the interpretation given to them in Chapter 3. The adjective 'strategic ' is further 
problematised through the mega-project phenomenon seen as an expression of implicit 
policies, where questions of 'why' and 'how ' are collapsed within the project level instead 
of across a spectrum of PPPs. The role of foreign, and private, investors challenges further 
the literature 's assumption that projects are the expression of strategic initiatives: in Chile 
many projects are initiated 'outside the region and country' for which strategic decisions 
'nunca se {oman sino que resultan' [(i.e. they are not actively taken, but are the result of 
foreign investment) comment-702]. Where they feature, strategic decisions are often diffuse 
and intangible as opposed to being part of hierarchical processes. This investigation has 
therefore lead to the suggestion of decoupling the adjective 'strategic' from the nature of the 
initiative being assessed, and associating it to the nature of effects or implications of any 
initiative. As these phenomena are by no means restricted to Chile, it is postulated that a 
core element of SEA's discipline needs to be revised. 
The importance and influence of the capacity of the four contextual dimensions to promote 
environmental integration and sustainable development was confirmed as a major factor in 
shaping SEA. Overcoming poor environmental integration and sectoral and disciplinary 
fragmentation, are at once the challenge and the purpose of SEA. The influence of implicit 
political theories on the interpretation of environmental and assessment dimensions (the 
latter in terms of a neutral or advocacy role), is also noted, and linked to this is the further 
understanding of the relationship between the capacity of context and instrument, whereby 
such capacity can be a constraint on SEA or part and parcel of its raison d 'hre. Thus, 
coherently with propositions for 'Purpose' and 'Assessment' (Table 5-a), SEA could have 
two 'objects ' : a particular initiative or set of strategic choices relating to a development 
proposal; and key aspects of the context's capacity which need strengthening to deliver 
integration and sustainability. 
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The environmental dimension of SEA and the purpose of using this instmment are closely 
linked. In Chile, as in many other contexts, there is a tension between environment and 
sustainability as the focus of SEA, and this relates to the nature of the problems identified 
by informants, notably the demand for strategic decision-making aimed at environmentally 
sustainable development (and hence for alternatives to be considered). Social and cultural 
issues are to be part of the scope of SEA, together with minimum identification of economic 
costs and benefits, considered critical in convincing elected decision-makers. In terms of 
purpose, interviews and seminars revealed that SEA is expected to help solve a wide range 
of problems, not unlike the growing set of expectations analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. There 
is an urgent need to improve the sustainability of mega-projects (especially infrastmcture 
ones) and in general of decision-making for development, reducing the problems caused by 
the project limbo phenomenon. 
This implies a compensatory, transformative purpose whereby SEA would help build a 
'strategic' dimension where it is considered weak or inadequate. Dialogue, inter-sectoral 
consultation, cooperation and public participation are weaknesses that need addressing, but 
are also seen as part and parcel of an SEA process expected to increase epistemological tmst 
and integration within planning, and strengthen the process of identification and discussion 
of alternatives. SuCh purpose, it is argued here, is not only inevitable, but is also desirable if 
SEA is to live up to the expectation that it should promote sustainable development, and 
may be equally relevant in developing and developed countries. 
Some experts and scholars are concerned that it could lead to SEA 's loss of identity. They 
raise a critical but not insurmountable problem: at stake is the essence of assessment and 
evaluation (cf. Section 3.3), and with it the expectation - or hope - of an independent 
judgement of development initiatives. However, the compensatory role mentioned above 
does not have to weaken the evaluation per se; it simply adds to a series of ex-ante 
functions , helping to reap the benefits of environmental protection and sustainability so 
frequently promi,sed in connection with SEA. 
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Overall, the Chilean example supports the proposition that the relationship between SEA 
and the capacity of its context informs the purpose and - as a result - the shape of the 
instrument. This is a two-way process: understanding the context reveals the obstacles and 
limitations to which SEA is subject, but it also indicates the areas where the instrument 
might most profitably be employed. The implication is that SEA will have two purposes: an 
immediate one of influencing the environmental and sustainability dimension of the direct 
'object' under assessment, and a medium-long term one of improving the capacity of some 
of the critical contextual dimensions. By shifting the focus away from instruments to the 
context, the Chilean discourses allow this thesis to challenge the emphasis given to EIA 
limitations as a trigger for SEA, and to suggest that this may have been a distraction that has 
reduced the latter's effectiveness and potential. The various opinions gathered throughout 
the first stage of field work suggest that SEA is more helpfully conceived as a banner 
serving a range of demands and needs which are context-specific, rather than a tightly 
defined concept like that of EIA. This also helps explain and justify the wide variety of SEA 
approaches around the world. 
The importance of identifying and unravelling problems relating to the strategic dimension 
and the contextual characteristics of the context, before searching for an instrument to 
provide the solution, is noted. Understanding the causes of the problems can be considered 
crucial in deciding why and how to introduce SEA in a specific context. The conceptual 
framework of this thesis suggests that learning could play a major role in making SEA an 
effective instrument of change and transformation (the double purpose). Evidence that EIA 
has had a similar effect is encouraging. It is suggested that by explicitly recognising the 
double 'object ' and purpose of SEA, the function of promoting learning through an SEA 
process can be strengthened, and that this would lead to shaping the assessment dimension 
of SEA according to a new philosophy. Purpose and methods are explored in more detail in 
the next Chapter, looking at a specific example of SEA. 
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Chapter 6 
Purpose and Methods 
[Tlhere had been problems from the start, that had to do with the objectives of the 
evaluation ... why on earth were we doing an assessment? 
Assessor [a] 
[Assessment was to be] an integral part [of] ... if not replace the ... Planes Directores 
Enforcers [a-b] 
[F]or us [the Regional Environmental Assessment is] a new experience .. . 
--- we are learning ... and there will be improvements 
Drafter [b] 
Chapter 5 examined the propositions related to three themes: what is meant by 'strategic', 
the centrality of context and the expected purpose of SEA, drawing on discourses amongst 
representatives of the Chilean public and private sectors, academia, think tanks and NGOs. 
This Chapter and the next take a closer look at the propositions on 'strategic', 'context' and 
'assessment', by investigating SEA-type initiatives conducted by the Ministry of Public 
Works, Transport and Telecommunications (MOP). MOP is considered by many as the most 
powerful and influential in the Chilean public sector (after, of course, Hacienda), not least 
because alone it. accounts for sixty percent of public spending. l Both Chapters look at the 
policy process (planning, decision-making and assessment) in relation to water resource 
management at river-basin level, for which the Ministry is responsible. 
1 [4] Millisterio de Obras PLiblicas, Trallsporte y Teleconumicaciolles. 
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What follows is a detailed investigation of how the approach and tools used for the 
environmental assessment of a national scale programme for water resource management: 
the Programa de Manejo de Recursos Hfdricos a Nivel de Cuencas Hidrograficas (PMRH) 
(MOP 2002), came to be chosen.2 This case is particularly interesting as it provides insight 
into a policy process that was shaped by a government ministry in collaboration with the 
World Bank, which intended to provide a loan to finance the Programme.3 The assessment 
was requested as part of the Bank's loan agreement procedures; thus, the analysis in this 
Chapter illustrates the strength and weaknesses of a process where an SEA conceived by an 
international funding agency is applied in a developing country. An issue of growing 
interest in the arena of international donors and financial institutions.4 
The process leading to the completion of the Programme document unfolds between 1998 
and 2002, starting with a planning effort later accompanied by a somewhat problematic 
assessment.5 The following analysis highlights the social identities of those involved, 
drawing on the use of the concept by Saarikoski (2000) and Forester (1999) and combining 
three aspects: the role played by participants in the context of the PMRH initiative, their 
professional experience, and their affiliation to a particular organisation. The first aspect 
distinguishes between those who wanted the PMRH, those actively involved in its 
production, those requesting its assessment, and those who carried out the appraisal. Several 
other people, not directly involved in any of these four aspects of the PMRH, were 
interviewed given their knowledge of the wider and immediate contexts (Section 3.4). 
Regarding the second and third aspect of social identities, it seemed that the opinions of 
interviewees could not be neatly categorised as personal or institutional; they tended to 
represent a grey area where all interviewees are professionals with many years of experience 
in the field being discussed and their views are, first and foremost, representative of that 
experience and 'what matters to them' (Saarikoski 2000:694). Their affiliation is 
2 The assessment was coming to an end during the author's fieldwork. 
3 The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) also played a role in the planning process. 
4 The World Bank is currently reviewing all its assessment work for initiatives above project level 
through the Structured Learning Programme launched in 2001 (see: 
http://lnwebI8.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsfl). The author participated in one of the last seminars 
organised through the Programme, in May 2003 [d4-SeminarlWorld Bank]. 
5 Note that the Programme was never officially adopted by the Ministry. 
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nonetheless significant, and is considered part of their social identity, but the emphasis is 
more on the role played in the Programme and its assessment. 
Table 6-a Social identities 
Main role of interviewee No. of Affiliation (generic categories) 
in the PMRH initiative' - times 
interviewed 
Those who wanted the PMRH -
• Promoter-a 
• Promoter-b 2 
• Promoter-c 3 
• Promoter-d 4 
Those actively involved in its production 
International organisation 
International organisation 
MOP 
MOP 
• Drafter-a 2 International organisation 
• Drafter-b 3 MOP 
• o rafter-c 4 MOP 
• Drafter-d 3 MOP 
• Drafter-e 2 MOP 
Those requesting its assessment 
• Enforcer-a 1 International organisation 
• Enforcer-b 3 International organisation 
Those who carried out the appraisal 
• Assessor-a 3 MOP 
• Assessor-b 3 Consultant 
• Assessor-c 1 Consultant 
• Assessor-d 1 Consultant 
Notes: *= Some individual~elated to more categories (eg. promoters and drafters) 
Although no interviewee asked for anonymity, some comments could cause difficulties and 
since the circle of people involved is well known, it was impossible to maintain anonymity 
for just a few. Hence, to ensure a certain degree of cover without compromising the focus on 
social identities, all interviewees are coded according to role played and matched against 
broad affiliation categories (Table 6-a, above): 'International organisation' includes the 
World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation; 'MOP' includes people from DOH 
and DGA; and 'consultants' includes academics and international experts. Unique numbers 
were allocated to each interview and these are noted in footnotes. The twelve interviewees 
were primarily senior bureaucrats, and nine of them were interviewed between two and four 
times over the period October 2001 - May 2003. The investigation unfolded a bit like a 
play where different actors nalTate the same story, each time from a different angle, and 
where the links - or gaps - slowly come to the surface. Since most key informants were 
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interviewed more than once and several months apart, it was also possible to see a certain 
evolution in the opinions expressed, and to identify instances of leaming.6 
Finally, since the PMRH example highlighted difficulties in the way the World Bank 
approached the issue of SEA, a series of interviews were conducted in Washington D.e. to 
explore further the principles which shape the process and methods of assessment within 
this organisation (Annex A). The insights from the investigation into the PMRH assessment 
proved essential to the final stage of fieldwork, which focused on conceptualising and 
operationalising SEA within a specific organisation (Chapter 7). 
The following analysis of the PMRH case is presented in four sections. Section 6.1 
describes the Programme and the assessment as it was conceptualised and canied out. 
Section 6.2 critically reconstructs the purpose and process that shaped and influenced the 
conception and practice of assessment in this case, in order to explore the source of the 
difficulties encountered and the objections that were raised against it by various parties. 
Section 6.3 suggests some reasons for these difficulties and shows how opportunities were 
missed as a result of inadequate conception and practice. Finally, Section 6.4 explores the 
broader implications of this case. 
6 
Some were asked to comment on a draft of this chapter, and their views were incorporated using 
another code [comment-700). 
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6.1 The Programme (PMRH) and its Assessment 
6.1.1 A programme for water resource management 
Water is a precious resource for all countries,7 and is intrinsically strategic due to its vital 
role in the life of all li~ing beings, as well as its contribution to economic development. 8 In 
Chile, water faces three main challenges: 1) the pressure from irrigation demands (84.5 %), 
domestic (4.4%) and mining and other industrial uses (11 %); 2) the need to protect 
ecosystems, respecting environmental requirements for water and addressing pollution; and 
3) the need to manage regional climatic variations of rainfall and total availability of 
freshwater (DGA 1999a; DGA 1999b). The approval of a National Water Resources Policy 
is particularly important in a country where natural resource policies are scarce (Chapter 5) 
and where water rights are granted to individuals as inalienable rights, 'free of charge and in 
perpetuity' to those who ask for them 'without having to justify the volume of water 
requested . . . and, of particular concern, without there being an obligation to designate such 
water to productive uses', (DGA 1999a:8). The policy identifies seven action areas to ensure 
that: 
'in a frameV(ork of environmental sustainabiIity, water does not become a serious 
limitation to the social and economic development of the country, and that on the 
contrary it becomes an element that strengthens [such development]' (DGA 
1999a:7). 
The Programa de Manejo de Recursos Hfdricos a Nivel de Cuencas Hidrograficas (PMRH) 
being discussed here relates to several of the seven action areas of the National Policy, and 
in particular to that on 'institutional structure, integrated management and planning' (DGA 
1999a:9), as it seeks to promote the integrated management of water resources based on the 
development of river-basin management plans across the country.9 However, the main 
7 The importance of this resource is repeatedly highlighted in international conferences and in UN 
reports. For example, while during the period of fieldwork the 3rd Latin American Conference on 
Water explored the opportunities and conflicts in using water for development [dl-
Conference/water] . See also: UNEP 1999 and the three World Water Forum events (see: 
http://www.worldwaterforum.netl). 
8 [57] :8 
9 Note that sometimes the expression 'watershed management ' is used in the text, as the World Bank 
literature (and some interviewees) tend to use this instead of river basin management. In practice, 
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concepts underlying the PMRH were first debated in 1994,10 while the Programme itself 
was prepared by MOP between 1998 and 2002. The aim was to 'develop an integrated, 
efficient and ecologically sound water resource management system' (DGAIMOP 2002:3) 
by 'pursu[ing] a significant change in the strategy and way of approaching the theme of 
water resources in the country' (MOP 2002:37). To achieve this the Programme envisaged 
eight objectives: 
'(i) develop an institutional framework to implement a decentralized 
management system in eight selected watersheds, which would take the 
watershed as the basic management unit and would guarantee full participation 
of all water users; 
(ii) integrate biodiversity considerations into the new water resources 
management approach, so to improve basin-wide ecological sustainability and 
protection of freshwater biodiversity; 
(iii) strengthen water mar'kets to improve water allocation; 
(iv) develop river training and flood control infrastructure to protect high risk 
ar'eas within the selected watersheds; 
(v) promote, within an appropriate framework of environmental and biodiversity 
conservation and protection, the development of new water resources through 
both a more efficient utilization of public funds and an increased participation of 
private resources; 
(vi) develop - and rehabilitate sustainable irrigation infrastJUcture within the 
framework of the new integrated water resources management stJUcture; 
(vii) improve the quality of life of JUral population in the selected areas through 
the expansion of JUral drinking water supply and sewage systems; and 
(viii) establish a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system, including 
ecological aspects ' (DGNMOP 2002:3). 
These were to be achieved through the four components and specific measures summarised 
in Box 6_a. 11 
MOP prefers to use the latter and stresses that this does not include full-scale treatment of land-use 
related issues. 
10 [e-workshopfMOP] 
11 Annex C includes more details of the components and specific measures of how the objectives are 
to be achieved. 
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Box 6-a The four components of the PMRH 
1) The Institutional Development component (US$7.1 million) 
It represents the key element of the project, as it would promote the process of developing a new 
institutional model for the planning and implementation of water and biodiversity-related activities in the 
country, within the existing legal framework. This would be achieved through the adoption of the watershed 
as the primary unit for planning purposes, as well as a comprehensive reorganization of roles and 
responsibilities of public and private sector institutions. 
More specifically, through this component, the project is expected to develop and implement a gradual 
process of decentralization from the central to the regional level, involving the establishment of mechanisms 
aimed at promoting the participation of regional and local government agencies, as well as private sector 
organizations, in the joint development and execution of activities included in the Watershed Development 
Master Plans. 
For this, technical assistance and training, covering various aspects of planning, administration and 
management of water resources and biodiversity would be provided to existing Water Authorities, water 
user organizations, and participating institutions at the central, regional, and local level. 
2) The Water Resources Management Instruments component (US$21.1 million) 
It is aimed at establishing the logistical and operational framework for the operation of a modernized and 
integrated system of water resources management, within the context of the decentralized institutional 
model to be supported by the project. The project would assist MOP and decentralized agencies in the 
implementation of a comprehensive set of instruments linked to three main categories: (i) Knowledge, 
Information and Monitoring; (ii) Planning of Water Resources Utilization; and (iii) Environmental 
Management of Water Resources. 
Additionally the aquatic biodiversity protection project consider several "in situ" actions, whose assigned 
funds reach the US$3.B mill ion. 
3) The preparation of watershed Master Plans (US$55.8 million) 
It would provide technical and financial assistance for the preparation of watershed Master Plans for each of 
the eight selected watersheds during the first year of project execution. These Master Plans would provide 
the framework for the development of integrated investment plans for these watersheds, including 
hydrological infrastructure required to improve water management and the efficiency of water use. The 
project would adopt a participatory approach to identify beneficiaries ' investment demands and define 
priorities for the execution of hydrological works. The infrastructure sub-project thus identified would be 
subject to technical, economic and environmental assessments. The economically viable and ecologically 
and environmentally sound infrastructure investment to be financed under the project would be divided in 
two broad categories: 
a) Social infrastructure: which would include: 
Flood control and river training structures to prevent damage to agriculture and livestock production as well 
as the destruction of urban areas from flooding. 
b) Production infrastructure: which would include the development of irrigation and drainage schemes, 
and investment for the erosion control and the conservation of aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity and 
natural resources. 
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4) The Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation component (U8$3.7 million) 
It would provide resources for the overall coordination and supervision of project activities, as well as the 
mechanisms to measure and assess project results and performance, primarily through indicators of water 
utilization and quality, the impact of project activities on environmental and biodiversity resources within the 
selected watersheds, and the technical, economic and social impact of the project. 
The program includes a GEF component for the protection of freshwater biodiversity. 
Source: DGNMOP 2002 and MOP 2002 
Of the four components, the Preparation of Watershed Master Plans (hereafter: Planes 
Directores) was considered the most significant. Drafters [c-d-e] identified three drivers 
which led the Ministry to promote these Planes Directores: 1) conflicts over the use of 
water, 2) repeated failure of many projects to deliver expected results for reasons which 
went beyond 'technical design', and 3) lack of coordination between actors involved in 
water resource use and management, particularly between public and private authorities ,I2 
The geographical coverage of the Programme is illustrated in Figure 6_a. 13 
12 [99][66][60] 
13 Initially, the PMRH refen'ed to eight watersheds but this was then reduced in 2002 to three pilot 
ones as it became clear that the Treasury was not prepared to invest the necessary money for the 
larger project. According to many interviewees, this reticence played a critical role in the eventual 
failure of negotiations for a loan with the World Bank [503][31][101], 
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Figure 6-a The watersheds included in the PMRH 
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Source: DGAlMOP 2002 (Note that plans for the first two basins, San Jose and Liuta will be discussed in Chapter 7), 
Figure 6-b summarises the key players involved in the policy process (planning, decision-
making and assessment) of the Programme, Significantly, although both Directorates 
responsible for water are included here (Hydraulic Works (DOH) and Water (DGA», it was 
DOH which initiated and lead the process from the early days, while according to assessor 
[a], DGA was brought in only half way through the process. Some claimed DGA 's 
participation simply strengthened DOH's approach to mUlti-purpose use of water, others 
argued it was instrumen,tal in shifting the whole programme away from a project-oriented 
focus on irrigation. Such focus was still paItialIy reflected in the budget allocation 
Considered by the assessor to reflect the Bank's interest in a loan agreement, which meant 
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that 'the credit is essentially based on water-related infrastructure . .. that's where the money 
. ,14 
IS . 
Figure 6-b The planners and decision-makers for the PMRH 
Consejo (PM RH Council) 
Headed by the Minister of Public Works (only met once) 
1999-2000 MrToha 
2000-to date Mr Etcheberry 
Secretary to the Council 
(subsequently integrated into the Unidad PMRH) 
Mr Torms Balaguer OTHER KEY PLAYERS: 
The Chilean Treasury 
The World Bank 
Co mite (PM RH Executive Committee) 
Lead alternatively by the 
Dir. General Obras Hfdraulicas (DOH) 
Dir. General des Aguas (DGA) 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(With the participation of Dir. Planeamiento) 
During the final months of preparationit was lead by: 
Dir. General Obras Pliblicas (DGOP) 
Unidad PM RH (Unit within the DOH) 
Responsible for the preparation of the PMRH: 
Headed by Michael Raczynski (Agronomist) 
Tomas Balaguer (Forest engineer) 
Enrique Gallardo (Agronomist) 
Rodrigo G6mez (Civil engineer) 
Orlando Bianchi (Civil Engineer) 
The next Section describes the assessment process. 
14[91]:3 
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ASSESSMENTS: 
Dir. General de Aguas (DGA) 
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1 2 Approach and tools 6 .. 
The regional dime'nsion 
Bank procedures and Safeguard Policies require that agreements for loans such as the 
PMRH must be subject to an environmental assessment prior to project approval (and hence 
release of funding). One option was to focus on the long list of projects included in the 
PMRH and carry out EIAs of all of them. According to one side of the Bank such an 
approach would have satisfied requirements for project approval. However, the timeframe 
set to approve the loan made it impossible to carry out all the EIAs. Also, applying project-
ElA - even if it had been possible - seemed insufficient, 'not acceptable ' in the words of 
promoter [b], given that the PMRH was more than a simple aggregation of projects. IS The 
interviewee recalled that it became clear that the whole Programme should be assessed, but 
the question was 'how': 
'The discussion with the [World] Bank was, what do we do. The first reaction 
[of] the World Bank was: "you have to have a full environmental impact 
assessment of the whole water sector". So then we say, fine, in theory perfect: 
you take the whole country and you assess every single possible impact that you 
might face ... how? .. you cannot ask the [borrowing] country to carry out that 
sort of work which in theory might be possible but in practice is impossible, in 
order to justify a loan that at that time was 150 million dollars ... 
So they [World Bank] say: "ok, that 's not possible, what do we do then?,,,I6 
This particular loan posed some difficulties to the safeguard system since it was not a 
project, nor a series of projects, but a combination of multiple projects and more strategic 
elements, so that framing the 'object ' of the assessment was going to be crucial. Promoter 
[b] reflected on the evolution of the Programme: 
IS [57]:2 
16 [57]' 
'What is now known as the PMRH, stmted as an irrigation plan,17 hence it was 
still a manageable project-based initiative where you had some certainty about 
what will be proposed and built. But now the PMRH is about water management 
17 .1 
h Some interviewees [comments-700] argued that this is not correct. They explained that the PM RH 
t ad been preceded by a 'World Bank project... concentrated on irrigation, [which had] recommended 
o Continue with an integrated water management project at river basin level '. 
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set to approve the loan made it impossible to carry out all the EIAs. Also, applying project-
EIA - even if it had been possible - seemed insufficient, 'not acceptable' in the words of 
promoter [b], given that the PM RH was more than a simple aggregation of projects. 15 The 
interviewee recalled that it became clear that the whole Programme should be assessed, but 
the question was 'how': 
'The discussion with the [World] Bank was, what do we do. The fIrst reaction 
[of] the World Bank was: "you have to have a full environmental impact 
assessment of the whole water sector". So then we say, fIne, in theory perfect: 
you take the whole country and you assess every single possible impact that you 
might face ... how? ... you cannot ask the [borrowing] country to carry out that 
sort of work which in theory might be possible but in practice is impossible, in 
order to justify a loan that at that time was 150 million dollars ... 
So they [World Bank] say: "ok, that's not possible, what do we do then?,,,16 
This particular loan posed some difficulties to the safeguard system since it was not a 
project, nor a series of projects, but a combination of multiple projects and more strategic 
elements, so that framing the 'object' of the assessment was going to be crucial. Promoter 
[b] reflected on the evolution of the Programme: 
'What is now known as the PMRH, started as an irrigation plan,17 hence it was 
still a manageable project-based initiative where you had some certainty about 
what will be proposed and built. But now the PMRH is about water management 
15 [57]:2 
16[57]:1 
17 Some interviewees [comments-700] argued that this is not correct. They explained that the PMRH 
had been preceded by a 'World Bank project... concentrated on irrigation, [which had] recommended 
to continue with an integrated water management project at river basin level'. 
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policy, and this implies [non-infrastmctural] initiatives. As a result we started 
speculating on how to carry out an EA of this type of proposal'. 18 
Eventually, a new assessment approach was proposed: it focused on the river-basin as the 
unit of analysis and its main tasks were summarised in the initial terms of reference sent to 
MOP: 
'(i) promote regional environmental assessment as an optimal methodology for 
the environmental analysis of river-basins; (ii) establish conceptual models of the 
environmental processes in the river-basin being examined; and (iii) proceed 
with the cumulative impact assessment in the river-basin' (World Bank 2000b: 1). 
This was to be done in four weeks. Two Bank experts travelled to Santiago to discuss the 
work and methods that needed to be applied in order to meet the requirements of project 
appraisal. The methodology centred round the following pillars for a Regional EA (REA), 
deemed to be a form of SEA within the Bank (DGAIMOP 2002:5; see also Oleson and 
Quintero 2001): 
1) identify and analyse the 'relevant environmental concerns and trends' in the 
Programme's watersheds; 
2) analyse the cumulative impacts of 'all projects and plans, ongoing and planned, 
public or erivate, with some relevance to water resources' in the basins, to 
'identify processes of environmental degradation directly related to water 
resources in the region[s], and ... open future dialogue across various sectors, 
which directly and indirectly affect the water resources'; 
3) use the information to 'ensure that environmental concerns are properly integrated 
into the water resource management schemes', the Planes Directores. 
The river-basin unit had the advantage of being consistent with the nature of the PMRH 
propositions, and of being recognised as a useful scale for addressing cumulative impacts. 
Its emphasis on the spatial dimension would also facilitate the understanding of REAs by 
those acquainted with EIAs (cf. Figure 3-b). Most importantly, it coincided with the areas to 
be planned and managed through the new Planes Directores proposed in Component 3 of 
the PMRH, which was to receive 64% (US$ 55.8 million) of the total budget, and which the 
Bank considered a priority (though some argued that it was primarily interested in financing 
18 [57]: 1 
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the project list within the same component). Focusing the assessment at this level would 
help ensure the environmental quality of the plans, and therefore of a major part of the loan. 
However, there was a problem. The Programme included the requirement to develop river-
basin plans (Box 6-a), but none would be ready before the first year of implementation (if 
that).19 In other words, the prefelTed unit of analysis was not actually meant to exist before 
the approval of the loan (a reminder that the process of framing the assessment's object 
requires consideration of time factors). So what could the Bank assess? To solve the 
impasse, the Bank, together with the Chilean counterparts, decided to maintain the three 
pillars above, but to apply cumulative impact assessment to a list of 'infrastructure projects 
identified [at the time of the assessment] which could be incorporated in the PMRH in the 
long term, and ... projects external to the PMRH that are being considered by public and 
private sectors' (DGAIMOP 2001 : Ill. 102). The infrastructure projects were assessed 
qualitatively using matrices with ten impact categories: soil, underground water, surface 
water, air, flora and fauna, noise, landscape, employment and economic activities, health 
and cultural heritage (DGAIMOP 2002),20 (see Annex D insert for an example of 
assessment matrices). 
It was decided that tQ.comply with Bank requirements, MOP would do an REA of the Elqui 
river-basin and related projects; but this solution was not reached easily, nor was it fully 
understood from the beginning, as shown from this comment by promoter [b]: 
'And that's why we chose the watershed of [the] Elqui. In an attempt to devise 
this methodology whereby you would incorporate ... all possible environmental 
issues that will affect the water sector, and then it was reasonable to do, because 
you knew at least where the boundaries of the watershed were and you had 
already a certain experience because there were previous projects there that had 
already carried out some EIAs ... Then the Bank said ok, but this is not a 
traditional project and therefore we cannot have traditional EIA, we have to have 
cumulative impact assessment at the watershed level. And that is where I stopped 
understanding what we really wanted to dO,? 1 
19 [85] 
20 Assessor [d] explained that originally the World Bank suggested 15 project-types and they then 
expanded this to 30. [51]:8 
21 [57] :2 
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The assessment of the PMRH was perceived as a huge effort from all sides, including the 
enforcers themselves who, having designed the process and method felt they had 
overestimated the capacity of Chilean institutions: 
'We thought that the Chileans might have been more advanced in their capacity 
to prepare EA reports and I think that for me it was a shock that they ... really 
were not. . . we tried to push a methodology for which [MOP] was not ready. ,22 
According to enforcer [a] they had perhaps proposed a method that was too comprehensive: 
'if you try to put the environment into every single instance of the decision-making process 
you will overwhelm the process and will not get anywhere ... and I think that is also what 
happened [in the case of the PMRH),.23 A comment partly linked to this was offered by 
assessor [a] who stressed that the culture of the MOP remained a very traditional one linked 
to infrastructure development, and that only very recently had it begun to confront its 
responsibilities in terms of environmental integration.24 The interviewee felt that 'to be 
realistic' it would have been better to adopt a simpler assessment process which would have 
led to four or five actions, rather than invest so much time and resources in data gathering 
and 'total impact assessment,.25 This view was echoed by another assessor [b], who 
criticised the early version of the methodology, focused on REA and cumulative impacts, as 
'too complex' given the data available: 'the combination made it essentially ridiculous 
[useless] ' .26 However, it must also be acknowledged that the novelty of methodology 
required time to be understood and internalised: time which was clearly not available in this 
case (see Section 6.2.2). A group interview revealed just how difficult the process had been, 
as four experts argued between them on the nature of this new assessment, for example, 
drafter [cl still disagreed with drafter [dJ, about the concept of 'cumulative' wanting to 
stress that this was 'not about a sum of impacts, but [an analysis of] the interaction between 
22 [97] :5-6 
23 [97]:7 
24 Interestingly, the interview with the Unidad Tecnica PMRH touched upon this issue, however, 
most of the interviewees stressed the fact that the Ministry had made progress in this sense, and was 
providing a useful example: 'Now this Ministry ... from the Minister downwards, has understood that 
these days the environment is a very important concern and that the Ministry should provide an 
example to the country, in terms of how to conserve ... the environment' [29]:2. Indeed, the MOP is 
the first Ministry that has established a coordinating secretariat (the focus of Chapter 7) in addition to 
environmental units within all Directorates. The difference between their view and that of Pardo, for 
example, can perhaps be explained by their position within the organisation: the former being 
engineers linked to the Water Infrastructure Directorate, and the latter being the Director of the 
Department of Conservation and Protection of Water Resources in the Water Directorate General. 
25 [93]:2 
26 [87]: 1 
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25 [93] :2 
26 [87] : 1 
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impacts '.27 However, the effort was worthwhile, as suggested by promoter [b], who had 
been sceptical about the exercise in the first instance: 
The idea was not just to create awareness about environmental problems among 
decision makers and stakeholders in the watershed, but also to incorporate 
environmental issues into the design and selection of investment proposals ... the 
proposed assessment of cumulative environmental effects of any investment 
decision in the watershed was pmticularly interesting ... provided a new way of 
looking at. .. impact[s] ,?8 
Eventually, the difficulties were overcome, and a number of drafts were produced. Yet this 
revealed further problems. A senior environment expert in the Environment Unit of the 
DOH, considered the REA 
'only as a baseline study .. . it talked comprehensively about what had happened 
in the watershed ... at the regional level with the natural resources ... but 
integration, that is: what happens with a project X [and] how this alters the 
overall situation in the watershed ... no, this was not done. Instead, they reverted 
... to what is an Environmental Impact Assessment,?9 
Similarly, and bearing in mind that REAs were being considered essentially equivalent to an 
SEA, assessors [c-d] concluded that the Elqui study fell short of this type of assessment: 'in 
our view, this is not a complete SEA of the river-basin, it is rather a progress towards one , .30 
'-
The sectoral dimension 
It is partly due to such limitations, but mainly because of the limited geographical scope of 
the Elqui REA (compared to the PMRH), that the Bank's quality assurance team, having 
studied the first draft REA asked that the legal and institutional sections of the draft should 
be : 
'expanded to take into account the proposed project [PMRH], the sectoral 
environmental problems that are intended to be solved through the project, and a 
description of the project as a whole, with an analysis of its potential 
environmental problems. It may be a better strategy to separate the sectoral issues 
in sepm'ate volumes from the REA itself' (World Bank 200lb:l). 
27 [98] :5 
28 [56]:2 
29 [117] :1 
30 [[36][51]:2 
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The comments suggest that the REA had been too narrowly focused on the example of the 
river Elqui, and was not considered sufficient as an assessment of the PMRH, which was 
what the Bank was financing and therefore the 'object' of the assessment. This led to new 
terms of reference and the appointment of new consultants (World Bank 2001 c: 1), who 
were required to prepare an 'Environmental Assessment of the Water Resource Sector' by 
adapting the original draft REA on the basis of 'the studies and reports already completed 
by the Unidad Tecnica'. The following additional tasks were therefore carried out as part of 
what became known as the Sectoral EA (S-EA, also considered to be like an SEA) of the 
whole PMRH (DGAIMOP 2002:5 and IV.2) : 
1) describe and critically analyse 'policies, legislation and institutional framework 
presently applicable in Chile to water resources management, conservation and 
environmental and biodiversity protection '; 
2) focus on the strengths and weakness of the EIA system and public consultation 
procedures, and explain how the PMRH will contribute to each; 
3) assess the positive and negative cumulative impacts of 'project typologies that could 
be considered in the different watersheds '. 
The request for an ,S-EA in addition to the REA led to numerous revisions and draft 
documents (see Table 6-b). However, a comparison of the first draft with all subsequent 
versions, including the final document, reveals a striking similarity, even by admission of 
the last consultants.31 Part of the information on legislation had to be expanded to complete 
tasks 1 and 2 of the S-EA and had to be restructured into a separate S-EA section, but the 
bulk of the data, and most importantly, the actual method of assessment, had already been 
established in the February 2001 version. In the words of the assessors: 'I would say that the 
sectoral [part of the assessment] was probably more complete in the original [draft, 
compared to the REA part]', though this was confusing because the sectoral information 
31 [36] [51] They explained that the Bank's comments had been a starting point but were 'too 
concerned with details .. . ask[ing] to add certain things' while their work ended up having to re-
structure the whole document: 'when one saw the original document. . . it did not have an SEA 
structure . .. [but] the Bank said "this is an SEA" '. They decided to re-order the document so that the 
S-EA preceded the REA, but admitted that most of the material was already there. They expanded the 
description of the PMRH itself and visited the Elqui valley to ascertain the relative importance of 
certain impacts, but the essence of the methodology remained exactly the same. 
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was presented as part of the Elqui REA.32 The heart of the exercise remained the assessment 
of potential negative impacts of infrastructure project-types, originally conceived for the 
pilot REA of the Elqui and subsequently extended to the S-EA. This is also reflected in the 
fact that most people refelTed to the combined assessments as 'the Elqui REA', and were 
sometimes unaware of the wider S-EA, or could not distinguish between the two. Indeed, 
with the exception of the final version (DGAIMOP 2002), all draft documents were entitled 
the REA of the Elqui. 
From this it can be infelTed that most key actors involved in the PMRH planning and 
assessment processes had focused on the problem of negative impacts of the Programme, in 
turn shaping their concept of the 'strategic object' as a combination of infrastructure 
projects and the concept of 'assessment' in terms of identifying and measuring, albeit 
qualitatively, such impacts. 
World Bank staff provided support and guidance on how to apply its methodology 
throughout the process. However, despite their efforts, the two principal enforcers faced 
difficulties in promoting the REA and S-EA, both within the international organisations 
involved, the consultaQts and the MOP itself. Some of these difficulties were common to 
any attempt at introducing SEA in a context that had traditionally focused on project work 
(no matter how big). However, Section 6.2 suggests that the main reason lies in the way the 
purpose of the assessment was defined, and how the policy process evolved. 
32 [36]:5 
Chapter 6 Purpose and Methods 206 
6.2 The Process and its Problems 
This Section starts with a description of the assessment method proposed by the World 
Bank, and then proceeds to unravel the purpose of the PMRH assessments as seen from 
different perspectives, comparing this to the actual process that took place. It shows how a 
purpose which was at best unclear and complex, and was poorly communicated to key 
players, led to a sub-optimal approach, method and results, thus lending support to the 
propositions outlined in Chapter 3. 
6.2.1 Multiple purposes 
Judging from interviews with assessors, drafters and promoters, at the time the assessment 
was being done, its purpose remained vague apart from the need to meet Bank requirements. 
Assessor [a] thought that 'there had been problems from the start, that had to do with the 
objectives of the evaluation ... why on earth were we doing an assessment? ,33 Many others 
voiced similar perplexity,34 and annoyance at the whole process and, refelTing to the 
reaction of most drafters and promoters at the idea of having to assess the environmental 
implications of the PMRH, assessor [b] explained: 
'all were totally perplexed by [World Bank] requests and ideas ... it was like the 
dialogue of the deaf,?5 
In order to establish the reasons for such difficulties, this section reconstructs the process, 
arguments and purposes, which led to the methodology set out above. Assessing the PMRH 
was a requirement of the Bank, hence responsibility for communicating the purpose of this 
effort lay primarily with this organisation. The primary purpose was to comply with Bank 
Safeguard Policies, but as they searched for a solution, the officials in charge of the 
assessment ('enforcers ') had more than one purpose in mind. They found that the character 
of the PMRH fitted well with the type of Bank initiative that, according to ongoing debates 
within the organisation (World Bank 1993; World Bank 1996; Goodland and Mercier 1999; 
Kjorven and Lindhjem 2001), should have been subject to Regional EAs (REA) and 
Sectoral EAs (hereafter S-EA), hence they felt that 'the whole thing came together in this 
33 [91]:8-9 
34 [[98][29][65][57] 
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project,.36 Assessing the PMRH became a mUlti-purpose task: apart from the obvious 
'technical' issue of ensuring that the funding was approved by 'providing the Bank with all 
the sectoral and regional environmental information needed to give clearance for appraisal' 
(Oleson and Quintero 2001:2), enforcers [a-b] also hoped to define a methodology that 
could become 'a sort of blueprint for future actions within [the] programme',3? and once 
they chose to do an REA at river-basin level, they expected this to be 
'an integral part [of] ... if not replace the ... Planes Directores ... [The Chileans] 
will use this process to identify the priorities which need addressing [and] to 
make sure that the investment. .. is consistent with them ,.38 
Thus, the assessment was to have a major role in watershed planning (Component 3, Figure 
6-c, below), partly in response to the weak planning culture that had characterised this sector 
in Chile, and was a concern for the Bank?9 Enforcers [a-b] expected the REA to ensure that 
water resource planning in Chile took a multi-sectoral approach, thus compensating for the 
problem they had identified whereby MOP considered water resources as strictly limited to 
its own boundaries of influence. The history of the PMRH went back many years, when 
Lagos (now President of the Republic) was Minister of MOP and serious consideration was 
being given to 'integrated territorial approaches '.40 However, the scope of watershed 
planning as envisaged-by MOP remained very narrow, excluding major users of the resource 
such as mining, and failing to treat adequately the urgent need for decentralisation. The 
PM RH had been conceived to address many of these issues relating to the immediate and 
wider context of the water sector in Chile. 
In Chile water is an important, but isolated and fragmented sector, both administratively and 
institutionally. Integration within it, as well as with other sectors, has been a key theme in 
the last few years at the Ministry, and the idea raised as much interest as concern (Sections 
7.1 and 7.3.1). The following exchange reveals diverging views on the subject, including 
concern that integration could threaten sectoral work per se; it also gives a clear perception 
35 [85]:3 
36 [89]: 1 
37 [57] :2 
38 [89]: 1-2 
39 [43][30][99][60][66] 
40 [503] 
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of the need for greater consultation, co-operation and decentralisation (themes identified 
also in Chapter 5 and 7). 
Drafter [d]: 'it's as if there was the concept that if I do integrated or multi-sectoral 
management, [then] sectoral management should disappear ... It appears that the 
great crime would be to apply sectoral focuses to the development of sectoral 
projects. [But] this is not the clime. The crime of the sectoral focus is to not look 
sideways, and [thus] fail to involve one's activities - that are specific of the 
sector - with other [activities]' 
Drafter [b]: 'But at that point it stops having this sectoral focus. In other words 
there stm1s . .. ' 
Drafter [cl: 'the integration!' 
Drafter [b]: 'the integration! There you have different considerations ... we are 
full of enormous [mistakes] due to this severed vision ... for doing things like 
this, without consulting, without talking, . . . without considering the regions! 
Doing everything here in Santiago ... ' 
Drafter [cl: 'over the table [instead of out in the Regions with those directly 
involved] ,.41 
The specialist culture of the Ministry also clashes with the need for interdisciplinarity, 
intrinsic to any call for integrated planning: 
Drafter [cl: 'what does the Programme do? It coordinates! That's what it does, 
nothing more!' 
Drafter [d] : 'And by coordinating it changes the processes, it does things to 
discuss, to know, to infOlm, . .. so that he who is a specialist or is part of a 
sector. .. does what he should do, but in addition acts with the knowledge of what 
others are doing ,.42 
The words of drafter-d show the difficult balance between specialist input and integration 
processes. They suggest that, although more coordination could be accepted, the essence of 
integrated river-basin planning (and SEA) - requiring a fundamental shift in the way the 
water sector is perceived and planned - could be more difficult to achieve. This is 
confirmed by an interviewee from DOH: 
Who are we [DOH]? We m·e the operational [bodies] in charge of designing the 
infrastructure projects ... we are here at the level of the micro-watershed ... we 
know that a policy was approved calling for the irrigation of a cel1ain amount of 
41 [65][29][98]:8 
42 [98][65]:9 
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hectares of land .. . DOH [is responsible] for selecting the optimal location for the 
infrastructure, but the decision to increase the surface under irrigation comes 
from the CNR [National Irrigation Commission] or the regional development 
strategies . . . : 
.. .in telms of investment. . . from a personal point of view this is how I see it: 
investments in a certain region . . . are ttiggered by central policies on how the 
economy is managed in this country. That is where we start ... 
We are coming out of [an era] of centralismo ... in other words, the system is 
designed so that everything is decentralised, but in practice the big decision are 
still being taken at the central level. [In the regions one can see that] there is a 
lack of capacity in terms of infrastructure, of personnel, .. . one would like to do 
things but there are these obstacles, and [so] we return to the centralismo. A3 
Indeed, it is the narrow sectoral focus, fragmentation and poor decentralisation that led to 
the definition of a component on Institutional Development in the PMRH (Box 6-a), and the 
emphasis on the Planes Directores. Thus, the Programme was (eventually, some would 
argue) conceived so that it would address major weaknesses in policy-making and in the 
wider context of the water sector. But some interviewees [DOH] warned that the recent 
'enthusiasm' for river-basin plans failed to recognise the reality of fragmented powers and 
responsibilities, even within the MOP itself, where it still seemed virtually impossible to co-
ordinate water and ,transport infrastructure.44 Assessor [a] stressed that in the short term, 
there was no legislative or institutional change in the pipeline to make such plans binding: 
'they are effectively a voluntary instrument,.45 The institutional and organisational proposals 
in the PMRH will have to operate within the existing legal framework, which provides 
limited support. For example, the PMRH introduces a working committee ('Comite de 
Trabajo'), which is new with respect to the earlier generation of (equally voluntary) river-
basin plans. The Committee is the closest MOP can go towards establishing a river basin 
authority without breaching the legal framework within which it has to operate. 
43 [117] :5-6 
44 [117] 
45 [93] 
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The Bank therefore had a legitimate concern about the capacity of MOP to develop 
environmentally sound Planes Directores, and an interest in directing the PMRH to a more 
coherent concept of planning.46 These expectations lend support to several propositions in 
Chapter 3, relating to the purpose of SEA and the centrality of contexts. For the enforcers 
'the idea [of the assessment was] to illustrate the multisectorial nature of the projects . . . to 
say ... one project doesn't just [have an] impact in its own sector,.47 In fact, both used the 
word 'learning' as they described these various reasons for undertaking the assessment: 'I 
think we have started a learning process with [the main MOP contact] ... we are on a 
learning track'. 48 
These were the objectives of the Bank. However the Ministry and DGA had a partially 
different understanding of the reasons and need for an assessment.49 They wanted to explore 
ways of carrying out assessments that would contribute to a more environmentally sound 
implementation of the PMRH, especially regarding the future production of Planes 
Directores for the eight river-basins, and in this sense shared the Bank's interest in the 
assessments as guidance mechanisms for the future Planes Directores.5o As interviews 
progressed, it became clear that the Plans had become the most important element of the 
Programme, and the understanding of this importance was partly highlighted by the 
assessment process itself" which pointed out the need for a holistic understanding of the 
river-basin character and development potentials. This also explains the assessors' growing 
interest in the role that assessment could play during formulation of such plans, in line with 
the early thinking of the enforcers. Assessor [a] had concluded that SEA could contribute to 
strengthen the dialogical and participatOlY nature of river-basin planning: 
'these plans [the old generation of Planes Directores] have had no concrete 
results because there was a lack of capacity to assemble .. . all the people". and 
because they are indicative and not binding ... so if one has an SEA . .. one can 
force them to get involved in certain aspects, which they may not be sensitive 
to ... , and will force them to engage from the beginning with the Plan Director ... 
[SEA] can be seen as an official request for dialogue ,.51 
46 [[503] 
47 [89] :2 
48 [89] :7 
49 [92] 
50 [89][97][91] 
51 [91]:9-10 
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This would secure ownership and backing for the Plans, which remain a voluntary 
instrument in Chile, and strengthen the influence of Plans on other powelful players, such as 
the Ministry for Mining.52 
However, MOP and DGA were not interested in (some would even say they opposed) an 
assessment process that would evaluate and influence the environmental implications of the 
PMRH itself, which was in the final stages of planning and approval. In their view, the 
principal result of the process should have been a methodological proposal for future 
implementation, rather than an evaluation, of the PMRH. Initially, the substantial difference 
between these two purposes was difficult to see because the Bank started off with a 
methodology focused on watersheds, and coinciding with the geographical area of one of 
the eight future Planes Directores (Section 6.1), thus appearing to match DGA expectations. 
Ultimately, the purpose was defined unilaterally by the Bank, and was framed on the basis 
of a range of criteria: firstly project appraisal and related safeguard policy requirements, 
secondly wider objectives of promoting a new approach and learning from the experience, 
and thirdly the idea to use SEA to address perceived institutional weaknesses in relation to 
the client's capacity to deliver the project (PMRH). The second and third criteria echo the 
idea of a transformative purpose in Chapter 3, and according to the propositions linking the 
purpose to the definition ..pf assessment approaches and tools this should have shaped the 
methodology, which the Bank more or less imposed on MOP. In practice, it was only partly 
successful in doing so. 
Judging from the majority of interviewees involved in the process, the complex set of 
objectives left most people confused and eventually frustrated. Indeed, the approach 
promoted by the Bank was as much a source of confusion, as one of learning. This analysis 
has shown that the process had great potential, but was thwarted by divisions and 
misunderstandings (especially in the early stages of the assessment process) sUlTounding 
conceptions of purpose. The PM RH example illustrates the challenge of designing SEA 
approaches for specific contexts, such as the MOP, with insufficient knowledge of their 
political, cultural and institutional characteristics.53 It also highlights the importance of 
communication between all parties. This had been difficult all along and in most directions: 
S2 [91] 
S3 For example, by their own admission, Bank officials felt they had overestimated the capacity of 
Chilean organisations in terms of promoting good EA. 
. 
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between the World Bank teams heading loan negotiations and those ensuring compliance 
with safeguard policies, amongst MOP Directorates, and finally between the Bank and 
MOP. For example, enforcer [a] admitted they were 
'working [in] a very constrained environment because our client [the Chilean 
Government] is very reluctant to exchange ideas or even meetings with [the 
National Environment Commission] ... we work with a tough ministry [MOP] ... 
engineers, the strongest ministry in the Government. .. Even as of today [January 
2002] we never talked to the ... consultants that prepared [the assessment]. ,54 
On the Chilean side, communication between DGA and DOHlUnidad Tecnica PM RH 
started on a difficult note, also as a result of long-established divisions between the two 
Directorates, which go at the heart of water management problems in Chile (Chapter 7). 
Some purposes attached to the assessment of the PMRH were potentially far-
reaching, however, the following sections show how the way the policy process actually 
evolved made it difficult to meet them. The timing and resources devoted to the assessment 
did not reflect the magnitude of some of the expectations attached to it, while difficulties in 
terms of communication between the parties, and issues linked to the culture and power of 
different organisations involved, posed obstacles to the assessment task and undermined its 
effectiveness. 
6.2.2 Time and resources 
All types of assessment, unless explicitly ex-post, will benefit from taking place as early as 
possible in the preparation process. In the case of SEA this condition has been central to 
principles of good practice, and generally considered crucial to its effectiveness (Section 
3.1.2). Therefore, since the PMRH assessment was begun a few months before the 
Programme was due to be sent over to Washington for appraisal, it can be inferred that its 
success was compromised from the beginning. Table 6-b summarises the main stages and 
related timing, and is followed by an analysis of their implications. 
54 [97]:6 
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Table 6-b Main dates in the PMRH preparation and assessment 
Date Key PMRH and assessment stages Comments 
. ~11"'//d 
1994-6 These years~an increasing interest in initiatives to 
develop water resources 
1998 PMRH process begins 
1999-2001 PMRH Unit commissions 44 studies (data gathering, 
mapping, analysis, ecological profiles, etc.) 
2000 May World Bank draft of first terms of reference for the REA of Suggesting 4 weeks for 
the Elqui the assessment 
2000 September Assessment process begins DGA was brought in at 
World Bank Mission visited the PMRH unit to discuss the the end of November 
REA approach, agree a methodology, help appoint 
consultants 
2001 February Most elements of the first draft REA (by first set of Approved by Bank 
consultants) were produced in December 2000. An official enforcers but rejected by 
first draft was produced in February 2001. Bank's quality assurance 
team. 
Considered poor by DGA 
2001 February World Bank mission goes to Chile to discuss improvements DGA gains control of the 
to draft and aiming to go to project approval end of assessment process 
Spring/beginning of summer 
2001 -World Bank written comments to the draft REA 
2001 World Bank second terms of reference for the Suggesting 6 weeks for 
assessment the assessment 
2001 Spring Second set of conSUltants hired to do REA and S-EA 
2001-2002 Several drafts between June 2001 and May 2002. 
World Bank mission goes to Chile to discuss improvements 
to draft hoping to go to project approval by end of Spring 
2002 June Final Version of the REA and S-EA. 
2002 August The PMRH project negotiations come to an end. No loan is 
agreed. 
Source: various interviews, (World Bank 2000b; World Bank 2001c) 
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Timing was a challenge to the assessment both in terms of overall time available to design 
and complete it, and in terms of when it was commissioned relative to progress in preparing 
the Programme itself: 
'the problem was that the impact assessment request came in at the end [of the 
planning process]... after 2-3 million dollars had been already spent on 
feasibility studies [for infrastructure projects] ... and GIS data ... [enforcer (a)] was 
sent to Chile just two months before the loan demand [the PMRH] was to be sent 
off to Washington ... he argued he needed at least six months ... but I think he 
needed much more,.55 
Hence, the environmental assessment of the PM RH was commissioned at the end of the 
planning process, and was given a very tight - arguably impossible - timeframe of four 
weeks (World Bank 2000b).56 This conflicts sharply with the accepted wisdom of an 'early 
start' to the SEA as a condition of its effectiveness in influencing decisions. Yet, despite 
being aware of the problem, assessor [b] argued that Bank enforcers 'had to support the 
process', suggesting they were not in a position of sufficient influence to request substantive 
changes in the project timetable.57 The pressures of the decision-making processes within 
the Bank were discussed with interviewees in Washington, confirming the impression that 
the integration of environmental and social dimensions in 'project preparation' were often 
squeezed by tight deadlines and budgets. 58 
Those within the Bank who were responsible for designing and enforcing the assessment of 
the PMRH admitted that they had to address the requirement within extremely tight 
deadlines, and that this affected their capacity to think through an essentially new approach 
which they themselves were having to learn.59 Indeed, according to many interviewees, the 
short time available for the consultancy, and the lack of experience of the World Bank, 
55 [87]:1 Note that the overall figure for the entire preparation phase was in fact US$ 1.32 million 
[comment-700). 
56 In terms of the actual time available to carry out the work, conditions were eased slightly since 
deadlines for the presentation and approval of the PM RH had to be extended several times, giving 
additional time to those preparing the assessment. For example, the second set of consultants was 
originally given one month to produce a separate S-EA, but this was eventually extended by several 
months due to delays with the overall project timescale [36][51). 
57 [87]: 1 
58 [519][503][505][509][515] 
59 [97][89] 
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MOP and the different consultants, affected the quality and effectiveness of the 
assessment.60 Assessors [a,c,d] felt they had lacked adequate guidance: 
'there was a lack of clarity ... first because we [MOP] had never done this, 
secondly because the Bank's guidance were zero or useless ... When the Bank 
[enforcers] came ... it too had not the faintest idea of how to do a strategic 
environmental assessment. .. like us, they did not know. Then came the 
observations of people [fi·om another World Bank office] that [highlighted] a pot 
poum of things that were missing [from the assessment], but they too had no 
integrated vision [of what had to be done],.61 
'the document sent [by the Bank] was extremely descriptive ... very similar to 
other documents that you saw ... in Chile, where you talk a lot about doing SEA, 
the benefits, and one says "ok, but how do I do it" ... so in ... [terms of] 
methodology it was not useful,.62 
A similar view was shared by several assessors and drafters. However, issues of both 
capacity and timing were perceived differently - perhaps not surprisingly - by promoters 
and some drafters. Promoter [a] explained that Chile belongs to the category of borrowers 
which are more 'resistant to impositions [in terms of] good procurement, safeguard 
policies ... Chile challenges the World Bank on environmental issues', having its own set of 
procedures it is less inclined to accept any requirement just because it comes from the 
"-
Bank.63 Hence, the interviewee found it difficult to explain to the client country that a new 
type of assessment had to be done, in addition to project-EIA.64 This task was further 
complicated by the fact that the Bank, together with the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF), had agreed to combine the loan with a $10 million grant for biodiversity protection 
in the PMRH watersheds, and the Chilean counterpart had interpreted this effectively as the 
equivalent of the programme's approval, especially since they viewed it as entailing no new 
dams or major infrastructure works but mainly rehabilitation of existing structures.65 Hence, 
when the REA was imposed as a condition, at first 'the client agreed and did nothing' about 
it.66 
60 [117] [91][98][29] [65][59] [36][51][85][97][89] 
61 [91]:8 
62 [51] 
63 [503] 
64 A difficulty that is also central to discussions in DFID and the OEeD, as they explore ways of 
introducing SEA in developing countries [d6-SeminarIDFID-OECD-DAC]. 
65 [503] 
66 [503] 
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According to the same promoter, the REA and S-EA 'extended project preparation time ... 
adding to all the other problems' which were internal to Chilean politics within MOP and 
between MOP and the Treasury (Hacienda). The complexity of the assessment method and 
process 'discouraged' the client, and this combined with the insistence by the Bank on 
decentralisation, meant -that the borrower ended up feeling 'threatened' by the whole 
negotiation. 67 The interviewee believed that the Minister was mainly interested in cost-
effectiveness (cf. Chapters 5 and 7), and that this - together with the fact that Hacienda was 
increasingly less willing to cover its share of the cost for the PMRH - may have further 
undermined the case for integrated watershed management.68 
Hence, although no one suggested that the assessment was decisive in the final collapse of 
negotiations, several felt that the process had been badly handled, adding to already existing 
tensions and possibly, by delaying decisions by several months, allowing the Ministries to 
pull out of an increasingly uncomfortable proposal. This perspective helps explain why the 
assessment process had caused so much resistance and frustration amongst various players. 
The order of events summarised in Table 6-b also had implications for the kind of 
information and knowledge entering the policy process, an issue that remains an important 
area of academic and empirical inquiry (Sections 3.3-3.4). As Radaelli (1995:160) points 
out, it is essential to focus on 'when and how knowledge matters in the policy process' 
(emphasis in original); if this is combined with 'what' kind of knowledge matters, then it 
offers a new way of interpreting the common - and crucial - issue of tiering in the context 
of SEA. 69 The failure to synchronise the timing and information produced by the assessment 
with that of core planning activities of the PMRH highlights the relevance and tangible 
implications of such concerns. 
67 [503] 
68 [503] 
69 These questions are at the centre of CUITent debates on instruments for decision-making: for 
example, the Overseas Development Institute has recently launched a series of seminars on Does 
Evidence matter? (see: http://www.odi.org.uk) . 
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As assessor [b] pointed out, 
'the project raised important methodological questions about what is needed to 
guide the decision-maker. .. about what is practical, feasible and relevant at the 
time,.7o . 
The PMRH had a budget for the preparatory work of data gathering, planning and 
assessment. By August 2001, the Unidad Tecnica PM RH had employed this to commission 
44 studies (produced between 1999 and 2001), ranging from water management plans for 
various river basins, to an analysis of the existing institutional framework for water 
management, to water quality studies and the distribution of flora and fauna (including the 
REA itself) . In addition the Universidad de Chile was to provide geographically referenced 
data on a variety of physical and environmental themes, partly linked to the Global 
Environmental Facility grant linked to the PMRH. 
Some however argued that the funding for preparatory work was not used efficiently, 
neither for core planning activities nor for the assessment that came later, and that many of 
the studies were commissioned without a clear idea of the purpose that such information 
would have to serve. Assessor [b] found the data gathered with GIS to be a lost opportunity 
and an inefficient use of resources: 'information supply with no idea about what it will be 
used for,.7I Many data-sets provided gave no indication of trends (for example comparing 
the same set ten years apart), they were a 'one-shot affair' which was difficult to apply in 
the REA.72 Drafter [b] felt that they were 'building a house on very uncertain foundations', 
suggesting that the information gathered was not entirely adequate; he also criticised the ad 
hoc data gathering process, which had failed to coordinate the requests for information from 
different institutions (GEF, CONAMA, World Bank and various MOP divisions).73 
70 [87]:2 
71 [87]:1 A view partly shared by drafter [c) [100] 
72 [57] :1 Assessor [b) also notes that lack of adequate physical information had affected also the 
previous major attempt at introducing watershed level management of water in Chile: the IADB 
~roject in the Bfo Bfo basin. 
3 [31]: 1 Lack of data was seen as an obstacle also by Saldfas [117] 
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This unsatisfactory outcome is a further illustration of the importance of co-ordinating (if 
not fully integrating) the planning and assessment processes from the earliest phases, in 
order to avoid expensive and inadequate collection of information and production of the 
wrong type of knowledge ('what') for a particular stage ('when' and 'how') in planning and 
decision-making. The next Section explores this in more detail. 
6.2.3 Process integration 
The PM RH case is also an illustration of the tensions between the need to integrate planning 
and assessment processes (Section 3.1.2) and the need for independence. The actual, or 
perceived, dichotomy between assessment and planning activities goes to the core of the 
concept of assessment. Although both instruments are part of the policy-process, and 
together are meant to inform, shape, and influence decision-making, in practice impact 
assessment disciplines have - partly by design - created a division between them, which 
advocates of process integration would like to reduce. Section 3.2.2 reveals increasing 
criticism for this separation, and the PMRH case contributes to such debate, providing 
evidence of the difficulties caused by a strict division of labour, and its impact on 
effectiveness. 
Promoter [b] was amongst the informants who found the dichotomy between EIA and 
project preparation, and the equivalent distinction at strategic levels, potentially 
counterproductive: 
'this dichotomy relates back to when roughly fifteen years ago we began taking 
environment into consideration through the EIA process. Before then the 
environment was simply not taken into account. Then, as EIA began to be used, 
it was seen as an addendum, it was attached . . . seen as something that needed to 
be done "to get the project approved,,,.74 
The interviewee stressed the need to move beyond the separation implicit in the impact 
assessment concept where there are those who plan and those who assess, involving 
'different teams and skills '. Indeed, several practitioners and academics advocate fully 
integrated planning and assessment procedures to counter the difficulties mentioned by the 
interviewee: the 'addendum' and 'project approval' factors. This could lead to a range of 
possible benefits, including optimisation of resources, enhanced learning opportunities, and 
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the placing of responsibility for integration more directly within the duties of planners and 
decision-makers. On the contrary, the division, combined with an exceedingly technocratic 
concept of assessment, can conflict with the objective, or indeed the need deriving from 
scarce resources, of optimising the procedures of policy-making as well as each step leading 
to decision and closure. 
The PMRH illustrates the · above dilemmas through the tension between the rigid 
requirements of the Bank, which also demand that an independent party is responsible for 
the assessments (thereby ruling out a full role for DGA and DOH, for example),75 and the 
more progressive and constructive purposes of the ensurers. In fact, a year after the end of 
the project, ensurer [b] conceded that today they would do things differently and probably 
conceive the whole exercise as an effort to get the Chilean authorities to apply integrated 
watershed management principles and processes. This suggests greater integration between 
assessment and planning, but at the time the similarities and differences had not been clear. 
This is not surprising since the interviewee went on to say: 
'we were not sure ourselves .. . SEA seemed like a great tool. .. but there were 
also the constraints of Safeguards which required that an assessment be done ... 
and [then there was the problem of] tirning,.76 
The REA experience shows how the dichotomy can also lead to excessive focus on the 
assessment itself, at the expense of the purpose it is meant to serve. Assessor [a] warned 
against turning SEA into the objective, arguing instead that it should 'help planning' to take 
environmental concerns into account.77 Assessor [b] went a step further, arguing that SEA 
should not require 'separate reports ... [and should] eventually disappear to give way to 
strategic planning, .78 This conclusion echoes that reached by some scholars after almost a 
decade when SEA reports were considered good practice (cf. Eggenberger and Partidario 
2000), and contradicts the requirement for an 'environmental report' set out in the recent 
European Directive 2001l42IEC (article 5.1 and Annex I). Of course, some reporting is 
required if the assessment is also intended to provide an auditable record of the process that 
74 [57]: 1 
75 [89][97][93] 
76 [515] 
77 [92] :2 
78 [85] 
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was carried out, but this does not mean that the outcome of SEA activities should all be in a 
separate report. 
Accordingly, it is noticeable that time and time again, interviews starting with a focus on the 
assessment of the PMRH quickly shifted to a discussion of the whole policy process, of 
planning and decision-making. The following is an example of where the two instruments 
overlap in the reasoning of one environmental expert [DOH]: 
Expet1: '[our understanding of SEA] is that it is orientating towards a planning 
instrument, in other words: that is what SEA is: a planning instrument. And at 
this stage we do not have planning instrument like that for DOH: ... tigid and 
strict, clear, well defined. We are therefore starting to work ... [to link things] in 
some way ... DGA sees its Planes Directores from the perspective of water 
resources, and [water] demand. We [DOH] see our investment plans [from the] 
infrastructure [perspective], therefore there is a need to join these things, and 
there obtain a plan with some weight. .. and subject it to an SEA' 
Author: 'what do you mean by saying that SEA is a planning instrument?' 
Expet1: 'that it allows me to make decisions ... I can assess in a comprehensive 
way all the impacts ... [of an investment programme] in a certain area, in a river-
basin . ... a traditional filter [for projects] may be costs ... but I think that apart 
from costs one needs to look for... what is best for the river-basin [in its 
integrity] ... [SEA is] a decision-making instrument... [to] generate investment 
maintaining the watershed's equilibrium,.79 
This is also partly due to the nature of integrated river-basin planning, which includes many 
objectives that are similar to those of SEA (Dourojeanni 2001).80 
The PMRH case exemplifies the problems of lack of process integration and late start, as 
they resulted in most drafters being unable to point out where the S-EA and REA had 
influenced the Programme document. Indeed, a comparison of the PMRH and assessment 
reports reveals several missed opportunities and no clear evidence of cross fertilisation. For 
example, in the section 2.1.2 Objectives of the PMRH, drafters had summarised problems, 
effects and objectives (MOP 2002:39): this section was at once promising and ripe for a 
contribution from, SEA in terms of strengthening its linkages with the national water and 
environmental policies (amongst others). However, no mention is made of this in the REA 
or S-EA. FUt1hermore, the Programme opens with a broad section on the environmental 
79 [117]:2-3, also: [91][89][106] 
80 [44] 
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problems of the sector, but then proceeds to summarise the Programme's expected benefits 
and fails to mention any environmental aspect - or indeed the results of the assessment. 
When asked about this, drafters [c-d] admitted this was a 'good question' and concluded our 
long discussion with: 'Si, tienes todas las razones, pesa mucho todavla, la tradici6n!,81 This 
suggests two things. Firstly that, despite the advances made, the cultural and political 
context in which decisions are. taken, still influences the administrative and institutional 
processes signalling a preference for framing benefits in terms of economic growth, rather 
than any environmental or social gain, tangible though they might be. Secondly, it can be 
inferred that had the processes been more integrated (and thus timely) the result could have 
been different. 
So long as this separation constitutes the essence of instruments such as SEA, 
reflecting amongst other things, the separation of power between those in charge of 
development and environment, pursuing integration and sustainability will remain a 
struggle. However, process integration needs to be conceptualised so as not to weaken the 
objective of environmental protection. As promoter [b] remarked, until environment was 
constructed into a theme and a priority thanks to the instrument of EIA, it had been 
essentially ignored, and thi~ is still the fundamental driver for environmental assessment 
around the world (Wood 2003), particularly where the environmental capacity of the context 
is weak. 
Having established how, and why, the assessment of the PMRH took the shape of a regional 
and sectoral EA, the next Section discusses the difficulties and missed opportunities that 
resulted from this. 
81 [29]:9 'yes, you are quite right. Tradition still has a great influence! '. 
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6.3 Falling Short of the Object and Purpose 
6.3.1 The mismatch 
As proposed in Chapters 3 and 5, assessment methods are inextricably linked to the nature 
of the object under assessment (according to the principle of tiering) and to the purpose of 
the exercise, which in turn depend on the context. It is argued here that the strategic nature 
of the PMRH (Section 6.1) had not been fully understood, and that this influenced the 
assessment. 
The PMRH's four components (Box 6-a) included policy elements, institutional measures 
(for example, the requirement to produce watershed plans) and other non-infrastructure 
components, as well as a substantial list of projects. This meant that within one document 
were combined strategic policy elements as well as - financially predominant -
infrastructure projects; in fact it included the four 'Ps ': policy, plans, programs and projects 
(Figure 6-c), thus warranting an equally diverse and tiered assessment approach (Figure 6-
d). 
Figure 6-c Relating PMRH components to strategic initiative categories 
PM RH components (US$ million) 
3.7 7.1 
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o 7.1-lnstitutional development 
(POLICY/PLAN) 
o 21 .1-Water Resources 
Management Instruments 
(PLAN/PROJECT) 
• 55.8-Watershed Master Plans 
and Projects 
(PLAN/PROGR/PROJECT) 
o 3.7-Project Management, 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
(PROGR/PROJECT) 
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Figure 6-d shows different assessment methods and how they could be related to the 
programme's complexity: starting from the bottom it shows the components of the PMRH in 
terms of PPPs (rectangles), each component is then linked to specific assessment methods 
and functions (yellow and orange ovals). These represent various options between the two 
extreme approaches to SEA (shown as a continuum between two poles: policy and EIA). 
Figure 6-d Assessment types and functions in relation to 'PPP' categorieslPMRH 
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However, the programme and its assessment were not defined in such linear terms. The 
strategic dimension of the PMRH was welcomed by most actors as a necessary step in the 
right direction for the water sector, moving away from individual initiatives to more 
integrated approaches.82 But the shift it involved was not easy to achieve, given the 
Ministry'S cultural, political, institutional and administrative characteristics, and its wider 
political context. Together, the delayed policy dimension and its difficult reception help 
explain the weaknesses in the assessment process and why most of it focused on the less 
strategic components of the PMRH. 
82 Interviews revealed divisions between those who claimed that the PMRH started as a set of 
projects, and those who think it promoted an integrated approach to water management from the start. 
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The way the 'problem, object and assessment' were framed (Section 6.2) did not match with 
the multi-dimensional nature of the PMRH or with the equally multi-faceted purpose for 
requesting an assessment. This led to the selection of an approach and tools that fell shOlt of 
the object and the purpose of the assessment (Figure 6-e). 
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By emphasising the idea of cumulative impacts. especially during the first Bank-MOP 
meetings when Chilean actors were exposed to the concept of SEA for the first time, the 
REA and S-EA efforts paradoxically stressed the infrastructure project dimension of the 
PMRH, at the expense of its most significant policy-level contributions to the management 
of water resources in Chile. Although the final version of the assessments has useful 
introductory and concluding sections, which place the exercise in a wider context and stress 
the overall positive contributions of the PMRH, reading the main body of the document 
suggests a more defensive message and a focus on the likely negative impacts of project-
types which may, or may not, be included in future Planes Directores. A similar problem is 
acknowledged by Partidario (1996). who found that some SEAs of policy or plans had been 
conducted without questioning the strategic direction of the initiatives, but rather focusing on 
the assessment of programme elements, or even of activities per se. 
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In the following sections, three aspects of the S-EA are used to exemplify the problem: 1) 
the analysis of the PMRH policy and legal context, 2) the production of an 'environmental 
plan', and 3) the discussion of alternatives. 
6.3.2 Paradoxical outcomes 
The first section of the assessments (DGAIMOP 2002) is a description and justification of 
the PMRH, followed by the sectoral appraisal including: IU) Introduction, 11.2) Legal 
framework, 11.3) Institutional framework, 11.4) Environmental sector policies, 11.5) Sectoral 
baseline, 11.6) Sectoral environmental assessment of the PMRH, 11.7) Environmental 
management plans at sectoral level, 11.8) Environmental monitoring plans, and 11.9) Public 
participation and conflict resolution. 
Despite its title, Section //,4 is where assessors have tried to locate the Programme in 
relation to those sectors which are most likely to affect water resources. The S-EA 
highlighted 'the lack of comprehensive national policies for resource use in areas such as 
water, land, forestry, fisheries, biodiversity and mining' (DGAIMOP 2002:6).83 Referring to 
Section II.4, of the fourth draft of the assessment (DGAIMOP 2001), assessor [a] argues: 
" 
'the fact is that in many cases there was no policy as such. There wasn't an 
explicit policy, there was no document, there was nothing that... [of course] 
there are always policies, what happens is that they are not necessaIily organic, 
nor do they have a report ,.84 
As a result, the assessment tried to 'summarise the contents and objectives ... of relevant 
sectoral policies which exist. .. and which have special environmental implications', 
including agriculture and forestry, waste water treatment, energy and mining (DGAIMOP 
2002:11.53). Producing and collating in one document this background information had 
rarely been done before and was in itself a useful contribution. However, it failed to identify 
the synergies, coherence (or conflicts) with the proposed strategies in the PMRH, and it was 
this aspect that concerned the Bank most. Enforcers worried about the highly fragmented 
allocation of responsibilities in the management of water resources, and wanted the S-EA to 
83 This was extensively argued during the Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo (CED) Seminars (Chapter 
5). 
84 [91] :7 
Chapter 6 Purpose and Methods 226 
make a clear analysis of the (many) sectoral policies related to water, identifying the 'major 
issues' which would justify the choices and solutions promoted in the PMRH (see also the 
discussion about alternatives, below).85 
It is argued that the guidance and methods proposed by the Bank are partly to blame for this 
shortcoming. The sectoral dimension of the whole assessment exercise was made explicit 
only late in the process, and according to the assessors interviewed, no-one ever explained 
how to go about doing it. This, together with an insistence on cumulative impacts, diverted 
much of the energy to an arguably secondary aspect of the PMRH assessment. 
Reflecting on the whole experience, assessor [d] concluded that an assessment of the whole 
PMRH, which is a 'national scale' effort, should focus on the existence and adequacy of 
policies, not on the 'evaluation' of impacts, and that: 
'water resources is not a black and white sector ... there is a large quantity of 
infrastructure projects that are associated with water resources and each has 
different impacts. Therefore, it is very complicated to [evaluate] at sectoral 
level... You need to do it at regional level ... to assess [the water resource theme] 
in relation to the local geography, climate . .. ,.86 
The production of an 'environmental plan' led to another somewhat paradoxical outcome. In 
order to comply with the Bank's request to 'propose measures for an environmental 
programme at sectoral and regional level, based on the water resources project to be 
financed' (World Bank 2000b:l; and 2001c), MOP developed two sections in the 
assessment document: lI. 7 Environmental Management Plans at sectoral Level, and IlI.5 
Plans for Contingency, Reparation and Compensation, which defined 'the measures for 
compensation ... capable of reducing adverse and significant environmental impacts, to 
acceptable levels' (DGA/MOP 2002:11.147). 
85 [89]:4 
86 [51]9-10 
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Both sections followed a similar logic, identifying 'the different projects and . .. the 
mitigation measures that arise from the PMRH through the projects included in the 
programmes for Institutional Strengthening, Management Instruments, and Programmes for 
the Conservation and Protection of Biodiversity' (DGAIMOP 2002:11.147). Having assessed 
the negative cumulative impacts of project-types in Section Il.6, the assessment developed 
tables listing the impacts and related mitigation measures per project-type,87 and following 
the terms of reference proposed 'sectoral management plans'. 
While the tables are not particularly useful, the sectoral plans have far-reaching conceptual 
implications for the way assessment is understood and framed at strategic level. The study 
seems to confuse concepts of sectoral-level assessment and cumulative impacts, by referring 
to the need to : 
'address the problems deriving from the different PMRH projects or [the ones] 
external to it. . . detail[ing] the cumulative environmental impacts and 
describ[ing] . . . a combination of measures that should be part of a sectoral-type 
Management plan' (DGAlMOP 2002:11.158). 
This further supports the argument that projects and cumulative impacts were the central 
idea in the assessments, at the expense of other activities which could have been carried out 
to ensure a complete and balanced analysis of the PMRH (compare Figure 6-e with Figure 
'-
6-d above). 
Notwithstanding the conclusions of both sectoral and regional EAs, whereby 'the 
implementation of the PMRH will have significant environmental benefits' (DGAIMOP 
2002:III.109), the overall tone of the document is defensive. Hence the paradox: a plan that 
was conceived (albeit not without struggle) to promote radical change in the management of 
water resources by introducing the concepts and instruments for integrated river-basin 
planning and management, was being assessed not for its consistency or contribution to 
national and international policies and principles in these areas, but in terms of the likely 
negative environmental impacts that could arise from categories of project-types, were they 
to be proposed and approved for development in each of the river-basins of the Programme. 
87 For example, declining water quality will be mitigated (inter alia) by the 'develop[ment of] a PIal! 
Director for each watershed in the PMRH' (see also Annex D). 
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It is argued that the exercise, far from being helpful, undermined the effort of the planners 
who produced a strategic Programme for water resources, only to be subject to an 
assessment that essentially ignores the strategic elements of their proposals, and focuses on 
the potential negative cumulative impacts of project-types, only to conclude that many of 
the strategic elements will act as useful 'mitigation '. This conclusion appears somewhat 
perverse, and goes someway towards explaining the widespread frustration felt towards the 
assessments. Although a simple re-wording of the text could change the overall impression, 
the problem remains the missed opportunity to develop an assessment that could push 
forward the positive ideas within the Programme. The implications in terms of how 
assessment is conceptualised are far-reaching and should be carefully considered before 
applying REAs and S-EAs in the future. 
6.3.3 Challenging alternatives 
In SEA rhetoric, addressing problems at the strategic level allows for the consideration of 
substantial alternatives that will not be available at later stages: the assumption being that 
identifying and selecting between alternatives is a common step in rationalist planning 
models. As a result, the task of assessing alternatives is central in SEA literature. However, 
while this may seem ~latively unproblematic at the project-level (though still far from 
common practice), it has raised significant conceptual and practical difficulties in relation to 
strategic initiatives where the idea often appears impracticable (Sections 3.1. and 3.2) and is 
dependent on political will, timing and resources. The experience of the PMRH, with its 
conceptual and methodological shortcomings outlined above, is a useful illustration of such 
difficulties. 
The lack of alternatives and related assessment was one of the main criticisms made by the 
World Bank quality assurance team of the first REA draft (Unidad TecnicaIMOP 2001): 
The sectoral analysis [requested here for the first time] must discuss succinctly 
and conclude with why the proposed project [the PMRH] is the best and most 
logical option for the future of the sector, and that possible alternatives have been 
looked at. .. 
[the memo lists examples of problems and alternatives such as non structural 
solutions and fiscal incentives] These examples illustrate the type of scenarios 
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that should be analysed from an environmental perspective and be included in the 
sectoral analysis' (World Bank 200 1 b:2). 
This demand and the near-impossibility of meeting it epitomise the tension between strict 
Bank requirements and the reality of Bank operations. On the one hand, the Bank's Task 
Manager for the PMRH was under pressure to bring the proposal to appraisal and close the 
negotiations; on the other, . the quality assurance team had decided to test higher standards of 
assessments using this case because it believed Chile was a country well advanced in this 
area and could mark a new approach to future Bank work. 88 However, the timing and 
resources for the assessment were clearly aimed at meeting the tight deadlines of project 
approval (Section 6.2.2), resulting in conflicts with the needs for higher standards in 
assessment. 
Reality 'on the ground' reflected this predicament, and demonstrated the severity of its 
implications. Enforcer [b] was clearly torn between the bureaucratic requirements of the 
Bank (based on the Operational Policies89 and the comments of the assurance team), the 
knowledge of the real difficulties of putting these into practice, and the awareness of the 
complexities that had characterised the production of the PMRH and its assessment. 
Looking at the draft REA document and the comments of the quality assurance team, the 
interviewee considereclthat: 
'[MOP] are going to look at the focus, objectives of the PMRH and the 
components and different activities, which is fine but I would like to see it one 
step above ... saying ... which alternative ... But we very rarely get that in any 
Bank project of saying is this really what the Government should borrow 350 
million dollars to do? So we can't expect too much. :. 
[looking again at the draft:] The focus on the objectives [of the PMRH] they 
[MOP] kind of defend, but then they say ... : "the components" [i.e. the main 
strategic themes of the PMRH] and activities are "not susceptible to 
alternatives" . .. [suggesting] there is no point in analysing them! ,90 
88 [503] 
89 In particular OP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment. This is one of the ten 'OPs ' or Safeguard 
POlicies, as they are known. See http://www.worldbank.org 
90 [89] :5 
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Hence, MOP was not going far enough, but was not a unique case in the Bank's experience, 
and more importantly it had reasons to fall short of requests. One such reason was 
mentioned by enforcer [a]: 
'the thing is ... we are coming in ... we have a report of this programme already 
designed... so to insist [on] an analysis of alternatives on policies and 
strategies ... they [MOP] feel that its going back to two years ago ,.91 
Given the late stage of preparation, the assessment would have been little more than a post-
justification; it would therefore be difficult to convince the various promoters of the PMRH 
(Figure 6-b) of the rationale behind such a task. 
These were the perceptions of people working within the Bank. Those outside the Bank 
were equally or even more puzzled. Most people involved in the promotion, drafting and 
assessment of the PMRH could not see the reason for the Bank's request, and their views 
help explain the challenges of this highly acclaimed - but rarely practised - step in SEA. 
Promoter [b] explained that: 
This idea [an initiative to develop water resources] started in 1996. We have 
been discussing this ... thing for donkeys years at several levels ... we even had 
seminars ... it~ not something we came and said: let's do the PMRH ok? .. We 
started with alternatives and then we arrived at this. With some imposition if you 
want, from the Bank in the sense that you move with the fashions. The fashion 
was that water resource management was a catch word and therefore it would be 
politically correct to have a project like that. It would be much easier to present a 
water resource management project, than an irrigation project, today, at the Bank. 
And if it's a natural resource management project, it's even better! It might be the 
same ... thing, but. .. it goes down much better,.92 
The interviewee admitted: 'I don't think we ever had the idea [of carrying out] an impact 
assessment of every single alternative which I considered before defining the PMRH '. 
Environment, after all, was one of the themes that informed all those years of discussion, 
though not the main one: 
91 [97]:7 
92 [57]:7 
'one of the issues is environment, but there are several others that you have to 
consider before reaching the environment. .. Let's say the EA of alternatives was 
not considered, except in that way [as one factor] ... probably environmental 
issues were not the main concern when we defined the alternatives'. 
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According to the Unidad Tecnica responsible for the PMRH, the whole policy process had 
been an effort to ensure that future management of water resources would be informed by 
environmental criteria: 
'today . . . the management of water resources cannot ignore the environmental 
dimension ... our world makes it necessruy to include the environmental variable 
in the focus of the analysis of these issues,.93 
One interviewee located the effort of discussing alternatives within the process of planning; 
therefore, having established that environmental integration was part and parcel of the 
overarching concept of the PMRH, found it difficult to see the point of 'an impact 
assessment ' . 
These views reflect common difficulties with strategic-level assessments, and introduce two 
important themes. Firstly, interviews revealed a tension between wanting to assess an 
initiative (and its alternatives), and wanting to integrate environmental considerations in it. 
The emphasis on impact assessment (which chru'acterised the REA and S-EA) complicated 
the task of assessing strategic initiatives, for example by underestimating the contribution of 
environmental integration activities embedded within policy-making itself. Discussions with 
promoter [b] illustrate this: 
There was a methodology ... a system [EIA] ... tools, instruments that would 
guarantee that [environmental implications were dealt with] ... I was much more 
concerned with the [overall] efficiency of the project [the PMRH], of the use of 
the water resources ... 
We are talking about efficiency, and one of the elements is the environment. If it 
is not environmentally sustainable it's not efficient. We are not dealing with how 
many cubic meters per dollar we are getting. What we ru'e maximising is the 
efficiency, the sustainability of the use of water,.94 
This quote suggests that assessment and the pursuit of 'efficiency' and 'sustainability ' are 
seen as separate pro,cesses while in fact they work towards a common goal (cf. Section 
6.2.2). Why was this coincidence missed by many actors involved? It is suggested that one 
reason was the emphasis placed on identifying the impacts of infrastructure, which focused 
93 [65] :3 
94 [57] :8 
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people's minds on a specific task undermining SEA's wider purpose and functions at 
strategic level. For example, the process of defining the efficiency criteria (described in the 
quote) and the way these were used to analyse information and alternatives as they arose, 
could be part and parcel of SEA. However, for this to happen, one would have had to 
conceive SEA differently and carry out the SEA much earlier than was the case with the 
PMRH. 
Secondly, promoter [b] 's description of what happened also highlights the diffuse, often 
seamless and ad hoc nature of a significant part of policy-making, discussed in Section 5.2 
and Chapter 3. None of the actors involved could fix an exact date (not even the year) for 
when the process defining the PM RH started, they all had different perceptions of this. The 
Programme is clearly not the product of an isolated event, but ties in with parallel efforts, 
such as the major proposal for watershed plans resulting from a project funded by the Inter-
American Development Bank (1994-1996), and the many years af debate leading - inter 
alia - to. the appraval of a National Policy for Water Resources (DGA 1999a). Hence, the 
rhetorical requests far the evaluation af alternatives are difficult to lacate within the 
seamless essence of palicy-making, the impelfect decision-making processes and time 
canstraints. 
The comments by the Bank's quality assurance team also. confaunded assessors, who found 
the issue af alternatives the most troublesame to. address (DGA 2001). Their frustratian was 
tangible during interviews: 
'having chasen the integrated approach ... what do. we do. to. mave farwards? .. 
[With regards to the] institutianal salutians [ane af the PMRH campanents] .. . 
the aptians [are] limited by legal restJictians ... ten years trying to. change the 
Water Cade... [Regarding the] Planes Directores ... we cauld call them 
differently but still the idea is the same ... The studies, research etc . ... there are 
no. alternatives! .. . Alternatives came later in the Planes Directores ... [Thus], at 
the sectarallevel the analysis af altemati ves was nat very feasible' .95 
When MOP was first asked to carry out the assessment af the PMRH it was unsure about 
'haw, starting from this [assessment]' it was 'to. modify the Programme', and in particular 
abaut how the Pragramme cauld effectively incorparate the results, without falling into. the 
95 [91] :3. Similar views were expressed by assessors [c-d], [51][36] 
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situation of an 'ex-post assessment in which decisions have already been taken ,.96 After 
significant struggle, MOP identified four 'conceptual levels' which could be targeted for 
alternatives: 
'the focus of the PMRH itself and the objectives ... At a subsequent level. .. one 
can identify alternatives for the components of the Programme ... [and for] the 
different activities identified to address the different problems or scenarios that 
were detected at sectorallevel for each said components' (DGNMOP 2002:1.26-
7, emphasis in original). 
However, the Ministry felt that the strategic directions of the PMRH had few or no 
alternatives, since they were the expression of:: 
'a conceptual focus, which ... is coherent and is derived from the National Policy 
for Water Resources ... Consequently, it is judged that the focus proposed in the 
PMRH is the legitimate, reasonable and valid alternative, that can effectively 
address the problems of water resources' (DGNMOP 2002:1.27). 
The four components (Box 6-a) were considered mainly as a 'generic' way of categorising 
the 'activities' that were to be developed during implementation, and were mainly justified 
in the light of their consistency with the national policy. MOP argued that the type of 
alternatives mentioned in the Bank's memorandum quoted above could be considered 
reasonable and feasible mainly in relation to an SEA of the future preparation of Planes 
Directores (an 'activity' under the Management Instruments Component).97 
The perspectives of the various actors raise important issues. The debate on 
alternatives cannot be separated from one's understanding of the essence of the strategic 
initiative being assessed, and of the nature of strategic assessment. In the case of the PMRH, 
such understandings varied significantly between promoters, drafters, enforcers and 
assessors. It is argued that the heart of the problem lies in the way the Programme was 
perceived, and the failure to shape (and communicate) the assessment methodology so that it 
reflected the multiple layers, both in terms of contents and timing, of the PM RH and 
particularly the forthcoming Planes Directores. 
96 [91]:5 
97 [91][36][51], The importance of applying SEA to such plans was recognised by most actors 
interviewed, including the four members of the Unidad Tecnica PMRH. Enforcers [a-b] had also 
repeatedly stressed the need for this application. 
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6.4 A summary of implications 
The PM RH case has implications for the propositions on purpose, strategic dimension and 
assessment, and provides some lessons for the future use of SEA by the World Bank and 
similar organisations and donor agencies. 
The mismatch between purpose, object and methodology supports the propositions in 
Chapter 3, whereby shaping the approach and methods of SEA is conditional to 
understanding the nature of the problem being addressed, the actual object of the 
assessment, and why an SEA is being asked for. The importance of this was illustrated by 
the tangible dissatisfaction of many actors with the whole process, and by the risk of 
achieving the opposite of what was desired: by focusing on infrastructure projects and 
stressing their cumulative negative impacts, the assessments underestimated the effort of 
planners to design an initiative inspired by the principle of integrated sustainable planning 
and, partly, by environmental integration. Given that the primary objective of ensurers and 
assessors was the improvement of the planning and decision-making processes, this could 
have serious consequences. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, reflecting back a year after the end 
'-
of the project, one of the enforcers felt that at the time they 'wanted to have a tool that 
would integrate the environment in the Planes Directores ' and thought that REAs would 
provide 'a good draft ... a base' for such plans. However, with hindsight, the person felt that 
now they would proceed differently, starting by sitting down with the country authorities 'to 
establish together with them "why and for what'" should an assessment be done.98 
The analysis of the expectations of each player in terms of what they hoped to achieve 
through the application of SEA has also substantiated the proposition that there can be 
transformative and modemist reasons for doing SEAs, and that making these explicit would 
help to shape the instrument more effectively . In the event, although both DGA and the 
Bank had identified transformative purposes, their communication had been weak and 
tensions between actors were not addressed effectively, partly reflecting the top-down 
approach by the financing agency. This, together with process constraints (timing, 
98 [515] 
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integration, resources and expertise), meant that the potential and effectiveness of the 
PMRH assessment were thwarted by a less than optimal concept and implementation.99 
Judging the assessment according to the basic principles of SEA, which define effectiveness 
in terms of influence on the decision-making process and on the actual initiative, it must be 
concluded that they had little impact on the PMRH itself. 
However, despite these problems, the assessment process had significant positive impacts 
which went beyond the nalTOW remit of influencing the Programme itself. Interviewees from 
all social identities (Table 6-a) agreed that the work on the PMRH and its assessment had 
led to an altogether more co-operative style of work and mutual learning. The process had 
triggered learning about integrated and sustainable planning, and this had partly been 
achieved through the dialogical process attached to the cumulative impact exercise: 'for us 
[the REA is] a new experience ... we are learning ... and there will be improvements '.100 
Indeed, even sceptical spectators within MOP felt that the Bank initiative had been useful at 
least in making the Ministry think in terms of SEA at the scale of watersheds, which is a 
very useful geographical unit in Chile, given its sequence of basins from north to south, 
mostly originating in the Andes, which roughly equate to regional boundaries. 101 
Cumulative impact assessment forced DGA and DOH to sit regularly in meetings with the 
consultants to discu~ the nature and significance of likely impacts. This showed each side 
how different their perspectives were: 'on the one hand many of the impacts that people 
from DOH were saying to be positive, the other group [DGA] were calling negative 
impacts '.102 Therefore, some of the more long-term objectives, linked to the improvement of 
contextual dimensions which determine the capacity for strategic planning, itself crucial to 
environmental sustainability, were achieved. 
99 It is important to note that the Bank experts have changed their approach almost completely since 
the PM RH experience. Enforcer [a] recently stated that cumulative impact assessment is not the same 
as SEA [d4-SeminarlWorld Bank] . 
100 [29]:4 The group interviews were particularly revealing in this sense, as they allowed participants 
to discuss many of the issues raised in this Chapter and find out how their own thinking had 
developed. Two interviewees commented after the meetings that they had enjoyed the interview as an 
opportunity to reflect on the experience, which they otherwise would not have had. 
I(j', [28] 
102 [51]:7 
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Furthermore - and somewhat ironically - it can be argued that cumulative impact 
assessment, far from being a sub-optimal method, was actually likely to play a crucial role; 
only, not in relation to the strategic planning of the overall PMRH. As assessor [b] pointed 
out, the future of the Programme had to confront the reality of how MOP operated, 
including the fact that individual projects that have been in the pipeline for years would still 
proceed independently of .any Plan Director, hence, taking the cumulative impact approach 
even outside a planning process was probably the most helpful addition to DOH 's toolS.103 
This suggests that the nature of the initiative was more diverse than might be inferred from 
the various components, and that three distinct assessment approaches could be needed: 
firstly, a full SEA of the PMRH as a whole, secondly cumulative impact assessments for all 
the projects 'ready to go', combining them with relevant initiatives within the same basin, 
and thirdly an SEA methodology shaped to apply to future Planes Directores. 
Finally, this case raises important questions about World Bank practices and its 
responsibility as an organisation whose ideas and principles on a topic like SEA will 
continue to influence many developing countries. Although the timing and time pressures of 
the PMRH process may appear somewhat extreme, interviewees suggested that the reality at 
the Bank is very close to this example. I04 It is argued that the Bank needs to redefine its 
concept of assessment , and safeguard policy, especially in the light of the changes which are 
leading to increasingly programmatic lending (as opposed to individual projects). Although 
environmental protection has achieved some status, the more long term and far-reaching 
concepts of integration and sustainability still have a long way to go (Liebenthal 2002). This 
affects the current concept of assessment, which still reflects a culture of risk aversion and a 
recognised need by the Bank to 'cover its back ,.105 The Chilean example analysed here 
shows the inadequacy of this approach when applied to more complex and multi-
dimensional initiatives. The concept of what assessment is and should achieve, together with 
the type of process and timing typical of Bank operations, are effectively in conflict with the 
major trends in SEA theory and practice, presented in Chapters 2, 3 and confirmed in 
Chapter 5. If due consideration is to be given to environmental and social impacts, the Bank 
103 [85] However, even if this was understood by the Bank, it could not be made explicit, since it 
would contradict the idea of the programmatic nature of the initiative it was financing. 
104 It is worth noting that such pressures are also common in relation to EU funded development plans 
in countries like Spain and Italy, hence this is not unique to developing country contexts. 
105 [514][509] 
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should review the whole policy process, and it is encouraging to see that it is currently 
exploring means of integrating these dimensions in its sectoral work. 106 
The next Chapter shows how the lessons that can be drawn from this case can 
contribute to the conceptual and practical development of SEA. 
106 The Bank recently published a new strategy for environment (World Bank 2002a), following a 
critical review of its past performance in terms of integrating sustainable development across its 
practices (Liebenthal 2002). As part of this effort, it is exploring a range of instruments, including 
SEA, poverty and social impact assessments, and country environmental analyses (World Bank 
2003). 
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Chapter 7 
Struggle, Debate and Learning 
Is it the job [and responsibility] of the Ministry of Public Works to be doing planning? 
Ministry's official 
The capacity of the country to finance infrastructure has grown far more than the capacity of MOP to 
present solutions and development proposals ... MOP's capacity has not changed at the same speed 
Juan Escudero, SEMATIMinistry of Public Works 
SEA can help us is ... a year of [discussion and work] on the integration of environment, territory and 
participation ... [Until recently] in this Ministry the different Directorates all went their own way as far as 
these themes are concerned. The instrument of SEA can give us methodological support [to achieve 
such integration] 
Ingrid Castro, SEMATIMinistry of Public Works 
Fieldwork in Chile took an interesting and unexpected turn half way through the second trip 
(spring 2002), leading to the author 's involvement in the lniciativa SEMAT: a project 
initiated by the environment secretariat (SEMAT) of the Chilean Ministry of Public Works 
(MOP) to explore the potential and actual workings of SEA. Section 4.2.2 explains how this 
happened. This Chapter combines an account of the events with an analysis of their 
implications in relation to the conceptual framework of the thesis . Drawing on the inquiry 
into emerging conceptualisations of SEA in the wider Chilean context (Chapter 5) and into 
the assessment of the water resource management Programme (Chapter 6), this final layer of 
the empirical investigation focuses on the conceptual and practical challenges faced by an 
organisation which embarks on the process of introducing SEA and making it operational. 
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The focus is on the four contextual dimensions specific to the MOP and on the nature of its 
policy process. 
The emphasis is not on how to carry out an SEA in practice (i.e. on methods and tools) but 
rather on understanding why and how to introduce the instrument within a particular 
organisational context, suggesting that the relatively recent focus on decision-making 
(Chapters 2 and 3) needs to be complemented - and preceded - by an understanding of 
contextual dimensions. The different perspectives graphically summarised in Figure 7-a 
represent the tiers that allow users to move from the conceptual definition of SEA (starting 
from the wider context) through to the detailed design of SEA approaches and tools 
(assessment instrument). The assumption is that SEA is essentially a banner rather than a 
pre-defined methodology, and that the reason for adopting SEA, and hence the purpose 
attached to this instrument, will vary according to the organisational and wider contexts. 
Figure 7 -a Perspectives on the introduction of SEA 
__ WIDER CONTEXT 
political, cultural, administrative and institutional 
ORGANISATION 
responsible for the 'object' 
'OBJECT' 
Assessment 
'OBJECT' 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
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The aims of this stage of the research are: 1) further to test the relevance, or otherwise, of 
the propositions set out in the conceptual framework for the thesis, 2) to increase the 
understanding of 'why' and 'how' SEA can be introduced and made operational within a 
particular organisational context, and 3) to explore the effects and benefits of the activity 
that leads to such an introduction (above and beyond the direct effects of applying SEA to a 
specific policy process). The findings will then be related back to the theory, contributing to 
a re-conceptualisation of SEA (Chapter 8). 
The shift to (and opportunity for) a more active role (Section 4.2.2) gave the author access 
to the process of internal discussion, which revealed struggles and moments of learning that 
would otherwise have been hidden from a researcher's eyes. In fact, this case study shows 
how the very process of understanding why and how SEA could be introduced within an 
organisation can lead to significant instances of learning. In an iterative process of 
observation and active contribution to the debates, the author gained a first hand impression 
of the concrete difficulties underlying the introduction of SEA in a specific organisational 
reality, thus making an additional contribution to the existing body of literature on SEA, 
which has mainly depended on second hand reviews of past work. 
The literature analys~d earlier in the thesis was preoccupied mainly with the methodological 
aspects and, to a lesser extent, with the origins and raison d'etre of SEA. It also devoted 
increasing effort to clarifying what policies, plans and programmes could be subject to such 
assessment. All these perspectives contribute to - but do not address exhaustively - the 
increasingly pressing question of introduction and operationalisation of SEA in the context 
of specific organisations, which is the objective of this final stage in the research. As it 
becomes recognised internationally, SEA requirements are more and more common, shifting 
demand from ad hoc applications to more systematic and comprehensive approaches. The 
fifteen years of debate over how to do SEA suddenly fall short of this new reality, having 
concentrated most efforts in generalising the applicability of principles and methods at the 
expense of temporal and local particularities (Toulrnin 1990; Flick 2002). A different 
perspective, that takes the context of application as the starting point, and seeks to forge a 
strategy for SEA's insertion, is now a priority. 
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Section 7.1 describes the aims of the Iniciativa, and the process leading to the identification 
of a 'policy process' that could be assessed. The initial discussions with senior SEMAT 
officers and the inter-departmental meetings to discuss why SEA could be helpful for the 
Ministry provide useful insight into key contextual dimensions. Section 7.2 draws on 
Chapters 2 to 6 to propose a conceptual framework for the introduction and 
operationalisation of SEA concepts and processes, and describes those elements which were 
used throughout the Iniciativa. Section 7.3 is a reflection on the issues, obstacles and lessons 
learned from the SEA process. The final Section analyses the closing remarks of the Team 
members, the concluding document by SEMAT, and the relevance of this in relation to the 
propositions in Chapter 3. 1 
7. 1 The Need - Clarifying Aims and Expectations 
What is strategic planning and what do we expect of it. .. as MOP? 
Aurora Puig, DOHI Ministry of Public Works 
[SEA} would show whether people are thinking of "muros" [dams} or of regional development .. . the 
first is the real situation, the second is the desired one 
Juan Escudero, SEMAT/Ministry of Public Works 
7.1.1 An initiative to promote SEA within the MOP 
By the end of 2001, SEA was hardly an item on the agenda for SEMA T, let alone for the 
rest of the Ministry. Eduardo Astorga, Director of SEMAT, was interviewed in October that 
year and made it very clear that, at that point, SEA was being increasingly discussed -
sometimes with insufficient knowledge: 'only a few really know about SEA' - however, 
there had been little practical application, either within the Ministry or in Chile in genera1.2 
The momentum behind SEA, in his view, came mainly from a handful of people in 
Government and, think tanks, who were keen to promote it. 3 
I Annex E details the sources for this Chapter. 
2 [Astorga-G-a-2911 010 1] 
3 Astorga mentioned Pablo Daud (CONAMA), Guillermo Espinoza (CED) and M6nica Pardo (DGA-
MOP), 
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Towards the end of November, Astorga contacted the author, asking if she could contribute 
to a half-day seminar on SEA for his team (see Section 4.2). Frugone [SEMAT] sent the 
foIlowing note in reply to my request for a clarification of what they were looking for: 
1n SEMA T we are mainly interested in: 
what are the basic necessaty conditions for applying SEA to plans and 
programmes? 
What at'e the costs of applying SEA? 
What is your experience of SEA of infrasttucture? 
What type of institutional arrangement is needed within the organisation in order 
to apply SEA? '.4 
FoIlowing discussions it was agreed that the author's role would be limited to a brief 
presentation of the general concept of SEA drawing from the literature and of a few 
examples of SEA of infrastructure initiatives, while the main focus would be to help 
SEMAT reflect upon and discuss SEA in relation to four questions: 1) what is the role of 
SEMAT within the MOP?; 2) who could and/or should do SEA in the Ministry?; 3) what 
type of strategic initiatives could be subject to SEA?; and 4) which type of SEA would be 
most useful? These questions triggered a lively discussion that revealed aspects of the 
organisation's context, which, it is argued (Chapters 3, 5 and 6), are essential in defining the 
purpose and shape of SEA. 5 
The Seminar helped SE~AT 's team to focus on the opportunity of introducing SEA within 
the Ministry, exploring their different understandings and expectations, as well as 
identifying obstacles. The fundamental issues and problems raised then were to characterise 
early debates during the Iniciativa (also echoing discourses analysed in Chapter 5), and are 
detailed in the following sections. Two objectives arose from the discussion: SEMAT 
wished to strengthen its position within the Ministry and 'develop the competence of its 
professional staff' for example by learning how to do SEAs, and secondly, it had a mission 
of promoting integration with the aim of producing 'better projects '. As the group discussed 
who should lead on SEA within the Ministry, there was initial agreement for the idea that 
3 Astorga mentioned Pablo Daud (CONAMA), Guillermo Espinoza (CED) and M6nica Pardo (DGA-
MOP). 
4 [Frugone-G-p.c.-20/1110 1] 
5 Eleven members of SEMAT attended the Seminar, mainly from the central office but also from 
some regional offices. See Annex C for details of their position and academic background. Note that 
it coincided with the day of the third and final CED Seminar analysed in Chapter 5, which both 
Astorga and Escudero attended. 
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Towards the end of November, Astorga contacted the author, asking if she could contribute 
to a half-day seminar on SEA for his team (see Section 4.2). Frugone [SEMAT] sent the 
following note in reply to my request for a clarification of what they were looking for: 
'In SEMA T we are mainly interested in: 
what are the basic necessary conditions for applying SEA to plans and 
programmes? 
What are the costs of applying SEA? 
What is your expenence of SEA of infrastructure? 
What type of institutional arrangement is needed within the organisation in order 
to apply SEA ?,.4 
Following discussions it was agreed that the author's role would be limited to a brief 
presentation of the general concept of SEA drawing from the literature and of a few 
examples of SEA of infrastructure initiatives, while the main focus would be to help 
SEMAT reflect upon and discuss SEA in relation to four questions: 1) what is the role of 
SEMAT within the MOP?; 2) who could and/or should do SEA in the Ministry?; 3) what 
type of strategic initiatives could be subject to SEA?; and 4) which type of SEA would be 
most useful? These questions triggered a lively discussion that revealed aspects of the 
organisation's context, which, it is argued (Chapters 3, 5 and 6), are essential in defining the 
purpose and shape of SEA.s 
The Seminar helped SEMA T 's team to focus on the opportunity of introducing SEA within 
the Ministry, exploring their different understandings and expectations, as well as 
identifying obstacles. The fundamental issues and problems raised then were to characterise 
early debates during the Iniciativa (also echoing discourses analysed in Chapter 5), and are 
detailed in the following sections. Two objectives arose from the discussion: SEMA T 
wished to strengthen its position within the Ministry and 'develop the competence of its 
professional staff' for example by learning how to do SEAs, and secondly, it had a mission 
of promoting integration with the aim of producing 'better projects'. As the group discussed 
who should lead on SEA within the Ministry, there was initial agreement for the idea that 
SEMAT was best placed given its, albeit limited, expertise. However, Castro pointed out 
that 'perhaps a mixed approach [should be considered] ... SEMA T could be the driver, 
4 [Frugone-G-p.c.-201l1/01] 
5 Eleven members of SEMAT attended the Seminar, mainly from the central office but also from 
some regional offices. See Annex C for details of their position and academic background. Note that 
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together with Senior Management support' to promote training and strengthen capacity.6 
This was indeed the approach that prevailed during the Iniciativa. 
The idea of SEMA T 
Inspiration for the Iniciativa came also from the participation of SEMA T in the CED 
Seminars (Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo) analysed in Chapter 5, which led to the intuitive 
assumption that SEA could help MOP. The subsequent ad hoc Seminar made it clear that 
the type of help required by MOP, and therefore the assistance that SEA might provide, 
needed clarification. The Iniciativa SEMAT was promoted by the SEMAT Team, with the 
crucial support of the Director of the Directorate General for Public Works (DGOP).7 Figure 
7-b shows the organigram of MOP and the stars indicate those directorates which were 
involved in the Iniciativa and in the closing Seminar discussions in September 2002. 
SEMAT's initial idea (March 2002) was to simulate an SEA to learn how to apply it: 
Escudero explained that they would organise 'a week-long concentrated seminar to simulate 
a final decision'. 8 SEMA T had four specific aims, ranging from technical to more strategic 
and long term: 1) learn how to do SEA, 2) understand what it is missing in terms of 
resources, to carry out SEA, 3) understand what interests will be served by using such 
instrument 'who gains from it ' , and 4) develop its group 's capacity to 'visualize and present 
---ideas differently' in order to overcome the exclusive focus on projects. 
it coincided with the day of the third and final CED Seminar analysed in Chapter 5, which both 
Astorga and Escudero attended. 
6 [e4-SeminarJSEMAT]:2 
7 [MOPJ/niciativa meeting-G-fgl-5J4J02] Note that soon after the first meeting, the name '/Iliciativa 
SEMAT' was dropped for the more generic terms 'initiatNe' or 'project', since SEMAT's objective 
was to secure ownership across the Ministry. 
8 [Escudero-G-fgl-28J3J02] 
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Figure 7-b The Ministry of Public Works and Directorates involved in the SEA 
initiative (starred) 
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As events unfolded during the following months, the Iniciativa's focus on methods was 
accompanied by a strongly dialogical process, providing this research with important 
in sights into the cultural, political, institutional and organisational dimensions of the MOP 
context.9 
9 It also seemed , to be driven by different pnorItles at different times during the six months, In 
particular, the Director of SEMAT pushed for the exercise to be less of a simulation and more of an 
assessment which would have influenced the initiative under scrutiny, This was seen necessary in 
order to present, and 'sell', the instrument to the Minister. However, given the limited time and 
resources available to the Team itself to cany out the work, it turned out to be difficult to balance the 
objective of learning about SEA (how it works and what are its benefits) with that of presenting 
arguments in favour of the instrument to the Minister. This became relevant during the closing 
Seminar [f-Workshop/MOP] discussed below, 
Chapter 7 Struggle, Debate and Learning 245 
The week-long seminar was replaced by elements of a SEA scoping stage, and the whole 
Iniciativa can be summarised thus: 
Phase 1: Meetings and round tables (28 March-9 May 2002). Objective: discuss 
the purpose and scope of SEA in the MOP context, and identify a suitable 
strategic initiative for an SEA test; 
Phase 2: Definition of the methodological components of an SEA (by 29 May 
2002). Objective: provide the basis for an exercise in which the initial steps of an 
SEA are carried out; 
Phase 3: SEA scoping exercise (June-September 2002). Objective: learn about 
doing SEAs; 
Phase 4: Seminar (October 2002). Objective: to reflect on the experience and 
draw lessons for the future. 10 
Being the initiator, SEMA T coordinated all four phases and, as a first step, created an 
informal group of members from different Directorates within MOP (hereafter referred to as 
'Team ') who would be involved in the Iniciativa. 11 The aim was to be integrative from the 
start and to involve interested people from those parts of the organisation more likely to 
want to apply SEA in the short and medium term. 
\0 This at least is how the exercise looked once completed. However, nothing was ever ten'ibly clear 
until shortly before it happened, particularly the internal meetings, round tables and presentations 
throughout Phase 1. 
11 See Annex E for a full list. The Team expanded once the case was identified, involving more 
people from the relevant Directorate. It also included Guillermo Espinoza and Victor Espinosa of the 
Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo (CED) as consultants hired by SEMAT to run the Initiative. The 
author played the role of observer and at times facilitator during Phases 1 and 4. 
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From 'object' to problems of context 
In the introduction, the organisational context is highlighted as a critical starting point. 
However, the objectives of SEMAT (above), meant that the initial focus of the Team went 
towards identifying a case which could be used to run a simulated SEA.12 In practice this 
made little difference, as issues of context soon appeared in the discussions. 
Following the long debate about mega-projects held in November and December 2001 13 it 
was not entirely surprising to find that the cases being put forward by members of the Team 
were all large infrastructure projects: primarily roads, airports and other transport-related 
infrastructure. People were concerned that these projects would have significant and far-
reaching implications for which EIA and other processes were inadequate: 
'the Mideplan [Minisuy for Planning] does not have sufficient resources to 
assess the quality of projects [and] this Ministry [MOP] does not calculate 
general impacts . .. bJidges are good because they are bJidges'. 14 
Several were preoccupied that projects were not defined in connection with a region's 
economic activities, and that their objectives tended to be too narrow. 15 Hence the need for 
'better' instruments, reflecting in many ways the general trend that led to the 
conceptualisation o~SEA in the 1980s. However, in this case, and arguably even back then 
(Chapter 2), the 'need' represented only the tip of the iceberg: beneath the sUlface are 
complex political, cultural, institutional and administrative problems that hinder 
environmental sustainability processes and outcomes. 
Just as in the CED Seminars, this project focus challenged the most basic tenet of SEA: that 
it applies to anything above project-level. It questioned the whole rationale behind the 
Iniciativa (or as mentioned above: the intuitive assumption that SEA was required) since 
improvements to the EIA process and the introduction of cumulative assessment could have 
12 Note that the term 'simulation' was never fully explained and was actually abandoned half way 
through the /niciaJiva, perhaps because the interest in influencing the policy-process under 
assessment through the SEA results became a greater priority. 
13 [el-3-Seminar/CED]; [e4-Seminar/SEMAT] 
14 [Astorga-G-a-2911 % 1] 
15 [MOP//niciativa meeting-G-fgl-5/4/02] ; [MOP//niciativa meeting-G-fg2-19/4/02]; [Escudero-G-
fgl-28/3/02]; [Castro-G-fg-28/3/02] In quite a funny exchange between the participants, Tondrew 
highlighted that they were mainly using the term 'project' even when refelTing to a plan or similar. 
She reflected on the fact that this showed how ingrained this concept was. 
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addressed at least some of the concerns raised. In order to move things forward, the author 
suggested that the Team could discuss why they felt they needed to develop SEA, what were 
the problems, difficulties or obstacles that they had in mind when they thought of SEA as an 
answer. 16 Given that SEA is essentially an instrument that an organisation chooses to adopt 
in order to solve or improve a situation, and that its most defining characteristic is the 
strategic dimension of its 'object', the Team began concentrating on exploring such 
dimension in the context of MOP. The debates that followed were in many ways similar to 
those triggered during the CED Seminars, except that in this case the focus was on the 
specificities of one organisational context, helping to reduce the abstraction of some of the 
initial conclusions drawn in Chapter 5. The following are comments on the poor state of 
planning within the Ministry and on the importance of project work by several SEMA T 
members during the December Seminar: 
'MOP is in a bit of a mess! Plans exist but are not prioritised ... they are a 
combination of projects and programmes '; 
'I do not think that SEA applies only to plans and programmes ... 1 think it also 
[applies] to projects that are significant [environmentally and economically] and 
which have various components attached to them.. . for example the Chacao 
bridge,.l7 
When the Iniciativa began, the political opportunity of the enterprise and the problems it 
aimed to address became clearer, further explaining the SEMAT's interest in SEA. Escudero 
and Castro viewed this as a particularly favourable moment to be pursuing SEA since: 
'at the moment the interest of the Minister and his Sub-Secretario ... and the 
existence of SEMA T, represent a unique oppOltunity to introduce changes in the 
"MOP method",.ls 
Such reference supports the emphasis on the political dimension of context described in 
Section 3.4. The political dimension was then discussed in terms of 'money, and where the 
money is coming from'. 19 Since the mid-1990s Chile's Government has been involved in 
projects of a much greater scale than ever before: 'any significant project done today will be 
no less than 300 mi~lion [US$] ... That is more than the total budget that MOP had ten years 
ago ' (Figure 7-c). The additional money is partly due to the fact that in 2002 Chile's gross 
16 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg 1-5/4/02]; [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-d2-5/12/0 1]: 1-2 
17 Each statement is from a different person [e4-SeminarISEMAT]:2:3 
18 [Escudero-G-fgl-28/3/02]; [MOPllniciativa meeting-G-fg-28/3/02] 
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domestic product was considered to be roughly three times that of 1990/° but most 
importantly the creation of 'the franchising directorate has meant that MOP receives more 
and more money from the private sector, and benefits from its technological innovation '.21 
Greater influence from the private sector has made financial feasibility of projects one of the 
principal decision criteria. This has meant that 'MOP has a huge influence over the 
country's territory, therefore it has a huge responsibility '.22 
Figure 7-c The 'metodo MOP' in practice 
Sources: (www.mop.cI and MOP 2000) 
19 [Escudero-G-fg1-28/3/02] 
20 The World Bank shows an increase in gross national income per capita from US$ 2190 in 1990, to 
US$ 4590 in 2000 (http://www.worldbank.org). 
21 [Escudero-G-fg1-28/3/02] 
22 [e4-Seminar/SEMAT]2:3 
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domestic product was considered to be roughly three times that of 1990/0 but most 
importantly the creation of 'the franchising directorate has meant that MOP receives more 
and more money from the private sector, and benefits from its technological innovation ' .21 
Greater influence from the private sector has made financial feasibility of projects one of the 
principal decision criteria. This has meant that 'MOP has a huge influence over the 
country 's territory, therefqre it has a huge responsibility, .22 
Figure 7-c The 'metodo MOP' in practice 
Sources: (www.mop.cl and MOP 2000) 
19 [Escudero-G-fg 1-28/3/02] 
20 The World Bank shows an increase in gross national income per capita from US$ 2190 in 1990, to 
US$ 4590 in 2000 (http://www.worldbank.org) . 21 [Escudero-G-fg 1-28/3/02] 
22 [e4-Seminar/SEMAT]2:3 
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The problem is that the change in the magnitude of spending was not reflected in changing 
capacities: 
The capacity of the countIy to finance infrastructure has grown far more than the 
capacity of MOP to present solutions and development proposals . . . MOP's 
capacity has not changed at the same speed ,?3 
Eventually, as discussions progressed, it became clear that this problem of capacity lay at 
the heart of the Iniciativa. However initially the focus kept falling back on the need to 
improve projects. But are these really different issues, or do they amount to the two sides of 
a coin? The view was that the gap between economic resources and organisational capacity 
had led to many projects being badly conceived, designed and implemented, at great social, 
environmental and economic costs - but what was the underlying cause of such 'bad 
projects '? A number of problems involving the institutional, administrative and cultural 
dimensions of context were mentioned (and sometimes - somewhat confusingly -
attributed to EIA shortcomings), and when combined with some characteristics of project 
formulation, came to be known as the 'MOP method' problem (Box 7_a)?4 
Box 7-a Problems with the 'metodo MOP' 
Problems relating to how projects are shaped: 
• Often project objectives are defined from a single perspective (rather than an integral one); 
• Project objectives are often unrelated to Regional economic activities; 
• The environmental theme is considered only at the final stage of project formulation; 
• Projects sometime fail to consider the social equity dimension; 
• Interests of the community targeted by the project tend not to be taken into account. 
Problems relating to the administrative, institutional and cultural dimensions: 
• There is a need for development plans (sectoral and multi-sectoral); 
• There is a lack of inter-sectoral coordination; 
• In general MOP suffers from a low level of environmental sensitivity; 
• There are problems in terms of the quality and effectiveness of EIA in the MOP, despite being well established 
both in the legal framework and in the practice of the Ministry. The problems are mainly to do with the way this is 
implemented (for example, it is initiated far too late in the process); 
• The Ministry's responsibility, and powers, are limited once the project has been completed, thus making it difficult 
for the organisation to ensure that the development objectives are actually met; 
• The regional dimension is missing (reference to the weakness of existing Regional Development Plans); 
• Lack or weakness of the spatial planning instruments (lPTs). 
Source: comments from various meetings. 
23 [Escudero-G-fgl-28/3/02] 
24 The expression 'metodo MOP' was used during the interview with Escudero and Castro [Escudero-
G-fgl-28/3/02] ; [Castro-G-fg-28/3/02] . 
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MOP's cultural straight jacket was strongly felt by most Team members who regarded the 
organisation as having too narrow a vision of its role in, and responsibility to, the country's 
development: 
'the main problem we have is that projects are badly defined ... SEA would point 
out what is missing ... conceptually, legally, economically, socially ... and would 
demonstrate the difference that would have resulted [in terms of a better decision, 
had these aspects been included] ... It would show whether people are thinking of 
"muros" [dams] or of regional development... the first is the real situation, the 
second is the desired one... Project designers call this idea [of taking a more 
strategic view of public works] "political interference" ,?5 
The cultural dimension was compounded by institutional, political and administrative 
aspects of the way initiatives are planned and decisions taken: 
'MOP divisions fail to include environmental impact results dUling the planning 
phase ... there is a lack of environmental integration during the early phases of 
project definition. For example, DOH [the people in the hydraulic operations 
directorate] think about projects following a sequence [that goes like this]: we 
need to make investments ... ,26 then they think of "muros" [i.e. concrete 
infrastructure projects], they carry out technical and economic feasibility 
studies, ... once they have completed the project proposal they remember that the 
water "produced" needs to be used. They therefore start thinking of irrigation 
schemes .... This leads to a chain of additional initiatives and Government 
expenses [s~ch as the inigation canals, the necessary roads, eventually POlt 
facilities to ship the goods to foreign markets] .. . Finally, the total cost of the 
project becomes "massive" ,.27 
The tendency is to assess projects separately, but to attribute to them wider social and 
economic benefits, such as the increase in exports, which would derive from a combination 
of initiatives. This example also highlighted wider concerns, including failure to link 
projects to 'actual community interests'; some commented that the 'metodo MOP' allows it 
2S [Escudero-G-fgl-28/3/02] Escudero clarified that in the past there had been attempts to strengthen 
planning. He mentioned an initiative (1993-94) by the Planning Directorate (Direccion de 
Planeall1iento) to design a regional development plan for the central regions (macrozona central), 
involving architect Marcial Echenique and looking at issues ranging from productivity to climate. 
However, 'old-schoQI engineers' were able to aITest this trend towards a change of approach, partly, 
according to Escudero, because Planeamiento itself 'did not have the capacity . .. to break through the 
established culture' and because the Minister at the time (Ricardo Lagos, the CU1Tent President of 
Chile) was himself attached to the project culture. 
26 This point refers to the fact that the Ministry is driven by the need to invest its resources, however 
it should be stressed that in most cases MOP Directorates respond to requests for infrastructure from 
'potential beneficiaries' [comment 704]. 
27 [523] 
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to design projects which only benefit a part of society?8 Similar practices 'do not facilitate 
synergic public [sector] management. .. for example, this does not help MOP to discuss 
issues with the Ministry of Agriculture [a water 'user '] ' .29 Discussions also unveiled some 
of the Ministry's limitations, since its influence tended to fizzle out as soon as the 
infrastructure was built. In response to this, one Team member argued that 'we need land-
use plans .. . but what we have now is too weak .. too easy to change'. 30 The criticisms of 
planning within the MOP, raised during the December Seminar31 were reiterated by the 
Team. The Ministry did some plans, but these were mainly composite projects or budgetary 
planning, while any policy-type initiative was simply not perceived as the driving force 
behind the organisation's spending. As one participant [MOP] at the final Workshop 
confirmed: 
'in MOP, planning practice is scarce: MOP is an institution that works with 
projects, develops projects and constructs what the project studies conclude that 
one has to build,.32 
More wonyingly, debate amongst the Team questioned the essence of strategic work by 
asking during one of the first meetings: 'is it the job [and responsibility] of MOP to be doing 
planning?' ?3 
The December Seminar also provided insights on the environmental dimension in 
Ministry that were relevant to the Iniciativa. Different parts of the organisation had different 
roles and attitudes to the theme; this led to some intense debate, which seemed to favour a 
focus on the concept of environmental integration: 
'the function of SEMAT is not to protect the environment ... it's closer to the 
idea of integration ... or incorporation '; 
'the truth is that if we are to be realistic .. . it's integration ... [it's about doing] 
assessments of development [proposals], and [ensUling] that the environment is 
wOlth as much as the economic, social and political components ... to make sure 
we do good projects'; 
28 [Castro-G-fg-28/3/02] 
29 [Castro-G-fg-28/3/02] 
30 [Escudero-G-fg 1-28/3/02] 
31 [e4-Seminar/SEMAT] 
32 [e-S-SeminarIMOP] 1:3 
33 [MOP-Illiciativa meeting-G-fg1 -S/4/02] 
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'the concept of protection and sustainability within the Ministry is absolutely ... 
vague ... what is a sustainable motOlway? We do not have the answer'; 
'our MinistJy ... intends to use the concept of "development" in terms of social 
and economic development of the countJy ... a poor country that has a condition 
of poverty ... [a countJy] in transition ... hence, the concept that we tend to use 
here [in the MOP] is that of infrastructure for development, to get us out of the 
condition of poverty. Sustainable development is viewed as a [type ot] 
development for countries that already have a celtain standard ,?4 
Sustainable development was considered a highly 'political theme' and it was evident from 
the way people discussed this, that there was a certain reticence in adopting this 
terminology, as if inappropriate in the MOP cultural context. In fact, one participant argued 
that: 
'historically, this MinistJy has not considered the environmental variable ... it 
builds great infrastructure works, and the political weight of MOP is in terms of 
the kilometres of tarmac road [it builds] ... therefore to discuss ... sustainable 
development is as if we were the Hare Krishna group ... 
To talk about sustainable development [in this context] is not strategic ... it is 
more reasonable ... more practical to [address the issue] by asking what would be 
a good project'.35 
In an earlier interview, Astorga had highlighted some of the challenges in pursuing 
environmentally sustainable development: 'Chile is the far-west of territorial regulation', 
apart from a few protected areas, most land is open to development and EIA is the only filter 
available. However, EIA's effectiveness is compromised by - inter alia - the fact that the 
critical concept of the 'territOly's environmental value ,36 which it is supposed to protect, is 
still awaiting interpretation and guidance to make it applicable in practice, both in planning 
and development projects (Astorga 2000:Chapter 4). 
34 Each statement is from a different person [e4-SeminarISEMATJ:1-2 
35 [e4-SeminarISEMATJ:2. Note that this comment, shared by others in the room, conflicts somewhat 
with the message in the Environmental Policy of the Ministry (MOP 2001). When this was pointed 
out, Astorga stressed that the document was aimed at the future, was indicative and programmatic. 
Implying that its propositions were for the future rather than immediate application. 
36 This expression was included in the Ley 19.300 as: 'valor ambiental del territorio' . 
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Hence, SEMAT appeared to stress the importance of environmental integration (cf. Section 
5.3.2) in the short term, albeit recognising - also in the light of its Policy on Environment, 
Territory and Participation (MOP 2001) - that the ultimate goal is for the Ministry to 
promote sustainable development. 37 In fact, its Director concluded that SEMA T 'must 
support the Minister in [promoting] sustainable development', as it co-ordinates and 
monitors the implementation of the new environmental policy within the Ministry and in 
other public administrations. 
The problems identified here echo those exposed during the CED Seminars: the 
need for strategic outlooks ('una mirada estrategica '), the weakness of environmental 
integration processes and institutions, and of the capacity to define environmentally 
sustainable development at regional or watershed level. They provided the basis for 
deciding the objectives of the Iniciativa. 
7.1.2 Defining and learning 
The discussion about the 'object' of SEA within MOP overlapped with issues of context and 
purpose, in line with ~e propositions in Chapter 3. After a series of meetings and round 
tables,38 the Team came to the conclusion that the main purpose of introducing SEA was to 
promote 'new ways of working' in the Ministry, to change the way it conceived projects. 39 
Intermediate objectives included: 
1) Promoting the identification of the strategic environmental and sustainability 
implications of decisions (reflecting the need to provide projects with a strategic 
framework which raises strategic issues that can guide their definition); 
2) Strengthening the integration of assessment and planning processes (reflecting the 
need for Directorates like Vialidad [Transportation] to integrate the process of 
design and construction with that of assessment); 
37 Interestingly, the attitude towards this concept changed during the /niciativa. 
38 The author was present to eight of these [MOPI/niciativa meetings-G-fgl-8], however, there were 
many more between the Escudero and other members of the Team. 
39 'nuevas formas de trabajo'. 
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3) Facilitating the identification of priority projects from a sustain ability perspective 
(reflecting the need to prioritise projects according to environmental and social 
criteria, so that the Ministry can get on with its work of investing in infrastructure); 
and 
4) Promoting the conditions for a change - in the medium turn - of the 'MOP method' 
of investing in public works (reflecting the need to ensure that other organisations, 
such as regional governments, work at a more strategic level).40 
These effectively relate back to the simple, though crucial need - identified by Escudero and 
Castro - to bridge the gap between the major increase in economic resources and the 
complexity and responsibilities that come with these on the one hand, and the capacity of 
the organisation on the other. In many ways, this was short of a revolutionary expectation. 
Undeniably, reaching this conclusion took a lot of effort, and at times frustrated some 
members of the Team who were more interested in the methodological aspects of SEA and 
could see little point in some of the discussions. However, the process of unravelling why 
SEA should be introduced in the Ministry led to learning about the strategic dimension of 
the organisation 's work, influence and responsibilities. None of the problems raised were 
newly discovered; however, exploring this dimension and its organisational context helped 
to structure some of the thinking, promoting a shift from the early focus on project 
inadequacy and EIA limitations to a new outlook. Firstly, the Team concentrated on the 
complexity of the relationship between environment and development, mindful of the 
political and cultural dimensions that characterise the Ministry and its 'method '. Secondly, 
having considered some of the main problems from an administrative and institutional 
perspective, participants identified the link between organisational capacity and concrete 
problems in project conception and design. 
The nature of the relationship between development and the environment, including its 
social element, is of course at the heart of any justification for instruments like SEA 
(Chapter 2). SEA's full potential is realised by placing this issue openly on the table, and 
discussing it across sectors, administrations, cultures; it then becomes evident that the whole 
discussion is really about promoting sustainable development, even when - as in the case of 
40 [Escudero-G-fg 1-28/3/02]; [Castro-G-fg-28/3/02] 
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the Ministry - such a theme is often considered low priority, or even inappropriate (Section 
7.1.1). This process also showed how resistance to a more strategic approach was going to 
be one of the main obstacles that the Team would face: when some Team members 
presented examples of issues which were not usually taken into account through the Mhodo 
MOP, but which should be considered in order to have 'good ', sustainable projects, others 
reacted with scepticism: 'let's keep our feet firmly on the ground '.41 Given the close link 
between strategic visions and sustainability (Chapter 3), this attitude was likely to pose a 
formidable challenge. 
The deliberations on the nature of 'strategic' uncovered the tension between the need for a 
holistic, or at least inter-sectoral - approach to the development, and the crude sectoral 
reality of organisations such as the MOP. Crucially, once the problem of project conception 
is linked back to the vacuum of clear indications for the sustainable development of regions 
across the country, the logical conclusion is that the relevance and rationale behind the 
existence of the Ministry itself is brought into question. Escudero concluded that MOP had a 
'strategic subordinated problem', a play on words by which he meant that the Ministry was 
in a somewhat paradoxical position, whereby it financed infrastructure for most economic 
sectors, but had little control over the way these sectors were planned (if at all) regionally.42 
Hence, viewed from~the perspective discussed above it was in a subordinate position despite 
being the most influential Government body after the Treasury.43 It could also be argued that 
the Ministry had benefited from the fact that regional plans (where they had been produced) 
were still weak instruments, since this would have allowed it greater independence and 
influence over what should be invested where, maintaining the highly centralised character 
of Chilean governance (Chapter 5). 
41 Original: '/lO vamos alas /lubes' . 
42 [Escudero-G-fa3-23/9/02] Original: 'tenemos un problema estrategico subordinado' [G-fa3-
23/9/02] 
43 The influence of MOP was concisely illustrated by one member of SEMAT who reflected on the 
fact that 'the Ministry 'is seen by politicians as the provider of visibility .. . it is the one [Ministry] that 
builds things and therefore bring votes .. . In Chile, inauguration of public works is a high priority .. . a 
great event. . . we even have the expression of "cortarla cillta'" [Pavez-G-b-26/9/02]. 
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7.1.3 The Case: A Plan for the Lluta and San Jose Rivers 
The unpacking of the 'strategic' dimension of the work done in the MOP helped to set a 
demanding agenda for SEA. The next step was to select an initiative that could be subject to 
a trial SEA (or simulation, as the Team called it). The Team felt it needed a case that would 
allow it to learn about working with a more strategic outlook, by which it intended the 
consideration of alternative development solutions and, closely connected to this, the themes 
of sustainable development at regional or watershed level, of cross-sectoral integration and 
better consideration of social and environmental aspects of development. Hence, after much 
discussion of various mega-projects the Team was able to agree on the Master Plan for the 
Rio Lluta and San Jose in the Primera Region. This was seen as a good example of an 
initiative whose implications were mostly within the remit of MOP itself. At least, this was 
what the Team thought at the beginning (but see Section 7.3). The nature of the initiative 
itself, which can best be described as potentially strategic, raised further insight into SEA 
'strategic' objects. 
The proposed initiative regarding the rivers Lluta and San Jose, located in the extreme North 
of Chile (Figure 7-d), involved MOP's central Hydraulic Works Directorate (DOH) as the 
lead authority, its regj onal office, and the Water Directorate (DGA).44 Although it had come 
onto DOH's agenda at roughly the same time as the Iniciativa, the history of the proposal 
went back more than a decade in a way that is often common with major and costly 
infrastructure projects aimed to solve complex problems whose understanding (and framing) 
keeps evolving as governments wait for the right time to invest: 45 'individual projects are 
already on the way, others are being planned ... and there is the political dimension '.46 
Espinosa [CED] stressed that DOH had been concerned for years about flooding in the 
region and that it had 'committed itself publicly to address these [problems]' but that until 
then it had had mixed results and 'needed to provide solutions with more certain 
outcomes ,.47 
44 Direcci6n de Ohras Hfdraulicas, Direccion General de Aguas, see Figure 7-b for the Ministry's 
organigramme. 
45 The same was suggested in relation to the PMRH (Chapter 6) which some interviewees saw as the 
natural evolution of an earlier idea of large inigation projects. 
46 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg4-9/5/02]:6 
47 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg3-7/5/02] 
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Figure 7 -d The study area within the Primera Region 
RIO SAN JOSE 
BASIN 
PERU 
Notes: The two river basins (Lluta and San Jose) discussed in the Terms of Reference of DOH, are identified here by 
green borders. The inset shows their position relative to the Primera Region and to bordering countries. 
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DOH had started drafting the terms of reference (DOH 2002a): the typical initial stage of a 
decision-making process within the MOP. It had in mind to finance one or two dams from 
past discussions with the regional authorities and a Presidential promise dating from the last 
major flooding, but had little information on the 'cost and location' of these potential 
projects, hence it planned to initiate studies to explore technical options.48 This is how the 
initiative was introduced to the Team. 
Naturally, the first reaction was to criticise most underlying assumptions: the pre-defined 
solution, the emphasis on cost and location as the main criteria, to mention but a few. 
However, this was the essence of the 'metodo MOP': having listened to the presentation by 
DOH, Escudero concluded that unless the lniciativa influenced the course of events through 
SEA, the Directorate would simply look for those projects that would be necessary to meet 
the objectives of the terms of reference (DOH 2002a) and that would have no major 
environmental impacts, thus following the traditional approach to decision-making.49 In a 
brief chat after the fourth Team meeting on the subject, Astorga reflected that it was only 
recently that the MOP had addressed the questions of 'why and for what are we doing this '. 
He too thought the terms of reference of the DOH still revealed the 'old way' of thinking of 
DOH, which essentially entailed identifying a list of projects, despite being called a Plan.50 
Indeed, it was a proposal that looked more like a combination of projects and some broader 
overview of the river systems; however, the Team decided to look for the potentiality within 
the initiative; and this was to become a key element of their approach to the 'strategic' 
dimension. DOH proceeded to explain the Plan in its structural and non-structural 
components: 51 
• Feasibility study for mUltipurpose dams on both rivers - considered 'a priority' and 
had to be discussed in terms of 'location and technical aspects '; and 
• Three sub-plans: for the riverbank and riverbed management, for rainwater 
management in the city of Arica, and for the regulation and optimisation of the river-
mouths (including related oceanographic studies linked to the affected coastline). 
48 The description of the Plan draws largely from two primary sources: [Escudero-G-fa3-23/9/02] and 
[G6mez-G-fal-23/5/02] and the draft Terms of Reference for the studies (DOH 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 
2002d). 
49 [MOP-Illiciativa meeting-G-fg3-7/5/02] 
50 [MOP-Illiciativa meeting-G-fg4-9/5/02] 
51 [G6mez-G-fal -23/5/02] 
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51 [G6mez-G-fal-23/5/02] 
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Together, these components were to become known by the Team (not officially by DOH) as 
Sustainable Development Plan of the Rivers Lluta and San Jose (hereafter the 'Plan' or 
SDPR), indicating the desire for them to be treated together and in the framework of 
sustainability. Initially, DOH wanted an integrated study and master plan that would search 
for solutions to all the components, taking into account the various perspectives of the 
sectors involved (by sector it meant rainwater, riverbank management, etc.), and -
significantly - taking a broad approach to water management in the region, including: 
irrigation, protection from flooding and resulting damage of economic activities (especially 
agriculture), and water quality issues due to rivers crossing a sulphur mine (a reduction in 
flooding could mean reducing the risk of water pollution). 
Having selected an initiative for the assessment exercise, the next stage required a 
definition of the approach and tools of SEA. The next Section takes stock of the analysis of 
this early phase in the Iniciativa, and combines this with the investigation in earlier chapters 
to propose two conceptual frameworks for addressing SEA. 
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7.2 Introducing concepts and methods 
[SEA should identify the} two most important [environmental} themes ... This is how I understand it... 
this is the job to be done ... not calculations or anything of the sort 
Aurora Puig, DOH 
Under/ying the concept of analysis is the concept of sustainability 
Government official 
[SEA} ratified common sense ... it provided a sort of scientific systematization ... and clarified the 
incoherence between DOH and DGA 
Member of the Team (Iniciativa) 
7.2.1 A conceptual framework for inserting SEA 
Chapter 5, and the initial part of this Chapter have focused on 'why' SEA could be of 
interest respectively: to Chilean authorities in general, and to MOP in particular. This 
Section builds on these insights to address two, closely related, questions: 'how' can SEA be 
introduced in MOP in general, and how can it be applied to the DOH case in particular. The 
first requires a conceptual framework for the translation of the concepts of SEA in a 
particular organisational context, the second requires a full SEA methodology. Also, the 
first question is central to this thesis, and the author's involvement in the Iniciativa provided 
a means to explore it. The second question reflects the direct interests of SEMA T in an SEA 
simulation exercise for the Iniciativa, whose main tasks the author was asked to help define 
(Chapter 4). She agreed to produce, not a full methodology, but a structured process that 
would help the Team to think through how it could apply SEA, including designing a 
method and tools (Bina 2002a). This had the advantage that she would not be imposing a 
particular conception of SEA, but would provide the Team with the instruments to develop 
one itself (Section 7.2.2). 
Drawing on the trends and propositions (Table 5-a) from the early theoretical work carried 
out for the PhD 'up to October 2001 , including a final contribution to the European research 
project ANSEA (Section 4.2.4), and on the empirical findings, comments and in sights 
collected throughout field work, this Section presents the four components of a conceptual 
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framework for the insertion of SEA in an organisation, thus helping to fill a gap in the 
literature, and to emphasise the context-specific character of SEA processes. 
The 1996 definition of SEA by Sadler and Verheem and the IAIA Performance Criteria 
(2002b) were used to provide a basic description of SEA, both during the CED Seminars 
(Chapter 5) and with SEMA T and the Team. However, the conceptual framework and 
guidance presented here are premised on the notion of SEA as a banner for a range of 
concepts and needs that have become increasingly pressing since the 1970s, and on an 
argument that ultimately the call for SEA is none other than a call for environmentally 
sustainable development. Figure 7-e illustrates this framework: the purpose of introducing 
SEA in an organisation and the functions that SEA ('A ') is then called upon to carry out, 
depend on the way context (both the wider regional or country context and the specific 
context of the organisation seeking to use SEA) frames the strategic and environmental 
dimensions. Hence, themes and initiatives become problems and 'objects' of an assessment 
CS ') only once the context has framed them in such terms, also in the light of its 
environmental values ('E '). Only once these components have been clarified can actors 
choose amongst the many approaches and tools available under the broad heading of SEA, 
and indeed the many other acronyms and similar strategic instruments (Section 2.2.2). 
Thus, a further assumption here is that the discussion about whether to use SEA, Strategic 
Assessment, Sustainability Appraisal, etc., should be solved from the perspective of the 
needs extrapolated from the contexts. 
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Figure 7 -e Interpreting SEA 
Interpreting the 'banner': 
normative objectives, principles and characteristics of 
SEA through the wider & organisational context 
. to introduce and operationalise it 
S - STRATEGIC 
Dimension: 
the source of the problem 
(a strategic initiative and its 
context) 
PURPOSE 
of SEA in a specific context 
E - ENVIRONMENTAL 
Dimension: 
the set of values that frame'S' 
as a problem 
WHY: 
worldviews 
in a particular 
context 
From WHY to HOW: 
A - ASSESSMENT 
Dimension 
Functions, activities to be 
carried out to meet the purpose 
.. Purpose shapes assessment in the light of the 
perceived problems CS') 
framed according to a set of values (E') 
Another premise of the conceptual framework described here, is the idea that each SEA 
constituent dimension can best be conceptualised by considering it from the perspective of 
the context-specific understanding of assessment and planning/decision-making (Figure 7-
f).52 This, it is argued, is essential in order to make the highly acclaimed principle of process 
integration (Section 3.1.2) operational. 
52 This distinction is based on the definition of policy-process in Chapter 2, which includes activities 
for assessment, planning and decision-making. 
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Figure 7-f The relationship between assessment, planning/decision-making and 
defining SEA 
ASSESSMENT 
STRATEGIC 
Dimension 
ASSESSMENT 
Dimension 
PLANNING & 
DECISION-MAKING 
The choice of four components (Figure 7-g) : purpose, strategic, environmental, and 
assessment) was relatively straightforward: they represent the research propositions 
combined with the empirical findings. They draw from the effort made during the first year 
of the PhD to disaggregate the SEA acronym and explore one by one its three constituent 
dimensions. The purpose of SEA is added as the fourth component, since it has been argued 
that the meaning of each dimension will depend on the purpose, which in turn can only be 
defined by the context. The aim of the framework is to establish 'why' and 'how' to 
introduce SEA in a particular organisational context. Table 7-a summarises the objective of 
each component. 
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Table 7-a The four components and their objectives 
SEA Component Taking into account the wider and organisational contexts, the component 
objectives can be summarised thus: 
A Strategic dimension: • To identify what it is about the existing policy process that needs changing/improving 
the 'object' of the from a sustainability perspective: What is the nature of the problem(s), how does it 
assessment relate to the environmental capacity of the organisation and the wider context? 
• To identify the type of organisations and stakeholders which should typically be 
involved in environmental integration and pursuit of sustainability. 
B Environmental • To identify the concepts and values that provide the basis for environmental 
dimension: the integration/sustainable development (within the organisation and its wider context): 
reference framework What is the social meaning of environment? What interpretation of sustainable 
development? 
C Purpose • To discuss definitions of key concepts and terms in context (strategic, environmental, 
assessment - see also Table 7-d); 
• To define the purpose of SEA in relation to the four dimensions of the wider and 
organisational contexts: political, cultural, institutional and administrative; 
• To define the scope and nature of SEA in relation to the broad types of initiatives that 
could be the 'object of SEA ' (see also 'A'). 
0 Assessment • To identify the different activities that can be included within the concept of 
dimension: activities assessment, bearing in mind A, Band C above. 
Although they are listed A to D, the order and relationship between each task is not linear: it 
entails an iterative and dialogical process (supported by information and analysis) between 
A, Band C (the three yellow ovals in Figure 7-g), before addressing D (assessment). In 
practice, components A to C equate to the dialogical process that took place during the CED 
Seminars (Chapter 5), the SEMAT Seminar in December 2001, and the Team meetings 
since the launch of the Iniciativa, where the strategic and environmental dimensions in MOP 
were discussed in an effort to agree on the purpose (fourth oval) of introducing SEA in 
MOP. Definition of the purpose would help to identify the broad characteristics and 
principles for operationalising SEA ('assessment ', component D) in the Ministry.53 Thus, 
Figure 7-g summarises the elements of the full inquiry into SEA conceptions and practice in 
Chile: the initial part that sought to answer the question 'why' referring to the broad national 
context through a range of stakeholders (Chapter 5), the second stage that critically 
reviewed an SEA identifying conceptual weaknesses which affected the practice (Chapter 
6), and this final part ~hat seeks to answer 'why ' and 'how ' questions from the perspective 
of one organisation. 
53 A classic example of an SEA principle which praxis shows to be at best poorly applicable (for 
example Short et at. 2003) is the consideration of alternatives, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Figure 7-g Organisational context and four components to introduce SEA 
STRATEGIC 
Dimension: 
Range of 'Object' type 
Component A 
SEA 
organisation specific 
PURPOSE 
ComponentC 
ASSESSMENT 
Dimension 
Activities under the heading 
'assassment' Component D 
Dimension: 
eference framework 
ComponentB 
x 
ID 
E 
8 
n; 
•• c: 
> .2 ~i 
e> 
o 
ID 
-s 
.s 
n; 
c: 
.2 
~ ~x 
> ~ ~ O en c: o 8 
::z::: ID 
-S 
.s 
While the last oval, 'Assessment - component D' is the ultimate objective of any process 
that aims to introduce SEA - and of course, of making it operational, as in the case of the 
lniciativa - it is claimed that the three preceding components are crucial in ensuring the 
relevance, acceptability and effectiveness of the concepts and the resulting approach and 
tools. The order of the framework 's components is based on the assumption that there can 
be no pre-determined model of SEA, and that even the IAIA performance criteria (2002b) 
can only be indicative of what is expected of the instrument, although it can be an objective 
of SEA to try and promote these, in which case the emphasis on purpose allows one to 
53 A classic example of an SEA principle which praxis shows to be at best poorly applicable (for 
example Short et al. 2003) is the consideration of alternatives, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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recognise this function explicitly, and shape the instrument (component D) accordingly. The 
two brown-line ovals and arrows indicate the dynamic character of the framework, and the 
way each component influences the other. By including the oval 'interpreting the purpose of 
SEA ' they stress the link between organisations and the wider context. 
7.2.2 A conceptual framework for operationalising SEA 
In Spring 2002 the author produced a guidance document to help the Team to translate SEA 
concepts into an approach and tools that were specific to an 'object' (in this case DOH's 
Sustainable Development Plan for Rivers Lluta and San Jose - SDPR) and its context 
(MOP's). The guide resulted from an iterative process that blended theoretical perspectives 
with the insights from the early meetings where Team members exchanged views on how 
they wanted to proceed with the SEA exercise in relation to the DOH process, clarifying 
what they thought could reasonably be expected from the formulation process in terms of its 
strategic outlook (best expressed through the nature of alternatives that could be 
considered), and how this could relate to the SEA objectives established at the beginning. It 
was ready by the end of May 2002. On this basis the Team carried out the initial stages of an 
SEA between June and September, and discussed results in a two-day seminar (October 
2002). Section 7.3 analyses this experience. 
----
Many authors have stressed the need for methodological guidance since the mid-1990s. 
Partidario (1996:50) called for something that would 'leave enough flexibility for SEA to 
become adapted to particular requirements in the integration of EA principles into decision-
making '. Later, Thissen (2000b: 175) identified a need for guidelines that would 'assist 
practitioners in selecting an appropriate approach given a specific situation and objectives' 
(emphasis added), arguing that empirical evidence for this was lacking and more research 
was needed at the interface of SEA and policy making. These calls remain high on the 
academic (Noble 2002: 13) and policy agendas, particularly amongst international funding 
agencies keen to apply SEA in less developed countries. 54 This research seeks to re-frame 
this need by distinguishing between understanding why and how SEA can be introduced in a 
particular organisational context, and subsequently applied to different initiatives (or 
54 This was discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, and was the focus of several seminars to which the author 
was a participant observer: [d4-SeminarlWorld Bank] [d5-Seminar/OECD-DAC] [D6-
SeminarIDFID-OECD-DAC] 
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'objects '). The framework described here is based on the work done for the guidance, but 
also reflects on its continuity with the effort to conceptualise SEA at the organisational level 
discussed throughout the. Iniciativa. Figure 7 -h illustrates the link between the first 
framework (yellow oval) and the case-by-case exercise of defining the purpose, approach 
and tools of SEA (blue ovals). 
Figure 7-h Operationalising SEA 
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The components remain the same, but acquire partly a different meaning as they refer to a 
specific initiative. This is particularly true of the strategic and environmental components, 
which now relate to the details of one proposal, as well as to the worldviews that inform 
each concept (Figure 7-e). In the document produced by the author for SEMAT, each 
component is developed in terms of objectives, key aspects, and detailed activities that 
would guide the Team, helping them to shape SEA. Table 7-b summarises the objectives, 
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key questions and tasks for each component in relation to the SDPR. The Team meetings in 
May, to discuss the strategic and environmental dimensions of the Plan were a first attempt 
to CatTY out some of the iterative tasks under components 1-3. 
Table 7-b The four components: objectives and key questions 
1 - Purpose Component 
Objective: To define the purpose of SEA in relation to the context, the scope and nature of the initiative 
(the SDPR) being assessed (see also 2) 
2 Strategic Component: the 'object' of the assessment 
Objective: 
Key questions: 
To define as clearly as possible the stages of the planning process and the key moments of 
decision-making. Identify all organisations and stakeholders involved. 
The strategic dimension of SEA depends on the characteristics of the initiative it will 
assess (and on the purpose of the SEA): 
Type (and level, scale, scope) of the initiative. Which of the following issues are to be 
addressed by the decision-making process? 
• why? The needs, objectives and principles of the strategic initiative; 
• what? The alternative solutions, options and implementation methods of the strategic 
initiative; 
• where? The location of the strategic initiative; 
• how? The design, minimisation and compensation (typically addressed at project level 
(through EIAs). 
If..?ppropriate, distinguish between those which are likely to be addressed, and which would 
you want it to address, for example in the case of mega-projects (cf. with Component 1: 
Purpose). 
The status of the strategic initiative being assessed: It is essential to distinguish between 
different statuses of strategic initiatives since, although desirable, it is not always possible to 
apply SEA to the earliest stages of an initiative's formulation process: 
• An existing product, or document for a strategic initiative: 
o Which is half way through its definition process (for example, a draft paper 
already exists); 
o Which already exists and has been approved (through a legal or other 
procedure); 
• A process of formulation of a strategic initiative, for example: 
o In its very early stages; 
o In its very early stages of formulation, but with an explicit link to certain 
projects which have already been defined (or even approved, for example, as 
part of earlier decisions). 
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1 
3 • Environmental component: the reference framework 
Objective: 
Key questions: 
To produce (identify sources for) a generic reference framework for environmental 
integration/sustainable development, to support the planning and assessment processes and 
the development of a 'strategic outlook 'that focuses on environmental and sustainability 
dimensions. 
The environmental dimension in SEA can reflect one or more of these different agendas: 
• Environmental protection and conservation; 
• Environmental integration (in sectoral initiatives and in broad economic development 
initiatives); 
• Sustainable development. 
The last two imply an increasing level of attention to socio-economic issues, and assume that 
understanding the interaction between these is as important as identifying potential effects on 
the environment. 
4 • Assessment component 
Objective: 
Key questions: 
To identify the different activities that can be included within the concept of assessment, 
bearing in mind the other processes and methods that are routinely applied. 
In terms of process, assessment within SEA can be conceived as: 
• An integrated assessment process that applies to, and during, the formulation process for 
a strategic initiative (PPP); or 
• An ex post assessment process applied to an existing strategic initiative. 
In terms of activities to be included in the overall strategic assessment concept, the following 
can be considered: 
• Definition of guidance and recommendations for the formulation of strategic initiatives; 
• Assessment of coherence, synergies, conflicts and gaps between the different strategic 
initiatives proposed within the same study area (for example, geographical, ecological, 
sectoral); 
• Assessment of the environmental and/or sustainabilily consequences; 
• Audit of the final decision on the strategic initiative; 
• Definition of guidance and recommendations for the formulation of an implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation plan(s). 
The questions in Table 7-b need to be answered upfront in order to shape the assessment and 
thus help those who engage in the SEA process to know what is being done and why. This 
emphasis on clarity of purpose underpins the entire conceptual framework, and owes much 
to the insights gained from the analysis of the PMRH assessment process (Chapter 6), and 
from the author's past experience as a practitioner. For the definition of the strategic 
dimension, in terms of focusing on identifying decision-making moments and main actors 
involved (Bina ' et at. forthcoming), she is indebted to the research as a member of the 
European Research team on the ANSEA project (above). Note that the section on the 
'Strategic Component' in Table 7-b, recommends a framework of four questions ('why', 
'what', 'where', and 'how ') to discuss the nature of an initiative. Throughout the experience 
of field work in Chile it became clear that the nature of SEA's strategic dimension was best 
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understood in relation to Verheem and Tonk's framework (2000:181, cf. Section 2.2); it 
provided a very effective way of engaging discussants in exploring such a dimension if they 
were not familiar with it. 
The section 'Environmental' presents a choice that goes at the heart of the purpose and 
functions of SEA (as discussed in Section 3.2). It can either be framed as an instrument for 
strict environmental protection, or be an advocacy tool for wider sustainability goals, or 
something in-between. The scope and range of themes covered in the 'reference framework' 
will depend on this choice; choice that will be influenced by the wider and specific contexts. 
This part of the framework owes much to the work of Hedo and Bina (1999). Taking the 
case of a hydrological and irrigation plan for the Duero watershed (Spain), partly funded 
with European development money (EC 2002b), Hedo and Bina (1999:261-2) advocate the 
definition of a reference framework as a key 'element' of an SEA methodology: '[t]he 
reference framework sets the basis for the analysis. Its aim is to provide a general overview 
of... socio-economic and environmental issues' related to the sector and/or region being 
assessed. Their assumption is that understanding the objectives of the developer is a 
precondition to setting the framework for the analysis (what is referred to in Component 2 
as the boundaries of the initiative and the assessment), and therefore a consideration of these 
three issues is ess~ntial. The framework thus 'highlights the structural, institutional, and 
environmental conditions' regarding the sector or region, and 'identifies the interactions 
between socio-economic and environmental elements ... , and between the various policies 
and institutional and legal principles'. It therefore emphasises the 'interaction' between the 
pillars of sustainable development, and between these and what are called here the 
contextual dimensions. 
Finally, based on the objectives and questions, Table 7-c proposes the basic tasks for each 
component, which were partly carried out by the Team during the summer of 2002. The 
next Section explores significant moments of deliberation and learning that were triggered 
by this framework. 
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Table 7-c Tasks for each component 
SEA Component 
1" Purpose 
3 
Strategic: the 
'object' of the 
assessment 
Environmental: 
the reference 
framework 
4 Assessment: 
activities 
Main tasks 
Developers and assessors to: 
Discuss definitions of key concepts and terms in context (strategic, environmental, assessment-
SEle table lob); 
Agree on the meaning and implications of SEA for the planning and decision-making process; 
Clarify the scope and limitations of the SEA; 
Outline the logistics of the assessment process. 
PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES - Contribute to define/frame the problem that the strategic initiative is 
meant to address, and the initial objectives of the initiative. 
Note: ideally this phase should involve different actors, stakeholders and the public. 
BOUNDARIES - Contribute to the definition of the 'object's' boundaries (scope and limits): 
Contribute to the identification and review all PPPs directly or indirectly related to the 'object' 
Contribute to the definition of the geographical boundaries 
Contribute to the identification of the range (scale) of possible alternatives that is desirable and 
acceptable. 
DECISION-MAKING MOMENTS - Contribute to the identification of key decision-making moments in 
terms of: 
Inputs, data and knowledge sources 
Dialogical and analytical moments 
Results, products and decisions. 
ACTORS - Contribute to the identification of organisations/actors/stakeholders directly and indirectly 
involved, and interested in the 'object's': 
Formulation 
Funding decisions 
Implementation and monitoring. 
CONSULTATION, COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION 
Contribute to the definition of a strategy for: 
Consultation and cooperation within the lead organisation, and between this and other key 
o'tganisations/actors/stakeholders 
Public participation. 
With reference to the sector(s) and/or geographical area subject to the assessment: 
ISSUES: Contribute to the identification of environmental, social, institutional and economic 
issues (weaknesses and opportunities), their interactions and potential conflicts (current and 
potential pressures) 
RELATE to the wider context: related policies/plans, legislation etc. 
OBJECTIVES etc: Propose environmental/sustainability objectives, targets, criteria and indicators 
(where appropriate) 
IMPACTS: Identify broad environmental/sustainability impact types. 
RANGE OF POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES: 
Define guidance and recommendations for the early decision-making moments identified in '2 '; 
• Evaluate the coherence (synergies, conflicts and gaps) between the proposed initiative and other 
. PPPs (identified in '1' and '2); 
Evaluate the contribution of each alternative to environmental/sustainability objectives (and/or 
targets) 
Predict and evaluate potential environmental and sustainability consequences (where 
appropriate); 
Analyse/audit the whole planning and assessment process ex-post. 
7.3 Deliberation and learning 
Often, we [Ministry, central offices] invest .. . in infrastructure, roads, canals, dams, 
but really not even the Region has a clear idea of what it wants to prioritise, 
what direction its development is taking 
Government official 
It's a problem of institutional hierarchy, of culture, of lack of collaboration 
Government official 
This country [Chile] is full of instruments [for sustainable development] 
but has no sustainable development politics 
Luis Lira, United Nations, CEPAL 
This Section reflects on key themes and obstacles that the Team had to address throughout 
the exercise that applied components 2, 3 and 4 to the SDPR process.55 It draws from 
memoranda produced by Team members recording progress during the summer, as well as 
interviews conducted by the author during the third trip to Chile (September 2002), before 
the closing workshop (Box 7_b).56 The latter was intended as an internal discussion, hence 
the 29 participants were mainly affiliated to MOP, or involved in the SDPR, including: 
regional representatives of MOP, the Ministry of Agriculture, and CONAMA,57 the 
consultants nominated by DOH to carry out the tasks of the terms of reference (DOH 
2002d), various stakeholders from the Region, and a member of the CED (Annex E). 
Box 7-b The Agenda of the Workshop (30 September-! October 2002) 
Session 1 
Session 2 
Session 3 
Session 4 
Session 5 
The SEMAT/MOP Iniciativa 
The objective of SEA 
Progress on the SEA exercise 
Proposal for the next steps 
Round table: conclusions and recommendations for MOP 
55 Components 1 (purpose) and 2 (strategic) had partly been discussed before the guidance was 
produced (see Section 7.1). 
56 In the period between May and September the work of the Team had taken the shape of a number 
of desk studies and investigations, a dozen seminars, and a trip to the Region by four members who 
interviewed twenty local stakeholders [f-Workshop/MOPJ1:7. 
57 Camision Nacianal del Media Ambiente 
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It is stressed that this is not meant as an account of the exercise, or of the specific results of 
the assessment of the Plan, but rather as an analysis of implications and lessons that can be 
learned from such experience in relation to the central focus of the empirical investigation, 
which seeks to understand why and how an organisation would engage with SEA. The 
Iniciativa carried out a series of tasks that reflected the propositions in this thesis and 
attested to their relevance by eventually adopting a series of recommendations that endorse 
their validity, as part of the Ministry's SEA programme (SEMAT 2003). 
Context, the strategic dimension of the policy process, and purpose were central to the early 
deliberations analysed in Section 7.1. Discussions proved to be a powerful tool in 
themselves. Discourses about the nature of MOP's work revealed profound discrepancies in 
worldviews and in the understanding among participants of the nature and role of planning 
and assessment. With reference to the propositions in Chapter 3, these can be referred to as 
contextual challenges, and the following sections provide an analysis of their implications 
for SEA. 
7.3.1 Defining boundaries and problems in context (component 2) 
In discussing Component 2 (strategic), the Team had to identify the boundaries of the 
'object' of the assessment from the institutional (including issues of administrative 
responsibility) and geographical perspectives. It had to decide how wide a range of themes 
and problems it intended to address through the planning and assessment processes (Tables 
7-b and 7-c). However, it struggled to come to a specific definition of the scope and 
limitations of the initiative and its SEA, as well as their geographical boundaries.58 At times 
the exercise proved more than a little frustrating for all Directorates involved, highlighting 
the problems caused by internal fragmentation and the wider centre versus regional divide 
(Chapter 6), which have long undermined MOP's performance from a sustainable 
development perspective. 
58 [Escudero-G-memo-1917 102] 
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Many involved in the Iniciativa admitted that one of the most intractable problems was the 
fact that 'MOP Directorates do not communicate with each other,.59 This was particularly 
conspicuous in the case of a natural resource such as water, where the responsibility for 
quality and quantity was split between two Directorates: DGA and DOH respectively (and 
between other Ministries and authorities beyond MOP, cf. Chapter 6). One participant 
explained that both could be criticised for taking a very naITOW approach to their 
responsibilities: too often DOH ignored quality issues and DGA never seemed to consider 
the contribution that DOH's 'obras ' could make to water quality. One of the first results of 
the Iniciativa was to reduce - if only slightly - the fragmentation between various 
administrative units (an outcome that had also been important in the PMRH case). The 
following is an illustration of the implications of this result. 
During the week last week of April, DOH engineers, members of DOH environmental unit, 
DGA and SEMAT had two meetings to discuss the use of the Lluta and San Jose case as the 
object of the Iniciativa. This simple fact in itself was seen as a very important step forwaI'd, 
and indeed, it led to important findings. It transpired that DGA had a water resources 
management plan (a Plan Director) for the two watersheds dating from 1998 (DGA 1998).60 
This plan constituted an initial strategic reference framework for the more specific DOH 
Plan (referred to here a,s SDPR).61 In particular, it had led to a DGA recommendation that 
there should be no more additional irrigated agriculture in the Valle de Azapa, primarily for 
problems of salinization, something that could have significant implications for DOH's 
Plan. DGA also indicated useful sources of data and relevant studies (past and ongoing).62 
Discussions based on the Plan Director of 1998 also helped to refine the issues at stake in 
relation to the two rivers: in summary, planning for San Jose should focus on flooding, coast 
line and agriculture, while for Lluta issues included water quality and the related problem of 
water productivity, as well as nature and biodiversity concerns in the high plateau. However, 
despite the seemingly useful framework provided by the Plan Director, DOH resisted 
refelTing to it, and it is interesting to consider why. 
59 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fgl-5/4/o2] 
60 The 'Pial! Director' was a planning document prepared for the San Jose River by DGA in 1998, 
and therefore provided a strategic framework for the DOH ll!iciativa, however this was contested by 
DOH on various grounds, discussed later in the Chapter. 
61 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg3-7/5/02] 
62 DGA produced a list of its studies and maps (DGA 2002) of the riverbanks, and informed DOH 
that a project was to deliver maps of the river at 1 :2000. 
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In the wide-ranging discussions about the role of MOP in relation to water management in 
the Primera Region, the finger was repeatedly pointed in the direction of institutional 
constraints: to date, MOP Directorates do not have legally binding power to secure 
implementation of DGA's Planes Directores (Chapter 6).63 Thus, even in the rare cases 
where substantive planning was being developed, it was effectively frustrated by the politics 
of natural resources in Chile, which - thanks to the deep-rooted market economy policy -
resisted any substantive constraint on natural resource exploitation (Chapter 5). 
Emphasising the political will factor, one participant argued that 
'legal instruments can be invented ... [they] exist when there is the political will 
for them to exist... It is not necessary to have a law strictly speaking, for 
instruments to exist,.64 
These views were corroborated during discussions over a lunch break at the Workshop, 
when one participant noted that the Plan Director of 1998 was being attacked somewhat 
unfairly, and that the main reason for its lack of real influence was the fact that 'in this 
country we have the problem that everyone wants to decide', hence DOH - that essentially 
works with projects - does not wish to be dictated by DGA, and DGA's Plans, it's 'a 
problem of institutional hierarchy, of culture, of lack of collaboration ,.65 Indeed, in previous 
interviews with Team members from DOH, they clearly resisted saying that the SDPR was 
an initiative, which had been planned in the Plan Director of DGA, and would only accept 
that the triggers for such Plan 'coincided' .66 
However, these factors, albeit critical, do not explain the whole picture. The intangible, and 
hence potentially more intractable, problem of the capacity of the organisation (its personnel 
as well as its institutions) to shift to a more strategic way of thinking and working repeatedly 
came to the fore. On several occasions throughout the Iniciativa, and at the closing 
workshop, the impression was that planning was simply not a useful - let alone essential -
feature of the Ministry's work, leaving no doubt about the extent of the challenge. The 
problem is multifaceted, however, here is one important angle: at the workshop the regional 
63 Indeed the 1998 Plan was reported as not having been 'validated either within or outside of DGA 
and the MOP', and therefore was to be considered more as a 'draft'. [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg3-
7/5/02] 
64 [f-Workshop/MOP]9:18 
65 [f-Workshop/MOP]author 's notes:2 
66 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg7-26/9/02] 
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representative of DOH claimed that the Plan Director for the Region was simply unusable 
for their purposes.67 This is because many regional offices were interpreting planning as a 
way to identify projects for investment, and not as an instmment for holistic overviews and 
vision setting. Other participants argued that regions were looking for the wrong 
information in the wrong place, since providing detailed data was not the point of such 
plans.68 Together, these arguments revealed a lack of tiering. On the one hand, people 
tended to talk about plans or programmes as one stage and projects as the other, leaving 
little room for policies. This could be explained with reference to the project-limbo 
phenomenon (Section 5.2) and the tendency to collapse questions of 'why' and 'how' within 
one level - usually the project one - without the transparency and opportunity for 
deliberation that is expected in policy-making. On the other hand, concerns expressed by 
DOH (and other Directorates) suggest that Planes Directores need to lead to more detailed 
technical programmes and/or relate to infrastructure plans, to facilitate the understanding of 
their relevance and applicability within regional offices engaged in projects.69 However, this 
requires close collaboration between DGA and DOH. 
In addition to the internal Ministerial politics and the problem of MOP's limited remit 
(discussed above), defining the issues and the geographical boundaries of the initiative also 
highlighted the pers~tent stmggle for power between central and local authorities. By the 
fifth Team meeting, the role and involvement of the Regional Government in the planning 
and assessment process was tabled for debate. As discussed in Chapter 6, MOP and central 
Government in general are reluctant to promote devolution of powers beyond the necessary 
lip-service to the concept; however, as the Iniciativa evolved, it became evident that there 
was a need to involve local authorities and refer to their existing planning documents 
(including a Regional Development Strategy and a Regional Environmental Policy). 
Equally, when the concept of 'territorial environmental value' (see Section 5.3) was raised 
in the meeting, people stressed that the Region itself should in fact define this.70 
67 Salazar [DGA] described this type of 'Planes Directores' as indicative instruments which aim to 
create links between the two principal functions of the State as regulator and investor, with private 
sector's investment role, to 'generate guidance and recommendations '. [f-Workshop/MOP]2:22 
68 [f-Workshop/MOP]author's notes:3 
69 [Comment-704] 
70 [MOP//niciativa meeting-G-fg5-16/5/02] A number of other issues were suggested to be relevant: 
the indigenous people's rights and livelihoods (which would be affected by the initiative), the 
geographical scope of the planning effort and whether this should include the high plateau and related 
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Given this background, it is less surprising that even before the SEA exercise officially 
started in June, the SDPR began to lose some of its 'potentiality' for strategic outlook. The 
following account demonstrates the real difficulty in winning hearts and minds over the 
need to take a broader look at what is being done to 'rise above' the project level. Or, with 
reference to the primary purpose for SEA listed above (Section 7.1.2), to 'change the way 
things are done' in the Ministry. It suggests a need to fight against the invisible enemy of 
political and cultural dimensions that combine to act as a sort of gravitational force that 
pulls 'downwards', preventing both senior and junior professionals to see beyond the tight 
boundaries of projects.?l 
DOH's Plan had been chosen because it promised the possibility of an integrated approach 
in the search for solutions to the rivers' problems.72 However, two things soon transpired: 
that part of the Directorate's hierarchy was more interested in concrete (quite literally) 
results than in a process of integrated and sustainable planning, and that the definition of 
what problems needed solving was far from un-contentious. Let us explore the first issue. 
The SEA exercise started almost in parallel with one of the first key stages of planning: the 
drafting of the terms of reference for the Plan. The first version (DOH 2002a) was quite 
promising, as it emphasised the integrated approach and the synergy between all the 
different sub-plans and the proposed dams. It also included a detailed request for the 
gathering of environmental information and the involvement of stakeholders which would 
have been in line with the idea of 'reference framework' proposed under component 3 
(Tables 7-b and 7-c) However, very soon this changed. A meeting of technical experts in 
May concluded that the draft terms of reference '[would] not work for the dams' as they 
could not provide the 'technical' solutions needed at the feasibility stage. Placing the dams 
component at 'feasibility stage' effectively meant that the integrated approach was little 
more than afa~ade, at least for some people in DOH.73 This impression was compounded by 
biodiversity issues, and the international dimension of the watershed: 'each litre of water taken from 
the watershed is a litre less for Bolivia '. 
71 Cf. Section 7.1.3. 
72 The whole concept and process underlying the first terms of reference was indeed promising. For 
example, the Plan included actions relating to the liver mouth and port infrastructure and, in a quite 
unprecedented move, G6mez [DOH] had provided the Directorate for Ports Infrastructure with a copy 
of the draft ToR asking them to contribute to the section related to their responsibilities. Furthermore, 
the two Directorates signed an agreement for the joint funding of part of the studies. 
73 [Escudero-G-fg2-27/9/02] [G6mez-G-fg-27/9/02] 
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the fact that at the same meeting some proposed to scrap the whole range of sub-studies 
under the heading 'Plan Maestro '. Several people demonstrated a clear opposition to the 
whole idea of integrated approach and of planning in general. 74 Referring to the terms of 
reference (2002a) they were reported by a participant as saying: 
, "[this is] a cocktail of things" ... the point of [having] integration was not being 
seen ... [People asked:] "why include the coastal areas? ... regarding the plans: 
will there be a project for construction coming out of them? .. why is it worth 
thinking in terms of doing plans?" , .75 
After a lot of discussion, it was decided that both elements would stay, however that two 
separate terms of reference would be produced, while care would be taken to ensure 
coordination between them. Hence, the threat came and went, but it set the tone of what was 
to come, and left no one in doubt about where priorities lay. The search for common ground 
promised to be a rough ride. 
In trying to define the boundaries of the plan and the SEA, the Team referred to five sources 
of information: the Plan Director, the Regional Development Strategy, the Regional 
Environmental policy, the Ecological Profile, and a series of interviews between MOP and 
regional stakeholders, arranged as part of the Iniciativa. From these, four issues were 
highlighted: the over~xploitation of water resources and related disequilibrium between 
demand and supply, salinization, flooding, and the expansion of the city of Arica in the 
Valle de Azapa. Of these, the issue of overexploitation was one of the most intractable and 
formative (in terms of learning), since it called into question the focus of DOH (and MOP) 
on providing the infrastructure promised by the President in 2001 76 and the organisation's 
tendency to steel clear of the water use issue, which would inevitably arise once the dams 
were built, given the water-hungry region in general, and farmers in particular. This 
separation between the economic dimension of the resource and its physical management 
undermined the early attempts at an integrated approach to the DOH Plan.77 Indeed, the 
initial results of the SEA were demonstrating the contradictions arising from the narrow 
scope and boundaries of the studies, ignoring the complex dynamics of the river basin's 
74 [4'11".] CQ) 
75 [4gJ C(~J 
76 This 'Presidential promise' whereby that something would be done for the Region, was made by 
Lagos in the aftermath of the 2001 flooding and cited by all regional stakeholders interviewed by the 
Team. [f-WorkshopIMOP]9: 13 
77 [f-WorkshopIMOP]5:1 
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socio-economic and environmental characteristics, When members of the Team went to 
interview representatives of the Regional authorities (including the regional MOP), it 
became clear that forthe Region: 
'undoubtedly, the greatest interest is centred around the dams, where there are 
many expectations, both in terms of increased water availability, and in terms of 
employment opportunities ttiggered by their constt'uction [and] there are explicit 
Presidential promises of "public works during this presidential period'" ,78 
The interviews also revealed an explicit recognition of 'acute conflicts' over the use of 
water in the region,79 and the expectation that the Plan and the SEA would 'improve their 
[local authorities] position in relation to the conflict',8o 
Even if DOH was not planning the dam in order to provide additional irrigation, the reality 
on the ground was that people were already counting on such an additional resource and 
planning to increase irrigation,81 Agriculture (currently involving 10000 ha) accounted for 
approximately 15% of labour in the region and there was constant pressure for it to increase, 
not least as a result of national policies promoting the development of exports,82 Amongst 
the issues uncovered by the SEA was a parallel discussion in the Region (involving several 
agencies: Agriculture, Public Works, Planning, Treasury) which explored the use of an 
alternative 15000ha by exploiting wastewater resources from Arica, The investigation also 
" 
unveiled other options to increase the quantity of water available for production and for 
drinking purposes, There was some resistance to their inclusion, on the grounds that they 
had already been studied separately for years and they should not be unearthed again, while 
others felt they should be studied and compared with the dam initiative, especially to 
compare the environmental implications,83 No definite decision was made, but it was 
recommended that the issue of pollution of the aquifer from agriculture should become 
central to the Iniciativa's exercise, and that it should be given the highest priority by DOH 
78 [127] 
79 Typically, there are conflicts between upstream and downstream users, such as waste-water 
management companies, and farmers using in'igation: one interviewee said there was 'a blind 
tendency to increase the surface subject to irrigation', Furthermore, while in terms of agricultural 
productivity, soil salinization was 'perfectly manageable' thanks to resistant crops, this would not be 
the case for environmental pollution and implications for the aquifer [127]. 
80 [127] 
81 [f-Workshop/MOP]S:lO 
82 [f-Workshop/MOP]S:3&6 
83 [f-Workshop/MOP]S:21 
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in its terms of reference.84 In fact, Puig [DOH] commented that each of the sources 
identified by the Team: 
'took a different perspective [and] reflected different and conflicting interests. I 
expe~t SEA to demonstrate, to ... highlight the conflict and to plan with regards 
to development alternatives that are a priority from the perspective of the water 
[sector] ,.85 
Discussions also revealed a higher order of problems, which further complicated the picture 
of public sector decision-making. As explained in Section 5.2.3 (Figure 5-c), all investments 
have to be evaluated according to the procedures requested by the Planning Ministry 
(Mideplan) and the Treasury, which grant final approval. It transpired that Mideplan sets all 
the indicators to move from one stage to another, until funding is granted, and that this 
meant that 'the activities of all public services ... are directed by what Mideplan requests ,.86 
Initially most people agreed that Mideplan's primary criterion for approval, despite asking 
for economic, environmental, social and technical evaluations, was 'profitability'. However, 
discussions eventually revealed that a policy (albeit not explicit in the form of a referenced 
document, cf. Section 5.2) to support the peripheral areas of the country - such as Arica in 
the Primera Region - was in fact the primary driver behind the whole initiative in DOH; this 
profitability could be ovelTuled by the fact that the Government intended to use investments 
" 
'to maintain a presence and development' in the area. 87 
At this point the Team felt it was necessary to ask how should a Plan like the one 
being commissioned by DOH be conceived? Should its territorial and thematic boundaries 
'be maintained within the powers confelTed to the MOP in relation to water' as one team 
member suggested?88 This is precisely the type of result expected according to the 
proposition that the negotiation and implementation of SEA can help to build a strategic 
dimension (Section 3.4). The impasse led to a Team meeting specifically aimed at 
discussing 'how should we [MOP] address the use of water strategically?' and 'what is the 
84 [f-Workshop/MOP]9:23 
85 [Puig-G-memo-24/6/02] 
86 [f-Workshop/MOP]9:6 
87 [f-Workshop/MOP]9:9&11 
88 [Puig-G-memo-24/6/02] 
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relationship between the Plan Director and the Plan Maestro?,.89 Underlying the second 
question was the intractable issue of the relationship between DGA and DOH, discussed 
earlier. Judging from the memorandum of that meeting, there was no clear answer, and 
indeed this issue kept reappearing throughout the Iniciativa. 
The difficulty in setting broad enough boundaries, both in terms of the problem definition 
and the geographical scale, went to the heart of MOP's engagement with SEA. Discussions 
about the strategic scope of the SDPR inevitably pointed to the intrinsic constraints of the 
vertical and horizontal organisational context. Finding a sustainable solution for water 
management in the Region became intrinsically linked to the culture and politics of the 
organisations involved (and excluded). Weak planning could be traced back to how politics 
and culture shaped the institutional and administrative framework of MOP, defining 
responsibilities and developing certain capacities at the expense of others. The case study 
also showed that one of the main contributions of SEA was to ask strategic questions 
throughout key instances of the policy process (cf. Partidario 1996)90 and highlighted the 
need for training staff in thinking strategically about their work. As the exercise proceeded 
to address components 3 (environment) and 4 (assessment) the Team had to make sense of 
the linkages, or lack thereof, between MOP's policy process (be it for PPPs or mega-
projects) and the enyironmental dimension of development. The lessons from this are 
discussed below. 
89 [E . spmosa-T -memo-l/5/7 /02] 
90 This point was subsequently supported by comments to a draft version of this chapter [comment-
704]:39. 
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7.3.2 Interpreting 'environment' in context (component 3) 
The Team gave a broad scope to the interpretation of 'environment' in SEA. The issues 
identified, and the questions raised throughout the SEA exercise led inexorably to relating 
DOH's work to the wider picture of the Region's future development and sustainability, 
thus confirming the indivisibility between environmental and strategic planning discourses. 
The Team discussed the following strategic problems: 
• how to improve the provision of water for economic uses; 
• how to improve the quality of water for economic, but also social and environmental 
uses; 
• how to reduce the impact of flooding and sedimentation problems; 
• how to protect the ecosystem of the high plateau; 
• how to address the problem of indigenous populations of the high plateau living off 
pastoralism. 
The sustainable development theme has wider implications too. In Section 7.2.2 it is argued 
that the call for SEA is ultimately a call for environmentally sustainable development. 
Indeed, a similar point was made at the workshop: 'underlying the concept of analysis is the 
concept of sustainabjlity,.91 Environmental sustainability was central to the tensions and 
problems exposed in the exercise and throughout the workshop deliberations. The majority 
seemed to think that SEA should be introduced as an instrument that considers all three 
dimensions of sustainability (social, environmental and economic), otherwise 'if I do not 
analyse them together and simultaneously' the sustainable development dimension and 'the 
recent [efforts] to try and work in terms of a vision ... for development' will be lost.92 
However, strong reservations remained, as witnessed by this comment expressing concern 
about how SEA could be done: 
'in a less developed country ... [where] the conflict between economic optimum 
and environmental optimum is difficult to address... it is difficult to be 
innovative in the environmental theme in a country which is fighting to eat,.93 
91 [f-Workshop/MOP]ll:lO 
92 [f-Workshop/MOP] 1 1:10 
93 [525] 
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The obstacles faced by the Iniciativa confirmed the findings in Chapter 5 regarding the 
weak environmental capacity of Chile's organisations and institutions. Despite the fact that 
the water sector had a policy (unlike many other natural resources), and that the Region had 
a sustainability strategy, the clout of these documents was shown to be very weak. 
After substantial debate, the majority within the Team felt that SEA should provide decision 
makers with a set of 'economic, social and environmental criteria [and] leave the [selection 
of] alternatives open, emphasising their [performance] in relation to each criterion ,.94 This 
wider scope was actually confirmed in the Team's final recommendations (SEMAT 2003), 
and, judging from the interpretation given by Astorga, this should not necessarily result in 
the undermining of the environmental dimension: he emphasised the need to communicate 
the centrality of environmental themes in the work of the Ministry. He thought it had been 
very important to get DOH and DGA together, 'to make them understand the importance 
and complexity of the environment '. Despite sometimes feeling that some of what SEA is 
about is simply 'common sense', 95 it still appeared of great value for its ability to give a 
'systematic structure' to the way SEMAT and others presented their views (which was one 
of the objectives stated at the beginning) and make the point about the need to 'act 
strategically ,.96 
94 [Puig-G-memo-24/6/02] 
95 Having presented a description of the Humber case where the first step had been to identify the 
major problems in the area and then define the plan's objectives, Astorga concluded: 'this is simple 
common sense!' [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg2-19/4/02]. 
96 [MOP-Illiciativa meeting-G-fg4-9/5/02] 
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7.3.3 Learning about 'strategic' assessment (component 4) 
Overcoming gravitational forces 
As argued earlier, the real capacity issue related to the Ministry's ability, willingness and 
power to promote strategic thinking and perspectives, in all three elements of the policy 
process (planning, assessment and decision-making). The project-level focus of Ministerial 
staff meant that Team members were concerned about the feasibility of the assessment 
process.97 Some feared that lack of existing data, the poor quality of what was available and 
the limited timeframe of the Iniciativa (a few months), would make it impossible to gather 
sufficient baseline data and create indicators for project evaluation.98 Often discussions 
revolved around the data for a particular project part of the future Plan.99 The exchange of 
views triggered interesting reactions. Puig, Head of the Environment and Territory 
Department of DOH, clarified her views on the scope of the Iniciativa, expecting it to help 
the Team come up with a common understanding of 'what is strategic planning and what do 
we expect of it .. . as MOP', and to carry out a limited analysis with the existing data (in 
reply to concerns raised by others) so that the SEA could identify the 
'two most important [environmental] themes ... in other words [to be able to 
say:] "forget the rest". This is how I understand it. .. this is the job to be done ... 
not ca\culationso r anything of the SOlt ' .100 
She then replied to a number of colleagues who were expressing concern about the actual 
results, and kept returning to the issue of data availability, arguing that: 
97 During the December Seminar with SEMAT, when the discussion turned to the often qualitative 
character of SEA tools, several participants could not see the relevance of such approach to their 
work: 'normally, between 20-25% of [a project's] total cost is devoted to a probable re-design ... to 
examine things that had not been taken into consideration from the beginning [such as] the 
environment.. . however, I do not understand ... how we can [do this] with a qualitative analysis .. . it 
seems to me that it complicates things, how am I going to calculate .. . I don 't know: is there a method 
that allows us to define numerically not only the cost.. .? ' [e4-Seminar/SEMAT]:4. The challenge, 
implicit in this statement, turned out to be crucial in the overall effort of conceptualising SEA within 
the MOP: the majority of people working at the Ministry had almost exclusive experience of project-
level work, and shared a widespread belief that only quantitative data could influence project 
decision-making processes. 
98 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg 1-5/4/02]; [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg2-19/4/02]; [MOP-
Iniciativa meeting-G-fg3-7/5/02] 
99 One academic from the Cat61ica University commented that indeed, Chileans, and Latin Americans 
in general , tended to be good at collecting data but lacked the skills or mindset to turn this into 
'information for decision-making' [Schlotfeldt-academia-personal comment]. See also [Romero-A-a-
20112/01] 
100 [MOP-Illiciativa meeting-G-fg4-9/5/02]:4 
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'my understanding is that the first stages [of the SEA] ... you are going to say: 
look, here you have a seties of information sources, information that is available, 
information that you need to collect, and other that is defmitely not available. 
And I imagine that this [result] will come with a responsibility attached to it. .. 
and we will be establishing [through the SEA exercise] at what level of detail we 
will go etc. All this, I understand is what will be defined in the early stages [of 
the SEA],. 
The intervention led to a discussion of the use of SEA in identifying priority criteria for 
project selection within a watershed, for example. One participant concluded that the 
contribution of SEA would therefore be to 'give common sense a systematic support, a 
systematic base', which triggered a warning by another colleague who saw the complexity 
underlying choices which are clearly heavily subjective: 'of course "common senses" are 
not all equal, therefore ... of course the criteria [of one person] for another chap will [be 
different] ,.101 
Progress was being made. In a subsequent Team meeting, Ricci and Figueroa, two students 
of the Universidad de Chile presented an SEA methodology they were developing in 
collaboration with Saldfas [DOH] for a watershed in the ninth region (Southern Chile).102 
This event showed a shift in the understanding of SEA by members of the Team. Key 
members from DOH itself, were particularly critical of the approach presented, arguing that 
it was not strategic, as it failed to question the raison d'erre of the projects being proposed, 
limiting itself to the definition of an extremely detailed checklist for the assessment of each 
project. They viewed the proposed method as a way of assessing a combination of projects 
in one area, which one of them argued was already being done (though others disagreed) 
and that in any case was a costly and potentially unnecessary exercise since often projects 
are 'nullified in time' and simply never get built. They felt this was essentially a larger 
version of project EIA and that excessive effort was being made to develop an almost-
perfect baseline data set when: 
'lack of data and lack of cooperation [between MOP directorates and between 
central and regional Governments] are all true ... but you have to work within 
this reality... we need to find ways of dealing with these limitations without 
waiting for perfection ,.103 
101 [MOP-!Iliciativa meeting-G-fg4-9/5/02] :5 
102 [MOP-!Iliciativa meeting-G-fg6-23/5/02] 
103 [MOP-!Iliciativa meeting-G-fg6-23/5/02] 
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These comments raised both the problems and some of the solutions. 
One other theme raised in early discussions was the focus on objectives, considered crucial 
in literature on strategic assessments (Chapter 2) which promotes an objectives-led 
approach, assuming a cultural and institutional set-up which delivers policies and plans 
based on objectives. This favoured 'approach' is one area where the Anglo-American 
influence in SEA thinking is perhaps most evident. This is true even within Europe: as an 
Italian Government official argued, the concept of planning and governing by objectives is 
less representative of continental Europe which is more geared towards using regulatory 
mechanisms. 104 In practice, government structures in countries such as Italy and Chile, are 
less conducive to the definition of assessment approaches centred around objectives. 105 For 
example, in one of the follow-up interviews Escudero [SEMA T] explained that 'the MOP 
[per se] does not have environmental objectives' and therefore Plans like that of DOH could 
not be assessed in terms of whether or not." contributed to such objectives. 106 Gomez 
[DOH] concluded that 'the Ministry does not work with objectives' and that DOH does not 
have a plan for projects in the Primera Region, instead, politicians will make promises for 
which 'objectives have to be found a posteriori'. 107 These views, shared by many in the core 
areas of the Ministry, show just how far integration still has to go in Chile (Chapter 5), and 
how unprepared some, of the mainstream SEA thinking can appear when viewed from less-
developed contexts. 
This is not to say that Italy or Chile cannot adopt objectives-led approaches. A similar 
suggestion would be very problematic since at strategic levels of assessment evaluation is 
/ ~ 
essentially a test of coherence and contribution of proposed measures to overall strategic 
objectives (supposed to be environmentally sustainable). However, it makes it necessary to 
acknowledge the difference and work closely with policy-making to change. 108 Without 
104 [Croccolo-government] 
105 A related comment was made by Felsenhardt [academia-b] as we discussed the paucity of policies, 
plans and programmes in Chile and she asked whether this was not also a 'cultural issue', where by 
the Anglo-Saxon worJdview was emphasising the relevance and importance of planning, while Latin 
cultures 'improvise... they do not predict,... they do not plan', they place greater emphasis on 
dealing with immediate problems and using creativity - 'quite effectively' - to deal with 
contingencies. 
106 [Escudero-G-fa3-23/9/02] 
107 [G6mez-G-fa2-24/9/02] 
108 The experience with Structural Funds planning in Italy fully supports this claim. Planning has had 
to change significantly as a result of the tight regulations setting out Commission's requirements in 
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such recognition, SEA systems risk imposing spurious rationalities, as pointed out by Flynn 
et al. (1999). 
Approaches, tools and context 
Discourses also substantiated the claim of interrelatedness between the nature of planning 
and decision-making, and that of assessment (its approach and tools), which is considered 
central to the effective shaping of SEA (Chapter 3). A tension could be perceived between 
those who wished the Ministry to apply SEA to address cumulative impacts of its many 
projects within one region, and those who wished it to focus on planning, visions and 
development objectives (cf. Chapter 6).109 Essentially, this reflected two interpretations of 
planning and decision-making in MOP and - more generally - of how the country was 
being governed (Chapter 5). Several who called for a cumulative-impact approach 
essentially believed that the whole idea of planning in Chile was simply a non-starter. There 
may be some lip-service paid to it within the Ministries and the Regions, but in essence 
investment was considered based on: 
'the ignorant creation of great lists of projects that the authority then adopts with 
political aims ... "the projects one should kill them when they are still in their 
infancy", if not, they will start making friends, and one ends up fighting against 
the friends ofthe project'. 110 
Cumulative impact assessment was confirmed by many as one of the issues that needed to 
be tackled, since the Ministry had the habit of operating in silos at regional level, leading to 
great inefficiencies and problems, and not only for multiple projects. For example, a 
representative of DGA described a process similar to cumulative impact assessment being 
promoted for the Planes Directores, explaining that in his view, their work on mathematical 
modelling of rivers to assess the impact of each project 'not only circumscribed to the local 
level, but also trying to address it in a much wider sense [over the whole river system]' was 
partly similar to SEA, although he stressed that they were not calling it that. I II 
terms of the contents and to a certain extent the structure of plans and programmes. SEA played a 
crucial role here, since it forced the systematic definition of objectives and indicators for sustainable 
development (Bina et at. 1997; Majocchi et at. 1999). 
109 [f-WorkshopIMOP]ll:18 
110 [f-WorkshopIMOP] 13:6 
III [f-WorkshopIMOP]2:31 
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However, although this would take care of the 'fragility [sensitivity mapping] of the 
territories involved', it would still leave unsolved the fundamental problem of market 
pressures and weak long-term planning. 112 Hence, others sought wider assessment and 
favoured the use of SEA in relation to more strategic initiatives. One participant summarised 
a widely shared sense of frustration at how the country, as well as the Ministry, were failing 
to meet the challenge of acting according to more coherent long-term visions: 
'I see [SEA] as an instrument that must not be absent in a Plan Director ... We 
need to work with our technical staff... There should be a platform [for 
discussion between MOP and] Agriculture .. . [to develop] an irrigation policy ... 
At the national level we have a paucity of planning and 1 think we cannot ask the 
country to plan itself if we, within our Ministry [MOP], cannot achieve this 
ourselves ... 
And today ... there are all the elements to suggest that we can say: You know 
what, let us work in a team, work in an integrated manner, "why are we moving 
so fast?" it would be better to think through things properly, because the cost of 
one infrastructure work is very high '.113 
Interestingly, one participant found that planning and SEA were essential in many cases to 
compensate for 'administrative separations' such as the one between DOH and DGA, 
bringing related themes together in spite of this fragmentation. 114 
The emphasis of the conceptual framework proposed in Section 7.2 for taking a wide 
approach to the definition of assessment, was essential in mediating between these different 
perceptions and expectations. Component 4 's reference to four broad activities (Tables 7-b 
and c) allowed the Team to influence the early stages of the formulation, particularly the 
DOH terms of reference, but more importantly, it enabled them to explore a range of 
applications of SEA to fit the peculiarities of MOP's policy processes. One very simple 
function, which gained widespread support, was the analysis of coherence between a 
proposal and wider institutional frameworks. One Team member summarised the widely 
held view that the SEA had been instrumental in allowing them 1) to make contradictions 
between the SDPR and the pre-existing Plan Director 'explicit'; 2) to identify problems and 
weaknesses in the ~egion; and 3) to highlight the contradiction - intrinsic to the MOP 
(above) - whereby it is responsible for the construction of infrastructure which, collaterally 
112 [f-Workshop/MOP] 11: 17 
113 [f-Workshop/MOP]9:26-27 
11 4 [f-Workshop/MOP] 1 1: 16 
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would most likely lead to 'increasing the sUlface being irrigated in a Region', but that such 
potential is not directly a matter for MOP to address. I 15 
Nonetheless, scepticism remained. One of the leitmotifs of SEA discourses has been the fact 
that planners, when confronted with some of the main characteristics and objectives of an 
SEA, tend to react saying 'but we do all this anyway'. Chile was no exception: 
'I think that we are not being presented with really new situations, 1 think that 
traditionally when one develops a study or a plan, implicitly one includes all 
these concepts, perhaps without realising . . . because it is part and parcel of this 
discipline ,. 1 16 
These views link to the academic debate on the 'temporary' nature of SEA (Section 3.4.3), 
whereby once planning is done sustainably SEA becomes redundant. However, this case 
study shows that the argument remains 'wishful thinking', since the plans, such as the 
Planes Directores, even when they are structured and formulated according to principles of 
good planning, regularly fail to include the environmental and social dimensions as anything 
more than an afterthought. I 17 
The solution probably lies somewhere in the middle-ground. MOP could proceed by 
applying SEA to the plans and programmes it can identify (both at the centre and in the 
---Regions) with the principal aim of assessing their likely effects on environment and 
sustainability. It could also continue to apply SEA to mega-projects (or combination of such 
projects within a territorial unit) that will continue being developed independently of any 
strategic framework for a while to come, trying to embed them into existing policies and 
plans, promoting a strategic outlook and identifying the wider implications for environment 
and sustainability - in a similar way to what was done for the DOH initiative. This double-
strategy for inserting SEA in the MOP would best meet the organisation's political, cultural, 
institutional and administrative specificities, working towards filling the gap between its 
capacity to promote environmental integration and sustainability, and its growing spending 
power. A similar conclusion was drawn by SEMA T (2003). 
115 [f-WorkshoplMOP]l1 :5-6 
116 [f-WorkshopIMOP] 11:2 
117 [f-WorkshoplMOP] 11: 15 
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7.4 Thoughts on the way forward 
7.4.1 Reflecting o,n the results of the Iniciativa 
The iniciativa, it was felt, had helped people to understand more about SEA: 
'it was the best way of leaming and making people acquainted with it, and [to] 
really decide what this methodology consists of ... where it can be applied, and of 
course that it is worth the effort ,118 
The Team concluded that working through the SEA components had helped in three areas: 
1) providing a comprehensive list of environmental themes, 2) identifying themes that could 
lead to conflicts amongst stakeholders, and 3) highlighting strategic issues and possible 
alternatives which were excluded from DOH's terms of reference (DOH 2002b-d). The SEA 
had allowed the identification of between 30 and 40 environmental and sustainability 
objectives, and had helped the team to prioritise four amongst these. Reaching a level of 
consensus on the objectives was deemed critical, as these would then be used to evaluate 
proposals in terms of their coherence with objectives. The consultation and dialogical 
approach helped primarily in 'making explicit all relevant alternatives ... not only the 
projects that are being considered', and therefore to ensure transparency in the way 
decisions are taken, by requiring a process of 'objective argumentation that indicates that 
one route is more deserving than another '.119 
These were referred to as contributions which could give a 'strategic outlook ' to the 
formulation process of DOH's Plan, thus countering the short-sightedness intrinsic in 
MOP's culture and in its highly fragmented structure; however, the outcome was far from 
being secured. The extent of the struggle and learning still to come was exemplified by the 
impression of progress achieved since June summarised by two Team members, interviewed 
before the Workshop; the views are almost diametrically opposed: one interviewee had 
found the process valuable, including: 
'the [demonstration of what would be a] COITect intelTelation between MOP 
projects ... coming from all Directorates ... We question[ed] the process that 
118 [f-Workshop/MOP] 11:5 
1\9 [f-Workshop/MOP] 1:5 
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The second felt deep scepticism - and almost frustration - at what was perceived as lack of 
any concrete progress: 
'I am not sure where we are going, what we are doing ... 1 think we have only 
advanced in terms of a diagnostic, still quite precarious ... It looks like the project 
approach is now impossible! ... [that it is] not valid anymore ... [but 1 do not think 
that] the project approach is as bad as we are saying', it can provide 'good and 
impOltant information', including for the environment. 120 
Clearly, they had been looking for different things, and this can partly be explained by their 
disciplinary focus and expertise: the technical and scientific background of the second 
interviewee being far more representative of MOP's professional spectrum. 
Deeply rooted cultural differences, combined with the political and institutional bias for 
project investment, highlight the extent of the challenge for SEA, and therefore, for 
sustainability. The DOH example analysed during the Iniciativa illustrated this, particularly 
through the unfortunate changes imposed on an initially promising terms of reference, 
eaU/have 
whic'Xprovided many levers for the integration of SEA concepts and tasks. 
A fundamental question arises about the usefulness of instruments in contexts where the 
politics and culture are at best not interested and at worse opposed to the objectives that 
such instruments are meant to serve. As Lira [international-UN-CEPAL] concluded in an 
interview: 'this country [Chile] is full of instruments [for sustainable development] but has 
no s,ustainable development politics'. 121 However, while the problem cannot be denied, the 
experience of the Team suggests that the conceptual framework proposed in Section 7.2 can 
lead to a multi-faceted purpose and shaping of SEA · that promotes learning about the 
conditions for environmentally sustainable planning. The framework can help us to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of contextual dimensions for the promotion of 
sustainability, and by taking a flexible approach to SEA, allows a way forward to be 
designed through incremental steps, for example, starting with the widespread adoption of a 
structured approach that maps and makes explicit incoherence between initiatives. The 
learning triggered ~y the framework was perhaps the most significant result of the 
Iniciativa, and lends support to the propositions that focus on the wider and organisational 
contexts (Chapter 3 and Section 7.2). This research argues that the rhetorical statement 
120 [G6mez-G-fa2-24/9/02] 
121 [Lira-I-a-4/1O/02] 
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whereby SEA will contribute to sustainable development (Chapter 2) can be made 
operational chiefly through the promotion of such learning. 
In this sense, it is necessary to reflect on the fact that the research was conducted in a 
country which had not been exposed to SEA's wide range of literature and practice, as in 
many of Europe's Northern countries and Anglo-Saxon countries like North America. This 
will have influenced, at least to some extent, the response reported in this inquiry, 
particularly in terms of the open-mindedness with which the topic was approached and 
hence the conclusions that were drawn from the experience of thinking through why and 
how SEA could be applied (in general and in MOP in particular). 
In a final meeting with some of the Team members (Figure 7-h), the conception of 
SEA elaborated throughout the exercise according to the purpose and objectives stated in 
Section 7.1.2, turned out to be very close to the mandate of SEMA T itself, making its 
adoption all the more urgent. These are some final impressions: 
'it's an instrument that allows [us] to do something that we do not normally do: 
take a strategic outlook from the sustainability perspective and organise the 
[planning] process' 
---
'it has forced us to reflect on what we do ... [but] there is a major problem in the 
lack of planning' 
'there are institutional obstacles [to the application of SEA] but we have to try 
and overcome these ... SEMA T must help [MOP] to develop a more sustainable 
vision for infrastructure' 
,[SEA] ratified common sense. . . it provided a sort of scientific 
systematization ... and clarified the incoherence between DOH and DGA ' 
'the ability to interpret consequences in a strategic sense can be extremely 
useful '.122 
122 [MOP-Iniciativa meeting-G-fg8-3/1O/02] Each statement was from a different person. 
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Figure 7-i The last meeting at MOP's offices 
Source: Fabrizio Frugone 
In February 2003, SEMA T - as leader of the Iniciativa - produced a document on the 
conclusions, lessons learned from the exercise (SEMA T 2003) and initial recommendations 
for a programme to introduce SEA in the Ministry. These are worth noting, as they support 
some of the propositions of this thesis. The conclusions recognise two main objectives for 
SEA in relation to MOP: a process of learning and the 'identification of elements that can 
introduce new ways of working within the Ministry' (SEMAT 2003:1). In line with the 
premise that SEA is most usefully conceptualised as a banner and that its 'assessment 
component' (noA) can encompass multiple activities throughout the policy-making process 
(Section 7.2), the recommendations refer to 'the instruments of SEA ': 
'the use of [SEA] is not conditioned by its adoption in a monolithic mode ... the 
pursuit of p~ial strategic objectives can benefit from the selective use of certain 
component instruments which are: SustainabiIity Framework, Analysis of 
Compatibility with Policies, Analysis of Actors, Development of Alternatives, 
amongst others' (SEMA T 2003:9). 
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The focus on the establishment of a 'formalised process in predefined stages' (SEMA T 
2003:9) echoes more traditional concepts of SEA (Section 3.3.2), but the flexibility that 
informs the approach ensures that MOP will not be constrained by pressure to call this an 
SEA, accepting instead the need to compromise and activate a partial processes to start with. 
This, it is argued, is an excellent example of process integration, which is likely to have the 
transformative potential that is suggested here as the ultimate purpose of SEA (Section 3.4). 
In a reality like that of MOP, where planning is essentially shrouded in mystery, SEA can 
help in the effort to strengthen environmental planning capacity, by ensuring that 
environmental sustainability is understood, and eventually accepted, as a fundamental goal. 
In terms of the 'object' of future SEAs, despite the deeply-rooted project culture within the 
Ministry, the lniciativa showed that there are strategic initiatives that can be subject to SEA: 
'I think we realise that it is necessary to be aware of this methodology, to apply 
it, but at decision-making levels which are much higher. .. this instrument should 
be applicable to avoid the problems we have as MOP [at regional level] ... where 
often, we [central offices] invest. .. in infrastructure, roads, canals, dams, but 
really not even the Region has a clear idea of what it wants to prioritise, what 
direction its development is taking'.123 
Such higher levels of decision-making are not common, especially at the regional level, 
which, judging from the many comments, was perceived as the critical scale for sustainable 
planning. However, a popular way forward amongst participants seemed to be to tighten 
integration between MOP's work and Regional Development Plans: 
'the truth is that if we were to be rigorous about this, a plan for the management 
of water resources should be embedded in a Regional Development Plan ... it 
should not be separate from it'.124 
'we [MOP] are only clients [of Agriculture etc.] who design public works ... and 
our infrastructure programmes . .. we can apply SEA to them ... but at the same 
time we have to ensure that [such programmes] are conceived within a regional 
development plan which should [also] be assessed strategically '.125 
The 'enthusiasm' for the Regional Development Plans was somewhat ironic, given the 
widespread views concerning their weaknesses (Chapter 5). Nonetheless, as one participant 
pointed out, MOP had the capacity to change the fate of such plans by making a greater 
123 [f-WorkshoplMOP] 11:5 
124 [f-WorkshopIMOPJlI:lO 
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123 [f-WorkshopIMOP]11:S 
124 [f-WorkshoplMOP] 11 : 10 
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effort in collaborating with regional authorities to define infrastructure priorities. 126 This 
view was reiterated in the final recommendations (SEMA T 2003), and indicated a step 
towards addressing the difficult issue of 'subordination' of MOP: a paradox whereby the 
substantial leverage that comes from disposing of approximately 60% of public spending 
power is coupled with 'a remit that is constrained within the concept of public works, rather 
than economic development. 
The application of SEA was therefore recommended for plans and programmes, but also for 
the projects that might: 'coincide in space and time' and which MOP tends to promote 
without much coordination; the aim would be to 'clarify objectives and tendencies in terms 
of economic development, social, environmental and spatial planning in the area of common 
influence ' (2003 :9). The need to promote the potential of strategic outlooks was further 
substantiated by members of SEMAT and MOP 's planning Directorate, who concluded that 
'important projects generate their own reference framework within the Ministry, and are 
assessed accordingly ', 127 corroborating Le6n's comment (Chapter 5) whereby projects are 
the 'expression of implicit policies '.128 This led to the following conclusion: 
there is wide consensus ... over the need to strengthen and improve the 
processes of planning within the MinistIy ... In this respect, we highlight the 
perception that it is necessary to emphasise the stages of formulating objectives 
(and consequently, of criteria for design and assessment) before the stages of 
project development' (SEMA T 2003 :8). 
125 [f-WorkshoplMOP] 13:3 
126 [f-WorkshoplMOP] 13:4 
127 [Escudero-G-fa3-23 /9/02]b:5&7 
128 [Le6n-A-b-301l1/0 1] 
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7.4.2 Implementing ideas at the organisational level 
In this closing Section, the results and conclusions from the Iniciativa and from Chapters 5 
and 6 are used as the basis to recommend activities that might help implement the two 
conceptual frameworks for SEA proposed in Section 7.2. The importance of organisations is 
discussed with reference to organisational learning theory, leading to proposals for actions 
to institutionalise learning through SEA, and for ways of evaluating such learning-oriented 
assessments. This is followed by a discussion of the contribution of the public to learning, 
during specific SEA processes. 
Different forms of learning 
The link between evaluation, learning and change, and the connection between these 
activities taking place at programme, departmental and organisational level , has become 
accepted currency in evaluation literature (Forss et al. 1994; Owen and Lambert 1995; 
Owen and Rogers 1999; Patton 1997; Preskill and Torres 2000; Russ-Eft and Preskill 2001; 
Shulha 2000; Torres and Preskill 2001; Weiss 1998). However, it remains surprisingly rare 
in EA work. In Chapter 3, the benefits of connecting policy learning and policy analysis 
literatures with mainstream EA work were discussed, and the field work in Chile was in part 
informed by the idea that SEA could help to institutionalise argumentative and instrumental 
forms of learning. In the long-term, it was suggested, this could lead to improved 
environmental capacity of the wider context, triggering the institutional and structural 
changes needed for policy-making to deliver environmentally sustainable development 
(Section 3.4). 
The different inquiries detailed in Chapters 5-7 have progressively focused on organisations 
as a valuable unit of analysis. In this way, the abstract description of environmental capacity 
and the wider context was usefully grounded and further developed in relation to the 
Ministry of Public Works (MOP), suggesting that organisations represent the missing factor 
in conceptualisations of SEA and its raison d 'etre. This development has led to a 
broadening of the initial analysis, to include the disciplinary thread of organisational 
learning, defined as: 
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'a continuous process of growth and improvement that (a) uses information or 
feedback about both processes and outcomes (i.e., evaluation findings) to make 
changes; (b) is integrated with work activities, and within the organization's 
infrastructure (e.g., its culture, systems and structures, leadership, and 
communication mechanisms); and (c) invokes the alignment of values, attitudes, 
and perceptions among organizational members' (Tones and Preskill 200 1 :388). 
The realisation that the Metodo MOP needed improvement (from a sustainability 
perspective) challenged the Ministry to strengthen the 'social agency and reflexivity' 
(Berkhout et al. 2002:83) of its organisation, and required the framing of SEA in terms of 
'learning machines' rather than the more positivist concept of 'truth machines' (a distinction 
borrowed from Berkhout et al. (2002:84), originally refeITing to tools for Climate Impact 
Assessment and Integrated Assessment). For the purpose of this work, organisations should 
be understood as complex realities, connected to the wider context and to the many agencies 
that are directly or indirectly related to them. Berkhout et al. (2002:87) argue that 
organisational learning theorists tend to assume that they are primarily operating within the 
organisational context, however, in practice learning also needs to take place amongst 
individuals (or communities) who do not necessarily belong to the same organisation. Each 
policy domain relates to different boundaries involving a range of actors: a point 
exemplified by the water policy domain discussed throughout the Iniciativa, involving 
several directorates -within MOP, as well as external organisations (both public and private). 
Activities that promote learning 
The idea developed throughout this research is to combine policy-oriented learning with a 
learning-oriented assessment process aimed at organisations. SEA's context-specificity 
provides a natural link to notions of organisational learning, while rejecting ideas of 
'learning by imitation' (which occurs 'when one organisation adopts the structures or 
procedures used extensively by other organisations' (Sanchez-Triana and Ortolano 
2001:224). In particular, it questions the practice of applying SEA concepts and models -
by-and-Iarge developed in Anglo-Saxon, industrialised countries - in developing contexts 
(Chapter 2), and supports Brown and Duguig's (1991) argument that becoming a 
practitioner, and not learning about practice, is the central issue in organisational learning. 
For these reasons , Section 7.2.1 proposes a conceptual framework for the insertion of SEA 
in a particular organisational context, and places the notion of purpose at the centre of any 
effort to operationalise the instrument (Section 7.2.2). If the purpose is primarily 
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transformative, a strategy for inserting SEA will be crucial, and learning (in its various 
forms) will be the essential ingredient of such a strategy, and of the subsequent shaping of 
the instrument itself. 
The strategy for introducing SEA can be compared to designing a social process of change 
that enables members within the organisation to construct new concepts, approaches to 
assessment and planning, procedures and methods. It is a process of transition, for which the 
awareness of a need to change is a conditio sine qua non (illustrated by the Iniciativa's 
identification of the need to change the 'Metodo MOP'). To initiate this process and the 
institutionalisation of learning, the traditional mindset of IA experts will have to be 
integrated with one geared towards active involvement for change. The following, adapted 
from Torres and Preskill (2001:392), is a set of proposals for integrating various forms of 
learning with assessment, planning and decision-making tasks, and promoting organisational 
development: 
• develop a first rough picture of the contextual dimensions and policy processes 
within the organisation using participatory processes (ideally involving a range of 
senior and junior bureaucrats, as well as high-level officials close to elected 
decision-makers - Ministers, Counsellors etc.) to identify issues and processes that 
should be considered in relation to the introduction of SEA; 
• develop guidelines which highlight the learning dimension of assessment; 
• create a pool of internal assessment experts who can provide 'relevant, customised, 
and reflective evaluation services' that will increase learning; 
• increase professional development opportunities, including training in basic SEA 
methods and processes, as well as in interpersonal communications, team 
development, and group process; 
• define short-term indicators of progress toward longer-term outcomes, linking 
activities of planning and assessment on specific initiatives to the accumulation of 
experience and understanding for institutional and structural change; 
• identify senior bureaucrats and decision-makers (elected) who 'embrace the role and 
importance' of SEPi process and methods, and are available to participate in such 
processes, especially in the early stages (for example, during scoping); and 
• provide routine learning opportunities through the use of seminars, meetings and 
informal gatherings to promote deliberation, team building efforts and conflict 
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management, and ensure collaborative reflection on the policy process (planning, 
assessment and decision-making). 
Underpinning this list is an assumption that rhetorical skills, including conversation, 
argument, negotiation, persuasion and justification (Gold and Watson 2001), are critical to 
the process of change and to an increased understanding of sustainable development goals. 
A similar argument is found in the field of policy analysis (Sections 2.4 and 3.4), with its 
emphasis on problem construction and reconstruction (Fischer and Forester 1993). However, 
if they are to achieve long-lasting and meaningful results, these activities and the 
enthusiastic support for learning and dialogical processes must be accompanied by the 
awareness of significant obstacles. Difficulties can be linked to notions of organisational 
culture and resistance to change, the political dimension of environment and development 
issues, the need for political commitment to a transformative purpose for SEA, and the 
fragmented interests and responsibilities within and between organisations. These are 
discussed below, bearing in mind that scholars and practitioners have been aware of many of 
these since the 1970s (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). 
Sanchez-Triana and Ortolano (2001:224) illustrate how failure to take these obstacles 
seriously could mean that organisational learning 'does not necessarily lead to 
"-
improvements in environmental quality', as organisations can learn ways of reacting to 
environmental requirements and policies. Their account of the poor results of introducing 
EIA in Colombia highlights the need to time and manage strategies for the insertion of SEA 
carefully. Similarly, collaborative and participatory approaches to evaluation (Patton 1997; 
Brandon 1998; Brunner and Guzman 1989; Cousins and Whitmore 1998), 'widely credited 
with increasing the relevance and use of both evaluation processes and findings', have been 
found 'necessary, but not sufficient for the full potential of evaluation to be realized within 
organisations' (Torres and Preskill 2001 :388). As March and Olsen (1989) cautioned, the 
resistance of institutional routine to change should not be ignored, and it remains essential to 
understand the reasons for these struggles, before embarking in the definition of new 
assessment approaches. 
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Interesting lessons can be learnt from the literature on project development (Gasper 2000; 
Platt 1997; Baum 1970),129 where Biggs and Smith (2003) find that learning has repeatedly 
taken place, but with little follow-up, for almost as many years as there has been a concept 
of a project cycle and of its evaluation (see also Choularton 2001). They highlight the 
existence of parallel literatures on the one hand promoting the project cycle, and on the other 
providing ample evidence of its problems, and suggest that persistent repetition of 'old 
mistakes' requires deeper investigation (Biggs and Smith 2003:1747; see also Thin 1998) of 
the culture of organisations. Biggs and Smith (2003) draw on the work of Clay and Schaffer 
(1986) who focus on the culture, the organisation and management of development 
activities, and the application of rewards or sanctions (cf. Liebenthal 2002) in an analysis of 
the policy cycle in agricultural organisations. They go on to argue that greater attention 
needs to be given to the 'human factor' and to social power structures: 
'project cycle planning and management could be improved a great deal if it was 
acknowledged that all patts of projects are canied out by people working in 
social contexts, with all the features of social relationships that are present in 
human interactions' (Biggs and Smith 2003:1748). 
These features will 'influence the way approaches, tools and techniques [such as SEA] are 
likely to be used in practice' (ibid: 1749), and the capacity to learn. Furthermore, scholars 
argue that the defensive behaviour that dominates in government organisations and industry 
(cf. Annandale 2000) tends to suppress the negative past, thus frustrating learning (Argyris 
and Schon 1974; Argyris 1982; Choularton 2001). The author observed this behaviour both 
within MOP and the World Bank. The activities proposed above are partly aimed at 
addressing these problems, through wide consultation and by promoting an incremental 
approach, rather than the hasty introduction of new processes and tools. 
More attention also needs to be given to the political dimension of development, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, and with reference to primary data in Chapters 5 to 7. This 
dimension affects processes such as SEA, but, as Biggs and Smith (2003: 1749) note, there is 
widespread acknowledgment of the need for 'political will' and 'management commitment', 
yet this is rarely followed by clear indications of 'how and why such commitment [might] 
come about'. One answer must lie in what Burgess (fOlthcoming:6) defines as the need 
129 Learning is at the centre of the concept of 'project cycle' in development which provided a 
rational way of conceptualising and managing projects since the late 1960s. The rational, linear 
phases (including: programming, identification, design, support, implementation and evaluation) tend 
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slowly to change the 'definition of what is "relevant" to policy-makers', and the activities 
proposed above could contribute to this. The transformative concept of SEA is fully 
dependent (possibly even more than traditional EA practice, and other forms of IA) on the 
interest and commitment 'of the leadership (for example, in MOP's case that of the 
Directorate for Obras Publicas or of the Vice-Minister). It is therefore recommended that 
both the SEA insertion strategy, and the design of the assessment process itself, are aimed at 
influencing decision-makers (elected) and those taking day-to-day decisions (Caratti et al. 
forthcoming; Bailey and Dixon 1999; Petts 1999d). 
The issue of who to engage in defining a strategy for inserting SEA relates to the point 
above, whereby focus on organisations should not mean the exclusive involvement of 
internal actors and interested parties. Instead, it is essential to acknowledge the complex 
thematic - and therefore institutional - interactions implicit in any debate on sustainable 
development. The notion of Communities-of-Practice (CoP) is helpful in thinking about 
such diverse actors: it refers to a group, situated in a particular context, which interacts over 
activities and practices that it values and which have meaning within its local context 
(Wenger 1998). Organisations like MOP will have a number of CoPs, 'each with a particular 
version of reality represented in the narratives, values and interests of its participants' (Gold 
and Watson 2001:509). Indeed, one of the efforts of the Iniciativa has been to involve 
different MOP Directorates and professions, as well as other agencies (for example, from 
the region). The different perception of two informants reflecting on the results of the 
Iniciativa (see above, same Section) could be explained in terms of their belonging to 
separate CoPs within the Ministry, which tend to interpret SEA in ways that are meaningful 
and sensible within their own specific context (Gold and Watson 2001). 
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.4, it is important to remember that significant changes in 
professional practice, and related institutions, values and behaviour (cultural shifts), often 
take time, develop in stages, affect a growing number of actors (Boothroyd 1995; Torres and 
Preskill 2001) and are subject to setbacks. Bearing in mind these obstacles and challenges, 
the following questions draw from the list of actions proposed above and represent an initial 
attempt at defining elements of a successful strategy for introducing learning-oriented SEA 
within an organisation: 
to be represented as a cycle to embody the learning principle, and to reflect the increasing emphasis 
on ' ''process'' ideas' and participatory processes in particular (Biggs and Smith 2003:1744). 
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• Have existing guidelines been amended (or new ones been produced) to highlight 
the learning dimension of assessment? 
• Has training in ' basic SEA methods and processes, as well as in interpersonal 
communications, team development, and group process been provided, or planned? 
• Has a pool or network of internal assessment experts been created, promoting 
coordination and coherence in the organisation's assessment practices, promoting an 
understanding of sustainability issues and on-going learning? 
• Number of senior bureaucrats and decision-makers (elected) involved in SEA 
processes, especially in the early stages (for example, during scoping)? 
• Have routine learning opportunities to ensure collaborative reflection on the policy 
process (planning, assessment and decision-making) been established? (for example, 
through the use of seminars, meetings and informal gatherings to promote 
deliberation, team building efforts, conflict management). 
• Have short-term indicators of progress been established? (For example: number 
different directorates, policy areas contributing to an SEA process; degree of 
involvement in terms of time and stage in the process; number of specific initiatives 
promoting the accumulation of experience and reflection on SEA). 
• Have longer-term indicators been identified? (For example: description of actions 
taken to address institutional and structural obstacles to environmentally sustainable 
development, identified as a result of SEA processes; number of cases of policy-
processes where planning/assessmentldecision-making efficiently timed and 
integrated). 
The role of the public 
Having focused on the organisational scale linked to the conceptual framework in Section 
7.2.1 , these final paragraphs turn to the role of public involvement in contributing to 
learning through SEA, once this becomes operational (as proposed in Section 7.2.2). The 
complexity of strategic decisions involves uncertainties that relate to well rehearsed issues 
of credibility and trust. Representative and participatory processes can promote collective 
learning, testing what is known, what is uncertain and what is assumed (Barnes 1999). This 
makes it necessary to shift from a concept of 'decision-legitimising' participation to one of 
'decision-enhancing' (Petts 1999d:171), which can give decision-makers greater confidence 
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to take difficult and complex decisions (Petts 2001), without transferring powers (Petts 
1999d). Stirling (forthcoming) refers to this as a more 'substantive' rationale for 
participation and argues that it will deliver greater benefits in terms of social learning 
(compared to instrumental notions): 'as a means to consider broader issues, questions, 
conditions, causes or possibilities' (2004:9). 
The role of consultation and the - albeit limited - participation of stakeholders from the 
region were critical in the examples discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, especially in terms of 
contributing to problem structuring and re-structuring, identifying relevant issues and 
concerns, selecting key actors and, finally, the criteria that would be used to investigate and 
evaluate the potential implications of proposed measures. Petts (l999d: 168) finds that a 
process of social learning can be observed as a result of public participation, and mentions 
the following results (observed in relation to waste management planning in Hampshire, 
England): decision-makers acquired a better understanding of concerns, and this led to a 
modification of the plan through 1) changes in the scope of considerations, 2) expansion of 
the issues considered, and 3) modification of options and mitigation measures. The design of 
SEA approaches should promote the role of public participation to achieve results. 
Additional support for engaging the public in the assessment of strategic initiatives and 
learning comes from the work of Berkhout et al. (2002), analysing socio-economic futures 
in relation to climate change scenarios. Contrary to the widely held view that complex issues 
are unlikely to be understood by the public, Berkhout et al. propose that society and 
organisations both have a role to play. The identify: 
'indeterminacy (impelfectly understood stmctures and processes) discontinuity 
(novelty and surpIise in social systems), reflexivity (the ability of people and 
organizations to reflect about and adapt their behaviour) and framing 
(legitimately diverse opinions about the state of the world' (2002:93) 
as problems that pose 'immense challenges' for the analysis of complex issues and see the 
future as a 'possibility space' through which 'organisations and societies move and navigate 
themselves ' (2002:86). They call for the use of techniques that 'combine participation, 
transparency and flexibility with [a] systematic approach to the elaboration and analysis of 
futures'. (2002:94). These efforts require the use of rhetorical skills and methods such as 
focus groups, citizen juries, consensus conferences, deliberative polls and community 
advisory committees, which can elicit public views and environmental and social values as a 
way to create or identify 'policy choices which will command wide support ' (RCEP 
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1998: 102), (cf. Section 2.4 and Figure 2-a). These approaches and methods can help counter 
a widespread view that participation of the public in SEA processes is desirable (as in many 
forms of IA) but problematic (for example: Bailey and Dixon 1999). 
Petts (2001) stresses the need to develop a concept of effective participatory and deliberative 
processes which balances outcome and process criteria. She combines principles of fairness 
and competency (Webler 1995) with those of publicity and accountability (Barnes 1999) to 
define 10 questions which can help shape ad hoc processes; these relate to notions of 
representativeness, procedural fairness, transparency and openness, the engagement of 
dissent, the challenge of expert claims, the promotion of personal value for all participants, 
consensus building, and the influence over decisions (Petts 2001). Such considerations could 
be used by organisations at the stage of operationalising SEA (Section 7.2.2), to help them 
select processes and methods fit for purpose and context. Bearing these in mind, criteria for 
successfullear·ning through individual SEAs applied to strategic initiatives might include: 1) 
How many stages and activities in the assessment process promote dialogue between 
bureaucrats, stakeholders, the general public and decision-makers? 2) Does the SEA process 
and documentation reflect the issues and views expressed throughout the policy-process by 
the different actors? 3) Is the assessment process useful in reducing the fragmented and 
disciplinary treatment of complex environment and development issues? 4) To what extent 
"-
did the learning-oriented SEA change or advance the activities and debates framing the 
issue(s) , setting the agenda, developing alternatives, evaluating impacts, exploring 
uncertainties? 
In conclusion, the Chilean case study provided a unique opportunity to refine a new 
conceptual framework for SEA, which emphasises two levels: that of the organisational 
context and that of the policy process (or immediate context). The Iniciativa was particularly 
useful to this process and represented an initial test of the ideas and approaches developed 
throughout the research. It illustrated the benefits of taking an organisational perspective and 
focusing on learning. It confirmed the importance of striving for clarity of purpose in terms 
of the specific policy process and highlighted the pivotal moment of problem definition, 
which in turn showed the un-dividedness of environment and development themes and the 
obstacle posed by fragmentation . 
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Chapter 8 
Reflections on the future of 
Strategic Environmental Assessment 
Che fare? Pache case difficili 
Antonio Saturnino' 
This investigation originates from concerns identified throughout the author's 
involvement in the development and application of SEA, primarily in a European 
context: what concepts underlie SEA and why should governments and organisations 
around the world adopt it? Following an initial literature review, these concerns are re-
framed as two broad questions: 
1) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the evolving conceptions of SEA's 
purpose(s)? 
2) What are the a) theoretical and b) practical implications of the changing 
conceptions of SEA's purpose(s)? 
The thesis develops according to grounded theory, treating these questions as the 
starting point of a series of iterations within a two-stage research process. Three more 
questions are id~ntified during the critical analysis of SEA literature, which reveals 
weaknesses, tensions and inconsistencies in the theoretical basis of the instrument 
(Chapters 2 and 3). The research then makes its own contribution to this literature, 
establishing the need for a re-conceptualisation of SEA along four main themes: 
I 'What is to be done? Just a few, difficult things ': Prof. Saturnino's (Director of Environment at 
the Research and Training Centre FORMEZ (Naples, Italy» opening words as he addressed 
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strategic dimension, context, purpose and shape of assessment, and identifying 
theoretical contributions from other disciplines. 
The second stage of the research seeks to deepen the understanding of the trends and 
propositions resulting from this initial investigation, and to verify their relevance in a 
different context from that which had produced most of the literature. Such literature is 
predominantly from developed and Anglo-Saxon countries, while the main case study 
focuses on a middle income country in Latin America, and is supported by a range of 
additional material from both developing and developed contexts? The nested analysis 
of Chile's approach to SEA (Chapters 5-7) provides a unique insight into the context 
and purpose of this instrument, while the supporting material acts as a form of 
triangulation. The field is crucial in understanding how SEA could contribute to 
sustainability in practice, leading to the definition of a framework for the introduction 
and operationalisation of SEA in the context of organisations. 
This Chapter does not attempt to summarise the detailed conclusions for Chapters 2-7, 
instead, Section 8.1 draws the findings of the two research stages together, reflecting on 
the significance of the evolving theory and practice of SEA and highlighting the key 
elements of its re-conceptualisation. Section 8.2 introduces policy recommendations, 
considers the prospects for future research on SEA and draws some concluding remarks . 
Government regional authorities at a conference on SEA of European Structural Funds 
Programmes in Italy [d4-Conference/SEA Italy] . 
2 This includes interviews and observations at the World Bank and UK Department for 
International Development, as well as the European research project ANSEA and the 
investigation into assessment practices in Italy ; Chapter 4. 
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8.1 Re-conceptualising SEA 
The most important conclusion is that SEA can only facilitate more sustainable forms of 
development, if conventional wisdom about its raison d 'etre is questioned. This 
questioning relates to four themes: strategic dimension and object, context, purpose and 
shape of assessment. 
After approximately fifteen years of practice and analysis SEA is at a crossroad: it either 
develops, both conceptually and technically, to match its potential and meet the growing 
expectations attached to it, or it allows increasing tensions slowly to undermine its many 
promises. This research takes stock of the existing body of work with the aim of helping 
to advance the theory behind the instrument. As it seeks to answer the first research 
question it identifies major theoretical weaknesses in the reasons for creating and 
adopting SEA, and relates these to the newness of SEA, compounded by the poor theory 
and practice of EIA, its predecessor. 
The second conclusion is that the idea that there is something 'strategic ' , whose 
environmental effects should be assessed, is misleading, as well as simplistic . Through 
the exploration of me~nings of 'strategic' and 'assessment' in academic and policy 
literatures, the research exposes the deficiency of assumptions crucial to the early 
justifications of the need for SEA. The widely held assumption that projects are the 
outcome of strategic initiatives such as policies, plans or programmes (PPPs), fails to 
acknowledge that many have no similar, or indeed clear, origin, and that it is this grey 
area which accounted for a significant part of the so-called EIA shortcomings. Secondly, 
the assumption that problems linked to EIA required a new methodology that could 
assess cumulative and indirect environmental impacts and generally more complex and 
broader alternatives, does not consider the broader limitations of positivist and 
' informational' (Caldwell 2000) interpretations of assessment. All too often, this has led 
into the trap of methodological solutions that do not confront the political will to close, 
or even bar, certain values and alternative strategies from the debate. Thus, ErA and 
early SEA practice have both fallen short of their 'revolutionary potential' (Wallington 
2002: 1). 
Why has this happened? This research postulates that the first attempts to promote SEA 
were a methodological - rather than a conceptual - response to perceived shortcomings 
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in EIA, addressing 'how' before having clarified 'why'. Early proposals amounted to the 
treatment of the symptoms rather than the causes of difficulties experienced in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The latter had essentially political and policy-related origins: a lack of 
political commitment to, and capacity for, environmental integration and sustainable 
development, and for strategic planning (Caldwell 2000; Bartlett and Kurian 1999; a 
view also supported by primary data discussed in Chapters 5-7). This line of inquiry 
exposed the inadequacy of the 'impact assessment mindset' [John Horberry-
practitioner],3 leading this thesis to argue that a new theory of assessment is needed 
before seeking to define approaches and tools. The rest of the investigation is a 
contribution towards this. 
As if implicitly shifting attention from symptoms to causes, trends identified in the SEA 
literature of the 1990s (Chapter 2) indicated a progressive broadening and deepening of 
SEA's scope, and - crucially - a purpose more closely related to actual needs and 
demands, expressed through two claims: that SEA would contribute to 1) sustainable 
development and 2) the improvement of policy-making processes (Chapter 3). However, 
despite being increasingly central to SEA discourses, the conceptual and practical 
implications of these claims remains poorly explored. This analysis stresses that, 
although the second claim appeared later in the literature, it actually represented the 
means to the first obiective, and that together, these claims triggered the following 
compelling questions: 
a) What is it that advocates of SEA want to change/improve in the current way 
of formulating strategic initiatives? 
b) In what sense should these be improved? 
c) How can assessment contribute to sustainable development? 
These questions indicated the way to investigate the second main research theme on the 
theoretical and practical implications of changing conceptions of SEA, and led to a 
scrutiny of the three constituent dimensions of SEA (,strategic', 'environmental' and 
'assessment'), starting with the meaning of 'strategic'. The questions and related 
dimensions provide the structure for the following sections. 
3 [d2-SeminarlDFID] 
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8.1.1 'Strategic' - the object(s) 
This research argues that the 'strategic' dimension of SEA is misunderstood and under-
theorised, thus helping to explain the slow development of this instrument. However, it 
also suggests that problematising such a dimension is a conditio sine qua non for the 
discipline's progress. Most academic and policy literature interprets the strategic nature 
of SEA in terms of its object: policies, plans and programmes (PPPs), so that SEA is 
commonly defined as the assessment of PPPs. However, the questioning of such 
literature, combined with the results of interviews and seminars, shows this to be at best 
a simplification of what triggers SEA demand (Chapter 2). The conceptual refinements 
of a more precise distinction between policies, plans, and programmes, and the focus on 
different decision-making moments are essential but not sufficient. 
Drawing on the literature and primary data, this thesis postulates that the question 
(above) 'what needs to be changed in current practices' relates to the necessity to 
strengthen, or even build, capacity for strategic thinking and planning (not only in 
developing countries). This view is supported throughout the Chilean inquiry 
highlighting the struggle to engage with the strategic dimension of planning and 
decision-making (particularly the contested issue of alternatives and the pivotal step of 
problem framing). Here, a neo-liberal political theory of planning, reinforced by decades 
of cultural and political support for sectoral fragmentation and disciplinary 
specialisation, makes strategic thinking a major challenge. The research in Chile adds to 
the problematising of the adjective 'strategic' , showing that the absence of PPPs and 
clear tiering, combined with substantial spending capacity, can lead to 'project-limbo' 
situations (Chapter 5). While these situations involve strategic effects that can, arguably, 
be dealt with by good practice EIA and cumulative impact assessment techniques, users 
view SEA as a mechanism that could compensate for the lack of a 'strategic outlook'. A 
role increasingly discussed also in the context of multi-lateral development banks .4 
The research uses these different interpretations of the object of SEA to expose the 
meaning of the claim t,hat SEA should improve policy-making, and to demonstrate the 
need for greater consideration of the context, itself a relatively new and vaguely defined 
concept (Chapter 3). It argues that the traditional object of assessment (a PPP) should be 
extended to include the wider context, defined here in terms of political, cultural, 
institutional and administrative dimensions. This definition brings to the fore the 
4 [d4-SeminarIWorld Bank] 
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political and cultural origin of many problems, which SEA is being requested to address; 
it also facilitates the connection with the 'causes' of EIA's shortcomings (mentioned 
above) that had initially been overlooked, in favour of a focus on methodological 
concerns. 
This new strategic object that emerges clearly from the combination of secondary and 
primary sources, leads to the third conclusion that 'context' is one of the most critical 
concepts for both the theory and operationalisation of SEA. 
8.1.2 'Environmental' - the purpose and the context 
Having concluded that the instrument has two objects, not one, the next question is 'in 
what sense should these be improved?' This thesis searches for the answer in the 
'environmental' dimension of SEA, and its relation to the almost universal5 claim that 
SEA is to contribute to sustainable development, and hence in the concept of 'purpose'. 
One notable result is the highlighting of both the significance and the misleading 
linearity intrinsic in this claim. The investigation asks how it could be reframed to do 
justice to the complexities involved by emphasising that purpose and context are 
indivisible and crucial in forging understandings of SEA. The research draws on Janicke 
--.. 
(1996) to propose a concept of 'environmental capacity', defined in this case to mean 
the combination of political will and availability of means to promote environmental 
protection and sustainability. The claim of contribution to sustainability is then reframed 
in terms of improving the environmental capacity of the policy process and its wider 
context: SEA should contribute to the progressive reduction of the gap between CUlTent 
practices of policy-making and processes that are more conducive to environmentally 
sustainable planning and decision-making. 
Thus, a fourth conclusion towards re-conceptualising SEA is the identification of two 
substantively different purposes for adopting this instrument: a modernist and a 
transformative one. The research maintains that the difference between SEA and EIA 
(cf. Chapter 2) lies in the latter. The Chilean case study not only confirms the relevance 
of a transformative purpose of SEA, but makes it central to the objectives of the whole 
Iniciativa by the Ministry, seeking to change the way in which the organisation operated 
5 This term is used with reservations, given the limits of the literature's geographical distribution 
(Chapters 1 and 4) . 
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(Chapter 7). Thus, SEA can be conceived as a transition mechanism with transformative 
purposes. However, far from being a matter of choice between two extreme purpose-
types, the inquiry shows a definite need to pursue both objectives at once, treating them 
as complementary (Chapters 6 and 7). The result would be a sort of strategy in two 
parts: a short-term one seeking to improve the specific policy-process under scrutiny, 
while at the same time seeking opportunities to improve environmental capacity over the 
long-term. 
The operationalisation of such strategy can be more easily conceived when the wider 
context is associated to an organisation. The in-depth inquiry into SEA in Chile 
(Chapters 5 and 7), and into the World Bank assessment (Chapter 6) generated the 
conclusion that making organisations the explicit arena where SEA should seek to 
contribute to conceptions of sustainable development is ideal for pursuing a 
transformative purpose, and could actually revolutionise our understanding of the raison 
d' etre of SEA. It was the debates linked to a specific organisation (the Ministry of 
Public Works) that yielded the most effective analyses of the facilitating, or obstructing 
role of political, cultural, institutional and administrative dimensions. 
Therefore, the fifth conclusion of this research is that the focus on economic sectors, 
which has characteris..ed efforts to advance the discipline, should be accompanied by an 
organisational focus. 
Discussions about purpose made it necessary to confront the divide between neutral and 
advocacy-type conceptions of assessment instruments. This investigation maintains that 
SEA needs to relate back to its environmental assessment origins and identify itself as 
the process that will contribute to environmentally sustainable policy-making. This 
would also be consistent with the nature of the two 'contributions' (to sustainability and 
to the improvement of policy-making) claimed in the literature, both implying an 
advocacy role for SEA. This role, which does not preclude SEA from considering and 
assessing social, health and economic effects, should be the key feature that 
distinguishes SEA from all other forms of strategic assessments whose scope often tends 
to overlap (Chapter 2). In fact, this research argues that an attempt to conceive SEA as a 
neutral tool (see for example, Chapter 5) would deny the nature of SEA as a 'process' , 
defined in Chapter 2. Thus, conceptually, this thesis concurs with the vision of Sadler 
(1999) who sees the future of EA in terms of the pursuit of environmental sustainability 
(Chapter 3), and admits that the transition to what he calls Environmental Sustainability 
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Assessment (ESA), may be desirable to avoid the inevitable puzzlement caused by the 
term 'environment' too often interpreted in narrow physical terms (though one is 
mindful of the problems being caused by the array of acronyms that is confusing both 
scholars and users) . 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the exact conception of sustainable development 
will depend, first and foremost, on the political and cultural context of SEA. Again, this 
is vividly illustrated in the case of Chile, which reveals a complex, and mainly unclear, 
position in terms of how organisations relate to environment and sustainability. 
Discussions during the seminars (Chapter 5) exposed deeply rooted tensions between 
dominant worldviews, and it was only once these exchanges are transposed to the 
organisational boundaries of the Iniciativa (Chapter 7) that these tensions become 
manageable, leading to greater environmental awareness and to a tentative 
understanding of 'sustainable development' in context. 
8.1.3 'Assessment' - institutionalising learning 
The final question, inevitably, is 'how can SEA achieve any of this?' The cultural and 
technical difficulties intrinsic in the rising prominence of sustainability, which has come 
to rival the concept Qf risk (Stirling 1999) in environmental assessment, are fully 
documented in the analysis of the SEA example in Chapter 6. Having focused on the 
symptoms rather than the causes of difficulties with EIA (a distinction highlighted 
above), early SEA theory and practice explored methods and tools for predicting 
cumulative, indirect, synergic impacts. But, although critical to the advancement of a 
widespread 'tool-kit' approach to the pursuit of more sustainable paths, these 
contributions are not sufficient for a transformative purpose that seeks to facilitate the 
transformation of policymaking as much as assess individual initiatives. 
According to Barry Sadler and others, SEA practice appears to have overtaken the 
theory.6 The often ad hoc search for solutions may partly explain the confusion and 
unnecessary duplication of methods and tools that currently plagues debate on 
assessment. This thesis calls for a new theory of assessment and reclaims the original 
concept behind the acronym 'SEA', which clearly implies that the strategic dimension 
(S) is, first and foremost, aimed at changing the nalTOW interpretation of environmental 
6 Sadler made this comment during an informal discussion with the author, in occasion of the 21 sI 
Annual Conference of the IAIA (IAIA'Ol Cartagena) . 
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assessment (EA). Drawing from theory and primary data, this investigation rejects the 
tight separation between assessment and planning/decision-making often implicit in 
environmental assessment literature, proposing that the steps, activities and tools 
required for a transformative assessment should explicitly combine prediction and 
evaluation tasks, with activities traditionally linked to planning, such as problem 
definition and the proposal of alternatives. By suggesting that SEA be conceptualised as 
a banner for this range of activities and tools , the thesis seeks to counter the straight-
jacketing of the implicitly new concept of assessment in an old frame and model : that of 
impact assessment (Chapter 6). 
To unravel further the meaning of ' strategic' assessment, the research brings together 
trends in SEA literature and practice which focus increasingly on decision-making 
processes with developments in the knowledge perspective of policy-making, policy 
learning (Majone 1989; Fischer and Forester 1993; and for possible links to SEA: 
K~rn~v and Thissen 2000) and policy analysis (Van del' Knaap 1995; Hall 1993). The 
empirical findings endorse the conceptual and practical relevance of such theoretical 
contributions to SEA's development. The Chilean investigation, which draws on the 
early findings of this research and on the author's participation in the ANSEA project 
(Cm'atti et aL. forthcoming) , stresses the importance of dialogical and subjective 
approaches and 'topls' such as inter-sectoral and inter-departmental meetings (Chapters 
6 and 7). Both the example involving the World Bank, and the SEA exercise initiated by 
the Ministry ' s environmental secretariat (SEMAT), highlighted the raising of wider 
issues and questions, and the opportunity to question (if not influence) policy 
assumptions, as the most useful function of the SEA. In fact, the simple appeal to 
sustainability (no matter how strong or weak its conception) during the scoping phase of 
the SEA, has led to reframing problems and to rational and argumentative learning. 
Thus, theories of policy-making and learning expose the potential of SEA processes, 
including their ability to trigger, or strengthen, institutional and policy learning, which in 
time could lead to institutional change and to the structural changes needed for 
sustainable development (see In 't Veld 2000; 2002). 
The final conclusion of this thesis is that learning, in its different forms, is key to the 
understanding - and promotion - of the link between the environmental capacity of the 
context and assessment. It therefore contends that Sadler' s (1999:31) 'paradigm shift' in 
environmental assessment can best be achieved through emphasis on debate and 
learning, rather than through what appears to be a focus on analysis alone: 
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ESA is a next-generation process that requires methodological and 
institutional advances and the use of a suite of policy and management tools 
for full cost analysis of development proposals. A parallel integration of EIA 
and socio-economic appraisal methods will be necessary to promote an all-
encompassing fOlm - sustainability analysis (SA)' (1999:29). 
Where the purpose of SEA is essentially transformative, activities promoting debate and 
learning, and their underlying theories, should play a greater role in shaping the 
approach and tools of SEA than those aimed at identifying and evaluating the potential 
effects of proposed measures. In particular, SEA should seek to institutionalise various 
forms of learning (Van del' Knaap 1993; also, Weiss 1988), both rational and 
argumentative, but, unlike policy analysis which tends to occur after an initiative has 
been approved, SEA should be shaped in such a way as to facilitate moments of learning 
throughout policy-making processes, integrating its traditional analytic role, which leads 
to a 'corrective' learning style, with one that promotes argumentative and dialogical 
moments, leading to 'cognitive' and 'social' learning (Van del' Knaap 1995:203). A 
learning-oriented approach to assessment will help planners, assessors and decision-
makers to 'think outside the box ' : in this way, SEA will be better equipped to trigger the 
virtuous circle illustrated in Figure 3.d, thus serving the transformative agenda implicit 
in calls for sustainability. Finally, the progressive focus on organisations as a valuable 
scale of analysis (Chapters 5-7) has led to suggest this as a critical context in which to 
introduce and operationalise SEA. Thus, organisational learning becomes central to 
learning-oriented assessments. 
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8.2 Recommendations and Concluding Remarks 
8.2.1 Policy Recommendations 
The Chilean case study demonstrates that introducing SEA in an organisation IS 
primarily about understanding the meaning of strategic and environment in that context, 
and only subsequently about fine-tuning methodologies. In an iterative process between 
theoretical insights and empirical research, it became clear that the trends and 
propositions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 could be crucial in structuring a conceptual 
framework which distinguishes between the introduction of SEA in a particular 
organisational context, and the operationalisation of the instrument in relation to specific 
policy processes (Chapter 7). The detailed sets of questions and tasks are intended to 
ensure that SEA, if appropriate at all, is designed and applied coherently with the basic 
characteristics of the context (its limits) and the purpose of the assessment. Significant 
effort should be devoted from the start to the definition of the organisation's purpose for 
introducing SEA, and to its clear communication to all parties involved, especially if it 
includes the desire to promote learning in the medium and long-terms. 
If an organisation chooses to introduce environmental assessment for a transformative 
purpose, this thesis claims that this would entail a new assessment concept, possibly 
---justifying the use of a new 'brand name', to borrow the expression from Rob Verheem. 7 
If however it chooses to introduce environmental assessment for the modernist purpose 
alone, it may find that EIA provides sufficient concepts and tools for this,8 and that it 
may not be helpful to embark on a whole new set of procedures and terminology, for 
what is essentially an adaptation of established (EIA) procedures and tools.9 
The elements of this conceptual framework may now be tested in other organisations 
and contexts, and the following recommendations may be relevant to governmental 
organisations, funding agencies, as well as donors and international bodies which have 
embarked in the promotion of SEA-type measures. The difference between most 
government bodies (with the obvious exception of Ministries of the Environment) and 
many international organisations, is that the latter can relate to SEA firstly as an 
7 Verheem used this expression at a seminar on SEA, at the IAIA'03 Conference in Marrakech. 
8 Though, as argued in Chapter 2, this - by and large - does not do justice to the far-reaching 
objectives originally attached to NEPA and EIA. 
9 In this sense, it is perhaps significant that the European Directive (EC 2001) on the 'assessment 
of the effects on certain plans and programmes' does not use the term 'Strategic Environmental 
Assessment' . 
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instrument which they should adopt in relation to their own policy-processes, and 
secondly as something they would like to see borrowing countries adopt, as has been the 
case for EIA. It is recommended that in both cases they adopt the conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter 7. 
8.2.2 Future Research 
Before drawing this research to a close, it seems appropriate to ask why should SEA do 
any of this? Why try to achieve structural changes in the wider and organisational 
contexts through an assessment process and tool? A similar question was in fact put to 
the author by a consultant working in developing countries, where the choice of 
strategies and means is constrained by limited resources.1O The question is also 
important as it points to some promising lines of inquiry. 
This thesis extrapolates the transformative purpose of SEA from implicit, as much as 
explicit, accounts of what is needed to address the tensions between the environment 
and development. It then proposes a different conception of assessment per se, which is, 
to a certain extent, implicit in the often cited reasons for adopting SEA: to take a more 
'pro-active' stance in influencing the nature of development, as compared to EIA. It is 
argued that the strategl c dimension of assessment implies the demotion of the activity of 
'assessing', and the promotion of a range of activities (both before and after the 
traditional moment of prediction and evaluation), which further the cause of a more pro-
active approach. Thus, the answer to the last question is that this thesis considers 
dialogical processes, inter-sectoral collaboration, and the institutionalisation of learning 
as key steps towards an environmentally sustainable development, and views the 
significant support for SEA as a vehicle to deliver some of these processes. There may 
be others, but the international profile of SEA provides a unique opportunity for action. 
The highlighting of the organisational dimension is an important result of the Chilean 
analysis which ought to be further explored. All too often, reference is made to inter-
sectoral integration and inter-disciplinary practices as a key to more sustainable 
outcomes, while findings in Chile, and interviews held at the World Bank and in Italy, 
reveal the resilience of sectoral and disciplinary fragmentation. Research seeking to 
understand the reasons of this remains relevant and urgent. It would also be important to 
catTY out a more detailed exploration of organisational learning, to evaluate the extent to 
10 Raymond Colley, during the author's presentation at the IAIA'Ol Conference, Cartagena. 
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which opportunities for systematic learning could lead to recommendations for 
institutional and administrative change. 
A further line of inquiry would be to explore the substantive overlaps between SEA 
conceptions and efforts to promote sustainable development strategies, which, like SEA, 
seek to 'emphasize coordinated, multi-stakeholder approaches providing for continuous 
learning and improvement' (OEeD and UNDP 2002:6), and have identified the need to 
promote strategic thinking and planning. This theme also touches upon the long-
standing controversy over the difference between planning and assessment instruments, 
and which needs to be resolved, especially in the light of the findings above suggesting 
that both instruments are far from meeting expectations. 
8.2.3 Concluding remarks 
This analysis shows how assessment discourses reflect systems of belief and values, 
highlighting the indivisibility of political and rational contributions to the policy 
process. It is the first, rather than the latter, that has often delayed progress, and that 
underlies Saturnino's comment that just a few, but difficult, things are needed to meet 
the claims and expectations linked to SEA. More often than not, the proliferation of 
solutions betrays confusion rather than purpose. Ultimately, problems arising from the 
"-
pursuit of conflicting objectives - implicit in the sustainability concept - cannot be 
eliminated through brave statements and policy-documents alone. To allow for such 
mUltiple goals, assessment thinking and practice are moving from EIA, to SEA and now 
to Sustainability lA, in sometimes costly and overlapping pursuits of methodological 
excellence, while the problems that lead to a demand for such mechanisms, persist more 
or less undisturbed from one decade to another. 
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At the very least, it is essential to draw lessons from the experience of SEA, and EIA, 
before moving to the next generation of tools. Assessments can be mechanisms for 
learning and for promoting change, however SEA risks being interpreted as a feature of 
modernity, limiting itself to the internalisation of the ecological dimension in 
institutional thinking, deflecting attention from substantive problems and real 
institutional challenges. The re-conceptualisation proposed here seeks to ensure that, if 
chosen, SEA is shaped so as to address some of these challenges upfront. 
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Coding and citation of primary data 
Coding system 
Throughout the thesis, all six categories of primary sources (detailed in the table below) are 
referenced in square brackets; both within the text and in footnotes. In the main text the 
information is limited to the name of the interviewee or seminar organiser, and the 
affiliation category in brackets. The coding system in the footnotes tries to provide the 
reader with an indication of the following variables (Table A-a): 
o organisation and affiliation category (capital letters) 1, 
o research method (a-e in lower case), 
o number of interview if the informant was interviewed more than once (Arabic 
numbers). 
For example: an academic interviewed informally twice: [A-b2-Gonzalez). Coding of 
material from seminars and conferences gathered under methods D and E follows a similar 
pattern, but numbering is used to indicate the order of such events, starting with '1' for the 
first event. The details are given in this Annex, while only the following information is 
included in the Chapters: for example, reference to the second group interview with 
Raczynski in the main text is: Raczynski [government), in the footnotes: [G-c2-Raczynski); 
footnote reference to the second Seminar attended by the author, relating to method D: [d2-
Seminar) . 
Table A-a Coding of interviewees and data gathering methods 
Broad description of interviewees Data gathering method 
affiliation 
A Academic a Interviews - formal open·ended interviews 
NGO Activist b Interviews - informal discussions 
C ConsultanVpractitioner c Group interviews (2-4 people) 
G Chilean Government bureaucrat d Observations - conferences or seminars on or around the research 
subject 
I International organization e Seminars, meetings and interviews partly shaped by the researcher 
representative to address research tOQics 
T Think Tank f Seminars, meetings and interviews related to the SEMAT Initiative 
B Businessman, private sector 
I Some informants belong to more than one category, for example academics acting as consultants 
would be coded' AC' . 
A nnex A - Prilllar." Sources A-3 
Anonymity 
Some interviewees asked for anonymity, and some are coded anonymously where the 
material was deemed to be potentially sensitive. In chapter 6, although no interviewee asked 
for anonymity, the researcher deemed that several comments might have caused difficulties, 
and since the circle of people involved was well known it was impossible to keep the 
anonymity of just a few of them. Hence, all interviewees were coded according to their main 
role in relation to the SEA example being analysed, securing partial anonymity. 
Page references of transcripts 
Where possible, page references from typed transcripts were added to the main reference. 
For example, CED Seminars data is cited including the reference to the page number of the 
individual transcript: thus [Seminar .. ,,]3:2 refers to the third CED-Seminar, page 2 of the 
transcript. 
Language and citations 
The majority of interviews and all seminars and meetings during field work in Chile were 
held in Spanish, thus quotes throughout Chapters 5-7 were translated by the author unless 
---
otherwise stated. The same applies to citation from Spanish texts referenced in the original 
language in the bibliography (note that this includes some World Bank sources). 
A nnex A - Pri llla/"\' SOllrCl!.I" A-4 
Table A-b Seminars and conferences - Method D 'observation' (period October 2000-
June 2003, listed in chronological order) 
Code used in the thesis Organisers Title of event Date 
d1-ConferencelWater MOP sponsored Conference, III Encuentro de las Aguas ' - 24/10/01 
Santiago, Chile, 24-26 October Agua, Vida y Desarrollo 
2001 
d1-Seminar/ Alumysa CED - Centro de Estudios y The Alumysa Project EIA. 16/11/01 . 
Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile Presentation of by the 
Consultants: Roberto Abeliuk 
(main presenter), Carlos Prado 
d2-Conference/lnfrastructure MOP Conference, Santiago, Infrastructure and Environment 5/12101 
Chile, 5-6 December 2001 
d3-Conference/ANSEA Fondazione Eni Enrico Mallei - ANSEA - New Concepts in 4/3/02 
FEEM, Milan, Italy Strategic Environmental 
Assessment: towards better 
decision-making 
d4-Conference/SEA Italy Fondazione Eni Enrico Mallei - Prospettive di Sviluppo della 5/3/02 
FEEM, Milan, Italy Valutazione ambientale 
Agenzia per I'ambiente Strategica in /talia ' 
Lombardia, Milan, Italy 
d2-Seminar/DFID Department for International Expert meeting - Enabling 6/3/03 
Development - DflD, UK agreement on environment and 
sustainable development 
d3-Seminar/ODI "- Overseas Development Institute 001 lunchtime seminars: 'Does 30/4/03 
-001, UK Evidence Matter?' 
d4-SeminarIWorld Bank World Bank, Washington D.C. World Bank SEA Workshop 22/5/03 
d5-Seminar/OECD-DAC OECD-DAC, at the IAIA 2003 Special seminar on SEA 19/6/03 
Annual Conference, Marrakech 
d6-Seminar/DFID-OECD-DAC Joint DFID/OECD-DAC Task Strategic Environmental 13/10/03 
Team Workshop, Novartis AssessmentlSustainability Impact 
Foundation, London Assessment 
d5-Conference/EDIAIS-IDPM Conference organized by New Directions in Impact 24/11/03 
Enterprise Development Impact Assessment for Development: 25/11/03 Assessment Information Service Methods and Practice 
(EDIAIS) and Institute for 
Development Policy and 
Management (IDPM), University 
of Manchester, Manchester 
Annex A - Prilllar" Sources A-5 
Table A-c Seminars partly shaped by the author - Methods E and F (period October 
2000-June 2003, listed by date) 
Code Organisation Seminar title Date 
e1-Seminar/CED* CED - Centro de Estudios y CED-SEA 1s1 seminar 'What is SEA?' 26/11/01 
Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile 
e2-Seminar/CED* CED - Centro de Estudios y CED-SEA 2nd seminar: 'What is the role 11/12/01 
Desarrollo of SEA?' 
e3-Seminar/CED* CED - Centro de Estudios y CED-SEA 3rd seminar: 'What can be 18/12101 
Desarrollo the future of SEA in Chile?' 
e4-SeminarlSEMA T* SEMAT, Santiago, Chile SEMAT-MOP seminar to introduce SEA 18/12101 
and discuss its role within SEMAT's 
remit 
e5-Seminar/PUC-M I NVU Pontificia Universidad Evaluaci6n Ambiental Estrategica: 15/5/02 
Catolica de Chile - Seminar como podemos ayudar? 
organised by the Instituto de 
Investigacion y Posgrado, 
Presentors and panel 
included representatives of 
academia, MINVU and 
CONAMA. 
f-Workshop/SEMA T* MOP, Santiago, Chile SEMAT-MOP seminar to discuss 30/9/02 
lessons learned from the Iniciativa and 
SEMAT 1/10102 
* = A list of all participants to these seminars is provided in the Annexes C and E. 
A nnex A - Prilllal''' SO ll rces A-6 
Table A-d Interviewees related to the Chilean case study (category of affiliation and 
methods A to G, see Table A-a) 
Name 
Name 
Alzina, V. 
Astorga, E. 
Balaguer, T. 
Balaguer, T. 
Balaguer, T. 
Blanco, H. 
Blanco, H. 
Borregaard, N. 
Brown, E. 
Cadiz, F. 
Castro, I 
CED Seminar 
CEO-SEA 
Seminar-1 
CED-SEA 
Seminar-2 
CEO-SEA 
Seminar-3 
Dourojeanni, A. 
Dourojeanni, A. 
Escudero, J. 
Escudero, J. 
Escudero, J. 
Escudero, J. 
Escudero, J. 
Escudero, J. 
VI Organisation (and place 01 interview) 
C: ~ Date 
o --:;::::-g~ 
~~!! 
== 'Q).= <E# 
I-b 
G-a 
G-c3 
G-c2 
G-c1 
V-b2 
V-b1 
T-a 
AC-c 
G-a 
G-Ig 
T-d 
T-e 
T-e 
T-e 
I-a 
I-b 
G-pc 
G-Ia2 
G-Ia3 
G-Ig2 
G-Ia1 
G-Ig1 
Organisation (and place 01 interview) Date 
Interview during lunch, Washington D.C. 21/1/02 
Interview at SEMAT/MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 29/10/01 
Second Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo), 214/02 
at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
First Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo), at 28/3/02 
DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
Joint Interview with Raczynski, at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 27/3/02 
CIPMA 17/12101 
CIPMA 29/10/01 
Interview at the offices il RIDES, Santiago de Chile. 21/3/02 
Joint Interview: Espinoza and Brown, done at Universidad de Chile, Santiago de 24/5/02 
Chile. 
MOP, Direcci6n General Concesiones 12112101 
Joint Interview: Castro, I. and Escudero, J., as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative', 28/3/02 
done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
CED Presentation 01 the Alumysia Project EIA by the Consultants: Roberto 16/11/01 
Abeliuk (main presenter), Carlos Prado (answer re biodiversity) 
CEO-SEA 1s1 seminar ·What is SEA?' 26/11/01 
CEO-SEA 2nd seminar: 'What is the role 01 SEA?' 
CEO-SEA 3rd seminar: 'What can be the luture 01 SEA in Chile?' 
Interview, at the CEPAL. 
Interview, at the CEPAL. 
Email comment, as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative'. 
Telephone conversation, as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative'. 
Interview, as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative', done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de 
Chile. 
Joint Interview: Escudero and G6mez, done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
Interview, as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative', done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de 
Chile. 
Joint Interview: Castro, I. and Escudero, J., as part 01 the 'SEMAT Initiative', 
done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
11/12101 
18/12101 
14/4/02 
8/11/01 
September 
2002 
27/8/02 
23/9/02 
27/9/02 
23/4/02 
28/3/02 
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Name 
Escudero, J. 
Espinosa 
Espinosa 
Espinoza, C. 
Espinoza, G. 
Espinoza, G. 
Espinoza, G. 
Espinoza, G. 
Felsenhardt, C, 
Felsenhardt, C., 
Sabatini, F" 
Schlotfeldt, C. 
and Garces, E. 
Floto, E. 
Floto, E. 
Frugone, F, 
Gallardo, E. 
Gallardo, E, 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R. 
G6mez, R, 
Gonzalez, S. 
Hamuy, T, 
Hardy, G. 
Hardy, G. 
IJ) Organisation (and place of interview) 
, == 
Date 
S .~ 
-=-"8'= ~=~ ~ ~;; . 
G-memo 
T-memo-
1 
T-
memom-
2 
AC·c 
TA·b 
TA·b 
TA-a2 
TA-a1 
A-b 
A·cb 
I-pc 
I-a 
19nJ02 
23nJ02 
Joint Interview: Espinoza and Brown, done at Universidad de Chile, Santiago de 24/5/02 
Chile. 
Interview at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile. 10/5/02 
Interview at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile. 24/9/02 
Interview at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile. 12111/01 
Interview at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile. 2/11/01 
Interview at the Pontifica Universidad Cat61ica de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 13/2/02 
PUC 13/11/01 
Email reply to four questions following up our interview in April 2002. 1/10/02 
Interviewed during his visit to discuss the progress on the PMRH, at the MOP 29/4/02 
offices, Santiago de Chile. 
G·p,c. Personal comment by email, laying out SEMAT's key issues of interest on SEA. 20/11/01 
G-c2 Second Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo) 2/4/02 
at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G·c1 First Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo) at 28/3/02 
DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G-fa2 Interview organised to discuss his impression on progress on the 'SEMAT 24/9/02 
Initiative'. Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile, 
G-pc Email comment on SEA. 2/10/02 
G-fg Joint Interview: Escudero and G6mez, done at SEMAT/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 27/9/02 
G-fa1 Interview organised to discuss the strategic dimension of the terms of reference 23/5/02 
for the water plan in the 1st Region (as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative). Location: 
MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 
G·c2 Second Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo) 214/02 
at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G·c1 First Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, G6mez, Gallardo) at 28/3/02 
DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G-memo 1/9/02 
AI-b FAO 24/10/01 
G-a Ministerio Hacienda, Dir Prosupuestos, 5/12101 
G·memo lOnJ02 
G-fa Interview organised to discuss the strategic dimension of the terms of reference 23/5/02 
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Name 
Jiliberto, R. 
Jiliberto, R. 
Kornfeld, M. 
Leon, S. 
Lira, L. 
Lopez, G. 
Mercier, J-R. 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
MOP 
Nelson, M. 
Nelson, M. 
Nelson, M. 
Oleson, K. 
Oleson, K. 
Oleson, K. 
Ortolano, L. 
Pardo, M. 
Pardo, M. 
Pardo, M. 
Parra, O. 
U) Organisation (and place of interview) 
'= ~ o .-
.. -g~ ~;~ ~ ~;;. 
for the water plan in the 1S1 Region (as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative). Location: 
MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 
Date 
G-d Seminar: Analfsis metodologico de la evaluacion ambiental de planes de 2214/02 
transporte urbano, Etapa 1. Apresentation of the progress in developing an SEA 
methodology for the Plan de Transporte Urbano de Santiago. 
COb Informal interview in Santiago de Chile. 14/4/02 
G-d 'Sistema de Inversion en Chile'. Lecture at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de 8/4/02 
Chile, Instituto de de Investigacion y Postgrado. 
A-b Intervention in reply to my presentation @ at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica 30/11/01 
de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
I-a ILPES, Santiago de Chile. 4/10/02 
G-a Joint interview of Gianni Lopez and Pablo Daud at CONAMA, Santiago de Chile. 18/4/02 
I-a Interview at the 2200 IAIA Conference (15-21 June 2002), The Hague. 20/6/02 
G-fg8 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 3/10/02 
G-fg7 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 26/9/02 
G-fg6 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 23/5/02 
G-fg5 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 16/5/02 
G-fg4 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 9/5/02 
G-fg3 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 7/5/02 
G-fg2 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 19/4/02 
G-fg1 --- Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 5/4/02 
G-d2 MOP conference on Infrastructure and Environment I was present during the 5/12101 
Presentations by: @ 5-6 December 2001 
G-d1 MOP Conference III Encuentro de las Aguas 'Agua, Vida y Desarrollo', 24/10/01 
Santiago, Chile, 24-26 October 2001 
IC-a2 Interview at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Instituto de de 20/5/02 
Investigacion y Postgrado, Santiago de Chile. 
IC-a1 Interview at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Instituto de de 29/3/02 
Investigacion y Postgrado, Santiago de Chile. 
IC-b Telephone interview, Santiago de Chile. 18/3/02 
I-a Interviewed during her visit to discuss the progress on the assessment of the 21/5/02 
PMRH. Lunch interview, Santiago de Chile. 
I-c Joint Interview: Oleson, K. and Quintero, J-D. at the World Bank, Washington 22101/02 
D.C 
I-b Interviewed at the World Bank, Washington D.C 28/5/03 
A-b Stanford University (campus in Santiago de Chile). 14/11/01 
G-a3 Interview at DGAlMOP, Santiago de Chile. 25/3/02 
G-a2 Interview at DGAlMOP, Santiago de Chile. 6/12101 
G-a1 Interview at DGAlMOP, Santiago de Chile. 15/11/01 
A-pc Email March 2002 
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Name 
Pavez, L. 
PUC-SEA 
Seminar 
Puig, A. 
Quintero, J-D. 
Raczynski, M. 
Raczynski, M. 
Raczynski, M. 
Raczynski, M. 
Reyes, S. 
Reyes, S. 
Reyes, S. 
Rivas, M. 
Rivera, C. 
Rivera, C. 
Rizzo, V. 
Romero, H. 
Rovira, J. 
Sabatini, F. 
Saldfas, A. 
Santibanez, C. 
Schlotfeldt, C. 
Schlotfeldt, C. 
VI Organisation (and place of interview) Date 
, == g .!!! 
:;:-gt: 
~=-E ~~;; 
G-b Interview over lunch, Santiago de Chile. 26/9/02 
A-e 'Evaluaci6n Ambiental Estrategica: como podemos contribuir? Seminar 15/5/02 
organised by the Instituto de Investigacion y Posgrado, Pontificia Universidad 
CatoHca de Chile. Presentors and panel included representatives of academia, 
MINVU and CONAMA. 
G-memo 24/6/02 
I-c Joint Interview: Oleson, K. and Quintero, J-D. at the World Bank, Washington 22101/02 
D.C 
G-c3 Second Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, Gomez, Gallardo) 2/4/02 
at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G-c2 First Group Interview (PMRH Team: Raczynski, Balaguer, Gomez, Gallardo) at 28/3/02 
DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 
G-c1 Joint Interview with Balaguer at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 27/3/02 
G-b Interview at DOH/MOP, Santiago de Chile. 22110/01 
AC-pc Personal Communication, email (in response to a detailed list of questions i sent 26/3/02 
in December 2001). 
AC-d 'Planes Reguladores Sustentables -l.Es posible que los instrumentos de 23/11/01 
planificacion urbana sean a la vez un instrumento de gestion ambiental'. 
Presentation at the Seminar Series on: Territorio al dfa. at the Pontificia 
Universidad CatoHca de Chile, Instituto de de Investigacion y Postgrado. 
AC-b Joint Interview: Reyes, S. And Rivas, M. at the Pontificia Universidad CatoHca 23/11/01 
_ de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
AC-b Joint Interview: Reyes, S. And Rivas, M. at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica 23/11/01 
de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
G-a 
G-d 
G-b 
A-a 
G-c 
A-b 
G-a 
G-b 
A-b 
A-b 
Interview at CONAMA and over lunch, Santiago de Chile. 23/10/01 
Presentation at the MOP Conference on Infrastructure and the Environment (5-6 5/12101 
December 2001), Santiago de Chile. 
At the Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 23/10/01 
Interview at the Geography Department, Universidad de Chile, Santiago de 20/12101 
Chile. 
Joint interview of Gianni Lopez and Jaime Rovira at CONAMA, Santiago de 18/4/02 
Chile. 
Interview at the Pontificia Universidad CatoHca de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 7/11/01 
Interview at the offices of DOH, Santiago de Chile 214/02 
Interview over lunch in Santiago de Chile. 26/3/02 
At the Pontificia Universidad CatoHca de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 5/11/01 
Intervention in reply to my presentation on principles and practice of SEA at the 30/11101 
Pontificia Universidad CatoHca de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
Schlotfeldt, C. A-pc 
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Table A-e Interviewees of the Italian overview on assessment and decision-making in 
the transport sector 
Name Category: Organisation 
Dr. Oliviero BACCELLI Academia CERTET - Centre for Regional Economics, Transport and 
Consultancy Tourism 
University Luigi Bocconi, Milano 
Dr. Francesco BELLA Central Government Directorate General for Sustainable Development 
Min. of Environment 
Dr. Marisa BELVISI Central Government National Environment Protection Agency - ANPA 
Eng. Andrea BENEDEnO Central Government Commission Member, 
Academia EIA Commission - Commissione Valutazione di Impatto 
Ambientale 
Pro!. Carlo BENEDEnO Academia Professor, 
Consultancy UNIVERSITY of ROMA TRE 
Dep\. Sciences of Civil Engineering 
Dr. Carlo BOERI Central Government Director, 
National Environment Protection Agency - ANPA 
Arch. Susi BOnO Local Government Unit for major infrastructures and EIA Provincia di Milano 
Eng. Fabio CROCCOLO Central Government Director, 
Relazioni internazionali 
Ministero delle Infrastrutture e Trasporti 
Eng. Pasquale Ing. Central Government Ministero delle Infrastrutture e Ministero dei Trasporti 
Pasquale D'ANZI 
Prof. Maria Rosario DE Academia Professor 
BLASIIS Consultancy Ingegneria Civile 
University Roma Tre 
Senator Anna DONATI Central Government Senator, 
- politician Senato della Repubblica 
Gruppo Verdi 
Dr. Marco FELlSA Local Government Unit for major infrastructures and EIA 
Provincia di Milano 
Dr. Francesco LA CAMERA Central Government Director, 
Directorate General for Sustainable Development 
Min. of Environment 
Prof. Eliot LANIADO Academia Professor, 
Faculty of Engineering 
Politecnico di Milano 
Dr. Elio MANTI Central Government Directorate General for Sustainable Development 
Min. of Environment 
Dr. Andrea NARDINI Central Government Directorate General for Sustainable Development 
Min. of Environment 
Dr. Silvio PANCHERI Central Government Director, 
Unita di Valutazione 
Mininstero dell'Economia 
Dr. Manuela PANZINI Local Government Assetto del Territorio (land use) 
Provincia di Milano 
Arch. Roberto PARMA Local Government Director 
.. -. . . . 
. _ .. 
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Name Category: Organisation 
Unit for major infrastructures and EIA 
Provincia di Milano 
Dr. Cristina PICCARDI Central Government Infrastructure Commission 
Servizio Studi, Ufficio ricerche nei settori delle infrastrutture e 
dei trasporti 
Senato della Repubblica 
Eng. Marco POMPILlO Local Government Director, 
Assetto del Territorio (land use) 
Provincia di Milano 
Prof. Marco PONTI Consultancy Director, 
Academia Consulenza trasporti e territorio - TRT 
and Professor, 
Politecnico di Milano 
Dr. Mauro RAVASIO Academia CERTET - Centre for Regional Economics, Transport and 
Consultancy Tourism 
University Luigi Bocconi, Milano 
Dr. Aldo RAVAZZI Central Government Directorate General for Sustainable Development 
Min. of Environment 
Dr. Andrea RICCI Consultancy Istituto di Studi per l'lnformatica e i Sistemi (IS IS) - ConSUltants 
Pro!. Maria Rosa VITIADINI Academia Professor, 
Architecture Faculty 
Universilil di Venezia 
(was President of the EIA Commission and Director of the EIA 
Directorate General of the Ministry of Environment 1997-2002) 
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Table A-f Interviewees from the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.e. 
Surname, Name Organisation and job title Date 
C: 
.2 "C 
"lac 
:::5 
== Q) c:( E 
Ahmed, Kulsum I-c Senior Environmental Specialist (Latin America and the Caribbean 29/5/03 
Region). Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Aim, Anders I-a Senior Environmental Specialist (Middle East and North Africa Region). 23/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Bojo, Jan I-a Environmental Economist. Interview at the World Bank offices, 29/5/03 
Washington D.C 
Carroll, Michael I-a Senior Agriculturalist (Latin America and the Caribbean Region). 30/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Castro, Gonzalo I-a Team Leader, biodiversity (The Global Environment Facility). Interview 28/5/03 
at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Dani, Anis I-a Lead Social Scientist. Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington 27/5/03 
D.C. 
Di Leva, Charles I-a Lead Counsel (Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 23/5/03 
and International Law). Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington 
D.C 
Feinstein, Charles I-a Lead Energy Specialist (Latin America and the Caribbean Region) . 27/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Green, Kenneth I-b Senior Environmental Specialist. Interview at the World Bank offices, 29/5/03 
Washington D.C 
Hanrahan, David I-a Lead Environmental Specialist (South East Asia Region). Interview at 21/5/03 
the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
~ 
Liebenthal, Andres I-a Lead Evaluation Officer at the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). 28/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Lovei, Magda I-a Lead environmental Economist (Team Leader, Environment Strategy). 27/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Mercier, Jean-Roger I-a Lead Environment Specialist (Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit). 19/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Oleson, Kirsten I-b Environmental Engineer (Latin America and the Caribbean Region). 28/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Palmieri, Alessandro I-b Lead Dam Specialist. Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington 29/5/03 
D.C 
Sanchez, Ernesto I-c Senior Environmental Engineer (Latin America and the Caribbean 29/5/03 
Region). Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Shetty, Sudhir I-a Sector Manager, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management. 30/5/03 
Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington D.C 
Todd, David I-b Global Environment Facility. Interview at the World Bank offices, 29/5/03 
Washington D.C 
Xie, Jian I-a World Bank Institute. Interview at the World Bank offices, Washington 30/5/03 
D.C 
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Table A-g Comments to Chapters 5-7 by some of the Chilean interviewees 
Surname, Name Chapter commented 
Escudero, J. Chapter 5 
Blanco, H. Chapter 5 
G6mez, R. Chapter 5 
Raczynski, M. Chapter 6 
G6mez, R. Chapter 6 
Escudero, J. Chapter 7 
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Annex to Chapters 2 and 3 
ff- ; 
Box A-a The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) ............................. B-2 
Table 2-d SEA Pelformance Criteria supported by the IAIA [325w] ... ... ..... ....... .... ...... ..... B-3 
Box B-a The International Association for Impact Assessment (lA lA) 
The academic and professional community on Technical Assessment formed a professional association (the 
International Society for Technology Assessment-ISTA), which flourished in the 1970s. In the late 1970s Charlie 
Wolf, Fred Rossini and Alan Porter established the successor professional organisation: the International Association 
for Impact Assessment (IAIA). The first meeting took place in 1981 in Toronto, Canada. 
IAIA has consistently tried to bring together researchers, practitioners and users of various types of impact 
assessment from all parts of the world (including: Technical Assessment, Environmental Impact Assessment, Social 
Impact Assessment and Risk Assessment). It seeks to develop approaches and practices for integrated and 
comprehensive impact assessment; improve assessment procedures and methods for practical application; promote 
training of impact assessment and public understanding of the field; provide professional quality assurance by peer 
review and other means; and share information networks, publications and professional meetings (see also 
http://www.iaia.org). 
Its members represent over 100 countries, and include corporate planners and managers, public interest advocates, 
governmental planners and administrators, consultants and policy analysts, university and college teachers and 
students. This mix of professions provides unique opportunities for interchange to: 
Advance the state of the art of impact assessment in applications ranging from local to global; 
Develop international and local capability to anticipate, plan, and manage the consequences of development to 
enhance the quality of life for-all. 
IAIA organises annual conferences (the most recent was the 23rd Annual Meeting in Marrakech, 14-20 June 2003) and 
training programmes held regularly in conjunction with them. It also publishes a quarterly peer-reviewed journal, 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal. 
Source: Vanclay and Bronstein 1995 
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Table B-a SEA Performance Criteria supported by the lA lA 
Criteria I Description of Each Criterion 
A good-quality Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) process informs planners, decision makers and affected 
public on the sustainability of strategic decisions, facilitates the search for the best alternative and ensures a 
democratic decision making process. This enhances the credibility of decisions and leads to more cost- and time-
effective EA at the project level. For this purpose, a good-quality SEA process: 
Is integrated 
Is sustainability-Ied 
Is focused 
Is accountable 
Is participative 
Is iterative 
Ensures an appropriate environmental assessment of all strategic decisions relevant for the 
achievement of sustainable development. 
Addresses the interrelationships of biophysical, social and economic aspects. 
Is tiered to policies in relevant sectors and (transboundary) regions and, where appropriate, 
to project EIA and decision making. 
Facilitates identification of development options and alternative proposals that are more 
sustainable (Le., that contribute to the overall sustainable development strategy as laid 
down in Rio 1992 and defined in the specific policies or values of a country) 
Provides sufficient, reliable and usable information for development planning and decision 
making. 
Concentrates on key issues of sustainable development. 
Is customized to the characteristics of the decision making process. 
Is cost- and time-effective. 
Is the responsibility of the leading agencies for the strategic decision to be taken. 
Is carried out with professionalism, rigor, fairness, impartiality and balance. 
Is subject to independent checks and verification 
Documents and justifies how sustainability issues were taken into account in decision 
making. 
Informs and involves interested and affected public and government bodies throughout the 
decision making process. 
Explicitly addresses their inputs and concerns in documentation and decision making. 
Has clear, easily-understood information requirements and ensures sufficient access to all 
relevant information. 
Ensures availability of the assessment results early enough to influence the decision 
making process and inspire future planning. 
Provides sufficient information on the actual impacts of implementing a strategic decision, 
to judge whether this decision should be amended and to provide a basis for future 
decisions. 
Source: http://www.iaia.org (13/12/02) 
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Annex on 
Emerging SEA concepts in Chile 
C-I 
Table C-a Chile Data Profile - World Bank Group ............................................................ C-2 
Table C-b Participants to the SEMAT Seminar of 18 December 2001, Santiago de Chile C-4 
Table C-c Participants to the three CED Seminars on SEA (November-December 2001, 
Santiago de Chile) ..... .............. ...... .. .. ........... .. .. ....... .......................... .......................... C-5 
Table C-a Chile Data Profile - World Bank Group 
Indicator 
1
1998 
1
2001 
1
2002 
People 
Population, total 14.8 million 15.4 million 15.6 million 
Population growth (annual %) 1.3 1.1 1.1 
National poverty rate (% of population) 17.0 .. .. 
Life expectancy (years) .. 75.8 75.9 
Fertility rate (births per woman) .. 2.1 2.1 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 10.3 10.0 .. 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children) .. 12.0 .. 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 99.7 .. .. 
Child malnutrition, weight for age (% of under 5) 0.8 .. .. 
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 mos) 94.0 97.0 .. 
Prevalence of HIV (female, % ages 15-24) .. 0.1 .. 
Illiteracy total (% age 15 and above) 4.6 4.1 4.0 
Illiteracy female (% of age 15 and above) 4.8 4.3 4.1 
Primary completion rate, total (% age group) .. .. .. 
Primary completion rate, female (% age group) .. .. .. 
Net primary enrollment (% relevant age group) .. .. .. 
Net secondary enrollment (% relevant age group) .. .. .. 
Environment 
Surface area (sq. km) 756.6 756.6 thousand 756.6 
thousand thousand 
Forests (1 ,000 sq. km) .. .. .. 
Deforestation (avearge annual % 1990-2000) .. .. .. 
Freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) .. .. .. 
C02 emissions (metric tons per capita) 4.1 .. .. 
Access to improved water source (% of total pop.) .. .. .. 
Access to improved sanitation (% of urban pop.) .. .. .. 
Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 1,527.2 .. .. 
Electricity use per capita (kWh) 2,082.4 .. .. 
Continued 
Annex C - Emerging SEA concepts in Chile C-2 
Indicator 
1
1998 
1
2001 
1
2002 
Economy 
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 72.4 billion 70.8 billion 66.3 billion 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 4,890.0 4,600.0 4,260.0 
GDP (current $) 73.1 billion 66.5 billion 64.2 billion 
GDP growth (annual %) 3.9 2.8 2.1 
GDP implicit price deflator (annual % growth) 2.5 1.5 2.6 
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP) 8.5 8.8 
" 
Value added in industry (% of GDP) 33.8 34.3 
" 
Value added in servicesj% of GDP) 57.7 56.9 
" 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 26.7 34.7 
" 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 31.5 32.7 
" 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 27.4 20.7 
" 
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 22.9 22.8 
" 
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP) 0.4 -0.3 
" 
Technology and infrastructure 
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people) 268.8 574.8 
" 
Telephone average cost of local call (US$ per three minutes) 0.1 0.1 
" 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 61.3 106.5 
" 
Internet users 250.0 3.1 million 
" 
thousand 
Paved roads (% of total) 18.3 
" " 
Aircraft departures 119.1 83,100.0 
" 
thousand 
Trade and finance 
Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%) 46.0 52.2 
" 
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%) 98.5 105.1 
" 
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 0.8 0.8 
" 
Net barter terms of trade (1995=100) 73.3 
" " 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting country 4.8 billion 4.5 billion 
" (current US$) 
Present value of debt (current US$) 
" 
37.7 billion 
" 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) 17.5 28.1 
" 
Short-term debt outstanding (current US$) 1.6 billion 2.6 billion 
" 
Aid per capita (current US$) 7.2 3.7 
" 
Source: World Development Indicators database, August 2003 
[hUp:lldevdata.worldbank.org/externaI/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=CHL&CCODE=CHL&CNAME=Chile&PT 
YPE=CP (30/8/03)] 
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Table Cob Participants to the SEMA T Seminar of 18 December 2001, Santiago de 
Chile 
Name and Surname Position in SEMAT Title 
Eduardo Astorga Jorquera Secretario Ejecutivo Abogado 
Medio Ambiente y Territorio 
Juan Carlos Bordones Nuiiez Encargado Depto. de Estudios, Pollticas y Ingeniero Civil 
Desarrollo. 
Juan Escudero Ortuzar Asesor Depto. de Estudios, Pollticas y Desarrollo Ingeniero Civil 
Loreto Isabel Pavez Ruiz Encargada Depto. de Auditorfa del SEIA, Programas Ingeniero Civil en 
de Fiscalizacion, Seguimiento y Control Geograffa 
Fabrizio Frugone Serrano Asesor de Depto. de Auditoria del SEIA, Programas Ecologo-Paisajista 
de Fiscalizacion, Seguimiento y Control 
Ingrid Lilian Castro Sanguinetli Encargada de Depto. de Participacion Ciudadana y Ingeniero en 
Gestion Territorial Desarrollo 
Local 
Alejandra Araneda Asesor Participacion Ciudadana y Gestion Territorial Geografo 
Pedro Antonio Muiioz Muiioz Asesor Participacion Ciudadana y Gestion Territorial Geografo 
Luisa Delfina Diaz Torres Asesor Participacion Ciudadana y Gestion Territorial Asistente Social 
Marfa Elena Avila Pino Asesor Participacion Ciudadana y Gestion Territorial Asistente Social 
Carlos Saavedra Pulgar Encargado Depto. de Fortalecimiento Regional Geografo 
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Table C-c Participants to the three CED Seminars on SEA (November-December 2001, 
Santiago de Chile) 
Surname Name Organisation 
Aldunce Paulina Universidad de Chile Academic-e-Seminar/CED 
Alzina Virgina IADB International-e-Seminar/CED 
Asenjo Rafael CED Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED 
Astorga Eduardo Ministerio de Obras Publicas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Bascur Maritza Aguas Andinas Business-e-Seminar/CED 
Bina Olivia Universidad de Cambridge 
Blanco Hermin CIPMA NGO-e-Seminar/CED 
Cadiz Fernando Ministerio de Obras Publicas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Contreras Luis Forestal Savia Business-e-Seminar/CED 
Debia Marcela EMG Consultores Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED 
del Canto Susana CODELCO Business-e-Seminar/CED 
Escudero Juan Ministerio de Obras Publicas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Espinoza Guillermo CED Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED 
Friedmann Claudio Ambar Consultores Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED 
Frugone Fabrizio Ministerio de Obras Publicas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Garces Juan Antonio Aguas Andinas Business-e-Seminar/CED 
Garcfa Sergio EMG Consultores Practitioner-e-Seminar/CED 
Gonzalez Santiago FAO International-e-Seminar/CED 
Gross Patricio Universidad Cat61ica Academic-e-Seminar/CED 
Leal Jose CEPAL International-e-Seminar/CED 
L6pez Carlos IADB International-e-Seminar/CED 
Matus Patricia Instituto de Salud Publica Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED 
Mege Anfbal Sociedad de FomentoFabril Business-e-Seminar/CED 
Morales Eduardo Fundaci6n Chile Think Tank-e-Seminar/CED 
Pardo M6nica Direcci6n General de Aguas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Riestra Francisco Minislerio de Obras Publicas Government-e-Seminar/CED 
Romero Hugo Universidad de Chile Academic-e-Seminar/CED 
Schlotfeldl Carmen Universidad Cal61ica Academic-e-Seminar/CED 
Silva Jaime Minislerio de la Vivienda y Governmenl-e-Seminar/CED 
Urbanismo 
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Box D-a The four components of the PMRH 
The PH RH consists of four main components: 
The Institutional Development component (US$7.1 million) 
It represents the key element of the project, as it would promote the process of developing a new institutional 
model for the planning and implementation of water and biodiversity-related activities in the country, within the 
existing legal framework. This would be achieved through the adoption of the watershed as the primary unit for 
planning purposes, as well as a comprehensive reorganization of roles and responsibilities of public and private 
sector institutions. 
More specifically, through this component, the project is expected to develop and implement a gradual process 
of decentralization from the central to the regional level, involving the establishment of mechanisms aimed at 
promoting the participation of regional and local government agencies, as well as private sector organizations, in 
the joint development and execution of activities included in the Watershed Development Master Plans. 
For this, technical assistance and training, covering various aspects of planning, administration and 
management of water resources and biodiversity would be provided to existing Water Authorities, water user 
organizations, and participating institutions at the central, regional, and local level. 
The component would be initially implemented in the three priority watersheds, and subsequently expanded to 
the additional five watersheds. Additionally (see Component 4), the project would finance the establishment of 
the Project Coordinating Unit and its operating costs, and provide technical and financial assistance for the 
design of the hardware and software required to operate a Monitoring and Evaluation System, including 
mechanisms to measure and assess indicators of water utilization and quality, environmental and biodiversity 
resources conditions of watersheds. 
The Water Resources Management Instruments component (US$21.1 million) 
It is aimed at establishing the logistical and operational framework for the operation of a modernized and 
integrated system of water resources management, within the context of the decentralized institutional model to 
be supported by the project. The project would assist MOP and decentralized agencies in the implementation of 
a comprehensive set of instruments linked to three main categories: (i) Knowledge, Information and Monitoring; 
(ii) Planning of Water Resources Utilization; and (iii) Environmental Management of Water Resources. 
Specific instruments to be supported by the project would include the development of water and biodiversity 
resources inventories, as well as Master Plans; a national hydrological information system; the improvement of 
criteria and procedures to ensure adequate dam safety; the definition of ecological flows; preparation of 
hydrological, biodiversity: and irrigation management simulation models; water utilization and water market 
development plans, water quality control programs, strengthening of biodiversity in environmental impact 
assessment processes, and strategies for private participation in water resources development. 
Additionally the aquatic biodiversity protection project consider several "in situ" actions, whose assigned funds 
reach the US$3.8 million, half are all ready defined and the other remaining portion will be allocated by a 
process of competition fund. 
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The third component (US$55.8 million) 
It would provide technical and financial assistance for the preparation of watershed Master Plans for each of 
the eight selected watersheds during the first year of project execution. These Master Plans would provide the 
framework for the development of integrated investment plans for these watersheds, including hydrological 
infrastructure required to improve water management and the efficiency of water use. The project would adopt a 
participatory approach to identify beneficiaries' investment demands and define priorities for the execution of 
hydrological works. The infrastructure sub-project thus identified would be subject to technical, economic and 
environmental assessments. The .economically viable and ecologically and environmentally sound infrastructure 
investment to be financed under the project would be divided in two broad categories: 
a) Social infrastructure: which would include: 
Flood control and river training structures to prevent damage to agriculture and livestock production as well as 
the destruction of urban areas from flooding; the identification of these works would be the result of systematic 
studies (to be financed under the project) of high risk areas, rather than the ex-post response to natural 
disasters as has been the case so far in the country, thus reducing the cost emergency-related works and 
improve their effectiveness. During the first year the project would execute river training and flood control works 
in the rivers Cato and Nuble, tributaries of the River Itata, in the VIII Region, which was identified and studied 
during preparation. This sUb-component would be complemented by relevant studies associated to flood 
control, flood plain management, risk and vulnerability studies, among other; 
b) Production infrastructure: which would include the development of irrigation and drainage schemes, and 
investment for the erosion control and the conservation of aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity and natural 
resources. During its first year of execution the project would start with the execution of those sub-projects 
identified and studied during preparation, i.e. Rehabilitation of Canals in the Elqui River (IV Region) and 
Rehabilitation of Canal La Canada (VII Region). 
The Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation component (US$3.7 million) 
It would provide resources for the overall coordination and supervision of project activities, as well as the 
mechanisms to measure and assess project results and performance, primarily through indicators of water 
utilization and quality, the impact of project activities on environmental and biodiversity resources within the 
selected watersheds, and the technical, economic and social impact of the project. 
The Local Preparation Team will define the final set of indicators (to be agreed upon during appraisal) to monitor 
the execution of the various components and to assess the technical, economic and social impact of the project. 
Apart from assisting the Under-Secretary of Public Works, the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) will be 
responsible for the preparation of reports and background material for the Council's sessions, operation of the 
M&E System and issuing periodic reports, preparation of the project's annual reports and sending them to the 
Bank, and preparation of the consolidated annual operation plans and budgets. 
The program includes a GEF component for the protection of freshwater biodiversity. The main purpose of the 
GEF is to develop approaches and methodologies that allow the conservation of the biological diversity and to 
incorporate ecological considerations in the administration of the water resources, and to support strategic 
actions that promote the conservation of biological diversity in the selected watersheds through immediate 
actions rotectin habitats, ecos stems, and s ecies of conservation concerns. 
Source: DGAIMOPTTIWorld Bank 2002 
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Table D-a Environmental Assessment of the whole PMRH - extract 
Consequences 
Action/process Physical Biological Social 
A - Operation of hydrolog ical systems and irrigation 
Piuquenes dam Loss of land due to the Barrier effect. No significant impact 
filling of the dam. Loss and changes to 
Changes in the natural biodiversity. 
river flow regime. Habitat modification. 
Changes in the 
equilibrium of 
sedimentation in river 
beds situated down-river 
of the dam. 
Improvement of the Reduced infiltration to the Loss of native flora . No significant impact 
Canal la Herradura underground system. 
Bellavista Dust, particles, during the 
phase of improvement 
works. 
Connection of the canals Reduced infiltration to the Loss of native flora. No significant impact 
San Pedro Cerda, Alto underground system. 
Campana and Piedra Dust, particles, during the 
Azul phase of improvement 
works. 
Improvement of the canal Reduced infiltration to the Loss of native flora. No significant impact 
Pangue and La Calera underground system. 
Dust, particles, during the 
phase of improvement 
works. 
Management of the river Reduced infiltration. No significant impact Damage or modification 
banks - Santa Gracia Avoids inundations. of archeological sites 
Reduces erosion. 
Greater stability of the 
infrastructure. 
Management of the river Reduced infiltration. No significant impact Damage or modification 
banks - Marquesa Avoids inundations. of archeological sites 
Reduces riparian erosion. 
Greater stability of 
infrastructure. 
Management of river Reduced infiltration. No significant impact Damage or modification 
banks Ruta N.41 Avoids inundations. of archeological sites 
Lachuzas/Huanta Reduces riparian erosion. 
Greater stability of 
infrastructure. 
. . Notes: ThiS Table IS an extract from the EA of the PMRH: It shows a list of the projects for Irrigation, and their phYSical, 
biological and social impacts. Translated by the author. 
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Table D-b Recommendations from the REA of the Elqui river basin - extract 
Recommendation Answer to recommendations 
Activities included in the PMRH Complementary activities, specific 
to the Elqui riverbasin 
1. Basic information PMRHI Component-Management 
instruments 
GEFI Component IV 
2. Plan Director PMRHI Component-Management 
instruments 
3. Pollution control (for PMRHI Component-Management 
point and diffuse sources) instruments 
GEFI Management instruments 
4. Zoning of river courses PMRHI Component-Management Study of @ natural river courses 
instruments, Component-Infrastructure Study of land-use planning 
Study for the provision of aggregates 
5. Institutional PMRHI Component-institutional 
strengthening strengthening 
GEF 
6. River flows for PMRHI Component-Environmental and 
ecological objectives Biodiversity Protection and Conservation 
GEFI Component IV 
7. Environmental GEF Environmental awareness raising 
education programme in the river basin 
8. Construction, operation PMRHI Component-Infrastructure 
and maintenance of 
infrastructure 
9. Irrigation techniques PMRHI Component-Environmental and 
Biodiversity Protection and Conservation 
10. Changes in the legal 
system (Water Code, EIA 
Regulation, others) 
11. Mining related risks Study of risks associated with waste 
disposal 
12. Reforestation of PMRHI Component-Environmental and 
riparian banks Biodiversity Protection and Conservation 
13. Erosion control PMRHI Component-Environmental and 
Biodiversity Protection and Conservation 
14. New protected areas GEF Demonstration area 
15. Protection of cultural Inventory of archeological sites 
heritage 
Notes: This table refers to the Regional EA: it shows an extract of the Recommendations and Actions for 
contingencies and compensation in the Elqui valley. Translated by the author. 
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Table E-a Participants at the SEMA T Seminar of 18 December 2001, Santiago de 
Chile 
Name Position in SEMAT Title 
Eduardo Astorga Jorquera Secretario Ejecutivo Abogado 
Medio Ambiente y Territorio 
Juan Carlos Bordones Nunez Encargado Depto. de Estudios, Poifticas y Desarrollo. Ingeniero Civil 
Juan Escudero Ortuzar Asesor Depto. de Estudios, Poifticas y Desarrollo Ingeniero Civil 
Loreto Isabel Pavez Ruiz Encargada Depto. de Auditoria del SEIA, Programas de Ingeniero Civil 
Fiscalizaci6n, Seguimiento y Control en Geograffa 
Fabrizio Frugone Serrano Asesor de Depto. de Auditoria del SEIA, Programas de Ec6logo-
Fiscalizaci6n, Seguimiento y Control Paisajista 
Ingrid Lilian Castro Sanguinetti Encargada de Depto. de Participaci6n Ciudadana y Ingeniero en 
Gesti6n Territorial Desarrollo 
Local 
Alejandra Araneda Asesor Participaci6n Ciudadana y Gesti6n Territorial Ge6grafo 
Pedro Antonio Munoz Munoz Asesor Participaci6n Ciudadana y Gesti6n Territorial Geografo 
Luisa Delfina Diaz Torres Asesor Participaci6n Ciudadana y Gesti6n Territorial Asistente Social 
Marfa Elena Avila Pino Asesor Participaci6n Ciudadana y Gesti6n Territorial Asistente Social 
Carlos Saavedra Pulgar Encargado Depto. de Fortalecimiento Regional Ge6grafo 
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Table E-b Members of the informal Team of the Iniciativa SEMAT 
Name MOPTT Directorate or other affiliation 
Eduardo Astorga Jorquera SEMAT (Director) 
Juan Escudero Ortuzar SEMAT 
Fabrizio Frugone Serrano SEMAT 
Ingrid Lilian Castro Sanguinetti SEMAT 
Pedro Antonio Munoz Munoz SEMAT 
Loreto Isabel Pavez Ruiz SEMAT 
Luisa Delfina Diaz Torres SEMAT 
Silvia Diaz Estudiante practicante en SEMAT 
Francisca Tondrew Direcci6n de vialidad Nacional 
Francisco Riestra Direcci6n General de Aguas 
Carlos Salazar Direcci6n General de Aguas (Director) 
Antonio Saldfas Direcci6n de Obras Hfdraulicas 
Rodrigo G6mez Direcci6n de Obras Hfdraulicas 
Grace Hardy Direcci6n de Obras Hfdraulicas 
Aurora Puig Direcci6n de Obras Hfdraulicas (Director) 
Guillermo Espinoza Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo (Director) 
Victor Hugo Espinosa Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo 
Olivia Bina PhD Student, University of Cambridge and Pontificia Universidad 
Cat61ica de Chile 
Note that this is a list of all the people who attended Team meetings between March and 
May 2002. Not everyone was present at each of the eight meetings. 
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Table E-c Interviews, meeting notes and memos produced during the Iniciativa 
SEMAT 
Name Co Where when 
de 
Hardy, G. 125 G-memo Answer to questions sent by Escudero on the Iniciativa 10/7/02 
Espinoza, V. 122 T-mem01 Reuni6n EAE Plan Maestro /MOP/ 25 de Junio de 2002 5/7/02 
Hardy, G. 120 G-fa Interview organised to discuss the strategic dimension of the 23/5/02 
terms of reference for the water plan in the 1 si Region (as part 
of the 'SEMAT Initiative). Location: MOP offices, Santiago de 
Chile. 
Escudero, J. 123 G-mem01 Reuni6n EAE Plan Maestro /MOP/ 10 de Julio de 2002 191703 
Puig, A. 121 G-memo Answer to questions sent by Escudero on the Iniciativa 24/6/02 
G6mez, R. 126 G-memo Minutes of the interviews done with Regional authorities as 1/9/02 
part of the Iniciativa 
Escudero, J. 127 G-mem02 Minutes of the interviews done with Regional authorities as 3/9/02 
part of the Iniciativa 
Espinoza, V. 124 T-mem02 Reuni6n EAE Plan Maestro /MOP/ 17 de Julio de 2002 23/7/02 
Castro, I 38 G-fg Joint Interview: Castro, I. and Escudero, J., as part of the 28/3/02. 
'SEMAT Initiative', done at SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de 
Chile. 
Escudero, J. 45 G-pc Email comment, as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative'. Septem 
ber 
2002. 
Escudero, J. 46 G-fa2 Telephone conversation, as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative'. 27/8/02 
Escudero, J. 47 G-fa3 Interview, as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative', done at 23/9/02 
SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de Chile. 
Escudero, J. 48 G-fg2 Joint Interview: Escudero and G6mez, done at 27/9/02 
SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de Chile. 
Escudero, J. 49 G-fa1 Interview, as part of the 'SEMAT Initiative', done at 23/4/02. 
SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de Chile. 
Escudero, J. 50 ,G-fg1 Joint Interview: Castro, I. and Escudero, J., as part of the 28/3/02. 
'SEMAT Initiative', done at SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de 
Chile. 
Espinoza, C. 51 AC-c Joint Interview: Espinoza and Brown, done at Universidad de 24/5/02. 
Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
Espinoza, G, 52 AT-b Interview at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrolio, 24/9/02 
r'to_ J.: __ -.1_ I"'\ L...· I_ 
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Name Co Where when 
de 
Santiago de Chile. 
G6mez, R. 61 G-fa2 Interview organised to discuss his impression on progress on 24/9/02 
the 'SEMAT Initiative'. Location: MOP offices, Santiago de 
Chile. 
G6mez, R. 62 G-pc Email comment on SEA. 2/10/02 
G6mez, R. 63 G-fg Joint Interview: Escudero and G6mez, done at 27/9/02 
SEMAT/MOPTI, Santiago de Chile. 
G6mez, R. 64 G-fa1 Interview organised to discuss the strategic dimension of the 23/5/02. 
terms of reference for the water plan in the 1s1 Region (as part 
of the 'SEMAT Initiative). Location: MOP offices, Santiago de 
Chile. 
MOPTI 75 G-fg8 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 3/10/02 
MOPTI 76 G-fg7 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 26/9/02 
MOPTI 77 G-fg6 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 23/5/02. 
MOPTT 78 G-fg5 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 16/5/02. 
MOPTI 79 G-fg4 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 9/5/02 
MOPTI 80 G-fg3 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 7/5/02. 
MOPTI 81 G-fg2 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 19/4/02. 
MOPTI 82 G-fg1 Location: MOP offices, Santiago de Chile. 5/4/02. 
MOPTI 83 G-d2 MOPTI conference on Infrastructure and Environment I 5/12/01 
was present during the Presentations by: @ 5-6 December 
2001 
MOPTI 84 G-d1 MOPTI Conference III Encuentro de las Aguas 'Agua, Vida y 24/10/01 
Desarrollo', Santiago, Chile, 24-26 October 2001 
Pavez, L. 95 G-b Interview over lunch, Santiago de Chile. 26/9/02 
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Table E-d Programme for the SEMA T Seminar of 18 December 2001, Santiago de 
Chile 
Lunes - 10:00-11:15 
Sesion 1 
La Iniciativa SEMA TIMOP 
Lunes - 11:30-13:00 
Sesion 2 
El objeto de la EAE 
Lunes - 15:00-18:30 
Sesion 3 
A vances del ejercicio de EAE 
Martes - 9:00-13:00 
Sesion 4 
Proposicion de proximas 
etapas 
Martes -15:00-18:00 
Sesion 5 
Mesa redonda: conclu&iones Y 
recomendaciones para el MOP 
Salon Planeamiento 
Introducci6n: 
• Donde surge la necesidad de la EAE en el MOP 
• Alcance del seminario 
Salon Planeamiento 
El plan de desarrollo sustentable de las cuencas de los rfos San Jose y 
Lluta 
• Antecedente: el Plan Director de la DGA'98 
• Los estudios de la DOH 
• Elementos de contexto para los estudios y la evaluaci6n 
Debate: el contexto para la decisi6n y la evaluaci6n 
Salon CED 
Presentaci6n de los elementos metodol6gicos de la EAE 
Conclusiones de las etapas resueltas (presentaciones y debate): 
• Etapa A+B: el desafi6 de trabajar a nivel estrategico 
• Etapa C: temas ambientales relevantes 
• Etapa C: fuentes de presi6n y conflictos en marcha 
• Etapa C: alternativas que no han sido incluidas 
E.1 Salo1l Pla1leamiellto 
(,Cwil es el proceso de planificaci6n de la DOH, y cual 
puede ser la contribuci6n de la EAE? 
• (,Cuales son los temas estrategicos de contexto para la DOH 
que no existen en la discusi6n? 
Debate: conclusiones y recomendaciones para el ejercicio de EAE: 
• (,Tuvimos un aporte hasta ahora? 
(,Falt6 algo? 
• (,Que recomiendan para mejorar el proceso? 
• Propuesta de acci6n a seguir 
Salon Planeamiento 
Debate: conclusiones y recomendaciones para el MOP: 
Fin 
• (,Ha valido la pena el esfuerzo dedicado al ejercicio? 
• (,Se justificarfa contemplar las siguientes etapas de EAE? 
• (,Hay otros casos en el MOP en que se justificarfa aplicar la 
EAE? 
• (,Que dificultad y limites son las que se debieran superar? 
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Table E-e Participants at the closing Workshop of the Iniciativa (30 September-l 
October 2002) 
Name 
1 Luis Arrau Del Canto 
2 Juan Escudero Ortuzar 
3 Antonio Saldfas A. 
4 Sandra Pefia M. 
5 Amador Torres H. 
6 Mauricio Montecinos R. 
7 Victor Hugo Espinoza 
8 Olivia Bina 
9 Ricardo Porcel 
10 Carmen Campusano 
11 Jorge O'kuinghtolns 
12 Lucia Ganter Vera 
13 Marco Guarello 
14 Pamela Zenteno 
15 Rene Tobar Q 
16 Francisca Tondreau 
17 Luisa.Diaz T. 
18 Eduardo Astorga 
19 Fabrizio Frugone 
20 Cesar Faundez Pefia 
21 Michael Raczynski 
22 Adriana Torrealba 
23 Eduardo Canteros G. 
24 Luis Vidal 
25 Monica Pardo 
26 Francisco Riestra 
27 Rodrigo Gomez 
28 Carlos Salalar 
29 Juan Andres Gonzalez 
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